A thousand years of the Hungarian art of war

CHAPTER IX

THE K.U.K. ARMY AND THE HONVEDSEG

The capitulation at Vilagos in 1849 and the collapse of Hungary opened the door once again for Habsburg absolutism in Hungary. When, eighteen years later Hungary was recognized as an equal of Austria, the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise marked the beginning of a new era in the life of the monarchy. Although this drastic change in Hungary's status was officially recognized only in the Compromise, international events were already working in this direction in the 1850's.

In 1853, serfdom as an institution was dissolved. In Austria, the liberated serfs and the government compensated the landlords, while in Hungary the entire amount was paid by the government, butonly on paper! In reality the nobility were paid less than one-third of the compensation to which they were legally entitled./1/ Adding to this amount the losses which they suffered through the invalidation of the banknotes of the Hungarian Republic of 1849, the nobility found themselves at the end of their financial capacity. Still, they had to carry a burden unknown to them in previous centuries paying heavy taxes. Many of them were unable to ride out this financial crisis and chose the only solution left to them: they either sold their lands and found employment in the state or county administration, or they got an education and made a living in one of the professions. The land began to change owners. In most cases, it fell under foreign control (mostly Austrian Germans). Only the high aristocracy and the Church were able to keep their holdings; on many occasions they even extended them.

The commercial and financial strata of society benefited most from royal absolutism. The lifting of custom barriers between Austria and Hungary made the export of Hungarian products more competitive and therefore more profitable./2/

Politically, Hungarian society retreated in passive resistance, making the Bach system very costly for Austria./3/ Kossuth and his emigrant friends tried to discredit the Habsburg system (most1y in

83

England and the U.S.). Their efforts were popular but ineffective. Thus, in the years from 1849 to 1859, there seemed to be no hope that Hungary would regain its freedom.

Then, in 1859, Austrian forces suffered a crushing defeat at Solferino from the combined French-Piedmontese army./4/ A subsequent great and honest soul-searching in Austria found that the army was badly supplied, and equipped with outdated guns and weapons; the government, while it had the greatest budget in Europe, was sinking deeper into debt as the yearly deficit grew to 238 million a staggering amount./5/

Emperor Francis Joseph dismissed the Bach cabinet and all those who supported it. Thus the Austrian middle class lost influence and the Emperor again entrusted the conservative feudal lords with the business of government. The most influential among the conservatives were the Hungarian aristocrats. Archduke Albrecht, Governor of Hungary, was replaced by the Hungarian General, Laszlo Benedek./6/ The Hungarians appointed in the Verstarker Reichsrat convinced the emperor to issue the famous October Diploma (October 20, 1860). In this document the Emperor abolished the absolutist system and restored the "historical individuality" of his countries,/7/ but reserved the right over common affairs for the imperial council. In 1861 the Hungarian Diet was called to session. It proved to be a mistake: instead of being a rubber stamp on imperial documents, the Diet demanded the complete restoration of Hungary's sovereignty. Francis Joseph rejected the demands, dissolved the Diet, and tried with very little success to return to absolutism. But the German unification demands threatening with a Kleindeutsch solution forced him into a reconciliation./8/ At the same time in Hungary, the more moderate politicians like Ferenc Deak and Count Jozsef Eotvos also urged the nation to give up their more radical demands. The principles on which a compromise between emperor and nation should be based according to Eotvos were:

Although not all the principles were realized during the long negotiations, the political compromise was prepared under the title "Law Xll of 1867" in March, 1867. Francis Joseph was crowned King of Hungary on June 8, and he sanctioned the Law on July 28./10/ The compromise recognized foreign affairs,defense,and finances

84

of the armed forces as fields which should be conducted in common for the benefit of both parts of Austria-Hungary./11/

The most sensitive negotiations were naturally concerned with defense. After all, aside from the duty to protect the empire from foreign enemies, the Habsburg army was also the mornarchy's most important and trustworthy pillar against internal political disorder. Since the compromise included the right of Hungary to organize her armed forces separately from those of the K.u.K. army, the organization of the Hungarian army (Honvedseg), its size and strength, the language of command, and its subordination became the most hotly-debated questions during the preparatory negotiations. The sessions were held under the personal direction of Emperor Francis Joseph at Buda between April 18 and April 29, 1 868./12/

The establishment of the Honvedseg meant not only an end to centuries-old principles which influenced the life, composition, organization, training, and employment of the Habsburg armies, but also the recognition of a second armed force, which in 1848-49 proved to be the most dangerous enemy for the monarchy. As Prince Carlos Auersperg, the minister president of Austria, put it in candid words: "The Honvedseg is an instrument of power. We should not allow our dangerous neighbors to use this instrument for the realization of their goals."/13/ Of course, the radical Hungarians who still followed the ideas of 1848 wanted the opposite: they did not want to see the Honvedseg as an instrument of the monarch which could also be used for the oppression of the people. In other words, the Austrians wanted to keep the old K.u.K. Army as the real army, while Hungarians wanted to see the Honvedseg as equal to the K.u.K. Army. The Austrians wanted to make the Honvedseg an instrument of the emperor, while the Hungarians wanted it to be an instmment of the Hungarian nation. This basic contradiction of principles caused negotiations to drag on until December 5, 1868, when Francis Joseph announced the agreement with the following words: "A new element, the Landwehr (Honvedseg) today joins the army as a valuable augmentation of the common defense."/14/

The Austro-Hungarian armed forces (Joint Army) now acttlally had three separate branches: the K.u.K. Army the Austrian Landwehr and the Hungarian Honvedseg, all three under the command of Francis Joseph. Since the army budget was controlled by the parliaments, which held different views the K.u.K.Army, the Landwehr and the Honvedseg evolved along different lines. In 1868 the law allowed for the recruitment of 95,000 men for the common army. Austria provided 55,000, Hungary 40,000. The Landwehr

85

and Honvedseg were to exist only in cadres. The Austrian Reichsrat, dominated by liberals, looked with suspicion at the Landwehr, while the Hungarian Diet took pride in the Honvedseg. The result was that that Landwehr consisted only of cadre units even in the 1870's, while the Honvedseg numbered 2,868 officers and 158,000 men organized in seven divisions./15/ However, it had only infantry and cavalry units, since the organization of artillery was not permitted. For the training of career officers, the Ludovika Akademia, a military preparatory school, was raised to the level of a cadet college providing education for the lower-ranked officer positions.

Thus, the organization, better, the restriction, imposed upon the organization of the Honvedseg blocked opportunities for the evolution of a separate Hungarian art of war. Strategic, tactical training, and educational principles were determined in Vienna, where the emperor, as well as the general staff, made every effort to prevent the Honvedseg from becoming a full-scale national army. Hungarian radicals sought just that: the result was a political struggle which became so bitter that, in l905, the imperial general staff worked out concrete plans for the military occupation of Hungary and the disso1ution of the Honvedseg./16/ Only the Emperor's opposition to a military confrontation prevented a new civil war. The international crises in the first decade of the 20th century convinced both Austrians and Hungarians of the danger of disunity. While the Hungarians gave up their demands for an autonomous national army, the Emperor permitted the Honvedseg to organize artillery units; but not before 1914./17/

The mobilization plans of the joint army still reflected the fear and suspicion of the general staff concerning the loyalty of the Honvedseg. It was not employed as one army, but instead its units were divided among the K.u.K. army corps in division and brigade formations. On the other hand, officers of Hungarian ethnic origin, also in the K.u.K. Army, were promoted to the highest ranks if they pledged their loyalty unconditionally "to the dynasty, the army, and (their) regiment."/18/

The Honvedseg had 27 regiments organized in 9 divisions. The K.u.K. Army also had troops designated as "Hungarian", "Hungaro-Croat", or "Hungaro-Sloven"./19/ This designation applied to cava1ry regiments (16 out of 39) and battalions (7 out of 32) as well. Three infantry regiments called Hungaro-Croat, one called Hungaro-Sloven and one ranger battalion called Hungaro-Croat had rank and file of mixed nationalities./20/

The training and equipment of the Honvedseg, as well as of the Landwehr, were the same as that of the K.u.K. Army.

86

This standardization made teaching strategic princip1es and preparing war plans easier on paper. In reality, the Honved and Landwehr divisions were equipped with outdated rifles and guns which decreased their combat value.

The strategic principles, developed para1lel with German theories, were based on the lessons of the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War. In this war, the offensive strategy proved victorious over the defensive. Take the initiative and encirc1e the enemy: this was the alpha and omega of military science. To fight great, decisive battles on wide-open spaces was the generals' dream. Cavalry attacks and hand-to-hand combat played the main role in the plans of the general staffs. They prepared diligently to win the coming war by memorizing the events of the Franco-Prussian War. To be objective, we must state that not only the generals of the Central Powers, but also the generals of the Entente, followed this pattern.

There was one lonely voice in Austria-Hungary, that of Maximi1ian Csicserics, Co1onel in the general staff, who was the military observer of the Joint Army (K.u.K., Landwehr, Honvedseg) on the Russian front during the 1904 Russo-Japanese War, and who questioned the validity of the old strategic principles./21/ He warned about the possibility of long battles and campaigns even wars lasting for years rather than weeks. He doubted the possibility of great maneuvers which could lead to the encirclement of the enemy. Rightly evaluating the effect of machine guns, he expected to see long enemy lines confronting each other, with flanks unexposed, leaving only one alternative to win a battle: frontal attack and breakthrough. As far as the behavior of individual fighters was concerned, he recognized the value of trenches and recommended the abolition of colorful uniforms which made each soldier an ideal target for the enemy's sharpshooters.

The majority of the general staff dismissed his arguments as applicable only for the Siberian theatre of war, but not to the battlefields of Europe. The Chief of Staff of the Joint Army, Conrad von Hotzendorf, was himself a staunch believer in a strategy which would win the next war by fighting great, decisive battles.

In harmony with the above principles, the soldiers were educated to be on the offensive always: "The infantry, filled with an aggressive spirit of attack, mentally stable, well trained and directed, is able to fight successful combats even among the most difficult conditions," stated the planned Military Regulations on Tactics in 1911./22/ Characteristically, the need for modern equipment and automatic weapons was omitted in the requirements. In order to utilize the few machine guns (2 per battalion), the line formation was used for combat. No depth, no reserves, no second or

87

third echelons of troops. The grouping of forces in the depth of the combat formation, even in defense, was considered absurd, artificial, and, therefore, not permissible. What effect the enemy forces and firepower would have on such tactics was never asked./23/

The cavalry prepared its soldiers for mounted attacks in larger units, sweeping away the enemy forces. Some thought was given to the possibility of using the dismounted hussars as infantry troops./24/

The artillery's only duty was to exchange fire with the enemy artillery. To support the infantry's advance by destroying machine gun nests and fortifications was not even considered as an artillery assignment. Only one lesson of the Russo-Japanese War was remembered: it was recommended that the artillery put its guns in positions invisible to enemy observers.

Such principles dominated the thinking of the German, French and Russian general staffs, as well as of the Austro-Hungarians.

The High Command of the Joint Army had one more unique worry: how the different ethnic groups would honor their loyalty oath to the Emperor, how they, especially the Slavic soldiers would behave on the Serbian and Russian fronts./25/ The mobilization order much to the relief of authorities" who expected trouble on the part of the different national minorities (especially in Bohemia)" was received with enthusiasm by the population and obeyed without hesitation./26/

HUNGARIAN GENERALS AND TROOPS IN WORLD WAR I.

The mixed composition of the mobilized forces make it a very hard task to find clear examples of the Hungarian art of war during World War I. Hungarian generals were not always in command of Hungarian army corps and armies, but only of tactical units divisions and regiments. On the other hand, generals of Hungarian origin who commanded strategic units also had under their command many non-Hungarian regiments and divisions. Consequently, we may say that as a general rule the strategic decisions of the high commanders were executed by mixed units. Thus, it would be a mistake to interpret a victory or defeat of the generals and their troops on the basis of national origin or affiliation.

Therefore, this study offers only a few examples to describe some battles of strategic importance in which the main responsibilities fell on Hungarian generals or on Hungarian units (commanded more often than not by non-Hungarian officers).

The war did not start off well for the monarchy. The general staff, which expected an isolated, local war against Serbia, on July 25, 1914, ordered only a partial mobilization. According to plan, the march-up of troops began at once up to the southern borders of

88

Hungary. Only six days later, on July 31, Russia declared war on Austria-Hungary. The entrance of Russia into the war forced the Austro-Hungarian military leadership to order a genera1 mobilization. This altered the original strategic plan, code name "B" alternative (which called for a quick attack against Serbia) to alternative "R." According to plan "R," only the first echelon of the mobilized army was to remain on the Serbian frontier to defend the borders against Serbian attack; the second echelon was to be employed against Russia. The problem of changing from plan "B", to plan "R" lay in the fact that the troops of the second echelon were also already moving according to a well-planned train schedule toward the Serbian borders. Any variation in the train schedule would demand risky improvisation. The general staff had to let the second echelon advance to their original destination near the Serbian frontiers, when they would be redirected to the Russian front.

HUNGARIAN TROOPS ON THE SERBIAN FRONT.

(August 1224, 1914). On August 6, 1914, Field Marshal Lieutenant Oskar Potiorek was appointed commander of the Balkan forces of the Joint Army. His forces consisted of the 6th army (in the upper Drina River valley) and of the 5th army (in the lower Drina valley with its left flank on the Sava River) altogether some ten divisions. The 2nd army alongside the lower Sava and Danube Rivers was preparing to leave for the Russian front./27/ To confront these forces the Serbian Army had 11 1/2 divisions.

Although the Supreme Command of the Joint Army warned Potiorek that the troops of the 2nd army soon would be transported to the Russian front and, therefore, its forces should be employed against the Serbians only for "demonstrations", he decided to launch an attack with the 5th and 6th armies anyway./28/ He hoped that the 2nd army's demonstration would misled the Serbian general staff, who would employ the bulk of their forces against the 2nd army's units. Such a move would enable the 5th and 6th armies to encircle the Serbian left flank and thus gain an easy victory.

The plan was more than risky, since it was baced on the assumption that the demonstrating forces would be able to create a successful diversion. (Plan 6) Without it, the 5th and 6th armies, which had to fight not only the enemy, but also had to struggle against the terrain (crossing several river valleys and smaller but very steep mountain chains without any roads), had a very slim chance for victory.

The "demonstration" was entrusted to ad hoc organized groups of the 2nd army's 4th army corps. The main burden was

89

to be carried by General Balazs Dani's troops, the 62nd brigade, made up entirely of Hungarian soldiers./29/ General Dani's troops successfully crossed the Sava River, occupied the city of Sabac on the south bank and lured the Serbian high command to send additional troops against them from the Serbian lst and 2nd armies. Thus, the first phase of the demonstration was successful and the attack of the Austrian 5th and 6th armies was made easier. However, bridge material, which the 5th army needed for crossing the Drava River, did not arrive on time. The delay gave the Serbian forces an opportunity to attack the demonstrating Dani brigade with superior forces. Although the brigade was strengthened by additional troops from the 2nd army, the Serbian high command recognized the situation, stopped the attack against Sabac and, promptly regrouping its forces, attacked the north flank of the 5th army. To save the situation, more troops were sent into battle from the Hungarian 4th army corps. They successfully repelled the Serbian assault and continued their attack against the regrouped Serbian force which confronted Potiorek's 5th army. The heroic and brave resistance of the Serbian soldiers s1owed down the Hungarian advance, while at the same time the Serbians forced the 5th army to retreat to its original position.

Potiorek tried a second attack on Serbia in November and December, 1914, without success. His troops suffered astonishing losses: 28,000 dead, 122,000 wounded, 76,000 captured./30/ On December 22, Emperor Francis Joseph released Potiorek from the command of the Serbian front.

The Serbian fiasco was caused by the careless and simpleminded leadership of Potiorek/31/ who, against all warning, constantly hoped that the high command would put more forces at his disposal. The main mistake, however, was committed in the preparation of the original plan, which foresaw the successful advance of the 5th and 6th armies on a terrain which gave all of the advantages to the defenders. Once the decision was made that the 2nd army would participate only in a demonstrating role, Potiorek should have used his forces to defend the Drina-Sava-Danube Rivers, instead of wasting them in bloody and risky battles.

The troops, on the other hand, proved their value and trustworthiness. The Hungarian division and brigade commanders (Dani, Terstyanski) led the troops with tactical skill and secured the necessary preconditions and a good chance for victory. Regrettably, their heroism and the sacrifices of ther soldiers were in vain. The Serbian front became of secondary importance compared to the Russian front, where the situation also deteriorated to the disadvantage of the monarchy.

91

THE BATTLE AT LIMANOVA.

December 3-11, 1914. On the eastern front the march-up of the Austro-Hungarian troops suffered a delay of several days because of the surprise declaration of war by Russia./32/ The troops took up their positions, not on the Russian frontiers as was originally planned, but further west, behind the fortified line along the Dniester and San Rivers.

The Austro-Hungarians were clearly outnumbered by the Russians: Austria-Hungary: 770 infantry battalions, 356 cava1ry companies, 2,098 artillery pieces. Russia: 824 infantry battalions, 694 cavalry companies, 2888 artillery pieces./33/ The German Army, was also inferior to the Russians.

The original strategic plan called for an attack of the Austro-Hungarian armies between the Bug and Vistula Rivers in order to prevent the bulk of the Russians from attacking East Prussia. Although the joint forces were weaker than the original plan called for, Conrad von Hotzendorf did not change the original plan./34/ Thus, the Austro-Hungarian troops attacked on a wider front (to satisfy the demand of the Germans) and with fewer forces. The result was as could be expected: in the Battle of Krasnik the 1st army, and in the Battle of Komarow the 4th army of the Austro-Hungarian forces defeated the Russians. But, as the Russian main force turned against the Austro-Hungarian troops between the San and Vistula Rivers, the 3rd and 4th armies lost two battles (Zloczow, Gnila Lipa); then, after heavy fighting around Lvov, the entire front was forced to retreat to the territory east and north of Krakow. To block the possible advance of the Russians in the direction of Budapest, only the 3rd army and an ad hoc organized force defended the territory south of the Vistula and on the eastern slopes of the Carpathian Mountains.

On November 11, the newly-appointed commander of the German eastern front, Colonel-General Paul von Hindenburg, first repelled the attack of the Russian 1st army against East-Prussia, then mounted a counterattack with the intention of encircling the right flank of the main Russian forces, "steamrolling" on the Austro-Hungarian sections of the Eastern front. The overwhelming Russian main force by that time had approached Krakow, while the Russian 8th army broke through the mountain passes of the Carpathian Mountains and reached the edges of the great plains in Hungary proper. The high command of the joint army decided to avert the danger represented by the Russian invasion of Hungary by joining the German plan, mounting an attack against the left flank of the Russian steamroller and thus, in cooperation with Hindenburg's forces, inflicting a decisive defeat on Russia. The over whelming majority of the forces which has to execute this plan were Hungarian: four Honved infantry divisions, two cavalry divisions, and several artillery regiments./35/ Hungarian generals were also in key positions: General-Lieutenant Baron Gyula Nagy commanded a cavalry army corps comprising the 2nd Honved cavalry division, the 10th K.u.K. cavalry division, the 6th Landwehr cavalry division, and the Polish Legion of Joseph Pilsudski. Lieutenant-General Jozsef Roth commanded the 14th army corps, which was 7 1/2 division strong. Lieutenant-General Sandor Szurmay commanded the 38th Honved division and the Honved division of Lieutenant General Kornhaber. From regiment commander down, the commanders were all Hungarians in the Honved as well as in the K.u.K. units.

In order to encircle the left flank of the giant Russian Third Army (Plan 7), the "steamroller," the Austro-Hungarian 4th army first had to stop the Russian attack; then Lieutenant-General Roth's group had to attack in a northeasterly direction on the left flank of the attacking Russians. By December 3, the 4th army not only had stopped the Russian attack but had a1so mounted a counterattack south of Krakow and the Vistula River. The Roth group, with its right flank around the little village of Limanova, took up a position to execute the encirclement. The eastern flanks of this army were covered by the cavalry division of Lieutenant-General Nagy. On December 4, the Russian high commander, Alexel Alexandrovich Brusilov, recognized the danger of encirclement. He ordered the 16th and 24th army corps (5 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions) to discontinue the attack on the northeastern Carpathian section of the front, then to regroup and attack the right flank of the Roth group. The success of the original Austro-Hungarian plan depended now on the good performance of Lieutenant-General Nagy's Hungarian cavalry division.

The division, fighting in several regiment-size groups (supported by artillery), followed orders to attack the left flank and left rear of the Russian steamroller. After two successful days, the overwhelming Russian forces not only stopped the hussar attack, but on the third day of the battle began to force them to retreat. By that time the high command of the joint army had sent several additional infantry regiments to reinforce the cavalry troops. On December 4,the attack against the Russian left flank was renewed. To repel this attack, the Russians sent into action some of the troops (originally intended to sustain the steamroller momentum) against this offensive. Thus, the attack of the main Russian force was slowed down and finally halted. In the center of the large battlefield lay the village of Limanova. Here, the Russians hoped to

93

break the resistance of the Austro-Hungarian right flank. But their repeated attacks gained very little territory. On December 10, the first divisions of the two Russian army corps which were to encircle the Austro-Hungarian left flank arrived. But, thanks to the heroic stand made by the Honved hussar and infantry regiments, there was no open flank to attack. To open up the now-continuous line, the Russians decided to break through the front at Limanova. They were late with this attempt, because the troops of Lieutenant General Szurmay, who was defending the mountain passes in the Carpathians, saw the withdrawal of the Russian forces and without waiting for orders began to fo1low them. On the last day of the battle, December 11, he launched a sweeping attack against the Russians. With this attack, he prevented the Russians from employing four divisions against the defenders of Limanova. Brussilov realized that, instead of a breakthrough, his forces were bogged down in a disadvantageous position and he ordered his armies to retreat behind the Dunajec River.

The victory at Limanova, which frustrated Russia's hopes of continuing their great offensive al1 the way to Berlin, also saved Hungary from the threat of a Russian invasion. Genera1 Ruski, commander of the Russian northwest front, summarized the impact of the battle at Limanova:

"This was the first significant defeat which the Russian troops suffered from the joint Austro-Hungarian army. We expected complete victory; instead we lost and this loss occurred on the most sensitive part of our entire front line./36/"

The troops which had won this precious victory over the Russians were almost exc1usively the Hungarian regiments of the K.u.K. and Honved armies, under the command of Hungarian generals.

The Russian steamroller, however, did not run out of steam completely. During the summer of l916, Brussilov renewed his attack, now with great success, but at the price of terrible 1osses. By the end of August, having reached the general line of the San-Vistula Rivers, the Russian attack was stopped once again. The great Russian offensive produced little result in the field of military strategy, but great success in the field of grand strategy: It convinced the Romanian government to change sides and declare war on the Central Powers.

During the four years of World War I, Hungarian troops proved to be trustworthy successors to the old Hungarian military tradition: on the plains of Galicia, in the mountains of the

95

Carpathians, Tyrol and the Alps, they successfully withstood attacks by the numerically superior and better-equipped armies of the Entente powers. Even on the sea, as the Battle of Otranto proved, under the leadership of Navy Commander Nicholas Horthy (regent of Hungary after 1920), the Hungarian art of war still flourished.

During the war, Hungary provided additional units for both the Honvedseg and the K.u.K army./37/ The Honvedseg organized 16 new infantry regiments, 16 new artillery regiments, 12 heavy artillery regiments, one cavalry regiment, and 12 mountain artillery divisions. The K.u.K. Army received from Hungary 19 new infantry regiments, 3 rifle battalions, I bicycle battalion, and 57 artillery regiments equipped with different sizes of guns. A grand total of 3,382,000 men of the Hungarian kingdom served in the Joint Army during the four years of World War 1. They served with honor, "above and beyond the call of duty": The Austrian-Hungarian high command awarded close to 1.5 million medals of merit to the soldiers of the Hungarian units of the K.u.K. Army. At the same time, 467,552 officers and soldiers of the Honvedseg were decorated for courage. Not only individuals but entire regiments were recognized for that valiant fulfillment of their duties. Regrettably, the price of heroism was also very high: 739,594. (Dead, 116,762; unaccounted for, 41,419; wounded, 367,673; disabled by disease, 39,313; captured, 174,427) The Hungarian losses made up 14 per cent of the total losses of Austria-Hungary./38/

When the end came in 1918, it was not the result of lack of military virtues and expert generalship, but simply the law of greater numbers. There was no stab in the back by secret forces as later myth has tried to establish. The Central Powers simply could not continue their war against the entire world. Still, Hungarian soldiers provided admirable examples of courage, military virtue and genera1ship for the pages of military history.

96

A thousand years of the Hungarian art of war