![[Table of Contents]](../icons/toc.gif){kind=icon}
![[Previous]](../icons/back.gif){kind=icon}
![[Next]](../icons/next.gif){kind=icon}
![[HMK Home]](../icons/home.gif){kind=icon}
|
HUNGARY IN THE MIRROR OF THE WESTERN WORLD |
The Kadar Government and the Soviet Government maintained the assertion that the planning of all revolutionary activities took place in Western Europe and in the United States and was financed by the United States. In the memorandum of February 4, 1957, the Hungarian delegate to the United Nations in behalf of the Kadar Government stated that many weapons captured from the revolutionary fighters were manufactured in the West. Spokesmen for the Kadar and Soviet views declared that Radio Free Europe, financed and directed by the U.S., played a part in inciting the riots, prolonging them and giving instructions to the movement concerning targets to be attacked by the rioters.
The Committee investigated the Soviet assertion that the uprising was planned, directed and armed by agents of the West. The Committee found proof that the demonstrations of October 23rd were peaceful and the weapons used by the revolutionaries had come from depots known by the workers and from the Hungarian military and police forces who sided with the demonstrators.
In connection with the Soviet allegations that armed fascists entered the country from Austria, it is important to recognize that Austria, in order to maintain absolute neutrality, created a zone on the Hungarian border which was inspected by military attaches stationed in Vienna. The Austrians reported that when Ferenc Nagy unexpectedly arrived in Austria, the Austrian Government forbade his entry into Hungary.
Russian statements that many airplanes disguised as Red Cross planes had flown into Budapest with military equipment turned out to be unfounded, as it was shown that from the 28th of October on, the Budapest airfield was in Russian hands.
The demand for neutrality and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops was the result of the general rejection of foreign occupation, not the result of counterrevolutionary demands.
The Committee's conclusion was that the Hungarian uprising was spontaneous and nationwide. The activities were improvised, which ruled out the existence of any larger scale planning of uprising.
Witnesses stated that Radio Free Europe was widely heard and created the feeling of an existing sympathy towards the cause of the uprising.
Because it was possible that some listeners gained the impression that armed help would come from the West, the Committee suggested that any future broadcasting by another nation should be much more precise.
The organs of the Kadar Government and the Soviet Union stated repeatedly that the revolution was a counterrevolution engineered by people who served in the Horthy and pro-Fascist military and also claimed the presence of arms shipments from the West, many disguised as Red Cross aid. Much blame was also attached to Cardinal Mindszenty, who had been freed on the first day of the revolution and whose speeches had been broadcast repeatedly on the radio. It was also claimed that the Hungarian Workers Council was infiltrated and manipulated by counter-revolutionary persons.
The Committee became convinced that there was no intention to reconstitute the prewar political or social order. Cardinal Mindszenty stated that he never would try to reestablish the landholdings of the Church. Count Eszterhazy made similar statements concerning the family's holdings.
It was also revealed that the Nagy Government was made up of leaders of the same parties which were sanctioned in 1945 by the Allied Commission for Hungary.
The General Assembly mandate for the Committee was to study all the different facets of the Soviet intervention, militarily and otherwise. The conclusion of the Committee was that Soviet intervention was in violation of the UN Charter (Paragraph 7, Article 2, of the Charter):
The Committee does not consider it necessary to review these arguments anew. It wishes merely to refer to its findings and conclusions contained in other chapters of this Report which directly bear on the assumption on which are built the Soviet and the Hungarian Governments' legal and political explanations namely, that the uprising was not of a fascist or antidemocratic character as these terms are generally understood; that armed Soviet assistance was sought in all probability before a peaceful demonstration had taken on a violent character and that whether the intervention took place in a regular or irregular manner under the terms of Hungarian constitutional processes is a matter which the Committee was not able to ascertain; that Imre Nagy's Government, whose legitimacy during the events was uncontested, had taken practical steps for reestablishing public order and conditions for a normal pursuit of peaceful activities of the people, and was reconstituting a democratic and parliamentary regime which would have given to all Hungarians the exercise of political and human rights; that the Nagy Government was endeavouring to bring about the withdrawal and not the intervention of the Soviet armed forces, the presence of which it did not find necessary,to maintain itself in power; and that Mr. Kadar's Government, on the other hand, not only was established because of the assistance of the Soviet armed forces, but could not under the terms of the Hungarian Constitution claim any but the most doubtful element of legality at the time of its appeal to the Soviet Command for intervention. The Committee's conclusions support, therefore, the assumptions on which were based the resolutions of the General Assembly on the question of Hungary and, in particular, resolution 1131 (XI).
The first U.S. Congressional Review of the events in Hungary took place in the House of Representatives where a subcommittee was formed to study the Hungarian Revolution and its effect on Hungary and on the other satellite nations. The results were documented under the title, Report of the Special Study Mission to Europe on Policy Toward the Satellite Nations . The Committee was chaired by Representative Edna Kelly, of New York. Members were Congressmen Armistead Selden of Alabama; Frank Coffin of Maine; James Fulton of Pennsylvania and Alvin Bentley of Michigan. The State Department and the Department of Defense made consultants available to the Committee. The work was done mostly in Washington. They reviewed the material collected by the U.S. Departments of State and Defense and the material produced by the U.S. Embassy in Budapest. The work took about two months, after which the Committee departed for Europe and held sessions in London, Paris, Rome and Bonn, with the representatives of those nations' governments. Representative Bentley received a visitor's visa to Poland and Representative Fulton visited Yugoslavia. None of the Committee members received a visa to Hungary but they all visited the Austro-Hungarian border and Hungarian refugee camps in Austria. The Soviet official organs attacked the formation and the work of the Committee and labeled it as an imperialistic plot against the Soviet Union.
The Hungarian revolution which broke out on October 23 was catastrophic in nature and caught the free world totally unprepared. The nature of its rapid development likewise came as a surprise. Its tragic finale left a feeling of bitter disappointment and regret that the governments of the free world were not ready to take effective action. Conversely, it appeared that the Soviet Union was determined to go to any and all lengths to maintain her empire of enslaved peoples by the most brutal forms of armed subjugation and repression, when permitted to do so. It also appeared that when the Soviets felt their own vital interests were involved, as in the case of Hungary, they were willing flagrantly to flaunt the public opinion of the peoples of the free world, who, it should be added were far more willing for dramatic action than their governments.
The Study Commission, during their stay in Europe, found that the effect of the Hungarian Revolution was the primary political fact of Europe in 1957. The Russian intervention seriously weakened Soviet prestige in Europe and the Communist parties in the West.
In connection with the future of American policy, the Committee's Report states, "The study mission believes that a new policy toward the satellites does not mean that we must either take steps which would bring about World War III, or do nothing. To be realistic and responsible, United States policy must seek constructive courses between the extremes of military action and abandonment."
The Committee also leveled charges against the existing American policy, stating, "As far as the study mission can ascertain, the policy of this Government toward the satellites is twofold: First, a negative policy of not intervening militarily, either unilaterally or internationally and, second, assurance of such policy in advance to the Soviets."
In addition, the Study Mission reported that the "Hungarian revolution exposed the ruthless colonialism of the Soviets." "The Hungarian revolution demonstrated that Soviet policy towards the satellite nations is a policy of ruthless colonialism and overlordship of both human and natural resources without parallel in modern history."
Furthermore, the Commission stated, "Hungarian Revolution exploded the Soviet myth. The Hungarian Revolution demonstrated to the whole free world that Soviet force cannot suppress the basic desire of people for freedom. It exploded the myth that constant indoctrination and savage suppression of fundamental liberties could destroy that basic desire among the workers, the intellectuals and, most important, the youth of a nation."
The Committee also stated that, "The brutal retaliation by the Soviets against the people of Hungary and the open subjugation of that nation has dealt a strong blow to neutralization in Europe, and should weaken the structure of neutralism elsewhere in the free world."
Furthermore, the Study Commission criticized the intelligence-gathering capacity of the USA in predicting the events in Hungary.
"The outbreak of hostilities in Hungary began on October 23. It was not until October 27, 4 days later, that the United States requested an emergency meeting of the Security Council of the United Nations. Four days during which the freedom fighters of Hungary fought and hoped for United States and United Nations support ....... four fatal days during which the United States was paralyzed by inaction. This inaction in effect weakened the morale of the freedom fighters and emboldened the Soviets to take their ruthless action without fear of counter-measures from the free world. These four days gave comfort to the enemy when they should have given comfort to the freedom fighters."
The Commission applauded the U.S. Government in orchestrating the resettlement of the Hungarian refugees from Austria. (174,000 Hungarian refugees arrived in Austria, equivalent to U.S.A. suddenly receiving 4,000,000 refugees.) The American leadership made possible the resettlement of these refugees throughout the world in a relatively short period of time.
The report of the Study Commission also included separate reports from Representative Bentley and Representative Fulton. Bentley visited Warsaw, Poland, in April 25 to 28, 1957 and met with Polish officials. Based on his discussion he stated that the Gomulka regime, although it was pro-Soviet, still was keeping the best interests of their own country in mind. Therefore, he suggested ongoing moderate U.S. help in Poland, especially increased delivery of grain to prevent starvation.
Congressman Fulton visited Yugoslavia from April 30 to May 5, 1957. In his report he pointed out that the flood of Hungarian refugees to Yugoslavia occurred after January 1, 1957 when the Soviets were able to seal off the Hungarian-Austrian border. By the end of February, the number grew to about 19,000, after which time the Yugoslav border was sealed by the Soviets and only a few hundred more arrived. Concerning the Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia, Fulton pointed out that they were the freedom fighters who had held out the longest and demanded the same immigration possibilities for them as had those who had fled to Austria.
Fulton had discussions with the Yugoslav officials and came back with the suggestion to increase the existing exchange of students and specialists between the USA and Yugoslavia.
The Committee Report was accepted by the U.S. House of Representatives and ordered to be printed on June 4, 1957, as House Report No. 531.
Whenever the U.S. Congress wants to make a statement on a very important question it creates a document called "The Sense of the Congress." Both Houses of Congress create their own versions of that statement and after they have been adopted by their own chambers the text goes to a Conference Committee made up of members of both chambers. The Conference Committee creates a third version from the two existing versions which goes back to both Houses again to be voted on. In connection with the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, this procedure resulted in a text which included the following:
Whereas the Hungarian freedom revolution which broke out October 23, 1956, was catastrophic in nature, and subsequent events shocked the conscience of the free peoples of the world; and
Whereas the barbaric action of the Soviet Union in Hungary demonstrates that the Soviet Union is determined to go to any and all lengths to maintain its empire of enslaved peoples by the most brutal forms of armed subjugation and repression; and
Whereas the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, created by the General Assembly of the United Nations under its resolution 1132 (XI) adopted at its six hundred and thirtysixth plenary meeting on January 10, 1957, has established that what took place in Hungary in the latter part of 1956, was a spontaneous national uprising caused by longstanding grievances engendered by the oppressive way of life under Communist rule and by the state ef captivity of Hungary under control of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and
Whereas the crisis and foment created by developments in the satellite nations require a continued reevaluation by the United States and the United Nations of strategic policy to meet changing conditions,
That it is the sense of the Congress that the President, through the United States representatives to the United Nations at the forthcoming special reconvening of the General Assembly of the United Nations, should take every appropriate action toward the immediate consideration and adoption of the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary and toward the immediate consideration of other available information on the brutal action of the Soviet Union in Hungary. It is further the sense of the Congress that the President, through such United States representatives, should at such reconvened session join actively in seeking the most effective way of dealing with the report of the United Nations Special Committee in order to advance the objectives of the United Nations regarding the situation in Hungary, to prevent further repressive action by the Soviet Union, and to seek all practical redress of the wrong which has been committed in violation of the principles of the United Nations and the elemental requirements of humanity.
It is the sense of the Congress that the United States should implement policies, through the United Nations or in cooperation with the peoples of the free world, that will work toward the freedom and independence of the captive nations, and will effectively utilize the position of the United States through all proper means, to the end that the Hungarian tragedy shall not be repeated anywhere.
This final text was voted in by both Houses and ordered to be printed and included in the documents of the Congress on August 6, 1957.
On November 8, 1956, President Eisenhower, by executive order, made it possible for 5,000 Hungarian refugees, located in Austria, to emigrate to the U.S.
On December 1, he directed that above and beyond the available visas under the Refugee Relief Act (approximately 6500 in all), emergency admission should be granted to 15,000 additional Hungarians by the Attorney General exercising his discretionary authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act and that, when these numbers had been exhausted, the situation be reexamined.
On December 12, he directed Vice President Nixon to go to Austria to visit the Hungarian refugee camps. During that visit Nixon stated that, the Hungarian revolution is the beginning of the end of the Soviet Empire.
On January 31, 1957, President Eisenhower sent a message to the Congress of the United States. In the preamble he stated the following: "The eyes of the free world have been fixed on Hungary over the past two-and-a-half months. Thousands of men, women and children have fled their homes to escape Communist oppression. They seek asylum in countries that are free. Their opposition to Communist tyranny is evidence of a growing resistance throughout the world. Our position of world leadership demands that, in partnership with the other nations of the free world, we be in a position to grant that asylum."
Furthermore, President Eisenhower told the Congress that "most of the refugees who have come to the United States have been admitted only temporarily on an emergency basis. Some may ultimately decide that they should settle abroad. But many will wish to remain in the United States permanently. Their admission to the United States as parolees, however, does not permit permanent residence or the acquisition of citizenship. I believe they should be given that opportunity under a law which deals both with the current escapee problem and with any other like emergency which may hereafter face the free world."
The Congress followed Eisenhower's request and created the Bill which made it possible for the Hungarian refugees to qualify for U.S. citizenship.
The U.S. led effort to win acceptance for Hungarian refugees in the Free World was successful. By the end of 1957 the United States had admitted 35,026 Hungarians. Another 68,000 were admitted throughout the entire world.
| Country | Hungarian Refugees Admitted During 1957 |
|---|---|
| United States of America | 35,026 |
| Canada | 24,525 |
| United Kingdom | 20,590 |
| Germany | 14,270 |
| France | 10,232 |
| Total | 104,643 |
Many more were accepted into the Free World during 1958.
By the end of 1958, 193,000 Hungarian refugees had been accepted in the Free World.
At the beginning of this chapter we reviewed the statements of the great French Marxist philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre, in connection with the Hungarian Revolution. At the end of this chapter we wish to report the statements of the noted American scholar Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to President Carter, authored a study on the European Communist regimes outside of the USSR covering the period of 1945-1960 entitled The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (The work was published first in 1950 and revised and republished in 1967, by Harvard University Press.)
In his book Brzezinski devoted an entire chapter to Hungary (Ch. 4 "Hungary: The Test Case of National Communism") in which he detailed the ongoing duel between Imre Nagy and Matyas Rakosi and the negative behavior of Marshal Tito.
In June 1953 there was a conference in Moscow between the new Russian leaders and the leaders of the Hungarian Communist Party. Apparently, the Soviet leaders were very much aware of the economic hardships created by the unquestioning adherence to Stalin's doctrine and criticized Rakosi severely for the economic problems. At the same conference another Muscovite, Imre Nagy, came to the forefront. Nagy had lived in the USSR from 1939 to 1945, was a part of the so-called Muscovite Communist leaders and was able to embrace the new post-Stalin era doctrines promulgated by Malenkov. As a result, Nagy became the Premier of Hungary but Rakosi kept the chairmanship of the party. Nagy's program included price reductions and wage increases, reduction of taxes on the peasantry, withdrawal from collective farms, some degree of religious tolerance and abolishment of internment camps.
These new policies were very popular and endorsed at least by some of the Communist Party leaders.
The other faction of the Communist leadership, headed by Rakosi, was violently opposed to Nagy's reforms, believing that in order to build Socialism it was necessary to distrust and suppress the masses.
Rakosi moved against Nagy, taking advantage of the illness of the Premier in 1954, and attempted a coup to remove him from the leadership position. That coup was rebuffed by the Soviet leaders. Nagy and Rakosi traveled together to Moscow where Rakosi was criticized by the Soviet leaders and Nagy kept his post.
The Hungarian Party Congress endorsed the policies of Nagy but Rakosi succeeded to build into the endorsement quite a few criticisms.
A year later, when Georgi Malenkov was removed from the Premiership of the USSR, Rakosi's influence increased once more and he succeeded, with Moscow's blessing and with the personal assistance of Suslov, to purge Nagy. Nagy was removed not only from the Premiership but also from the membership of the Central Committee. Rakosi once more assumed full power and, after the publication of all these condemnations, Nagy was expelled from the Communist Party. Nagy's policies were based on economics and political expediency, but were really not in conflict with the Soviet interests. During the time that he was out of power he began to develop the realization that for Communism to succeed in Hungary, it must be based on the country's self-interest served by a national Communist regime. Nagy advocated a neutral position for Hungary in between the two opposing world blocs in order to make it internationally possible to build a Hungarian Communist country.
Rakosi moved against Nagy and his followers and on July 12 arrested Nagy and about 400 of his coworkers. To his surprise the Soviets did not go along with his move. On July 17, Mikoyan arrived in Budapest and Rakosi was forced to resign, stating poor health. The Soviet activity was only a halfmeasure because Rakosi's place was given to Erno Gero, who was the closest coworker of Rakosi. Gero's efforts to create a transitional situation were unsuccessful and the ongoing revolutionary ferment could not be stopped. On October 23 the Hungarian Revolution began and was followed by the ascendance of Imre Nagy to the premiership.
In order to prevent repetition concerning the history of the Hungarian Revolution we skip Brzezinski's description of the historical events between October 23 and the second Soviet intervention. We wish to mention that Brzezinski states his belief that the Anglo-French move against Nasser on October 30 was a decisive factor in the Soviet military moves against the Hungarian Revolution.
We should also include Brzezinski's statements concerning Tito and his activities in connection with the Hungarian Revolution.
The Nagy government was the product of a wish to build a Communist regime compatible with Hungarian interests. In theory, that was what Tito preached, but the fact that Tito endorsed the second Russian intervention destroyed his own credibility. In the United Nations Security Council on October 28, Yugoslavia voted against placing the Hungarian matter on the agenda. On November 4, Yugoslavia abstained twice from voting in the UN on the resolution which called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, and on November 21 Tito reached an agreement with Kadar, which paved the way for the end of Nagy's embarrassing and symbolic sanctuary in the Yugoslav Embassy. While his arrest on leaving the Embassy was violently protested it did not lead to any serious political consequences. Therefore, Tito's assertion that his regime was a prototype which could be followed by other nations became an empty statement.
|
HUNGARY IN THE MIRROR OF THE WESTERN WORLD |