István I. Mócsy:The Effects of World War I ...

[1.] ASzET, p. 253.

[2.] Szinai, Horthy Miklós titkos iratai, p. 14, n. 3. Cf. Hefty, Adatok, p. 37.

[3.] Gömbös, Egy magyar vezérkari tiszt, pp. 40-41.

4. Szabó and Pamlényi, Fejezetek, p. 63.

[5.] ASzET, pp. 71, 120, 134.

[6.] Gusztáv Gratz, A forradalmak kora: Magyarország története, 19181920 [The Age of the Revolutions: History of Hungary, 1918-1920] (Budapest, 1935). pp. 189-90, 195.

[7.] Ibid., p. 196. Count Pál Teleki had similar conversations with some American representatives. He reiterated to them the ABC's willingness to participate in a liberal coalition government-in-exile. See " Letter to Captain Gregory in Trieste from E Caskie, U.S. Food Commission. Vienna,'' 3 May 1919. MS, ARA-Paris, H 73, folio No. 2.

[8.] Lábay, Az ellenforradalom, p. 151.

[9.] Eva S. Balogh," The Hungarian Social Democratic Centre and the Fall of Béla Kun'' Canadian Slavonic Papers 18 (March 1976}: 15-35.

[10.] Miklós Kozma, Az összeomlás, 1918-1919 [The Collapse, 1918-1919] (Budapest, 1935), p. 207.

[11.] See Gratz, A forradalmak kora, p. 194. Deme and Keleti, Az ellenforradalom Vasvármegyében, p. 69.

[12.] For details of theBankgasse affair, see, Hefty, Adatok, pp. 42-43; László Koncsek, A rengassei összeesküvés [The Conspiracy of Rengasse] (Budapest, 1959), pp. 78 -86; IET I: 392-94. Not all the money, however, was used for the cause; some members of the ABC who had access to this money, especially members of the Szmrecsányi group, were later accused of squandering great sums on their own pleasures. Repeated parliamentary inquiries during the 1920s failed to uncover the truth about the disposal of these funds. Szmrecsányi and his followers, of course, denied any impropriety, and cleared their honor by fighting several duels with their accusers.

[13.] Hefty, Adatok. pp. 46-53; Gratz, A forradalmak kora p 199; Koncsek, A rengassei összeesküvés. pp. 142-48. What this group lacked in numbers they perhaps made up in prestige. Ten out of the 44 members were young aristocrats, among them three Count Zichys, Counts István Csáky, and József PálffyDuan, and Margrave György Pallavicini. Some participants in this affair, officers, such as the sadistic Count Hermann Salm, subsequently reemerged as members of the Prónay detachment.

[14.] Kövágó, A magyarországi délszlávok. p. 229. n. 170.

[15.] Ibid., p. 229. For a slightly different point of view see L. Nagy, Forradalom p. 132.

[16.] In addition, Brodmann and Stürgkh delivered about 300 guns and 50 men. Kövágó, A magyarországi délszlávok p. 233; see also, pp. 230-31.

[17.] Anton Lehár, Erinnerungen. Gegenrevolution und Restaurationsversuche in Ungarn,1918-1921 9 (Vienna,1973),pp. 83-86.

[18.] Dósa, A MOVE, p.65.

[19.] ASzET , p. 37.

[20.] Ibid., pp. 45-46;Lábay, Az ellenforradalom, p. 148.

[21.] During the interwar years, right-wing authors tried to minimize the role of these Jewish officers in ousting the Communists from Szeged. According to some liberal sources, two out of the five leaders of that countercoup, and 33 out of the 72 participants were Jewish. See Egyenlöség évkönyve és naptára, 1921[The Yearbook and Calendar of Equality, 1921] (Szeged, 1921), pp. 127-28 in ASzET p. 118. Cf.Jób Paál,A száz napos szegedi kormány [The Hundred-Day Government of Szeged] (Budapest, 1919), pp. 28-32.

[22.] Koréh,A székely hadosztá1y, II: 84.

[23.] MPL, pp. 398-99,ASzET , pp. 347-48. About 600 ultimately joined Horthy's National Army. Ibid., p. 348.

[24.] Gömbös,Egy magyar vezérkari tiszt, p. 44;Szabó and Pamlényi, Fejezetek, pp. 63-65; ASzET , p. 368.

[25.] Prónay, Fejezetek, p. 74.

[26.] According to the 1920 census figures, the population of Szeged was 118,000. Of these, 16,000 were born in the lost territories: about eight thousand in Yugoslavia, six thousand in Romania, and fewer than two thousand in Czechoslovakia. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal,Az 1920 évi népszámlálás,new series, 73 (Budapest, 1928), pp. 8-9. A comparison with the 1910 census figures seems to indicate that roughly six thousand of these settled in Szeged before 1910, mostly from the territories subsequently awarded to Yugoslavia; it shows that about 10,000 were refugees. In addition, however, an estimated three to four thousand refugees from the Successor States and 12-15,000 refugees from the Communist-held territories left Szeged at the time or soon after the departure of the National Army; thus, they were not included in the 1920 census figures. Szilveszter Somogyi, the mayor of Szeged, in 1919, estimated that the population of Szeged, including all the refugees, was around 150,000; an indication of a refugee population of around 35-40,000.ASzET , p. 303.

[27.] Ibid., pp. 348, 498.

[28.] Délmagyarország[South Hungary] (Szeged), June 26, 1919, abstracted inASzET, p. 305. Prónay, one of the chief instigators of these street attacks, regretted only that his plans of revenge became prematurely known. He wrote: "It proved to be a great error on our part, that is on the part of the counterrevolutionaries, to trumpet our intentions of revenge so loudly and so openly. We were still too weak, we did not even organize, and already we emphasized our intention of revenge when we came to power. There is an old folk saying: 'You cannot catch a sparrow with drums,'" Szabó and Pamlényi, Fejezetek, p. 75.

[29.] Szegedi Napló[Journal of Szeged], July 11, 1919, abstracted inASzET, p. 355. This paper argued that the refugees should depart, partly because of food shortages, but, more important, because far too many were undesirables. Its outburst was the sharpest against what the paper called the "piratic opportunism "of the refugee politicians, against those"well dressed gentlemen, who, armed with their noble patronymics," sought only to advance their own careers. Szegedi Napl6,June 29, 1919, inASzET,p. 312; also, pp. 237, 355.

[30.] The first anti-Communist group was formed by the liberals under the leadership of Lajos Varjassy and Lajos Pálmai. This group established contacts with the French, who suggested the formation of a countergovernment. Paál, A száz napos szegedi kormány,pp. 12-15. Cf.Albert Kaas and Fedor de Lazarovics, Bolshevism in Hungary. The Béla Kún Period (London, 1931), p. 278. Count Gyula Károlyi, a local magnate, was a moderate conservative politician -- a rather modest and retiring man, who assumed the post reluctantly. The Arad liberals'first candidate was Gábor Ugron, a moderate Transylvanian politician, who was rumored to be already marching against Budapest at the head of the Székely Division. The second choice was Lajos Návay, the former president of the Lower House, who was, however, captured as he traveled to Arad and executed by a Communist terror group. Károlyi's name came up only as an afterthought. Paál, A száz napos szegedi kormány, p. 19.

[31.] ASzET.pp. 257, 302, 334, 346.

[32.] See a confidential memorandum of the National Army, July 1919, in Tibor Hetés and Mrs. Tamás Morva, eds.,Csak szolgálati használatra! Iratok a Horthy-hadsereg történetéhez, 1919-1938 [For Service Use Only! Documents to the History of the Horthy army, 1919-1938] (Budapest, 1968), pp. 62-63. Henceforth cited asIHHT

33 .ASzET , p. 220. Also, Kaas and Lazarovics,Bolshevism in Hungary, p. 278.

[34.] The British and the Italians were promised by both the right-wing groups and by the Social Democrats to form a pro-British and pro-Italian government if their faction was helped to power. Dezsö Nemes, Az ellenforradalom története Magyarországon, 1919-1921,[History of the Counterrevolution in Hungary, 1919-1921] (Budapest, 1962), pp. 16-18. Colonel Cuninghame, head of the British mission in Vienna, maintained regular contacts with both the ABC and the moderate Socialists. He indicated that both a pro-British monarchist or a pro-British Socialist government would have been acceptable to his government. The United States also supported the idea of an all-Socialist government. Herbert Hoover's aide in Vienna, Captain Thomas Gregory, held several discussions to this effect with some of the moderate Social Democratic leaders. The Italian government even toyed with the idea of maintaining the Communists in power and supplied some arms to the Red Army.Herbert C. Hoover, An American Epic. Famine in Forty-five Nations. The Battle on the Front Line, 1914-1923 (Chicago, 1961) II: 126.

[35.] For the various Serbian-Hungarian contacts see ASzET, pp. 286-87, 371, 394, 430, 487; IHHT, pp. 63, 69-73. See also Nicholas Horthy,Memoirs (London, 1956), p. 101; Paál,A száz napos szegedi kormány, pp. 56-57.

[36.] ASzET, p. 482; IHHT, pp. 65-66.

[37.] ASzET, pp. 145, 148, 160, 162, 207. Such a union sacrée was already formed in Arad even before the establishment of the Károlyi government; yet, in Szeged, where the liberal and extreme right split was much more intense, it was difficult to achieve cooperation. Paál, A száz napos szegedi kormány, p. 18.

[38.] ASzET, pp. 119-20, 134, 160.

[39.] For the text of the proclamation, see, ibid., pp. 207-208. Also in Kaas and Lazarevics,Bolshevism in Hungary, Appendix, nos. 24 and 26, pp. 399-401.

[40.] Szabó and Pamlényi, Fejezetek, p. 90;ASzET, pp. 209-210.

[41.] A Solemn Memorandum of the Jewish citizens of Szeged," (in Hungarian) June 23, 1919, ibid., pp. 299-300.

[42.] Ibid., p. 362. Also, Kaas,Bolshevism in Hungary, p. 285.

[43.] Letter from the Székely National Council to Károlyi, see ASzET, p. 575. See also, pp. 574-75, 211.

[44.] Minutes of the Ministerial Council, June 13, 1919, ibid., p. 269: see also, p. 270.

[45.] Ibid., p. 243.

[46.] Hefty, Adatok, pp. 82-84.

[47.] Minutes of the Ministerial Council, June 29, 1919, ASzET, pp. 314-17; Minutes of the Ministerial Council, July 12, 1919, ibid., p. 356. For repeated French demands of changes in the composition of the government see ibid., pp. 257, 300, 327, 334, 346. See also Gömbös. Egy magyar vezérkari tiszt, p. 58; ASzET, pp. 398-49.

[48.] IET 1: 120.

[49.] Ibid., p. 122; alsoASzET,p. 472.

[50.] Gömbös,Egy magyar vezérkari tiszt, p. 52.

[51.] Naively, some of the refugees assumed that once the standards of counterrevolution were raised the majority of the people, and especially the peasantry, would rally around the flag. See letter of American chargé d'affaires Dodge to Paris, April 11, 1919. ARA -- Paris -- H73, folio no. 2.

[52.] ASzET, p. 145.

[53.] Among the confiscated arms in question there were 6512 German, Austrian, and even Mexican rifles and carbines, 52 machine guns of similar variety, and 29 artillery pieces. From this, on August 8, 1919, the National Army finally received 5428 rifles, all the machine guns, and 9 artillery pieces. Ibid., p. 451.

[54.] From the approximately 24-million crowns collected, excluding Teleki's three million, the ministries of interior and defense spent together 21.5-million crowns. Ibid., p. 504.

[55.] Ibid., pp. 590-92. Cf. IHHT, pp. 57-61.

[56.] According to a contemporary police report, the workers of Szeged threatened to desert and join the Red Army if they were drafted into the National Army. IHHT, p. 61.

[57.] György Borsányi, ed.,Páter Zadravecz titkos naplója [Secret Diary of Father Zadravecz] (Budapest, 1967), pp. 238-39.

[58.] ASzET, pp. 492493.

[59.] Some estimates of the number of officers in Szeged go as high as 3500, but this figure may be an exaggeration. Lábay, Az ellenforradalom, p. 158.Cf. Kozma, Az összeomlás, p. 301.

[60.] ASzET, pp. 592-93.

[61.] Ibid., pp. 495-96. Szabó and Pamlényi,Fejezetek, p. 70. In the Ostenburg detachment, the old "k. und k. spirit," the spirit of the joint army, and the German element were stronger than in the Prónay company. A large contingent of officers in the Ostenburg detachment were refugee Transylvanian Saxons. Ibid., p. 166.

[62.] For a complete list of the names of the original Prónay detachment at Szeged seeASzET, p. 495. Hefty argues that even a higher percentage, about three-fourth came from the ranks of the gentry. Hefty,Adatok, p. 77. Cf. Szabó and Pamlényi, Fejezetek, p. 30.

[63.] Ibid., p. 91.

[64.] British Joint Labour Delegation to Hungary, The White Terror in Hungary (London, 1920), p. 11.

[65.] ASzET, pp. 523-24.

[66.] Koréh, A székely hadosztály II: 183-84. Also,IHHT, p. 75.

[67.] Lehár,Erinnerungen, pp. 93, 118.

[68.] For instructions of the National Army concerning the necessity of cooperation with the Romanians, see. IHHT, pp. 77-78.

[69.] Kozma, Az összeomlás, p. 380.

Chapter 8

[1.] According to some estimates, over 100.000 individuals fled from Hungary after the victory of the right. Böhm, Két forradalom,p. 478. A more recent estimate put the number of those new refugees at 140,000. Ágnes Godó."A Horthy-rendszer kalandor háborús tervei, 1919-1921" [The Planned Military Adventures of the Horthy Regime, 1919-1921]Hadtörténeti közlemények [Bulletins of Military History] VIII, no. 1 (1961): 140.

[2.] IET I 110-15.

[3.] Nemes, Az ellenforradalom története, p. 32.

[4.] Balogh."The Hungarian Social Democratic Centre,'' pp. 28-35.

[5.] For a discussion of Romanian and Allied roles in the overthrow of the Peidl government, see Eva S. Balogh, Romanian and Allied Involvement in the Hungarian Coup d'Etat of 1919.''East European QuarterlyIX. no. 3 (1975): 299-307.

[6.] IET 1: 125.

[7.] Ibid., pp. 182-83, 211-12.

[8.] On August 22, 1919, the Zionist Organization of Hungary made a special appeal to Friedrich in which they gratefully remembered his past efforts to help the Jews,including his attempt at organizing the Zionist Guards immediately after the October Revolution, and offered to use the considerable financial resources of the Jewish community to support his government. That is, the Jewish upper bourgeoisie lined up behind Friedrich. Ibid., pp. 123-24.

[9.] IHHT,pp. 84-85; Ladányi, Az egyetemi ifjúság, p. 25.

[10.] Ibid., pp. 81-82.

[11.] IET1: 122.

[12.] This party was first established in February 1919 by the Bethlen faction, but it remained dormant during the time of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. In the original party, the Transylvanian group was dominant, in the one established in September 1919, that group no longer occupied a central position.

[13.] Horthy retained this admiration of the emperor to the end of his life. As he wrote in his memoirs: "His Majesty had been my great teacher, to whom I knew that I owed much. How often had I not, in performing my task as Regent, asked myself, 'What would His Majesty Francis Joseph have done in a case like this?' Even after his death, I continued to trust in his wisdom, and I have never regretted that I retained so many of his arrangements, tested by centuries of use, in dealing with Hungarian problems." Horthy, Memoirs,pp. 152-53.

[14.] See, for example,IHHT, pp. 14-16.

[15.] From Kaposvár, for example, Prónay was forced to withdraw under pressure of the local authorities and the local nobility, who were opposed to the terror he was instigating. Szabó and Pamlényi, Fejezetek. p. 125.

[16.] Nemes, Az ellenforradalom története p. 121. The expansion of the army continued even after November 1919. When Horthy marched into Budapest. By mid-1920 it stood around80-90,000 men. Ibid.,p. 388. For the merger of Horthy's and Lehár's forces, see IHHT, p. 91.

[17.] The report explains that except for the Székelys, most men joined the gendarmerie not from conviction, but because service was the only available livelihood for these people, Ibid., pp. 149-50.

[18.] IET I: 187-88.

[19.] Ibid., p. 188, n. 1. Similarly. the officers' detachments had to be also renamed. IHHT, pp. 106-108.

[20.] All draftees had to be classified according to their political reliability. IET 1: 191. See alsoIHHT,pp. 101, 131-32.

[21.] IET I: 183-84.

[22.] IHHT,p. 14.

[23.] IET I:194-95.

[24.] The most important of these were: cutting wages roughly in half;IET I: 129, 138; elimination of unemployment compensation in view of severe large-scale unemployment, (ibid.. p. 128); and dismissal of dangerous workers. Some officers wished to minimize the political danger presented by the mass unemployment by drafting workers into the army: by using them as forced laborers on reconstruction projects, or as supplementary farm workers on the large estates. Ibid.. pp. 23, 135. Tibor Eckhardt, a close associate of Horthy believed that this would be advantageous because the drafted workers "if not in name, but in fact would be interned and the problem of their political supervision would be easily solved." Ibid., p. 147.

[25.] For examples of this special relation see IHHT, pp. 151, 166.

[26.] Szabó and Pamlényi, Fejezetek, p. 103. These claims of Prónay are confirmed by the official instruction issued to the First Division by General Károly Soós on August 7, 1919.IHHT,pp. 80 81.

[27.] Edgar von Schmidt-Pauli,Nikolaus von Horthy (Hamburg, 1942). p. 160, quoted in Horthy, Memoirs, p. 106.

[28.] IET I: 155.

[29.] Ibid., p. 107.

[30.] Szabó and Pamlényi,Fejezetek, p. 113.

[31.] György Száraz. Egy elöitélet nyomában [Tracing a Prejudice] (Budapest, 1976), p. 212.

[32.] FRUSPPC XII: 695. The British military observers similarly denied the White Terror's existence. See report of Admiral Ernest Troubridge in [British Foreign Office]Report on the Alleged Existence of "White Terror" in Hungary (London, 1920), pp. 95. A similar report was also sent by General Reginald Gorton to his military superiors. Ibid.

[33.] FRUS PPC XII: 695. Cf. IET I: 162.

[34.] Lehár,Erinnerungen! pp. 99-100. See also, Kádár, ALudovikától Sopronköhidáig, pp. 121. 124.

[35.] FRUS PPC XII: 708.

[36.] A reference to the practice of throwing bodies of murdered victims into the Danube. IET I: 167. See also Markvits, Magyar pokol, pp. 95-96.

[37.] Both the government and the military tried to convince Sir George Clerk that the Social Democratic Party and the liberals were most unpopular in the country, that they had no political base outside of Budapest. To underline their arguments, they instructed the provincial authorities, county officials, military commanders, to send delegations of respectable citizens as well as letters and telegrams with similar messages. IET 1: 20F10.

István I. Mócsy:The Effects of World War I ...