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A thousand years of the Hungarian art of war |
HUNGARIAN TROOPS ON THE SOVIET FRONT, l94l
1. Molnar, History of Hungary, 11, p. 436; Kadar, From Ludovika, p. 386.
2. Adonyi, Hungarian Soldier, p. 27.
3. Horthy, Memoires, p. 189; Antal Ullein-Reviczky, Guerre Allemande Paix
Russe (Neuchatel: Editions de la Baconniere, 1947), pp. 101-102. Nandor A. F.
Dreisziger. Hungary's Way to World War 11 (Toronto Ont.: Hungarian Helicon
Society, 1968), p. 176.
4. Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 (Washington: United States
Government Printing Office: 1949-1964), Series D, 13 vols.; Fuhrer's
Directive, Fuhrer's Headquarters, December 18, 1940, Vol. XI, pp. 899-902.
Doc. No. 532. (Hereafter referred to as DGFP.)
5. Alan Bullock, Hitler, a Study in Tyranny (New York: Harper Torchbooks,
1964). Revised edition, p. 625, states that the new directive ".... made it
clear that the active cooperation of Finland, Hungary and Romania was counted
on from the beginning." However, the Directive never even mentions Hungary.
6. Gyorgy Ranki, Ervin Pamlenyi, Lorant Tilkovszky, Gyula Juhasz (eds.), A
Wilhelmstrasse es Magyarorszdg. "The Wilhelm Street and Hungary." (Budapest:
Kossuth Konyvkiado, 1968). Clodius (Carl von, Leader of the Economic-Political
Department of the German Foreign Ministry) to the Foreign Ministry January 13,
1940, Doc. No. 299, p. 471. (Hereafter referred to as Wilhelmstrasse. )
7. The Second Vienna Award returned to Hungary the northern parts of
190
Transylvania, where the majority of the population was Hungarian, but left
Romania in control of the southern part. For details, see: C. A. Macartney,
October Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary, 1929 1945 (Edinburgh:
University Press, 1969), Second edition, 2 vols., 1, pp. 404-428.
8. His letter addressed to Horthy gave his reasons in the following words: "We
sided with the villains . . . we shall be bodysnatchers, the most worthless
nation . . ." Full text is in Miklos Szinai and Laszlo Szucs, Horthy Miklos
Titkos Iratai. "Secret Documents of Nicholas Horthy." (Budapest: Kossuth
Konyvkiado, 1965), Third edition, Doc. No. 55a, pp. 291-292.
9. DGFP, D, XlI, Directives of the High Command, Fuhrer's Headquar ters, March
22, 1941, Doc. No. 195, pp. 338-343.
10. Archiv Des Auswartiges Amtes, Bonn. File Inland D, Vol. Vlll, p. 142g.
Jagow (Dietrich von, German Ambassador to Budapest) to the German Foreign
Ministry, Budapest, October 31, 1941, p. E227037, as quoted in: Anthony
Komjathy and Rebecca Stockwell, German Minorities and the Third Reich (New
York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, lnc., 1980), pp. 151 - 152.
11. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, 1, p. l 32.
12. Although Werth did not know about Operation Barbarossa and the projected
dates, the transporting of a large number of German troops into Romania during
the spring of 1941 with the excuse, "to prevent the seizure of a foothold in
Greece by British forces," left no doubt that the Germans had other goals in
mind. DGFP, D, Xl. Reich Foreign Minister to German Embassy in the Soviet
Union and Turkey, to legations in Yugoslavia and Greece (Berlin: January 7,
1941), Doc. No. 616, pp. 1040-1041.
13. Lajos Kerekes (ed.), Allianz Hitler-Horthy-Mussolini. Dokumente zur
Ungarischen Aussen Politik (1933-1944) (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1966).
Memorandum of the Hungarian Chief of Staff (Henrik Werth) for
Minister-President Laszlo Bardossy (Budapest, June 14, 1941), Doc. No. 105,
pp. 309-312. (Hereafter referred to as Allianz.)
14. See the evaluation of General Szombathelyi above. p. 125.
15. Allianz, Memorandum of Werth, Budapest, June 14, 1941, Doc. No. 105. pp.
309-312.
16. DGFP, D, Xll, Foreign Minister (Ribbentrop) to the Legation in Hungary
(Otto Erdmannsdorff), Venice, June 15, 1941. Doc. 631, p. 1030.
17. DCFP, D, Xll. Hitler to Horthy, Fuhrer's Headquarters, June 21, 1941. Doc.
No. 661, pp. 1070-1071.
18. DGFP, D, Xlll. Erdmannsdorff to Foreign Ministry, Budapest, June 24, 1941.
Doc. No. 10, pp. 13-15.
19. DGFP, D, Xlll. Erdmannsdorff to the Foreign Minister, Budapest, June 24,
1941 , Doc. No. 11, pp. 15- 16.
20. Ibid.
21. Allianz. Jozsef Kristoffy, Hungarian Ambassador to Moscow, to the
Hungarian Minister-President, Moscow, June 23, 1941. Doc. No. 108, p. 314.
l91
22. Ibid., Sztojay to Bardossy, Berlin, June 26, 1941. Doc. No. l10, pp. 315-
317.
23. The "Bombing of Kassa" became the center of interest when contradictory
reports of well-trained eyewitnesses identified the attacking aircraft as
German-made with Russian insignia. Opinions about the incident, lacking
documentation, are based on speculation and on convictions of the authors. For
example: Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, 1, p. 135; Adonyi, Hungarian Soldier, p.
27; Gyorgy Nagyrevi-Neppel, "The Bombing of Kassa" in Danubian Reporter, XXI,
1-2, March, 1980, pp. 708, agree that the attacking planes were Soviet;
Horthy, Memoires, p. 191; Macartney, October Fifteenth, 1I, pp. 31-32,
published another version of the story according to which the bombing was done
by German planes with Soviet insignia to provoke Hungary and help the war
party to declare war. Peter Gosztonyi Hitler's Fremde Heere (Dusseldorf-Wien:
Econ Verlag, 1976), p. 116, mentions one more version: the attacking airplanes
were piloted by embittered Slovak officers. A book devoted entirely to the
Kassa bombardment is: Julian Borsanyi, Das Raetsel des Bomben angriffs auf
Kaschau, 26, Juni 1941. See, also: Dreisziger, Hungary's Way to World War 11,
pp. 167-175. After this ms. went in the press, a Hungarian historian, Ignac
Olvedi published new information in the Magyar Hirlap "Hungarian News",
Budapest, June 28, 1981 issue. He stated that according to Soviet sources tha
airplanes which bombed Kassa belonged to the Romanian air force.
(*** There is another - plausible - explanation of the bombing of Kassa
(Kaschau, Kosice). The late Jozsef Ormay (of Toronto, Canada) conducted a very
exhaustive research in the archives of the European War Ministries, bomb-rack
and airplane manufacturers.
Since there is no doubt concerning the origin of the bombs (standard Soviet
make), Ormay wanted to know, which bombers of the other belligerents were also
capable of accommodating these bombs in their bomb-racks.
After personally visiting and researching the possible sources, came to the
conclusion, that only Soviet bombers were capable of loading and releasing
these bombs. No one else!
Ormay's well documented report appeared in installments in the periodical
"Magyar Szarnyak" (Hungarian Wings. Published by the Hungarian Aero Museum,
Oshawa, Ontario, Canada, now defunct), sometime between 1983-85.
This undeniable proof points to to the Soviet Air Force. Weather the Soviet
flyers simply attacked clearly defined targets or got lost and mistakenly
bombed Kassa, is another question. The WWW editor)
24. Article XII of the 1920 law regulates the rights of the regent. He could
declare war only with the previous consent of the parliament. Dalnoki, Army of
Hungary, I, p. 137.
25. Detailed organization of the mechanized army corps is in Dalnoki, Ibid.,
II, pp. 155-159.
26. Ibid, p. 161.
27. Ibid., p. 153.
28. A. J. P. Taylor, The Second World War (London: Paragon, 1975), p. 102.
29. DGFP, D, XIII. Colonel-General Franz Halder, Chief of the German Staff.
Diary, September 9, 1941. Editors' note, pp. 466-467.
30. Ibid, p. 170
31. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, II, p. 175, 10n.
32. Ibid., pp. 176-177.
33. Ibid., pp. 174-175; Kadar, From Ludovika, pp. 403-404.
34. Wilhelmstrasse, p. 615, 3n.
35. Ibid., Rudolf Toussaint, German Military Attache at Budapest to the
Foreign Ministry, Budapest, September 5, 1941. Doc. No. 431, p. 611.
36. Fabian von Schlabrendorff, The Secret War Against Hitler (New York: Pitman
Publishing Corp., 1965), pp. 134-151; F. W. Wheeler Bennett, The Nemesis of
Power, The German Army in Politics, 1918-1945 (London: MacMil1an Co., Ltd.,
1964), pp. 514-525. (Hereafter referred to as Nemesis.)
37. The Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Fuhrers'
192
Headquarters, December 8, 1941 , "Directive No. 39'. in H. R. Trevor Roper
(ed.), Blitzkrieg to Defeat (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp.
107-110. (Hereafter referred to as Blitzkrieg.)
38. George Vernadsky, A History of Russia (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale
University Press, 1961), p. 175.
39. Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago (New York: Harper and
Row, Publishers, 1975), 2 vols., I, pp. 18-23.
40. Isaac Deutscher, Stalin, A Political Biography (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1978), p. 468.
41. Memorandum of Alfred Rosenberg (Reichminister of "Eastern Territories"),
Berlin, March 16, 1942. Office of the United States Chief Counsel for
Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington:
United States Government Printing Office 1946-1948), 11 vols., Supplement A
(1947), p. 335.
42. Ibid.
43. The strength of the Hungarian occupational forces and the size of
territory they had to protect changed year by year. In 1941: two light
divisions; 1942: six light divisions; 1943: nine; 1944: three light divisions,
were serving behind the front lines: Adonyi, Hungarian Soldier, p. 34.
44. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, II, p. 74.
45. Adonyi, Hungarian Soldier, p. 32.
46. Ibid., p. 46.
47. Up to April 30, 1941, Hitler had already dismissed more than 35 generals.
Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, I, p. 308, 2n. These dismissals continued throughout
the War, depriving the German Army of the best-trained and most talented
Generals Out of 17 Field Marshals, only I survived; out of 36
Colonel-Generals, only 3 survived the War in their positions. Wheeler-Bennett,
Nemesis, p. 526, I n.
48. Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Tofal War, Causes and Courses of the
Second World War (New York: Penguin Books, 1979), pp. 198 199. (Hereafter
referred to as Total War. )
49. Between 1942 and 1945, the Soviet Union received 400,000 trucks, 12,000
tanks, 14,000 airplanes, 35,000 tons of explosives and shiploads of foodstuff.
50. Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg, p. 111.
51. Ibid., Fuhrer's Directive No. 39, December 8, 1941, pp. 107-110.
52. Wilhelmstrasse, Councilor Weber to the Foreign Ministry. On the special
train of Ribbentrop, January 17, 1942, Doc. No. 475, pp. 646 647.
53. Ibid., Ribbentrop to Dietrich von Jagow, Ambassador to Hungary. Special
train, January 19, 1942, Doc. No. 476, p. 648.
54. Ibid., Jagow to Ribbentrop, Budapest, January 22, 1942, Doc. No. 477, pp.
648-649.
55. For the history of the recruitment of ethnic Germans of the different
East Central European countries to the Waffen SS, see Komjathy Stockwell, op.
cit.
56. Wilhetmstrasse, Jagow to Martin Luther, Chief of Department Inland 193
11 of the Foreign Ministry, Budapest, Febmary 20, 1942, Doc. No. 479. pp.
649-651.
OPERATIONS OF THE SECOND ARMY, 1942-1943
1. Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg; The Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces, Directive No. 41, Fuhrer's Headquarters, April 5 1942, Doc. No. 41,
pp. 116-121.
2. The following narrative is based on Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, l, pp.
316-329.
3. About $4,000,000
4. Istvan Nemeskurthy, Requiem egy hadserege'rt. "Requiem for an Army."
(Budapest: Magveto Zsebkonyvtar, 1972), p. 14. (Hereafter referred to as
Requeim)
5. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, I, p. 318.
6. Ibid.
7. Nemeskurty, Requiem, pp. 15-17.
8. See p. 138 above for Ribbentrop's negotiations and Keitel's "not too
smooth" conversations with the Hungarian leadership and general staff.
9. Due to the heavy traffic on the only railroad line in the territory of the
Eastern Army group, the troops were unloaded 60 miles behind the march-up
territory and took part in the operations immediately after the long march.
10. To the credit of the corps commander, Lieutenant-General Domaniczky, when
he learned that his troops were not to receive the promised German artillery
and tank support, he resigned in protest before the attack.
11. Adonyi, Hungarian Soldier, p. 43.
12. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, 1, p. 354.
13. The battle for Stalingrad began on November 19, 1942. On February 2, Field
Marshal Friedrick Paulus surrendered with the remnants of his 6th Army to the
Soviet forces, which by that time were threatening the right flank of the
German Eastern Army group, i.e., the Italian 8th army and the Hungarian 2nd
army.
14. Quoted in Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, I, p. 369.
15. Ibid.; Nemeskurty, Requiem, pp. 48-49.
16. Nemeskurty, Requiem. p. 56.
17. Since the German High Command did not have at their disposal enough
equipment to arm the replacing forces, they ordered them to go in the front
line unarmed and to take over the weapons and equipment of the forces they
would replace. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, 1, p. 355.
18. Adonyi, Hungarian Soldier, p. 55.
19. Ibid., p. 50.
20. Ibid., p. 54. A good description of Hitler's mental and physical
condition during the Battle of Stalingrad and the Don breakthrough is
l94
in Calvocoressi-Wint, Total War, pp. 477-478.
21. Adonyi, Hungarian Soldier, p. 53.
22. Nemeskurty, Requiem, pp. 198-199.
23. Kurt, General Tippelskirch, Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Bonn:
Athenaum Verlag, 1951).
24. For the full text of Jany's order, See Laszlo Zsigmondi, A magyar 2.
hadsereg - mint a nemzetiszocialista Nemet Birodalom segelyhada - a
Szovjetunio elleni haboruban 1942-1943-ban. "The Second Hungarian Army, as
Auxiliary Force of the Nazi German Reich in the War Against the Sovietunion,
1942- 1943" (Aachen: Manuscript, 1981.) Appendix 27.
25. Wilhelmstrasse, Jagow to the Foreign Ministry, Budapest, June 21, 1943,
Doc. No. 544, pp. 725-726.
26. Ibid., Ribbentrop to Jagow, Special Train, June 26, 1943, Doc. No. 545, p.
726
27. Ibid., Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Chief of the Reich's Security Office to
Heinrich Himmler, Reichsleader of the SS. Berlin, October 26, 1943, Doc. No.
559, pp. 740-742.
DEFENSE OF THE HOMELAND AGAINST SOVIET INVASION, l 944
1. Churchill, The Second World War, V: Closing the Ring.
2. Szinai-Szucs (eds.), Horthy's Secret Documents. Memorandum of Ferenc
Szombathelyi, Febmary 12, 1943. Doc. No. 67, pp. 345-355.
3. Ibid. Memorandum of the Foreign Ministry, March 30, 1943, Doc. No. 71 pp.
364-368.
4. Ibid. Horthy's letter to Hitler, May 7,1943, Doc. No. 75, pp. 391 -397.
5. Wilhelmstrasse, Jagow to Gustav Adolf Steengracht von Moyland,
Undersecretary of State in the Foreign Ministry, Budapest, September 17, 1943,
Doc. No. 554, pp. 732-733. Jagow suggested to Ribbentrop that he "warn the
Hungarian government that the German Army may occupy those territories which
Hungary received from Germany, as results of the First and Second Vienna
Awards." Jagow certainly had a unique way of interpreting the Vienna
decisions.
6. Ibid. Jagow to Ribbentrop, Budapest, December 31, 1943, Doc. No. 564, p.
759.
7. Examples for these contradictory interpretations are in Bullock, Hitler;
Szinai-Szucs, Horthy's Secret Documents; Adonyi, Hungarian Soldier.
8. Although references to college textbooks are usually not made in scholarly
studies, it is necessary to do so in this case because for the great majority
of our adult population, college textbooks provide the
l95
only historical information they ever receive. If textbooks are inaccurate,
people will forever believe what may have been omitted or sometimes even
falsified to be the truth.
9. Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, p. 535.
10. Over 100,000 men died, 34,000 were wounded, sick and disabled. Over
132,000 surrendered to the Russians. Material losses equalled six-month's
production of armor, three month's of artillery, and two month's of small arms
production of the German war industry. Fuller, Military History, III, p. 537.
11. Schlabrendorf, Secret War, pp. 229-239.
12. The resolution was accepted (January 24, 1943) upon the suggestion of
Churchill. Churchill, The Second World War, IV: The Hinge of Fate, pp.
593-595.
13. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, New York: Dolphin
Books, 1961), p. 167.
14. Seweryn Bialer (ed.), Stalin and His Generals. Soviet Military Memoirs of
World War II (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 362.
15. A. J. P. Taylor, A History of the First World War (New York: Berkeley
Medallion Books, 1966), pp. 13-14. Schlieffen prepared the German strategic
plans before World War I and warned Germany about the possible catastrophic
consequences of a two-front war.
16. Directive No.51. Fuhrer's Headquarters, November 3, 1943, Doc. No. 51, in
Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg, pp. 149-153.
17. Fuller, Military History, III, p. 548.
18. Ibid. Excerpts from the document prepared for the Teheran Con ference by a
US. military authority (sic) on Russia's position.
19. Churchill, Second World War, V: Closing the Ring, pp. 347-348.
20. Horthy, Memoires, p. 207.
21, Ullein-Revizky, Guerre Allemande, pp. 124- 127, lists the names of the
most important antifascist collaborators.
22. Ibid., p. 125, Kadar, From Ludovika, p. 492.
23. Ibid., pp. 512-SlS; Horthy, Memoires, p. 206; Emil Csonka, Habsburg, Otto
(Munchen: Uj Europa, 1972), pp. 352-357.
24. Roosevelt assured Queen Zita, Otto's mother, that after the War he and
Churchill would like to see the establishment of a Danubian Confederation.
Ibid., p. 356.
25. Times of London, June 1, 1943, p. 4, and June 2, 1943, p. 4. The reporter
who published these secrets probably did not think or care about the
consequences of his reports.
26. Horthy was aware of "Operation Margareta," the German military plan which
was prepared for the occupation of Hungary by German, Slovak and Romanian
troops in the case of Hungary's capitulation, Horthy. Memoires, p. 210.
27. Macartney, October Fifteenth, 11, pp. 211-213.
28. See p. 147 above.
29. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, 111, p. 12; Macartney, October Fifteenth, 11, p.
219.
30. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, 11, pp. 78-80.
196
31. Data in Ibid., p. 85.
32. Ibid.
33. On January 23-26, 1944, Wilhelmstrasse, p. 263, 2n.
34. Ibid., Jagow to the Foreign Ministry, Budapest, February 14, 1944, Doc.
No. 572, pp. 767-768.
35. Macartney, October Fifteenth, II, p. 243.
36. Ranki,Memoires. pp. 262-270; Csonka, Habsburg, Otto, pp. 368-378.
37. Wilhelmstrasse, Weesenmayer to Ribbentrop, Budapest, March 25, 1944, Doc.
No. 602, pp. 797-798.
38. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, III, pp. 12-14, contradicts the above
interpretation, arguing that Hungarian resistance to the German occupation
would have caused the collapse of Germany and the end of the War, although it
would have represented "new trials" for Hungary. It is a curious statement in
light of the fact that after the invasion of Normandy (June 6, 1944), the
Anglo-American forces attacking from the West (13 American, 11 British. I
Canadian division: Eisenhower, Crusade. p. 287) and Soviet forces attacking
from the East with an army of 11,365,000 men (Peter Gosztony, Die Rote Armee,
Wien: Verlag Fritz Molden, 1980, p. 427) were able to crush the German
defenses and end the War only 11 months later (May 7, 1945). What could the
poorly-equipped 14 Hungarian divisions have achieved besides "New Trials"?
Nothing! See, also, Kadar, From Ludovika, pp. 663-665.
39. The socialist writing of Hungarian history desperately attempts to prove
to the Free World, with diplomatic documents and arguments, that only the
Horthy administration opposed the liberation of Hungary by Soviet troops. See
Ranki, Memoires! pp. 256-277; Kadar, From Ludovika, pp. 665-666; Szinai-Szucs,
Secret Documenis, pp. 419-422. What these writers fail to mention is the
result of the first free elections in Hungary, held on November 4, 1945, in
which the Communist Party received only 17% of the vote, a clear rejection of
the Soviet system by the people. See Stephen D. Kertesz, Diplomacy in a
Whirlpool. Hungary between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia (Notre Dame,
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953), pp. 139-143.
40. Komjathy-Stockwell, German Minorities, pp. 147-156.
41. Willhelmstrasse, Karl Ritter, Special Envoy to Budapest, to Edmund
Weesenmayer, Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Hungary, Salzburg, March 25, 1944,
Doc. No. 601, pp. 796-797. It is interesting that some historians accuse the
same Hungarian Army of Nazi and pro German loyalties. Szinai-Szucs, Secret
Documents, p. 439.
42. Wilhelmstrasse, Weesenmayer to Ribbentrop, Budapest, March 26, 1944, Doc.
No. 611, p. 805; and p. 798, In.
43. Ibid., Weesenmayer to Ribbentrop, Budapest, March 26, 1944, Doc. No. 610,
p. 804.
CHAPTER XIV
CHAPTER XV