|István I. Mócsy:The Effects of World War I ...|
[1.] István Bethlen, Bethlen Islván grófbeszédei és írásai[Speeches and Writings of Count István Bethlen] (Budapest, 1933),1:286.
[*] The Kingdom of the Serbs. Croats and Slovenes was formally proclaimed on December 4. 1918. For the sake of brevity the term iYugoslav' will be applied when referring to this Kingdom.
[1.] Emil Petrichevich-Horváth,ed., Jelentés azOrszágos Menekültügyi Hivalal négy évimüködéséröl [Report on the Four Years of Operation of the National Refugee Office](Budapest, 1924). p. 37. Henceforth cited as OMH Report.
[2.] For functions of 0MH see, Hivatalos Kiadványok ,A m. kir. ministerelnök 3240/1920számú rendelete az OrszágosMenekültügyi Hivatal (O.M.H.) szervezéséröl [The Royal Hungarian Prime Minister's Edict, Numbered 3240/1920, on the Organization of the National Refugee Office (O.M.H.)] (Budapest,1920 ).
[3.] As early as 1916, at the time of the Romanian invasion of Transylvania, a refugee organization was established which continued to function to the end of the war. In 1918, a number of politicai organizations also came to life to promote the defense of Transylvania and to function as refugee aid offices.
[4.] O.M.H. Report, pp. 10 -11.
[5.] Magyar Királyi Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, Recensement de la population en 1920, New Series, 93 (Budapest, 1928),pp. 8 - 9.
[6.] OHM Report, p. 37.
[7.]Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference [ Delegation Information Supplementars Document(Budapest, 1920),] 11. The Peace Delegation statistics reflect only the strength of positive and negative internal migrations (gains and losses). county by county, but do not provide absolute figures. Those can be found only among the raw data of the 1910 census. They were. nevertheless, useful as controlling figures for the establishment of representative sample communities and districts. The results of our calculations had to be further modified, taking into consideration internal migration between 1910 and 1914, which we assumed to be similar to the rate of the 1900 and 1910 period. and especially the heavy movement of population during the war years. These figures, of course, still, do not reflect those individuals who went to inner Hungary temporarily during the war, but were prevented from returning to their homes by the establishment of new frontiers.
[8.] In comparing the 1910 statistics with those of the postwar period, adjustments had to be made to account for the change of population due to natural causes. Between 1910 and 1914 the birth rate, and therefore the increase of population, continued roughly at the rate of the preceding decade; it declined sharply during the war years, and during the immediate postwar years, owing to the absence of males, malnutrition, higher infancy mortality rate, and epidemics. In addition the 66l,00l military losses of Trianon Hungary had to be taken into account. See József Kovácsics, ed., Magyarország történeti demográfiája, Magyarország népesedése a honfoglalástól 1949-ig [Historical Demography of Hungary; The Population of Hungary from the Time of Conquest to 19491 (Budapest, 1963). pp. 229-38. Also, László Buday, Megcsonkitott Magyarország [Dismembered Hungary] (Budapest, 1920), pp. 36-39.
[9.] Raw data was obtained from the following sources: books quoted in note 8; Károly Kugotowitz, Etnographical Map of Hungary (Budapest, 1929); Cechoslovakische Statistic, vol. 9, series VI: Volkszählung in der Tschechoslovakischen Republikvom 15 Febr. 1921, part I (Prague, 1924); Lászlo Fritz, Az erdélyi magyarság lélekszáma és megoszlása [The Numbers and Territorial Distribution of the Transylvanian Hungarians] (Kolozsvár, 1930); Elemér Jakabffy, Erdély statisztikája [Statistics of Transylvania] (Lugos. 1923).
[10.] In Hungary, as in most multinational states, a large number of individuals were of doubtful national origin: therefore, they easily passed for Hungarians. These individuals, such as those with mixed parentage, benefited from declaring themselves Hungarian before the war. It was only natural for them to change their nationality to Slovak, Ruthenian, Romanian, Serbian or Croatian after the change of regimes. But the largest single block of Hungarian minorities where the change of nationality adversely affected its numerical strength was the Jews. In 1910 most Jews of Hungary were recorded as Hungarians, but in the Successor States a great majority of them was carried in the statistics as a separate minority. This, alone, in the case of Czechoslovakia, accounts for the "loss" of 94,000 Hungarians; and in Transylvania, of 125.000. Iván Nagy, A magyarság világstatisztikája [World Statistics of Hungarians] (Budapest, 1930). pp. 12, 23. Similarly, many half-assimilated Germans, who claimed to be Hungarians in 1910, were recorded as Germans in the Successor States. Adjustments were made for several other factors, such as the natural increase of population, which was significant, however, only in the case of Romania. Further adjustments had to be made for Hungarian emigration during the postwar years. The unreliability of data on the number of individuals who migrated into the former Hungarian territories from the prewar kingdoms of Romania and Serbia created the greatest difficulty.
[11.] OHM Report, p 37. It should be noted that figures in the report were added incorrectly.
[1.] For details of the immediate repercussions of the dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy see Béla K. Király, Peter Pastor, and Ivan Sanders, eds., Essays on World War 1: Total War and Peace Making; A Case Study of Trianon (Boulder, Colo., l983). For discussion of Western war aims and approach to peacemaking see Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919 (New York, 1967); W. H. Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy. 1914-1978 (Oxford, 1971): Wilfred Fest, Peace or Partition: The Habsburg Monarchy and British Policy 1914-1918 (New York, 1978); Kenneth J. Calder, Britain and the Origins of the New Europe. 1914-1918 (Cambridge, 1976).
[2.] Peter Pastor, Hungary between Wilson and Lenin: The Hungarian Revolution of 1918-1919 and the Big Three (Boulder, Colo., 1976), p. 40.
[3.] U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919 (Washington, D.C., 1942), II: 175-82. Henceforth cited as FRUS PPC.
[4.] For reasons of delay in reaching agreement see Vilmos Böhm, Két forradalom tüzében, októberi forradalom, proletárdiktatura, ellenforradalom [In the Crossfire of Two Revolutions, The October Revolution, Dictatorship of the Proletariat, Counterrevolution] (Vienna, 1923), pp. 68-71. Cf. Oscar Jászi, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary (New York, 1969). pp. 53-54; Michael Károlyi, Faith Without Illusion: Memoirs of Michael Károlyi (London, 1956), pp. 130-37. See also, Pastor, Hungary between Wilson and Lenin pp. 60-66; Zsuzsa L. Nagy, A párizsi békekonferencia és Magyarország, 1918-1919 [The Paris Peace Conference and Hungary, 19181919] (Budapest, 1965), pp. 8- 12.
[5.] For text of the Belgrade Military Convention see FRUS PPC II: 183-85.
[6.] Ibid., pp. 183, 185. For an interpretation of these lines see Jászi, Revolution pp. 57-59: see also, D. Perman, The Shaping of the Czechoslovak State: Diplomatic History of the Boundaries of Czechoslovakia, 1914-1920 (Leiden, 1962), p. 79.
[7.] László Kövágó, A magyarországi délszlávok 1918-1919-ben [South Slavs of Hungary during 1918-1919] (Budapest, 1964), pp. 58-59.
[8.] Ibid., p. 61. See also, László Kövágó, A Magyarországi Tanácsköztársaság és a nemzeti kérdés [The Hungarian Soviet Republic and the Nationality Question] (Budapest, 1979), p. 8.
[11.] József Breit, A magyarországi 1918-l919 évi forradalmi mozgalmak és a vörös háború története I: A Károlyi korszak föbb eseményei [Hungarian Revolutionary Movements of 1918 -19 and the History of the Red War. Vol. I: Main Events of the Károlyi Era (Budapest. 1929), pp. 115-16. See also Leslie Charles Tihany, The Baranya Dispute. 1918-1921: Diplomacy in the Vortex of Ideologies (Boulder, 1978), p. 18
[12.] Already, in 1915, the k. und k. army suffered mass desertion of peasant soldiers. The number of deserters, in 1915, was 26,251; in 1917, it rose to 81,605: during the first three months of 1918 alone. there were as many as 44,611. Tibor Hajdu, Az öszirózsás forradalom [Revolution of White Hollyhocks] (Budapest, 1963), pp. 48-49. Out of an estimated 400,000 deserters about 200,000 were South Slavs. József Galántai, Magyarország az elsö világháborúban, 1914-1918 [Hungary in the First World War, 1914-1918] (Budapest, 1974), pp. 396-97. Deserters presented a major security problem to the Hungarian authorities and were the first troops to rally to the flags of the secessionists .
[13.] Jászi, Revolution p. 61.
[14.] Tibor Hajdu, Az 1918-as magyarországi polgári demokratikus forradalom [The 1918 Hungarian Bourgeois Democratic Revolution] (Budapest, 1968), pp. 97-98.
[15.] See Royal Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hungarian Peace Delegation at Neuilly s/S, from January to March 1920 (Budapest, 1921) I: 366- 67. Henceforth cited as HPN. See also, Kövágó, A magyarorszagi délszlávok, pp. 95-96.
[16.]Breit, A magyarországi 1918 - 19 évi forradalmi mozgalmak, 1: 116. For the repeated but fruitless protests of the Hungarian government see Enclosures to Note IX, HPN I: 360, 362, 368. As a result of the occupation of the Muraköz, an estimated 5300 individuals became refugees.
[17.]The first group of legionnaires left Vladivostok on January 15, 1919 and arrived in Naples only on March 11. Thus. the legionnaires could not be used until late spring or early summer.
[18.]Zoltán Szviezsényi,Hogyan veszett el a Felvidék? [How was Upper Hungary Lost?] (Budapest, 1921), p. 84.
[19.]Ferenc Boros,Magyar-csehszlovák kapcsolatok 1918-1919-ben[Hungarian-Czechoslovak Relations during 1918 -1919, (Budapest, 1970), p. 11.
[20.]Jenö Horváth, A trianoni béke megalkotása; 1915-1920.Diplomáciai történelmi tanulmány[The Creation of the Treaty of Trianon. A Study in Diplomatic History] (Budapest, 1924), p. 22.
[21.]Pastor, Hungary between Wilson and Lenin, p. 70; L. Nagy. A párizsi békekonferencia, p. 29.
[22.]Fest,Peace of Partition, p. 255.
[23.]Perman, The Shaping of the Czechoslovak State, p. 88.
[24.]Enclosure LXXI to Note IX,HPN 1: 383 - 84.
[25.]For details of negotiations see Boros,Magyar-csehszlovák kapcsolatok, pp. 44-48: Pastor, Hungary between Wilson and Lenin, p. 84;Hajdu,Károlyi Mihály, pp. 272, 300.
[26.]Enclosure CXXII and CXXIII to Note IX, HPN l: 384-85.
[27.]Breit,A magyarországi 1918/19 évi forradalmi mozgalmakl; 86, 88, 91. Also, Eduard Benes, My War Memoirs (London, 1928), p. 48;: R. W. SetonWatson, ed., Slovakia, Then and Now (London, 1931), p. 20.
[28.]Gyula Lábay. Az ellenforradalom története az oktoberi forradalomtól a kommün bukásáig [History of the Counterrevolution from the October Revolution to the Collapse of the Commune (Budapest, 1922), p. 3.
[29.]Szmrecsányi had estimated that 10 - 12,000 men would be sufficient to throw back the Czechs; he intended using the rest of his forces to carry out his counterrevolutionary designs. Istvan Friedrich, then undersecretary of war, was informed of these plans and promised Szmrecsányi weapons and officers to organize that army. Lábay,Az ellenforradalom története, pp. 5-6. Also, Béla Kelemen,Adatok a szegedi ellenforradalom és a szegedi kormány történetéhez [Documents to the History of the Counterrevolution and of the Government of Szeged] (Szeged, 1923), p. 368. Henceforth, cited as ASzET. Szmrecsányi also had contacts with Gyula Gömbös, leader of the rightist officers' association, MOVE. Richard Hefty,Adatok az ellenforradalom történetéhez[Facts to the History of the Counterrevolution] (Budapest, 1920), p. 20.
[30.]Nearly all the city officials of higher ranks fled the city, leaving only a few clerks behind. László Hangel, ed.,Mit élt át a Felvidék?[What did Upper Hungary Endure?] (Budapest, 1939), p. 460.
[31.]László Boros, ed.,Magyar politikai lexikon, 1914-1929[Lexicon of Hungarian Politics, 1914-1929] (Budapest, 1929), p. 330. Henceforth cited as MPL. From the students of the Forestry College, a battalion of 800 men was formed, but it was disarmed by the government before it could be used in defense of the city. Nonetheless, the students fled to inner Hungary. Szviezsényi,Hogyan veszett el a Felvidék, p. 88.
[32.]MPL, p. 122; Hangel,Mit élt át a Felvidék, p. 566.
[33.]In late 1919, he was arrested by the Romanian military authorities and charged with inciting the Ruthenian population to armed resistance. MPL, p. 252-53. For a detailed examination of the transfer of Ruthenia to Czechoslovakia see Paul R. Magocsi, The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948 (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), pp. 85-102; for the activities of Kutkafalvy: ibid., pp. 203, 312. A group of pro-Hungarian Slovaks with Hungarian backing tried to prevent union of Upper Hungary with Bohemia and Moravia by declaring Slovakia's independence. This group's leader, Gyözö Dvorcsák, was condemned to death by Czech courts, but managed to escape to Poland, and then to Hungary, where he was elected to the National Assembly in 1920. MPL, p. 96.
[34.]Szmrecsányi, Beniczky, Pethes. Kutkafalvy, and Dvorcsák became members of the National Assembly; Fornet remained in the county administration and, later, was rewarded with a seat in the Upper House.
[35.]Seventeen allied divisions were concentrated around Hungary -- six Romanian, four Serbian, four Czech, and three French. Böhm,Két forradalom, p. 327. Cf. Ervin Liptai,A Magyar Tanácsköztársaság[The Hungarian Soviet Republic] (Budapest, l958), p. 269.
[36.]Galántai,Magyarország, pp. 190-92, 236.
[37.]Ibid., pp. 351-52.
[38.]No ethnic, only historical differences exist between Hungarians and Székelys. Székelys are Hungarian residents of eastern Transylvania, who in the past enjoyed certain privileges. We refer to the entire area ceded to Romania as Transylvania only for the sake of convenience. Historically, that is inaccurate. In addition to Transylvania, Romania was also awarded a broad strip of the Great Hungarian Plains adjacent to Transylvania . This area always formed a part of inner Hungary. Whenever necessary, to distinguish between the two regions, we shall refer to Transylvania proper as historical Transylvania.
[39.]In mid-1919 the székely akció still had 30-million crowns in its treasury. It was used, in part, to finance the counterrevolutionary National Army of Szeged. ASzET, p. 300.
[40.]This offer may have been made, though it is not confirmed by reliable sources . Nevertheless, at the time, many Hungarians believed it.
[41.]FRUS PPC II: 183-85.
[42.]In the mixed Hungarian and Romanian Arad county, for example, by the end of December, out of 45 gendarmerie stations only seven were still manned. Hajdu, Az 1918-as magyarországi polgári demokratikus forradalom, p. 102.
[43.]Miron Constantinescu et al, Unification of the Romanian National State: The Union of Transylvania with Old Romania (Bucharest, 1971), p. 235.
[44.]Zoltán Szász, "Az erdélyi román polgárság szerepéröl 1918 öszén" [On the Role of the Transylvanian Romanian Bourgeoisie during the Fall of 1918], Századok 106, no. 2 (1972): 328-29. Cf. Constantinescu, Unification, pp. 265-66.
[45.]Ibid., p. 244; Pastor,Hungary between Wilson and Lenin,pp. 72-74.
[46.]Robert Braun,Magyarország feldarabolása és a nemzetiségi kérdés [Dismemberment of Hungary and the Nationality Question] (Budapest, 1919). p. 45. Cf. FRUS PPC II: 394, Also, Constantinescu, Unification, p. 252.
[47.]FRUS PPC II: 396.
[48.]This decree was published on December 26. But France , along with the other Western Powers, refused to recognize its validity . As the French ambassador to the United States wrote to the secretary of state:"This has , in the eyes of my Govt. no consequence one way or the other from the international point of view, for such an annexation cannot be consecrated by Romania alone, but by the general Treaty of Peace.", Ibid., p. 404.
[49.]By the end of December 1700 Székelys were serving in the division. Gradually its strength grew to 10,000. Breit,A magyarországi 1918/19-i forradalmi mozgalmak I: 37. Also, Endre Koréh,Erdélyért: A székely hadosztály és dandár története, 1918 -1919 [For Transylvania: History of the Székely Division and Brigade, 1918 -1919] (2nd ed., Budapest, 1929) I: 36-37, 47.
[50.]Enclosures XLVI-L to Note IX, HPN I: 371-74.
[51.]Koréh,A székely hadosztály I: 154, l68.
52.Breit.A Magyarországi 1918-19-i forradalmi mozgalmak I:Appendix 15. p. 208.
[53.]Enclosure LIV to Note IX. HPN I: 374-75.
[54.]Koréh,A székely hadosztály I: 146.
[55.]Ibid., p. 169.
[56.]Among the victims 14 were women; 32 persons, above the age of 60. Ibid. II: 48-52, 54.
[57.]Peace Conference Delegation.Atrocities Committed by Romanians and Czechs. Memorandum to the Mandatories of the Associated Powers at Budapest re. the Abuses Perpetrated by the Powers of Occupation in the Territories Subjected to Czecho-Slovak and Romanian Administration(N.p.,n.d. );Appendix 2, p. 10.
[58.]Commenting on the lack of mass support for the Székely Division. on June l0), 1919. Samu Barabás, a refugee Calvinist minister from Kolozsvár, wrote in his journal: "At the beginning of recruiting the public mood was the worst possible. With the October Revolution the people felt themselves liberated from the burden of work, discipline, and duty.... Upon the promise of land distribution . . . the ancient hostility between noble and peasant sharpened, resulting in a social paralysis." Defense of the nation's frontiers was viewed by the peasants as a problem concerning only the nobility. Koréh.A székely hadosztály I: 215-17.
[59.]Annex 6 to Note VIII, HPN I: 215. Also, Breit, A magyarországi 1918/19-i forradalmi mozgalmak III: 84. The Székely Division's desertion came at the height of the military crisis caused by the powerfully reinforced Romanian army's renewed attack in mid-April.
[60.]See Koréh, A székely hadosztály I: 200, 211; II: 152.
[1.]FRUS PPC II: 183.
[2.]Stefan Pascu. "The National Unity of the Romanians and the Breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.'' Austrian History Yearbook IV-V (1968-1969): 82.
[3.]Harold Nicolson,Peacemaking 1919 (New York. 1965), p. 279.
[4.]Plans to invade Slovakia were drawn up by some of the refugee organizations and were considered in the highest Hungarian circles, even by Horthy himself. Dezsö Nemes, Iratok az ellenforradalom történetéhez 1919-1945 [Documents to the History of the Counterrevolution 1919-1945] (Budapest, 1956) I: 200-207, especially pp. 205-206. Henceforth cited as IET. For later invasion plans see Miklós Szinai and László Szücs. eds., Horthy Miklós titkos iratai [Secret Papers of Miklós Horthy] (Budapest, 1963), pp. 74 - 81.
[5.]HPPC, Supplementary Documents, no . 9. This ratio was even higher in the old minority areas.
[6.]Peace Conference Delegation,Atrocities p. 10.
[7.]Buday,Megcsonkított Magyarország, p. 260.
[8.]See Notes 173, 325, 345, and 400, HPN II: 485, 529-30, 533, 542.
[9.]Seton-Watson.Slovakia, p. 215.
[10.] Ibid., pp. 217, 221.
[11.]Peace Conference Delegation,Atrocities, p. 1. As the Hungarian Peace Delegation in Paris protested: "The Czecho-Slovak and Romanian Governments compel the Hungarian officials, professors and teachers __ under charge of instant dismissal and expulsion -- to take the oath of allegiance to the Czecho-Slovak and Romanian State respectively, this being a manifest infraction of Article 45 of the Hague Convention."
[12.]Tivadar Battyány. Beszámolóm[My Report](Budapest, 1927) I: 298-99.
[13.]HPPC, Supplementary Documents, no. 16. To be sure, a large number of state officials had a Slovak ethnic background. Most were assimilated Slovaks who, in 1910, declared themselves to be Hungarian.
[14.]The Czechs and Slovaks disagreed on the level of development of Slovakia. The Czechs always preferred to paint Slovakia's backwardness in the blackest colors, and their views found their way into Western historical literature. According to one assertion, in 1918, only 500 Slovaks had the requisite education to perform administrative duties. Seton-Watson.Slovakia, p. 219. In another work he wrote: "the number of educated and nationally conscious Slovaks in 1918 did not exceed 750 to 1000!" R. W. Seton-Watson, History of the Czechs and Slovaks(London, 1943). p. 323. Slovakia's backwardness served as a justification for domination of Slovakia by Czechs. At least that was the view of the Slovaks. They resented both the implications of Czech cultural superiority and Prague's paternalism. See Joseph Mikus, Slovakia;A Political History: 1918-1950 (Milwaukee, 1963), pp. 26-37. The Czechs promised to withdraw their officials as soon as native Slovaks were trained, but even in 1938 about 121,000 Czechs lived in Slovakia, while unemployment was high among Slovak intellectuals. S. Harrison Thomson, Czechoslovakia in European History (Princeton, 1943), p. 292.
[15.]Seton-Watson, Slovakia, pp. 245-47. For other repressive measures against Hungarian officials see Annex I to Note IX, Notes LXXVIII and XCI, HPN I: 355-56, 387, 393;also, Note 334, II: 512.
[16.]Buday,Megcsonkított Magyarország, p. 260.
[17.]See Enclosures I-VIII to Note LXIV, HPN 1: 379-81; also, Notes LXII and LXIV, pp. 378-79. The demand of loyalty oath illustrates the prevailing legal confusion. It was logical to demand such oaths if the Romanian government still considered the population of Transylvania citizens of the Hungarian state. If, on the other hand, the Royal Proclamation of Union accomplished the annexation of the region, the population, including ethnic Hungarians, should have automatically acquired Romanian citizenship. That would have made such an oath superfluous.
[18.]Peace Conference Delegation,Atrocities, p. 7. In Fogaras out of 6000 Hungarians about 1000 were forced to leave.
[19.]Ibid., p. 11.
[20.]Zsombér Szász,Erdély Romaniában.Népkisebbségi tanulmány [Transylvania in Romania. A National Minority Study] (Budapest, 1929), p. 82.
[21.] Ibid., pp. 83-84.
[22.] HPPC, Supplementary Documents, nes. 2.
[23.] Ibid., no. 15.
[24.]See Notes LXI and LXVIII in HPN 1: 377,382; note 333, II: 513. See also, Seton-Watson.A History of Czechs and Slovaks, p. 323.
[25.]The lower literacy rate among some Hungarian national minorities was viewed by the Successor States as evidence of a deliberate antiminority policy by the prewar Hungarian regime. The great divergence of literacy among the different national groups, however, contradicts that thesis. Correlation between literacy and the level of economic development of a particular region is far stronger than between literacy rate and the state's nationality policy. Thus, in the more developed Nyitra county, 80.5 percent of Slovaks could read and write, whereas in the remote Zemplén county, the rate was 41.5 percent. Similarly. in Temes county, 40,1 percent of the Romanians were literate; in Szolnok-Doboka county, only 14.7 percent. Illiteracy was also high among the Hungarian agrarian proletariat working on the large estates. This further underlines the argument that the reason for some groups' educational backwardness among the national minorities was due to economic causes, to the survival of an antiquated social system.
[26.]HPN,III/A: 264-65. At the time of compilation of these statistics, the Bánát was still claimed by both Yugoslavia and Romania. Hence, the disputed area was carried in a separate column.
[27.]Seton-Watson. Slovakia, p. 125.
[28.]The dismissed teachers, furthermore, were encouraged to leave Slovakia by the refusal of the state to honor its pension obligations. The dismissal notice normally ended with the statement: "As regarding your claims to a pension you are referred to the Hungarian Government, which at the same time is informed by us of your dismissal." Peace Conference Delegation,Atrocities, p. 9.
[29.]Andor Ladányi, Az egyetemi ifjúság az ellenforradalom elsö éveiben (1919-1921) [University Students during the First Years of the Counterrevolution (1919-1921)] (Budapest, 1979), p. 12.
[30.]Magyar Sorskérdések, A jugosláviai magyarság helyzete [Conditions of Hungarians in Yugoslavia] (Budapest, 1941), p. 14.
[31.]A number of denominational schools were financed by the Hungarian state, which were treated by the Romanian government as state schools. In some statistics these schools appear as denominational while in others as state schools.
[32.] Szász.Erdély Romániában, p. 233.
[34.]Romaniaexpropriated 95.5 percent (277,645 yokes) of landed property of the Catholic Church. Protestant churches lost 45.2 percent (36,686 yokes) oftheir lands. Nicholas Móricz , The Fate of the Transylvanian Soil: A Brief Account of the Romanian Land Reform of 1921 (Budapest, 1934), p. 81.
[36.] Ladányi,Az Egyetemi ifjúság, p. 12.
[37.] OHMReport, p.37.
[38.] Buday,Megcsonkított Magyarország, p. 260
|István I. Mócsy:The Effects of World War I ...|