Maracz: Hungarian Revival

Before the agreement between Hungary and Slovakia was signed, much criticism was levelled at the Hungarian government for its way of dealing with the matter. The political parties of the Hungarian national communities and the Hungarian opposition parties had heard that the Horn administration wanted the treaties to be signed quickly. On 19th August 1994, the Independent Smallholders' Party (Hun. Fuggetlen Kisgazda Part, FKGP) organized a congress in which the Slovak Hungarians were represented as well. The congress was rounded off with a petition which suggested that a possible friendship treaty between Hungary and Slovakia should not be signed without the consent of the Slovak Hungarians. On 20th October 1994, prime minister Horn announced at the congress of the World Federation of Hungarians, in the presence of all the leading representatives of the Hungarian national communities, that no agreement would be signed behind the backs of the Hungarian minorities. This prompted Hungarian societies in the diaspora to bombard the prime minister with letters beseeching him to keep his promise.

The protest against a quick and unconditional signing of the friendship treaties between Hungary and Slovakia/Rumania was initiated by the World Federation of Hungarians who organized a meeting on 3rd March 1995. At this meeting, they once again stressed that Hungarian communities would have to give full permission for these treaties to be signed. Only a true consensus would guarantee peaceful co-existence for the people of the region. The declaration contained the following demands:197

(1) The Komarom (Komarno) and Kolozsvar (Cluj) declarations will have to be incorporated in the treaties of friendship.

(2) The parties involved will have to conform to the objectives and regulations that underlie European integration, also in their inter-relations. The free interchange of persons, goods, services and capital must be guaranteed and unlimited streams of information, as well as active border crossing regional co-operation must be allowed.

(3) Slovakia and Rumania must return all the Hungarian property that was confiscated by the previous governments. This includes

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private property as well as the property of churches, institutions, societies, educational establishments etc.

(4) The treaties must be signed in full accordance with the international agreements made in the context of the OSCE and the Council of Europe.

The protest letter formulated by the World Federation of Hungarians was followed by a series of protests on the part of the Hungarian political parties in Slovakia and the opposition parties in the Hungarian parliament. For the first time in a long while, the Hungarians were actually fighting back and opposing the Trianon encirclement. With the signing of the treaty looming ever nearer, the Hungarian political parties in Slovakia were drawn closer together. In a common declaration on 17th March 1995 Coexistence, the MKDM and the MPP announced that they were aware of the agreement between Horn, the Hungarian prime minister and his Slovak counterpart Meciar, but that they doubted whether in Slovak government coalition circles the political will existed to sanction the treaty. Before the ratification of the treaty in the Hungarian parliament, the Slovak Hungarians, furthermore, asked the Hungarian government to draw up a programme that would guarantee that the agreement would be realized. The Slovak Hungarians finally pointed out that it was not exactly clear to them how the financial resources for their own educational establishments were to be safeguarded.

The Hungarian opposition parties: KDNP, MDF and FIDESZ rejected the treaty in a joint declaration on 18th March 1995, just as the FKGP had done at an earlier stage. The Horn administration was sharply criticized for having acknowledged that the Slovakian Hungarians form an integral part of Slovak society and for not having mentioned that the Hungarian minority is a constitutional entity and that the Hungarians in Slovakia are a concrete part of the Hungarian cultural nation. According to the Hungarian opposition the treaty accepts the Slovak programme for a national unitary state. The Hungarian opposition parties also resented the fact that prime minister Horn's Hungarian government did not allow the Slovak Hungarians to have a proper

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part in the shaping of the treaty and that they had to face accomplished facts. The opposition parties were finally disappointed that these parties were not consulted on issues of national interest. MDF, KDNP and FIDESZ proposed that the agreement be revised on the following points:

- the Hungarian national community in Slovakia must be liberated from the decrees made by Benes which hold the Hungarian people collectively responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War and for crimes committed during the war. Once these decrees have been rescinded the Hungarian community in Slovakia must be indemnified.

- the treaty's frontier clause must be brought into line with the border change options included in the Helsinki Agreement which accepts border changes as long as the parties involved agree to such changes and as long as they are resolved in a peaceful way.

- the problems surrounding the Danube dam at Gabcikovo have to be settled.

- the Hungarians living in Slovakia must be given autonomy in accordance with Resolution 1201 of the Council of Europe and Hungarian institutions must be sure of receiving financial support from the Slovak state.

- a system of international monitoring must be set up to see that the agreement is really observed in practice.

As a result of the treaty, coalitions were formed in Hungarian politics that had not been possible for a long time. FIDESZ, the young liberals party that had become more conservative in its inclinations just before the 1994 election and the World Federation of Hungarians organized their first official meeting. In a joint declaration issued on 20th March 1995, they turned down the treaty made with Slovakia.

The FIDESZ spokesman, the member of parliament Zsolt Nemeth, claimed in an interview that the Hungarian government had misled public opinion with their argument that signing the treaty with Slovakia was an absolute prerequisite for Euro-Atlantic integration. Nemeth said: "Prime minister Balladur announced somewhere in February that the signing of the treaties of friendship

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would be very important as far as the European integration process in Central Europe was concerned. The next day, Juppe, the minister of Foreign Affairs, announced that the treaties of friendship were not essential in the process of securing Euro-Atlantic integration. The French declarations were contradictory but this had to do with the imminent presidential elections. There was one other concrete point. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Istvan Szent-Ivanyi explained at a press conference on returning from the US that the State Department did not regard the signing of the friendship treaties as essential, when it came to the matter of establishing Euro-Atlantic integration. It would, therefore, have been no disaster, if the treaty had not been signed. In giving the impression that Euro-Atlantic integration depended on the signing of the treaty the Hungarian Foreign Affairs Department wilfully misled public opinion.198 In the same interview, the young FIDESZ member of parliament further mentioned that just before the treaty was signed the Slovak delegation handed over a memo to the Hungarian delegation, without discussing this at all beforehand. The Hungarian delegation, therefore, knew nothing of its contents and the Slovak delegation regarded it as being similar to the agreement:

"...this move proved in no uncertain terms that the Slovaks were not motivated by an understanding of the minorities or by a desire to improve Hungarian-Slovak relations. The Slovak move gave the Hungarian government a last chance to decide against signing the treaty. In Paris, the first effects of this bad agreement were immediately felt. The day after it had been signed, Horn and Meciar started hurling abuse at each other in connection with the treaty in the presence of representatives from other countries. They, thus, made themselves ridiculous in the eyes of international public opinion. The treaty itself, therefore, started generating tension and instability. The Hungarians will refer to the treaty in order to defend the rights of their minorities, while the Slovaks, by contrast, reject every claim made by the minorities that is not specifically mentioned in the treaty."

The Hungarian government surmised that the signing of the treaty - in reality a one-sided confirmation of Trianon encirclement

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politics - and the promises made by prime minister Horn at the meeting of the World Federation of Hungarians, which he had not followed up, would go down badly in Hungarian diaspora circles. Therefore, the secretary of state in charge of affairs for Hungarians on the other side of the border, Laszlo Labody, wrote a letter to the Hungarian diaspora societies on behalf of the government in which he endeavoured to rectify what had gone wrong in Paris. Through this letter, which was couched in old-fashioned communistic jargon, the Hungarian government recognized that the diaspora constitutes an important political pressure group.199 The secretary of state enumerated the treaty's main assets: the agreement would increase stability in the region and raise the level of trust between Slovakia and Hungary which in turn would be beneficial for the Hungarian minority living in Slovakia. The treaty would make Euro-Atlantic integration more supple and finally, Hungary showed that it was capable of and prepared to arrive at compromises in a civilized way in line with internationally laid down norms and legal customs and according to mutual and rational interests without in any way transgressing national interests, etc., etc., etc.

The last point gave clear insight into the opinions and attitudes of this particular government. What should Hungary, the country that since the Ausgleich with Austria of 1867 had established an impressive number of agreements with its neighbouring countries, that in 1956 had bravely stood up against the Soviet Union and which had fulfilled a leading role in the upheavals of 1989 that had ultimately led to the fall of Communism still have to 'prove' that it is interested in seeing a Central Europe that is civilized, stable and democratic. What nonsense! It is high time that the neighbouring countries that have been expanding at Hungary's expense ever since Trianon treat their Hungarians better. The best proof of the defective reasoning of Horn's administration emerged from the fact that within a month of the signing of the agreement Slovakia had already cast it on one side.

Only if Hungary adopts a hard political line towards the neighbouring countries that oppress their Hungarian national

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communities, will the respect of nationalistic leaders be won. Slavishly signing treaties that offer no compromise, but which rather provide one-sided recognition, on Hungary's part, of the positions of Hungary's neighbouring countries is not the solution. Taking the lenient and soft approach will only encourage the Slovaks to pursue anti-Hungarian policies and place increased pressure on their Hungarian community. After the treaty with Slovakia had been signed, the Slovak Ministry of Education started increasing pressure. In contravention of what had been agreed in the Balladur Pact and in the Council of Europe's 1201 resolution, the Slovak Ministry of Education resolved to stop financing Hungarian language education. The subsidy of 80 million crowns that had been paid out to the Hungarian community each year in recent years was withdrawn. Government subsidizing of Hungarian cultural societies and magazines also ceased.

On 22nd April 1995, the Hungarian national community in Komarom (Komarno) organized a massive demonstration against the anti-Hungarian measures being taken by the Slovak government. Some 7,000 people took part in the protest. In a petition drawn up during the protest, the Hungarian community claimed that such measures taken by the Slovak government constituted a danger to Slovakia's Hungarian community and to the future of the country. The Hungarians came up with the following suggestions for ways of improving the situation:

- The government must drop the introduction of 'alternative education in Slovak' in the case of bilingual Hungarian/Slovak schools.

- The president of the Slovak Republic must reject law number 542/1992 already accepted by the Slovak parliament as it directly contradicts the self-determination principle.

- The Ministry of Education ought to recognize the validity of higher education given at the municipal universities of Komarom (Komarno) and Kiralyhelmec (Kralovsky Chlmec).

- A separate Hungarian faculty should be set up for teachers in training at the Nyitra (Nitra) college.

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- Subsidies should once again be provided for general basic education and mass communication in the Hungarian language.

- The Ministries of Education and Culture should take back all employees dismissed for political reasons before December 1994.

It is right that the Hungarians in Slovakia protest at the cuts being made in education and culture as far as the Hungarian language is concerned, but it is, of course, frustrating for them to have to demonstrate every time they want to make some amendment. It would be much better if the Hungarians of Slovakia were to stick to the idea of a federal structure in which the country would consist of Slovak and Hungarian republics. In this way, Hungarian education and culture would come to be regulated in a proportional way.

In international politial circles reactions to the Balladur Pact were optimistic. The attitude being that every problem that seems to be solved is one problem less. This explains why, against their better judgement, the representatives of international politics welcomed the Balladur Pact with open arms. International politics had been putting pressure on the countries concerned. Labody, the secretary of state, remarked in his memo to the Hungarian diaspora that "before the commencement of the stability conference of 21st March the leading NAVO and EU powers had placed pressure on Slovakia and Hungary to sign an agreement to establish good neighbourly relations. The German, French and Spanish prime ministers wrote a joint letter to the relevant governments. Even Clinton, the American President sent letters to Pozsony, Bucharest and Budapest. Both French and American diplomacy was very active."200 International politics did not offer solutions to the internal Hungarian questions. Because of the above-mentioned objections to the agreement, it was to be expected that the treaty drawn up between Hungary and Slovakia would not work, at least not in its present form. As a result, certain Western politicians who were not convinced of the durability of this agreement, also because of the opposition it had received from Hungarians, put searching questions to their own ministers of Foreign Affairs.

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The Dutch MP, J.D. Blaauw (of the VVD party, the liberal right) put his questions on the Hungarian-Slovak treaty to Van Mierlo, the Dutch Foreign Affairs minister, in parliament on 24th March 1995. The six questions raised in the House related, amongst other things, to the matter of whether with so much opposition to the treaty, political stability could be influenced in a positive way. Another important point was the question as to whether Hungarian-Slovak representatives should be involved in the monitoring process in view of the fact that it was a treaty between states. On 13th April, the Dutch Foreign Affairs minister reported that he was aware of the opposition but that "in view of the political situation in the country [Hungary] one should not attach too much importance to this." The minister, furthermore, said that "while it was true that this agreement did not solve all the problems it was important that both governments nurtured a wish to improve relations. In this way, the agreement could contribute to further concilliation and political stability in the region." Blaauw absolutely disagreed with the nonchalant replies of the minister. Together with Gabor (MP of the Christian Democratic Party) Blaauw posed a new series of questions in the House on 12th May which were again directed at the Foreign Affairs minister. This time the minister was forced to go into the issue in more depth, because there was the possibility of a parliamentary majority arising. Clearly, it was not worth having a cabinet crisis about this matter. Blaauw and Gabor wondered whether, in view of the 'social and historical processes' at stake here, it might not be best if these questions were given the greatest possible consensus and whether criticism should not be examined from the point of view of content, regardless of who had produced it. The minister and his civil servants were again given a lot of homework to do.

What had been called a 'stabilizing pact' had led to big differences of opinion in the very first parliamentary debate on the matter in a Western parliament. It underlined the fact that what had happened in Paris on 21st March had been nothing more than a charade. It was important that the political discussions had taken place in the Dutch parliament, because they had put the

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Hungarian question on the international political agenda. For instance, in its spring congress the Liber International was unable to decide whether or not to support the treaty between Hungary and Slovakia. This was partly due to the activities of the Dutch VVD faction and one of its assistants, Geert Wilders. It seemed that where the Hungarian question is concerned, changes are taking place in the international political arena. Since the dictation of this treaty, change has been discernible within the Hungarian parliament. People have started to talk about the injustices of Trianon and the untenability of that treaty.

In May 1995, the MP of the FKGP, Sandor Kovassy, wrote the following to the Hungarian Foreign Affairs minister, the ex-communist Laszlo Kovacs. "I should like to draw your attention to a major injustice and to a situation that definitely needs to be rectified. In the Treaty of Trianon, seven Slovenian villages remained under Hungarian jurisdiction while 25 villages inhabited entirely or almost entirely by Hungarians were annexed by Slovenia. They were the following villages: Kamahaza, Lendvahidveg, Banuta, Csekefa, Kisszerdahely, Alsolakos, Felsolakos, Peteshaza, Gonterhaza, Radamos, Kebeleszentmarton, Zsitkoc, Lendvavasarhely, Szecsiszentlaszlo, Volgyifalu, Kapornak, Orihodos, Kisfalu, Alsolendva, Csentevolgy, Kapca, Kut, Partosfalva, Lendvahosszufalu and Zalagyertyanos. Why the Hungarians of these villages should be living in Slovenia remains a complete mystery. Furthermore, all the problems of the Hungarian minority in Slovenia could be instantly resolved, if the border was just moved one 1-2 kilometres. Why not simply exchange these villages for those to the south of Szentgotthard? Hungary could offer the following villages populated by Slovenian majorities in exchange: Alsoszomolnok, Felsoszomolnok, Apatistvanfalva, Ketvolgy, Orfalu, Rabatotfalu and Szakonyfalva. Obviously, this would have to be done in consultation with the inhabitants of these villages. Any villages wishing to remain where they are, either in Hungary or Slovenia, should not be forced to change allegiances against their will..." In his letter, Kovassy asks the minister to start negotiations on this issue with Slovenia.

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The Hungarian MP put pressure on the minister by inquiring about the situation in conjunction with Hungarian autonomy in Beregszasz (Beregovo) in Subcarpathia. On 8th May, he wrote the following to minister Kovacs: "No one who thinks and feels in a humane and democratic way can possibly remain indifferent to the endeavours of Hungarians in the district of Beregszasz. No one has the right to ignore the referendum results, if human dignity, popular sovereignty and the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination means anything to them. If there is one power organization in the world that should not take the easy way by being a quiet observer and burying its head in the sand, then that is the Hungarian government. I would, therefore, ask the Hungarian government to support the Hungarians of Beregszasz in their quest for autonomy..."

With the debate on the ratification of the Hungarian-Slovak treaty the cycle of spiritual revival was complete. During the interpellation on 23rd May, the vice president of the Hungarian parliament, Agnes Maczo-Nagy (FKGP), presented a number of strong arguments for why the treaty between Hungary and Slovakia should not be signed. For the first time ever, the situation of the Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin was being lucidly and sharply defined. For the first time, the psychological shackles that had held the Hungarians mentally prisoner since the Treaty of Trianon were being cast off. At last, Maczo had revealed the sad truth that the Carpathian Basin is full of Berlin walls that keep the Hungarians divided. "How many of you here in this House know that Berlin was not the only city that was split in two? Not very long ago, the whole world witnessed the collapse of the Berlin wall and saw how people's souls were set free. How many of you really know that the city of Satoraljaujhely [a city on the Hungarian-Slovak border in north-east Hungary, LM] is also divided in two by a river that flows through the city, a river that should be navigable. [See the Treaty of Trianon, LM] Now even a rowboat is too big for that 'river'! The 'big wall' at Satoraljaujhely was opened, but not like at that time in Berlin... But at the time nobody shouted out the words irredentist and chauvinist not even here, none of you did!... Even today, the great iron gate

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that separates Satoraljaujhely has remained closed. Patiently and apathetically, people stood and waited on both sides of the border. A small door was opened, but everything else remained the same as before. Satoraljaujhely has become Europe's new Berlin, a city you can only move about in with a passport. In the words of president Kennedy who once said: "Ich bin ein Berliner", we might all say: We are inhabitants of Satoraljaujhely."

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Maracz: Hungarian Revival