A thousand years of the Hungarian art of war

CHAPTER X

DEFENSE OF HUNGARY UNDER RED FLAGS

If the German soldiers found reasons to believe that Germany had lost the war only because the activities of the leftist political forces in the Hinterland had "stabbed the army in the back," the soldiers of the joint army of Austria-Hungary found equally good reasons to believe the same myth. After all, after initial setbacks in 1914-1915, the famous Brusilov offensive was stopped in 1916, the Italian army's attack was repelled on the plateau of Doberdo, Romania was knocked out of the war, and Turkey declared war on the side of the Central Powers. The troops of the joint army, although they sustained horrifying losses, stood fast on the fronts. The different minority units (with the exception of a few Czech regiments) remained loyal to the monarchy, and the enemy was unab1e to occupy and hold even a square inch of the monarchy's territory. In the minds of the simple soldiers, the black market, inflation, food shortages, and the spread of pacifism and defeatism, were the works of speculators, war profiteers, and of the leftist political parties.

The new Emperor and King, Charles IV, and the High Command, knew that the decline of the will to fight had, in the Hinterland, only one overriding basic reason: the economic and mi1itary exhaustion of the monarchy. The Central Powers had with their limited resources had no chance of winning the war of attrition. Therefore, already on December 12, 1916, the monarchy and the German government sent a joint peace proposal to the A1lied (Entente) Powers. This proposal was rejected, but the announced principle of President Woodrow Wilson, "peace without victory," on January 22, 1917, created new hope for the monarchy. Optimism grew even stronger when in February the Russian Revolution weakened the monarchy's main enemy and offered a flash of hope for victory. But with the entrance of the United States into the war on the side of the Allied Powers in April, 1917, the Central Powers, especially Austria-Hungary, found themselves

97

again in an insoluble crisis. The self-appointed leaders of the monarchy's minority groups in Corfu, London, and Paris increased their activities with one single goal: they wanted to convince the Allied leadership of the necessity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy's dissolution./1/ The situation deteriorated further in Austria and Hungary. Runaway inflation, along with coal and food shortages, triggered strikes in key industries: "Thousands of deserters organized in 'green bands' roamed the countryside," internal order broke down in many localities, and "prisoners of war returning from Russia brought with them Bolshevik ideas."/2/ Count Ottokar Czernin, the Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary, warned Emperor-King Charles that the monarchy could not survive the winter of 1917-1918. If peace will not be restored, revolution will break out./3/

Czernin's prophecy came true. In late 1917 and the spring of 1918, strikes, demonstrations, and military fiascos on the front destroyed the remnants of morale in the hinterland. National minority leaders now joined in the demands of emigrant leaders. The Croat representatives declared their intention to organize a united Southern-Slav state. The Slovaks demanded autonomy and the Czechs organized their National Committee.

On October 16, 1918, Emperor Charles declared Austria a federal state, but it was too late. Not only the ethnic groups but also President Wilson refused to accept this solution as a basis for peace negotiations. Two weeks later, on October 30, Count Mihaly Karolyi was appointed Minister-President of Hungary. His cabinet included the representatives of the Social Democratic, the Independent, and the bourgeois Radical Parties. His program included the creation of a new, independent legislative assembly, universal suffrage, land reform, and a general amnesty. The new Minister of Defense won popularity by ordering the Hungarian troops home from the fronts. In foreign policy, Karolyi wanted to sign a separate armistice for Hungary with the Allied Powers./4/ To secure better conditions for Hungary, Karolyi visited the commander of the Allied Forces operating in the Balkans, French General Franchet d'Esperey, and signed a separate armistice, which actually was less tolerant than the armistice at Padua.

Time proved that d'Esperey and the Allies were either unwilling or unable to keep even this agreement. The secret treaties signed previously with representatives of ethnic groups and exile governments obliged the Allies to consent to the demands of the Romanians, Serbians, Croats, and Czechs./5/ Accordingly, Karolyi was instructed by the Allied Powers on December 2, l918 to evacuate Transylvania, as well as Slovakia and Ruthenia. Not

98

having any significant military force at hand, because of their unilateral disarmament, the Karolyi government was unable to oppose these orders by force. The occupation of the rich industrial and mineral-producing territories, as well as the southern grainproducing districts of Hungary, furthered the existing economic crisis to great proportions and increased civil unrest.

The Hungarian Communist Party (organized November 2, 1917), which exploited the situation for its own benefit, prepared to gain control of the government under the leadership of Bela Kun./6/ On February 9, 1919, the Social Democratic Party, losing patience with communist anti-government agitation, propaganda, and activities, decided to expel the communists from the Party as well as from the trade unions. The communists replied on February 20 with a violent anti-government demonstration which ended in street fighting and gunfire. The same evening, the social democrats in the government consented to the arrest of the Communist Party leaders. However, their arrest did not solve the economic crisis.

The statesmen of the victorious powers were frightened by events in Hungary. Andre Tardieu suggested to the military representatives of the Supreme War Council that Allied troops occupy additional Hungarian territories "with a view to preventing the spread of Bolshevism, which was prevalent in Hungary."/7/ The proposal was accepted. On March 20, General Vyx presented the allied demands to Karolyi, by now President of the Hungarian Republic. The Vyx note undoubtedly proved the failure of Karolyi's policy; he had hoped that the Western powers would prevent the dismemberment of Hungary. The social democrats, in despair, turned to Bela Kun's communists for help to achieve their goal, i.e., to save Hungary from mutilation with the help of the East, since the West had denied Hungary's plea. East meant, for them, the Soviet troops, which at that time were holding the Dniester River against interventionist forces. Kun accepted the offer and assumed power. Although only the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, he represented the real power in the Council of the Peoples' Commissars, which declared the creation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic on March 23, 1919.

The Western powers, which had attempted to prevent the spread of Bolshevism by ordering the Allied occupation of Hungary, now changed their policy. On April 4, John Christian Smuts, the former South African freedom fighter and British General (in World War I), who represented the Allied Powers, arrived in Budapest and tried to explain to Bela Kun that the line of demarcation marked out in the Vyx note "was not intended to be a permanent political

99

frontier" and the Allied occupation of Hungarian territories would "in no case prejudice the Hungarian case."/8/

Learning about Smut's declaration, Karolyi remarked with justified bitterness: "So what my Government had not been able to obtain in five months was granted the Communists after a week . . ."/9/ Kun rejected the Allies' explanations. Therefore, Romanian troops invaded Hungary on April 16. The army of the Czech-Slovak Republic joined up and launched an attack from the North. Within days the Romanians had occupied Nagyvarad, and in a week they had reached Debrecen. while Czech troops occupied Miskolc. The units of the Hungarian Red Army fled in disorder toward Budapest.

The Revolutionary Governing Council now changed its tune. Instead of referring to world revolution and proletarian internationalism, they appealed to the patriotism of the Hungarian masses in their declaration of April 20th. The high command of the army was centralized. Aurel Stromfeld, a professional general staff officer, was appointed Chief of Staff of the Eastern Army. The appeal to patriotism bore fruit: workers and peasants volunteered for military units. "Many Hungarian officers (of the former K.u.K. and Honved army) had joined Kun out of patriotic reasons./10/ ..."Better to be communist than suffer the humiliation which the Allies had decided to inflict upon Hungary" was the bitter argument of the officers."/11/ Stromfeld also attracted a great number of his comrades by his dynamic and warm personality. Many of his officers who volunteered, after the collapse of the communist regime were accepted in the anti-communist Horthy army and reached high rank and position./12/ Not only officers volunteered, but also the cadets of the Ludovica Military Academy petitioned the Minister of Defense to send their battalion to the front to defend Hungary./13/

Colonel Stromfeld proved to be an exceilent choice. A good organizer, a good strategist, he was a commander who enjoyed the confidence and loyalty of his soldiers. The soldier councils, the "hot-beds of insubordination," were dissolved,/14/ the authority of political commissars curtailed, iron discipline restored, party politics forbidden.

The military strategic plan was excellent: while defending on the south and southeast generally along the Drava and Tisza Rivers with inferior forces (one division and two mixed brigades), the bulk of the army (one army corps and supporting artillery) was to attack along the Tisza River in a northerly direction to cut a gap between the Czech and Romanian forces. (Plan 8) The attack started on May

101

30 and by June 10 the units of the Hungarian Army had reached the thousand-year-old frontiers in the northeastern Carpathians. In the northwest, the campaign reoccupied important industrial regions around Miskolc, Salgotarjan and Selmecbanya. However, it was clear that the military successes were only temporary and that the Allied forces would have the upper hand in the long run. The Allied forces were outnumbering the Hungarian troops three to one. On the south, the Yugoslav troops numbered 20-30,000 men; in the east, the Romanians had 20-30,000 men (not mentioning the 20-30,000 French back-up army); in the north the Czechs had around 20-25,000 soldiers.

During this period, when the patriotism of the Hungarian officers and soldiers produced military victories, the communist dictatorship of the proletariat created more and more dissatisfaction in the different segments of the Hungarian population./15/ In many p1aces, civilians and soldiers in the countryside and in the army began to organize an uprising to overthrow the repressive government./16/

To make the situation even more sensitive, Georges Clemenceau sent two telegrams in the first ha1f of June, demanding that the Revolutionary Governing Council withdraw its troops from the reoccupied territories. The Council, with a majority vote against the militant Bela Kun and his followers, complied with Clemenceau's demand and ordered the army to withdraw to the line of demarcation. It was clear that against the will of the Allied Powers, Hungary (communist or noncommunist) could not succeed in its desire to prevent dismemberment. This recognition undermined the morale of the army and desertion began to decimate the troops.

Aurel Stromfeld, the organizer and leader of the successful military campaign, resigned on July I and was replaced by Ferenc Julier in the position of Chief of Staff. At the demand of Bela Kun, he launched an attack over the Tisza River against the Romanian forces, but this attack had no chance. The patriotic officers and soldiers, who only a few weeks before had fought heroically for the reoccupation of the Hungarian territories, now turned against the purposeless bloodshed. In the absence of leadership, discipline broke down and the army rushed back toward Budapest without offering any resistance to the Romanian troops. On August 1, the Revolutionary Governing Council resigned: "Bela Kun and several communist and socialist leaders of the Hungarian Soviet Republic and their families ... Ieft for Austria."/17/ The Romanian troops "took advantage of the opportunity and plundered (Hungary) ruthlessly."/18/ They would have also evacuated the treasures of the royal palace and of the national museum if the American member

102

of the Allied Military Mission, General H. H. Brandholtz, had not prevented them from so doing./19/ With the Romanian occupation, the story of the Hungarian Red Army reached its end.

During the Horthy regime, official Hungary, as well as public opinion, condemned the Hungarian Soviet Republic, and with good reason. The natural consequences of its condemnation was that those who had served in the Hungarian Red Army were also stamped as defenders of the communist dictatorship. In the eyes of the most tolerant historians, those soldiers and officers were naive and misled patriots, who by participating in the military campaigns actually prolonged the life of the hated proletarian dictatorship and thus caused more damage than good./20/

One observation may correct this view. First, the soldiers and officers fighting against the Romanians and Czechs were not defending the regime of Bela Kun, but Hungarian territories. During the summer of 1919 it was no secret that the so-called 'line of demarcation, was regarded by the Czechs and Romanians and their French patrons as possibly the final frontier for Hungary. The Vyx note and the Smuts negotiations c1early indicated this possibility. Thus, Hungary was to be dismembered no matter what kind of regime control1ed it. After the fal1 of the Bela Kun regime, the Romanians occupied Budapest on August 3rd and soon reached the line of Gyor and Szekesfehervar. John Bratianu, Romania's representative at the peace conference, refused even in October to withdraw the Romanian troops. He warned the Allies about the danger represented by "Bolsheviks and monarchical reactionaries" in Hungary./21/ Bratianu's intentions were clear: to keep Hungary occupied and present a fait accompli to the peacemakers. In 1920, even the new Horthy regime, which enjoyed the support of the Allied Powers, could not secure better conditions for Hungary visa-vis the Romanians, since Romanian troops were de facto in control of the Transylvanian territories. The form of government had very little to do with the decision of the peacemakers. In this light, the heroic fight of the soldiers of the Red Army defending Hungarian territory against foreign invaders was an act which should be appreciated, valued, and praised by the students of Hungarian military history.

103

A thousand years of the Hungarian art of war