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1. Molnar, History of Hungary, 11, p. 436; Kadar, From Ludovika, p. 386.

2. Adonyi, Hungarian Soldier, p. 27.

3. Horthy, Memoires, p. 189; Antal Ullein-Reviczky, Guerre Allemande Paix Russe (Neuchatel: Editions de la Baconniere, 1947), pp. 101-102. Nandor A. F. Dreisziger. Hungary's Way to World War 11 (Toronto Ont.: Hungarian Helicon Society, 1968), p. 176.

4. Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office: 1949-1964), Series D, 13 vols.; Fuhrer's Directive, Fuhrer's Headquarters, December 18, 1940, Vol. XI, pp. 899-902. Doc. No. 532. (Hereafter referred to as DGFP.)

5. Alan Bullock, Hitler, a Study in Tyranny (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964). Revised edition, p. 625, states that the new directive ".... made it clear that the active cooperation of Finland, Hungary and Romania was counted on from the beginning." However, the Directive never even mentions Hungary.

6. Gyorgy Ranki, Ervin Pamlenyi, Lorant Tilkovszky, Gyula Juhasz (eds.), A Wilhelmstrasse es Magyarorszdg. "The Wilhelm Street and Hungary." (Budapest: Kossuth Konyvkiado, 1968). Clodius (Carl von, Leader of the Economic-Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry) to the Foreign Ministry January 13, 1940, Doc. No. 299, p. 471. (Hereafter referred to as Wilhelmstrasse. )

7. The Second Vienna Award returned to Hungary the northern parts of


Transylvania, where the majority of the population was Hungarian, but left Romania in control of the southern part. For details, see: C. A. Macartney, October Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary, 1929 1945 (Edinburgh: University Press, 1969), Second edition, 2 vols., 1, pp. 404-428.

8. His letter addressed to Horthy gave his reasons in the following words: "We sided with the villains . . . we shall be bodysnatchers, the most worthless nation . . ." Full text is in Miklos Szinai and Laszlo Szucs, Horthy Miklos Titkos Iratai. "Secret Documents of Nicholas Horthy." (Budapest: Kossuth Konyvkiado, 1965), Third edition, Doc. No. 55a, pp. 291-292.

9. DGFP, D, XlI, Directives of the High Command, Fuhrer's Headquar ters, March 22, 1941, Doc. No. 195, pp. 338-343.

10. Archiv Des Auswartiges Amtes, Bonn. File Inland D, Vol. Vlll, p. 142g. Jagow (Dietrich von, German Ambassador to Budapest) to the German Foreign Ministry, Budapest, October 31, 1941, p. E227037, as quoted in: Anthony Komjathy and Rebecca Stockwell, German Minorities and the Third Reich (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, lnc., 1980), pp. 151 - 152.

11. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, 1, p. l 32.

12. Although Werth did not know about Operation Barbarossa and the projected dates, the transporting of a large number of German troops into Romania during the spring of 1941 with the excuse, "to prevent the seizure of a foothold in Greece by British forces," left no doubt that the Germans had other goals in mind. DGFP, D, Xl. Reich Foreign Minister to German Embassy in the Soviet Union and Turkey, to legations in Yugoslavia and Greece (Berlin: January 7, 1941), Doc. No. 616, pp. 1040-1041.

13. Lajos Kerekes (ed.), Allianz Hitler-Horthy-Mussolini. Dokumente zur Ungarischen Aussen Politik (1933-1944) (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1966). Memorandum of the Hungarian Chief of Staff (Henrik Werth) for Minister-President Laszlo Bardossy (Budapest, June 14, 1941), Doc. No. 105, pp. 309-312. (Hereafter referred to as Allianz.)

14. See the evaluation of General Szombathelyi above. p. 125.

15. Allianz, Memorandum of Werth, Budapest, June 14, 1941, Doc. No. 105. pp. 309-312.

16. DGFP, D, Xll, Foreign Minister (Ribbentrop) to the Legation in Hungary (Otto Erdmannsdorff), Venice, June 15, 1941. Doc. 631, p. 1030.

17. DCFP, D, Xll. Hitler to Horthy, Fuhrer's Headquarters, June 21, 1941. Doc. No. 661, pp. 1070-1071.

18. DGFP, D, Xlll. Erdmannsdorff to Foreign Ministry, Budapest, June 24, 1941. Doc. No. 10, pp. 13-15.

19. DGFP, D, Xlll. Erdmannsdorff to the Foreign Minister, Budapest, June 24, 1941 , Doc. No. 11, pp. 15- 16.

20. Ibid.

21. Allianz. Jozsef Kristoffy, Hungarian Ambassador to Moscow, to the Hungarian Minister-President, Moscow, June 23, 1941. Doc. No. 108, p. 314.


22. Ibid., Sztojay to Bardossy, Berlin, June 26, 1941. Doc. No. l10, pp. 315- 317.

23. The "Bombing of Kassa" became the center of interest when contradictory reports of well-trained eyewitnesses identified the attacking aircraft as German-made with Russian insignia. Opinions about the incident, lacking documentation, are based on speculation and on convictions of the authors. For example: Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, 1, p. 135; Adonyi, Hungarian Soldier, p. 27; Gyorgy Nagyrevi-Neppel, "The Bombing of Kassa" in Danubian Reporter, XXI, 1-2, March, 1980, pp. 708, agree that the attacking planes were Soviet; Horthy, Memoires, p. 191; Macartney, October Fifteenth, 1I, pp. 31-32, published another version of the story according to which the bombing was done by German planes with Soviet insignia to provoke Hungary and help the war party to declare war. Peter Gosztonyi Hitler's Fremde Heere (Dusseldorf-Wien: Econ Verlag, 1976), p. 116, mentions one more version: the attacking airplanes were piloted by embittered Slovak officers. A book devoted entirely to the Kassa bombardment is: Julian Borsanyi, Das Raetsel des Bomben angriffs auf Kaschau, 26, Juni 1941. See, also: Dreisziger, Hungary's Way to World War 11, pp. 167-175. After this ms. went in the press, a Hungarian historian, Ignac Olvedi published new information in the Magyar Hirlap "Hungarian News", Budapest, June 28, 1981 issue. He stated that according to Soviet sources tha airplanes which bombed Kassa belonged to the Romanian air force.

(*** There is another - plausible - explanation of the bombing of Kassa (Kaschau, Kosice). The late Jozsef Ormay (of Toronto, Canada) conducted a very exhaustive research in the archives of the European War Ministries, bomb-rack and airplane manufacturers.

Since there is no doubt concerning the origin of the bombs (standard Soviet make), Ormay wanted to know, which bombers of the other belligerents were also capable of accommodating these bombs in their bomb-racks.

After personally visiting and researching the possible sources, came to the conclusion, that only Soviet bombers were capable of loading and releasing these bombs. No one else!

Ormay's well documented report appeared in installments in the periodical "Magyar Szarnyak" (Hungarian Wings. Published by the Hungarian Aero Museum, Oshawa, Ontario, Canada, now defunct), sometime between 1983-85.

This undeniable proof points to to the Soviet Air Force. Weather the Soviet flyers simply attacked clearly defined targets or got lost and mistakenly bombed Kassa, is another question. The WWW editor)

24. Article XII of the 1920 law regulates the rights of the regent. He could declare war only with the previous consent of the parliament. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, I, p. 137.

25. Detailed organization of the mechanized army corps is in Dalnoki, Ibid., II, pp. 155-159.

26. Ibid, p. 161.

27. Ibid., p. 153.

28. A. J. P. Taylor, The Second World War (London: Paragon, 1975), p. 102.

29. DGFP, D, XIII. Colonel-General Franz Halder, Chief of the German Staff. Diary, September 9, 1941. Editors' note, pp. 466-467.

30. Ibid, p. 170

31. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, II, p. 175, 10n.

32. Ibid., pp. 176-177.

33. Ibid., pp. 174-175; Kadar, From Ludovika, pp. 403-404.

34. Wilhelmstrasse, p. 615, 3n.

35. Ibid., Rudolf Toussaint, German Military Attache at Budapest to the Foreign Ministry, Budapest, September 5, 1941. Doc. No. 431, p. 611.

36. Fabian von Schlabrendorff, The Secret War Against Hitler (New York: Pitman Publishing Corp., 1965), pp. 134-151; F. W. Wheeler Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, The German Army in Politics, 1918-1945 (London: MacMil1an Co., Ltd., 1964), pp. 514-525. (Hereafter referred to as Nemesis.)

37. The Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Fuhrers'


Headquarters, December 8, 1941 , "Directive No. 39'. in H. R. Trevor Roper (ed.), Blitzkrieg to Defeat (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 107-110. (Hereafter referred to as Blitzkrieg.)

38. George Vernadsky, A History of Russia (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 175.

39. Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1975), 2 vols., I, pp. 18-23.

40. Isaac Deutscher, Stalin, A Political Biography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 468.

41. Memorandum of Alfred Rosenberg (Reichminister of "Eastern Territories"), Berlin, March 16, 1942. Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington: United States Government Printing Office 1946-1948), 11 vols., Supplement A (1947), p. 335.

42. Ibid.

43. The strength of the Hungarian occupational forces and the size of territory they had to protect changed year by year. In 1941: two light divisions; 1942: six light divisions; 1943: nine; 1944: three light divisions, were serving behind the front lines: Adonyi, Hungarian Soldier, p. 34.

44. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, II, p. 74.

45. Adonyi, Hungarian Soldier, p. 32.

46. Ibid., p. 46.

47. Up to April 30, 1941, Hitler had already dismissed more than 35 generals. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, I, p. 308, 2n. These dismissals continued throughout the War, depriving the German Army of the best-trained and most talented Generals Out of 17 Field Marshals, only I survived; out of 36 Colonel-Generals, only 3 survived the War in their positions. Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, p. 526, I n.

48. Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Tofal War, Causes and Courses of the Second World War (New York: Penguin Books, 1979), pp. 198 199. (Hereafter referred to as Total War. )

49. Between 1942 and 1945, the Soviet Union received 400,000 trucks, 12,000 tanks, 14,000 airplanes, 35,000 tons of explosives and shiploads of foodstuff.

50. Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg, p. 111.

51. Ibid., Fuhrer's Directive No. 39, December 8, 1941, pp. 107-110.

52. Wilhelmstrasse, Councilor Weber to the Foreign Ministry. On the special train of Ribbentrop, January 17, 1942, Doc. No. 475, pp. 646 647.

53. Ibid., Ribbentrop to Dietrich von Jagow, Ambassador to Hungary. Special train, January 19, 1942, Doc. No. 476, p. 648.

54. Ibid., Jagow to Ribbentrop, Budapest, January 22, 1942, Doc. No. 477, pp. 648-649.

55. For the history of the recruitment of ethnic Germans of the different East Central European countries to the Waffen SS, see Komjathy Stockwell, op. cit.

56. Wilhetmstrasse, Jagow to Martin Luther, Chief of Department Inland 193 11 of the Foreign Ministry, Budapest, Febmary 20, 1942, Doc. No. 479. pp. 649-651.



1. Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg; The Fuhrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Directive No. 41, Fuhrer's Headquarters, April 5 1942, Doc. No. 41, pp. 116-121.

2. The following narrative is based on Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, l, pp. 316-329.

3. About $4,000,000

4. Istvan Nemeskurthy, Requiem egy hadserege'rt. "Requiem for an Army." (Budapest: Magveto Zsebkonyvtar, 1972), p. 14. (Hereafter referred to as Requeim)

5. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, I, p. 318.

6. Ibid.

7. Nemeskurty, Requiem, pp. 15-17.

8. See p. 138 above for Ribbentrop's negotiations and Keitel's "not too smooth" conversations with the Hungarian leadership and general staff.

9. Due to the heavy traffic on the only railroad line in the territory of the Eastern Army group, the troops were unloaded 60 miles behind the march-up territory and took part in the operations immediately after the long march.

10. To the credit of the corps commander, Lieutenant-General Domaniczky, when he learned that his troops were not to receive the promised German artillery and tank support, he resigned in protest before the attack.

11. Adonyi, Hungarian Soldier, p. 43.

12. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, 1, p. 354.

13. The battle for Stalingrad began on November 19, 1942. On February 2, Field Marshal Friedrick Paulus surrendered with the remnants of his 6th Army to the Soviet forces, which by that time were threatening the right flank of the German Eastern Army group, i.e., the Italian 8th army and the Hungarian 2nd army.

14. Quoted in Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, I, p. 369.

15. Ibid.; Nemeskurty, Requiem, pp. 48-49.

16. Nemeskurty, Requiem. p. 56.

17. Since the German High Command did not have at their disposal enough equipment to arm the replacing forces, they ordered them to go in the front line unarmed and to take over the weapons and equipment of the forces they would replace. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, 1, p. 355.

18. Adonyi, Hungarian Soldier, p. 55.

19. Ibid., p. 50.

20. Ibid., p. 54. A good description of Hitler's mental and physical condition during the Battle of Stalingrad and the Don breakthrough is


in Calvocoressi-Wint, Total War, pp. 477-478.

21. Adonyi, Hungarian Soldier, p. 53.

22. Nemeskurty, Requiem, pp. 198-199.

23. Kurt, General Tippelskirch, Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Bonn: Athenaum Verlag, 1951).

24. For the full text of Jany's order, See Laszlo Zsigmondi, A magyar 2. hadsereg - mint a nemzetiszocialista Nemet Birodalom segelyhada - a Szovjetunio elleni haboruban 1942-1943-ban. "The Second Hungarian Army, as Auxiliary Force of the Nazi German Reich in the War Against the Sovietunion, 1942- 1943" (Aachen: Manuscript, 1981.) Appendix 27.

25. Wilhelmstrasse, Jagow to the Foreign Ministry, Budapest, June 21, 1943, Doc. No. 544, pp. 725-726.

26. Ibid., Ribbentrop to Jagow, Special Train, June 26, 1943, Doc. No. 545, p. 726

27. Ibid., Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Chief of the Reich's Security Office to Heinrich Himmler, Reichsleader of the SS. Berlin, October 26, 1943, Doc. No. 559, pp. 740-742.



1. Churchill, The Second World War, V: Closing the Ring.

2. Szinai-Szucs (eds.), Horthy's Secret Documents. Memorandum of Ferenc Szombathelyi, Febmary 12, 1943. Doc. No. 67, pp. 345-355.

3. Ibid. Memorandum of the Foreign Ministry, March 30, 1943, Doc. No. 71 pp. 364-368.

4. Ibid. Horthy's letter to Hitler, May 7,1943, Doc. No. 75, pp. 391 -397.

5. Wilhelmstrasse, Jagow to Gustav Adolf Steengracht von Moyland, Undersecretary of State in the Foreign Ministry, Budapest, September 17, 1943, Doc. No. 554, pp. 732-733. Jagow suggested to Ribbentrop that he "warn the Hungarian government that the German Army may occupy those territories which Hungary received from Germany, as results of the First and Second Vienna Awards." Jagow certainly had a unique way of interpreting the Vienna decisions.

6. Ibid. Jagow to Ribbentrop, Budapest, December 31, 1943, Doc. No. 564, p. 759.

7. Examples for these contradictory interpretations are in Bullock, Hitler; Szinai-Szucs, Horthy's Secret Documents; Adonyi, Hungarian Soldier.

8. Although references to college textbooks are usually not made in scholarly studies, it is necessary to do so in this case because for the great majority of our adult population, college textbooks provide the


only historical information they ever receive. If textbooks are inaccurate, people will forever believe what may have been omitted or sometimes even falsified to be the truth.

9. Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, p. 535.

10. Over 100,000 men died, 34,000 were wounded, sick and disabled. Over 132,000 surrendered to the Russians. Material losses equalled six-month's production of armor, three month's of artillery, and two month's of small arms production of the German war industry. Fuller, Military History, III, p. 537.

11. Schlabrendorf, Secret War, pp. 229-239.

12. The resolution was accepted (January 24, 1943) upon the suggestion of Churchill. Churchill, The Second World War, IV: The Hinge of Fate, pp. 593-595.

13. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, New York: Dolphin Books, 1961), p. 167.

14. Seweryn Bialer (ed.), Stalin and His Generals. Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 362.

15. A. J. P. Taylor, A History of the First World War (New York: Berkeley Medallion Books, 1966), pp. 13-14. Schlieffen prepared the German strategic plans before World War I and warned Germany about the possible catastrophic consequences of a two-front war.

16. Directive No.51. Fuhrer's Headquarters, November 3, 1943, Doc. No. 51, in Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg, pp. 149-153.

17. Fuller, Military History, III, p. 548.

18. Ibid. Excerpts from the document prepared for the Teheran Con ference by a US. military authority (sic) on Russia's position.

19. Churchill, Second World War, V: Closing the Ring, pp. 347-348.

20. Horthy, Memoires, p. 207.

21, Ullein-Revizky, Guerre Allemande, pp. 124- 127, lists the names of the most important antifascist collaborators.

22. Ibid., p. 125, Kadar, From Ludovika, p. 492.

23. Ibid., pp. 512-SlS; Horthy, Memoires, p. 206; Emil Csonka, Habsburg, Otto (Munchen: Uj Europa, 1972), pp. 352-357.

24. Roosevelt assured Queen Zita, Otto's mother, that after the War he and Churchill would like to see the establishment of a Danubian Confederation. Ibid., p. 356.

25. Times of London, June 1, 1943, p. 4, and June 2, 1943, p. 4. The reporter who published these secrets probably did not think or care about the consequences of his reports.

26. Horthy was aware of "Operation Margareta," the German military plan which was prepared for the occupation of Hungary by German, Slovak and Romanian troops in the case of Hungary's capitulation, Horthy. Memoires, p. 210.

27. Macartney, October Fifteenth, 11, pp. 211-213.

28. See p. 147 above.

29. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, 111, p. 12; Macartney, October Fifteenth, 11, p. 219.

30. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, 11, pp. 78-80.


31. Data in Ibid., p. 85.

32. Ibid.

33. On January 23-26, 1944, Wilhelmstrasse, p. 263, 2n.

34. Ibid., Jagow to the Foreign Ministry, Budapest, February 14, 1944, Doc. No. 572, pp. 767-768.

35. Macartney, October Fifteenth, II, p. 243.

36. Ranki,Memoires. pp. 262-270; Csonka, Habsburg, Otto, pp. 368-378.

37. Wilhelmstrasse, Weesenmayer to Ribbentrop, Budapest, March 25, 1944, Doc. No. 602, pp. 797-798.

38. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, III, pp. 12-14, contradicts the above interpretation, arguing that Hungarian resistance to the German occupation would have caused the collapse of Germany and the end of the War, although it would have represented "new trials" for Hungary. It is a curious statement in light of the fact that after the invasion of Normandy (June 6, 1944), the Anglo-American forces attacking from the West (13 American, 11 British. I Canadian division: Eisenhower, Crusade. p. 287) and Soviet forces attacking from the East with an army of 11,365,000 men (Peter Gosztony, Die Rote Armee, Wien: Verlag Fritz Molden, 1980, p. 427) were able to crush the German defenses and end the War only 11 months later (May 7, 1945). What could the poorly-equipped 14 Hungarian divisions have achieved besides "New Trials"? Nothing! See, also, Kadar, From Ludovika, pp. 663-665.

39. The socialist writing of Hungarian history desperately attempts to prove to the Free World, with diplomatic documents and arguments, that only the Horthy administration opposed the liberation of Hungary by Soviet troops. See Ranki, Memoires! pp. 256-277; Kadar, From Ludovika, pp. 665-666; Szinai-Szucs, Secret Documenis, pp. 419-422. What these writers fail to mention is the result of the first free elections in Hungary, held on November 4, 1945, in which the Communist Party received only 17% of the vote, a clear rejection of the Soviet system by the people. See Stephen D. Kertesz, Diplomacy in a Whirlpool. Hungary between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953), pp. 139-143.

40. Komjathy-Stockwell, German Minorities, pp. 147-156.

41. Willhelmstrasse, Karl Ritter, Special Envoy to Budapest, to Edmund Weesenmayer, Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Hungary, Salzburg, March 25, 1944, Doc. No. 601, pp. 796-797. It is interesting that some historians accuse the same Hungarian Army of Nazi and pro German loyalties. Szinai-Szucs, Secret Documents, p. 439.

42. Wilhelmstrasse, Weesenmayer to Ribbentrop, Budapest, March 26, 1944, Doc. No. 611, p. 805; and p. 798, In.

43. Ibid., Weesenmayer to Ribbentrop, Budapest, March 26, 1944, Doc. No. 610, p. 804.

44. Adonyi, Hungarian Soldier, p. 61.

45. Dalnoki: Army of Hungary, 11, pp. 190-192.

46. This author crossed the Uzsok Pass, literally with shovel in hand,


digging out the road for the horse-drawn wagons and heavy equip ment, and spending several nights in shelters dug in the 10-15-foot high snowdrifts.

47. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, 11, p. 194.

48. Eyewitness account. Commander of the 24./1. rifle company. "During my company's attack in the forest of Jedlina, we found a patrol I had sent for reconnaissance hanged, naked, with traces of heavy beating all over their bodies, their sex organs cut off and stuffed in their mouths. Seeing that horror, even my most peaceful soldier (a Sabatarian medic who refused to bear arms) cried out for vengeance." See also: Hugh Trevor-Roper (ed.). Final Entries 1945. The Diaries of Joseph Goebbels (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1978), p. 173.

49. Szombathelyi was placed under house arrest on April 19; then on June 16, at the demand of the Germans, he was handed over to the SS. Wilhelmstrasse (June 16, 1944), Doc. No. 686, pp. 868-870.

50. For a detailed account of the aborted assassination attempt, see: John Toland, Adolf Hitler (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., lnc., 1976), pp. 777-822.

51. Ibid., p. 811.

52. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, 11, p. 207.

53. For the description of this battle, see Ibid., pp. 207-223.

54. Ibid., II, p. 437.

55. Ibid., III, pp. 21 -22.

56. For the operations of the Soviet and German forces in Romania, see: Peter Gosztony, Endkampf an der Donau, 1944/45 (Wien-Munchen Zurich: Verlag Fritz Molden, 1969), pp. 12-32.

57. Dalnoki, Army of Hungary, 111, p. 57.

58. Ibid.

59. Personal experience of the author.

60. Csonka, Habsburg, Otto, pp. 371 and 375; John A. Lukacs, The Great Powers and Eastern Europe (New York: American Book Company, 1953). p. 623.

61. Tibor Eckhardt, President of the Small Holders. Party, was the secret envoy of the Hungarian government to Washington since the spring of 1941.

62. Hennyey, Ungarns Schicksal, pp. 88-89.

63. Ibid ., p. 89.

64. Horthy, Memoires, p. 225.

65. Th events of October 15. 1944 are described in: Macartney, October Fifteenth, 11, Chapter 18, pp. 319-443. Shorter accounts can be found in Horthy, Memoires, pp. 227-234, Hennyey, Ungarns Schicksal, pp. 98-109; Kadar, From Ludovika, pp. 739-755.

66. His son. Nicholas, Jr., was a member of this group. Jozsef Kovago, "In Memoriam of Hungary's Anti-Nazi Resistance" in The Hungarian Quarterly, Vol. V, No. I -2, April-June, 1965, p. 146.

67. Ibid Also see: Macartney, October Fifteenth, 11, p. 231.

68. The names of these officers: Colonels Pal Almasy and Miklos Makay,


Majors Istvan Szemes and Miklos Balazsi, Captains Kalman Revay, Jozsef Kovago and Istvan Toth. Personal information of Jozsef Kovago, who was the adjutant of General Kiss.

69. Laszlo Csettkey. Az osszeomlas eloestejen. "On the Eve of Downfall" (New Brunswick: Universe Publishing Company, 1981), p. 46.

70. Experience of the 24./1. infantry company commander in the Upper Tisza River Valley.

71. This statement was made during the interrogation of the author at a Soviet division headquarters in Slovakia. The 24th Division went over to the Soviet side upon hearing the news that the territory of Hungary was completely occupied ("liberated") by the Soviet armies, and even Vienna was in their hands. See, also: Pal Darnoy: Honvedeink Idegen Foldon, "Our Honveds in Foreign Lands," in Hadak Utjan, XXXIII, pp. 354-355.

72. The history of Hungarian military operations in the Second World War has still to be written. A valuable contribution to the work of future historians is the excellent series by Pal Darnoy, "The Fight for Budapest," in Hadak Utjan XIV-XXV, Nos. 154-294.

73. These divisions were organized and launched into battle in late summer of 1944 and early 1945. Their rank and file were volunteers, most of them not older than 16 or 17 years. The Szent Laszl division fought against the Russians as one of the divisions of the German 6th army North of Lake Balaton. The core of the division was the 1st air borne regiment. Seeing the hopelessness of their fight and becoming outraged over the German practice of constantly using the Hungarian units for rearguard duties while the German Army quickly retreated, on March 30, 1945, the division turned its arms against the German 6th army and ran over to the Soviet troops. Janos Barczy, Zuhanougras, "Skydiving" (Budapest: Magvet6 Konyvkiado, 1981). Tenyek es tanuk sorozat. "Facts and Witnesses Series," p. 566.


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