Maracz: Hungarian Revival

Introduction

The fall of the Berlin wall brought Central Europe back to life politically, economically and culturally. The collapse of communism contributed to the disintegration of the Cold War geopolitical power constellation established after the Yalta Peace Treaty (1945). However, the toppling Berlin wall also dragged the Trianon system with it in its fall. The Treaty of Trianon (1920) - the Versailles Treaty of the East - that has determined the structure of the power constellations in Eastern Europe for the last 75 years is now on the verge of falIing apart. It is not only the Soviet-Russian imperium that has collapsed but also the artificial national dictatorships of former states such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia that have now disintegrated. The state, national, cultural and geographical patterns that characterized Central Europe before the First World War are re-emerging as the force and dynamism of the Wilsonian right to self-determination and autonomy for national communities asserts itself.

The consequences of the Treaty of Trianon imposed on Central Europe by Western powers, notably France and Great Britain, were first felt in Hungary, the country on the continent of Europe with the oldest constitutional monarchy. In 1920, Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory and millions of its people suddenly became second class citizens in successor states such as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Austria. Today members of the Hungarian communities in these states are still confronted by a ruthless kind of uncompromising psychological and physical terror which in past decades has taken on the form of genocide in the sense of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, dated 9 December 1948. According to Article 11 of this Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such:

a. Killing members of the group;

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b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group-,

c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to an other group.

Although the situation of the Hungarian communities in Central Europe conforms with this definition of genocide which is predominantly qualitative and not quantitative I will avoid using this term throughout the text because it arouses too much emotion. Instead I will employ ethnocide or cultural genocide. Such political treatment of Hungarians was and still is accepted by the West, probably because in terms of Western power politics Hungary has a marginal role. Trianon successfully disrupted the relatively good relations that had up until then existed between the various nations and ethnical groups of people living in the Carpathian Basin, the former Hungarian part of Central Europe. For Hungarians, Trianon was traumatic because it led to humiliation and to the fragmentation of their country. For other peoples, Trianon constitutes a psychosis because they very well know that it is because of Trianon and the later 'peace' conventions that they have been so richly rewarded at Hungary's expense. People in Hungary's neighboring countries are plagued by the fear that one day the Hungarians will band together and claim the right to self-determination that has been withheld from them for so long because of Trianon .

In this book, it will be argued that on the basis of internationally recognized moral, cultural and political standards it is now high time to innovate change in this intolerable situation. Not only is it necessary to find a satisfactory solution to the Hungary question for all parties involved but also for Europe as a whole. As long as hotbeds of national and ethnic unrest exist in the heart of Europe, peace and safety for people living on the continent of Europe will be under threat.

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Hungarian Revival is constructed like a triptych, the three individual parts of which closely interrelate. The first part introduces the Hungarians, the second part deals with Trianon and its consequences for Hungarians and in the third part the way to the formation of a new Central Europe is outIined. The three separate but closely related themes together constitute the Hungarian-complex. A thorough analysis of the complex of historical, political, cultural, geographical, social and linguistic variables, certain specific factors and manipulation and distortion of the Hungarians will give a deeper insight into the role that has been played by Hungarians in Central European in the past and into the part that they might well play in the future. Thoroughly analyzing the Hungarian-complex is like creating a window to a new era that since the fall of an inhuman, anti-liberal power political system - that of communism -is coming towards us with great dynamism and at great speed. In the future, it will no longer be possible to base international politics on purely power political considerations people will also have to take into account humane, moral-cultural, economic and communicational values, as the fall of the wall in Berlin so clearly demonstrated. For Hungarians everywhere mental-moral imperatives and values, cultural and historic ties, tolerance, the drive for freedom, willingness to compromise; the struggle for emancipation, human rights, autonomy and self-determination; opposition to national egoism; mental power, communication and information technology and the global dispersion off Hungarians will be the main aspects and determining factors into he next century. These qualities and values will merge and crystallize in Hungarians enabling them to take on a global 'guiding role'.

In part one, the reader will get to know the Hungarians by becoming acquainted with their history, national and cultural identity, their Western perception and their newly emerging self-image. The analysis will highlight the fact that the West hardly knows and understands Hungary and the Hungarians. The Western image of Hungary derives from a collection of stereotypes and prejudices that are either too positive or too

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negative. The Western view of Hungarians is a constantly fluctuating one. In that respect, it is a view that falls most readily into the so-called barbarian category, the way in which, since olden times, all cultures which fell outside the Western sphere of influence were collectively viewed. Because of Trianon the Western image of Hungary has been predominantly negative throughout this century. This demonstrates how close the tie is between image-forming and political power. Hungarians are still branded as 'nationalist', 'irredentist', revisionist' and 'anti-Semitic' 75 years after Trianon and 50 years after the end of the Second World War. The labels have stuck despite the brave Hungarian uprising of 1956 when, unarmed, the Hungarians fought to liberate themselves from the powerful Soviet Union and its communist ethics, despite the fact that in 1989 the Hungarians took the lead during the political upheavals in East Europe and despite the fact that in neighboring countries Hungarians helped instigate the fall of national-communist mini-dictators such as Ceausescu, the 'Rumanian genius'. The fall of communism in Central Europe has given Hungarians renewed access to their own national identity, history and culture. The suppression of Hungarian national identity of the last century and a half has led to deliberate falsifying, distorting, twisting and manipulating of views of Hungarian history, society, culture and language. The identities of Hungary's neighboring peoples have also been subjected to distortion and manipulation which means that they too have mythologized self-images. It is this collection of self-images that has legitimized Trianon and also a dangerous kind of anti-Hungarian expansionism in the Carpathian Basin.

Now, for the first time in a long while, the Hungarians have the opportunity to examine the characteristics of their own national identity and to contribute to breaking down the mythologized self-images of people in their neighboring countries. These will be the terms for establishing peaceful and lasting relations between the peoples of the Carpathian Basin. The transparency of the Hungarian culture and history provides the basis for a new Hungarian self-image founded on elements which are

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integral to Hungarian culture, language and history itself. Here the central keynotes are mental-moral imperatives, constitutionalism, tolerance, integration, the drive for freedom and willingness to compromise. What being Hungarian actually involves will spontaneously emerge when this mental-cultural state is recognized.

The second part of the book examines Trianon and its consequences for the Hungarians. The background to the First World War will be analyzed. It will be argued that the Allied camp, the Entente, France and Great Britain (and Russia) also contributed considerably to the outbreak of the 'Great' War and to the repercussions this had for Central Europe. Since they were part of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy the Hungarians stood firmly in the camp of the Central Powers led by Germany. The French view of Europe, which very much mapped out the power balance in Central Europe after the First World War, aimed at completely eliminating Germany's power over Europe. This point of view automatically entailed minimalizing the importance of Hungary, Germany's 'naturally'. The confederates of the Little Entente; Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania planned to surround Hungary and, by annexing Hungarian areas, trap the Hungarians in a deadly stranglehold grip. ln Central Europe, a cluster of nationalistic states was established. They poured all their energy into 'internal' imperialism the main objective being, to rid themselves of their Hungarian 'minorities'. The Second World War brought slight relief for the Hungarians but did nothing to help restore a kind of independence in Central Europe that might benefit the peoples of that area. Likewise, Soviet-Russian occupation did noting to improve the lot of people in Central-Europe. Since Trianon the successor states of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania and since 1989 the post-communism successor states of Slovakia, Rump Yugoslavia (Serbia), the Ukraine, Rumania and, to a lesser degree, Austria, have tried in all sorts of ways to get rid of their Hungarian 'minorities'. The Hungarians have been exposed to the whole possible repertoire of genocide practices: anti-Hungarian administrative restrictions,

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actual 'apartheid' legislation, language bills aimed at curbing the use of Hungarian, restrictions on Hungarian education. Furthermore, there have been restrictions for Hungarians employed in public service, agriculture and property restrictions, bans on Hungarian co-operatives, societies and institutions, restrictions for Hungarian s wanting to own property. Through deportation Hungarian areas have been territorially restructured, non-Hungarian settlements have been established and there have been centrally stimulated and co-ordinated anti-Hungarian hate campaigns and psychological warfare. Times of war, such as recently in ex-Yugoslavia, and the anti-Hungarian pogrom in Marosvasarhely (Tirgu Mures) in March 1990, have seen the attempted mass murder of Hungarian people. Even though Hungarian national communities have been at the receiving end of a tremendous amount of anti-Hungarian ethnic engineering. 75 years on from Trianon none of the Hungarian communities in any of the various states have been effectively broken down.

ln the third part of the book we shall consider the possibilities for restructuring and creating a new Central Europe. The territorial and political restructuring of Central Europe began immediately after the collapse of communism. This is in turn led to the disintegration of various states, the creation of certain new states and claims lodged by national communities for autonomy and the right to self-determination. Until now Hungarian national communities have been excluded from such developments. Western politics and public opinion sticks rigidly to the Trianon constellation arrangement which compels Hungary to go along with degrading 'compromises' that do not safeguard the rights of Hungarian national communities in surrounding countries. Apart from all the negative Western stereotype notions and ideas used to hide what the situation is really like in the Carpathian Basin there is also a rich assortment of Trianon apologias which effectively mask from view the Hungarian lot. Retaining 'logical' structures is something that plays a significant part in all this. Asymmetries stating that 'non-Hungarians have rights that are withheld from Hungarians' or

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misconceptions such as the one that Hungarians form 'minorities' in the Carpathian Basin while they are in the majority. Alternatively, Hungarians are neutralized by being classified as extremist when all they are doing is standing up for their rights in absolute conformity with the norms and regulations of internationally recognized organizations such as the United Nations or the Council of Europe. A cursory glance at any of a number of articles in international papers and journals or statements, declarations and reports drawn up by international negotiators will suffice to convince the reader how deeply rooted the anti-Hungarian apologia is in Western political culture.

So it is that the West, or at least a number of Western states, inadvertently support a dangerous sort of state nationalism in Slovakia, Serbia, Rumania and the Ukraine that is gravitating from the periphery towards the central part of the Carpathian Basin; encroaching at the expense of the Hungarians who live there on their own native soil. Despite all the national disunity and the fact that Hungarians are now being threatened by expansionary state nationalism they have remained the only loyal discussion partner of the international community of free and democratic states in the Central European region. If autonomy is achieved among Hungarian national communities, this will contribute to stability and cohesion in Central Europe and will be a factor stimulating possible political, economic and cultural prosperity in the region. in my opinion, the West can, therefore, no longer afford to remain insensitive to Hungary - a country - that in 1996 will be II00 years old - and to Hungarians and should, therefore, start to support Hungary in accordance with its own Western norms. ln this way the West could contribute to the regeneration of the Carpatln an Basin and the region would once again be able to function as 'a European hinge': a In-between West and East, thus perpetuating a 1000 year old tradition. A strong and clearly defined Central Europe would also be conducive to stimulating reconciliation between the Western and Eastern Christian spheres of influences. Without political and cultural stability in Central Europe the continent will be weakened by internal strife and the cultural-moral allure

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of the European continent will fade. Subsequently, in the next century Europe will not be able to compete on an even footing with other continents in the global race. A radical revising of Western policies on Central Europe may, therefore, be delayed no longer. For their part, Hungary and the Hungarian people themselves will have to fight for emancipation and decisively turn forty years of communism into something mentally and morally cathartic. In this area change is already clearly evident. The fight for political en emancipation, equal human rights and autonomy for Hungarian national communities and the evident mental-moral catharsis among Hungarians is taking on evermore self-conscious forms. It is now only a question of time before the Hungarian question, like other emancipation struggles on the international political agenda, will be rightfully dealt with.

Hungarians call themselves Magyars. Until 1920 the terms Hungarian and Magyar were separate concepts. All the country's citizens were known as Hungarians. That included not only ethnic Hungarians but also Germans, Slovaks, Rumanians, Ruthenians etc. The name "Magyar" was reserved for ethnic Hungarians. Today, the Magyars are mostly concentrated in the central area of the Carpathian Basin. This area forms a continuum composed of the territories of the Hungarian state and the areas of the border regions with Austria (Burgenland), Slovakia, the Ukraine (Subcarpathia), Rumania, (West Transylvania), Rump Yugoslavia (North Vojvodina), Croatia (Baranya) and Slovenia (the Mura region). Some 800,000 other Hungarians, known as Szekelys 'Szeklers' live compactly in an area which is historically known as Szekelyfold; 'Szeklerland', situated in the heart of Transylvania at the foot of the Carpathians. The Szeklers are ethnic Hungarians. in the Hungarian kingdom of the past they defended the country's southern borders and in exchange received special royal privileges. In the past, the Rumanians manipulated census figures in order to make it look as if there were fewer Hungarians living in Rumania. One of the ways in which they did this was by counting Szeklers as non-Hungarians which is

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why the term Szekler-Hungarian is still used today. The only real Hungarian minority is that of the Csangos (Csango-Hungarians). They number approximately 200,000 and live on the other side of the Carpathians, in the Rumanian region of Moldavia near the city of Bako (Bacau).

ln this book, Carpathian Basin is used to denote the whole south-east region of Central Europe that is surrounded by the Carpathian Mountains and the Adriatic coastIine, roughly speaking the area that was historically Hungarian and which, in 1920, was drastically reduced to its present size. Until 1920 Slovakia did not exist and the area that is now more or less covered by Slovakia, together with the Ukranian Subcarpathian region was called Felvidek - 'the Upper Lands' - in Hungarian. Since the Second World War and the annexation of Karpatalja ('Subcarpathia'), also known in Slavic as Ruthenia or Ukranian-Carpathia, by the Soviet Union. The name Felvidek 'the UpperIands' is reserved for Slovakia. The area Karpatalja, 'Sub-Carpathia', denotes the area that was historically Hungarian and that is now part of the Ukraine. After the First World War, the north-west region of Hungary which was incorporated into Austria came to be known as Burgenland. In Hungarian the name Orvidek 'Watch Area' has recently been coined for Burgenland. Until Trianon the name Delvidek the 'Southern- Lands' denoted the whole historic area (excluding Croatia) that in 1920 was annexed partly by former Yugoslavia and partly by Rumania, namely the Muravidek the 'Mura area' in Slovenia, the Baranya in Slavonia. Bacska in Serbia and the Banat in Serbia/Rumania. Today the name Muravidek, 'Mura Area' is used to indicate the area of Slovenia that was formerly Hungarian and the Baranya 'Baranja' is the name given to the area of Hungary that now forms part of Croatia. Vajdasag 'Vojvodina' in Lesser Yugoslavia (Serbia) incorporates Bacska and the Serbian part of Banat. The other part of Banat is in Rumania. Until Trianon Erdely, 'Transylvania' was the name of the historic area of 'Siebenburgen'. This area is smaller than the area that was given to Rumania in 1920. Today, apart from the historic area of Transylvania Erdely, 'Transylvania' consists of

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the regions of East Hungary and the so-called Reszek 'the Parts or the Partium'. On the whole, I have endeavored to keep as close as possible to the regional names given above although in some places it has been necessary to deviate. As indicated, it would be more correct to call the area annexed by Rumania in 1920, eastern East Hungary and the historic region of Erdely 'Transylvania'. ln most cases though I have stuck to current usage by calling the whole area 'Transylvania'. Throughout the book place names in Hungarian areas are first given in Hungarian then the local name is given in brackets, for instance: Kassa (Kosice), Kolozsvar (Cluj-Napoca). When only one place name is given it is usually the Hungarian variant.

For discussions on the material, facts and observations included in this book I would like to express my grateful. thanks to: Jozsef Bakonyi (France), Jozsef Borocz (Switzerland), Rezso Gracza (USA), Sandor Gyori-Nagy (Hungary), Endre Jonas (Germany), Michiel Klinkhamer (the Netherlands), Bruno Naarden (the Netherlands), Zoltan Palotas (Hungary), Gabor Pap (Hungary), Istvan Sebestyen-Teleki (Switzerland), Zsolt Szabo (the Netherlands) and Szabolcs de Vajay (Switzerland). The work of the Dutch historian Bruno Naarden was important when it came to comparing the Western image of Hungary with the barbarian concept which he elaborated as a paradigm when examining Western perceptions of cultures that fall outside of the Western sphere of influence. The studies of the American-Hungarian historian Stephen Borsody helped to give clear insight into the history of national and ethnic relations in Central Europe. In view of the fact that this book contains political reflections on the situation in Central Europe and a position is chosen which favors the Hungarians I sincerely hope that I have not in any way misused history. Should this prove to be so then any criticism levelled by historians will be justified. Yves de Daruvar, the French-Hungarian anti-Nazi freedom fighter who served in the French army should be praised for the fact that he so unequivocally criticized the role played by France, the country he so loved, at the time of the outbreak of the First

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World War and for the fact that he found France responsible concerning the Hungary question in Central Europe.

I am deeply honored that Bishop Laszlo Tokes for whom I have enormous respect agreed to write a brief foreword. Through his moral uprightness, his courage and his perseverance in matters of human rights and religious freedom and because of his unshakable faith in God and justice, Laszlo Tokes has become a shining example for Hungarians and others who serve the cause of freedom. The fact that Transylvanian Hungarians have been able to produce someone of the calibre of Tokes is proof enough that Hungarians have moved into a new era. I am certain that Laszlo Tokes will be given his rightful place in history among others who fought for the emancipation of their people and who are so respected in the West such as: Gandhi, de Dalai lama and Bishop Tutu.

Last but not least, I would like to express my indebtedness to the Dutch historian Perry Pierik, publisher of this book, who encouraged me to at last put in writing all the loose ends on issues relating to the lot of the Hungarians. I am especially grateful to him for his devotion, supervision and for the high speed at which he has worked. I hope that he will be satisfied with the final result.

Finally, I would like to mention that none of the persons referred to above or the Institute for Russian and Eastern European Studies of the University of Amsterdam may be held in any way responsible for the contents of this book. Only the author of this study is answerable for any mistakes, misapprehensions and blunders and for the possible consequences.

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Maracz: Hungarian Revival