Mark Imre Major : American Hungarian Relations 1918-1944

None of the Paris Peace Treaties was more drastic in its terms than the Treaty of Trianon. By it Hungary was not so much mutilated as dismembered. Even if we exclude Croatia, which had stood only in a federal relationship to the other lands of the Holy Crown of St. Stephen - although one of eight hundred years' standing - Hungary proper was reduced to less than one-third of her pre-war area, and a little over two-fifths of her population. Territories and peoples formerly Hungarian were distributed among no less than seven states. Rumania alone secured, at Hungary's expense, an area larger than that left to Hungary herself.⁽¹⁾ These losses were proportionately far greater than those inflicted on Germany or Bulgaria. The Austria of 1920 was, indeed, an even smaller fraction of the State which had borne

that name in 1918, but the old Austria had not been a unitary state, but only a federation of kingdoms, duchies, and provinces, the hereditary estates of a super-national dynasty. The Treaty of St. Germain simply divided this federation into its constituent elements. Turkey retained almost intact the Turkish core of her Empire, losing only outlying portions.

The Hungarian State, on the other hand, had existed for a thousand years within frontiers which had shown a very remarkable degree of stability. The political state enclosed within those boundaries had been unitary long before most of the states of today. Moreover, its geographical structure had imposed upon it also a very close economic coherence, obviously beneficial to almost all its inhabitants. The unity of Hungary was thus something of an entirely different order from that of the Austrian or the Ottoman Empire. It was even far more firmly established than that of Germany.

These issues were never seriously denied. But the real reason for the partition of Hungary was, of course, that the racial diversity of its population was at least as undeniable as its historic or geographical unity. The majority of the population of the periphery was German in the west, Slovak in the north, Ruthene in the northeast, and Rumanian in the east, while in the south there was a large contingent of Serbs, mingled with the Magyars and with German and other colonists. It was, broadly speaking, the principle of self-determination which was invoked in 1919 to bring about the dismemberment of Hungary. The German area in the west was assigned to Austria; the north, both Slovak and Ruthene, to Czechoslovakia; the east to Rumania, and the south to Yugoslavia, with Italy taking the Port of Fiume; Poland got some in the far north, while the center remained with Hungary.

The ethnographic boundaries were not, however, followed exactly. The successor states and their advocates took their stand on the simple right of self-determination of peoples, which, according to them, automatically justified the non-Magyars in leaving Hungary to form their own national states. This right seemed so obvious

that it was hardly argued at Trianon. The doctrine of self-determination was used to detach not only the Rumanians and Serbs from Hungary, but also the Slovaks. The Ruthenes were assigned to Czechoslovakia as a more natural home for them than Hungary. But the assumption was carried even further. It was supposed that the neutral or third-party minorities, such as the Germans in Northern, Eastern, and Southern Hungary, ought also to be reckoned in the non-Magyar camp. Thus in Southern Hungary, for example, the Germans were added to the Serbs; whereas, if the Germans had been added to the Magyars, it would have been the Serbs whose claim might have appeared thin. Moreover, evidence was presented to show that Magyar rule in Hungary had been unjust, oppressive, and tyrannical. Because of this oppressive Magyar rule, it was argued that the new national states were automatically justified, and that even where it was necessary to assign minorities to them, this did little harm, because they were more democratic and socially more advanced than Hungary. Furthermore, hecause of economic and strategic considerations, three and a half-million Hungarians, one-third of the Hungarian speaking people, were transferred to the successor states, and many of these were living in compact blocs contiguous to the new frontiers.⁽²⁾

Hungary did not altogether deny the right of national self determination, but she protested strongly against the conclusions drawn from it. She admitted as valid only the decision taken by the Diet of Croatia. For the rest, she questioned the representative character of the local popular meetings, and maintained stoutly that the nationalities never really wished to separate from her at all. If the point was uncertain, it could be settled by plebiscites, which she requested, but in vain. Hungary was confident that their result would be favorable to her for she contended that the nationalities had no reason to desire a change, as was proved

by the remarkable cohesion shown by the Hungarian state through out history. And although the Magyar nation had predominated in Hungary, it had never in any way oppressed the non-Magyars. The Magyars' only postulate had been the political unity of the state. A non-Magyar had been left entirely free to enjoy his own national culture in private and local affairs. Therefore to speak of oppression was absurd, and to parcel up the old historical and economic unit of Hungary was to inflict not merely injustice but also disaster upon the peoples concerned.⁽³⁾

It must be emphasized that the Treaty was not negotiated but dictated. Hungary was not even invited to Trianon until the Allies had agreed among themselves, and the mass of maps, historical essays, and statistics which her delegates brought with them represented, from the point of view of the Conference, so much wasted labor.

Although in most respects there was little difference between Trianon and the other Peace Treaties, there was at least one pe-

culiarity. The Treaty could not be presented in Hungary until 1920. At that time many who participated in the work of the Peace Conference admitted without reservation the errors committed by the conference and the defects of its conclusions. One had only to refer to the Senate of the United States, whose attitude toward the treaties is well known. On November 19, 1919, the Senate, after months of debate, rejected the Treaty of Versailles. As a consequence of this, when William C. Bullitt, geographic and economic expert of the American delegation at Paris, saw the first drafts of the peace treaty with Hungary, he left the conference in order to voice in the United States his opposition to what was happening in Paris.⁽⁴⁾ In England several members both of the House of Lords and of the House of Commons spoke openly for revision of the Trianon Treaty.⁽⁵⁾ In 1919, John M. Keynes published a book in London entitled The Economic Consequences of the Peace. Although he dealt with the German treaty, he concluded that the treaties must be revised.⁽⁶⁾ The movement for revision reached a more significant stage when Signor Nitti, former Premier of Italy, appeared on the scene. When Nitti resigned the premiership, having regained his freedom, pointed out frankly that the Allies would have been horrified if anyone else had used the tone which they had adopted toward the defeated nations. The article in which these views were set forth was originally intended for publication in the United States but was ultimately printed in Italian newspapers.

Soon after, Nitti raised his voice in a meeting of the Union of Democratic Control in London, urging the revision of the Versailles Treaty.⁽⁷⁾ Lord Newton stated in the House of Lords that

the Trianon Treaty was the scandal of civilization. Senator de Monzie, member of the French Senate, came to the conclusion that Central Europe had been balkanized by the Trianon Treaty, that this created a new danger zone for Europe, and that revision of this treaty was imperative in France's own interest. M. Danielou stated in the French Chamber of Deputies that the French were extremely uninformed about the situation in the Danubian states, that the French Parliament should not approve this stringent Treaty and that a way ought to be found to remedy its injustice.⁽⁸⁾

In 1920 many articles were published in the French, British, and Italian newspapers which advocated treaty revision in the general interest of mankind. On the first of May, 1920, the New York Herald stated that Europe was rapidly approaching ultimate destruction because of the Peace Treaties.⁽⁹⁾ It appeared from the article that although peace was presumably re-established in the world, nine countries were still engaged in war, armed forces still occupied nineteen fronts, four states were threatened with imminent danger of hostilities, and in seven countries there was active or imminent civil war. Furthermore, Turkey was fighting with all her strength against the treaty. The New York Herald quoted Poincare, who, in an article published in the Revue des deux Mondes, characterized the Turkish peace treaty as "broken Sevres china."⁽¹⁰⁾

There was much talk of revision, but the treaty remained the same. Millerand, the new French Premier, declared that the Trianon Treaty could only be accepted or rejected because all the peace treaties constituted a single organic structure which would be impaired by any change.⁽¹¹⁾

The Hungarian Peace Delegation, headed by Hungary's "Grand Old Man," Count Albert Apponyi, arrived at Paris on January 5, 1920. It was lodged in the Hotel Chateau de Madrid,

in Neuilly, one of the suburbs of Paris, perfectly isolated. The members of the mission were not permitted to communicate with any foreign diplomat or embassy in Paris. Apponyi informed the Hungarian government in his first telegram to Budapest of the fact that the Hungarian Delegation was indeed interned. This isolation was so near total that when the Japanese ambassador in Paris expressed the wish that the Hungarian Delegation should seek contact with him, it was all but impossible. Colonel Paul Henry, the representative of the French Government, declared that personal contact with Allied diplomats was impossible until after the signing of the peace treaty.⁽¹²⁾

Although Hungary had no allies in 1920, she still had some personal friends. Among them were some influential members of the British Parliament. Before the peace delegation left for Paris, Lord Bryce advised the Hungarian Government that it would be most important to establish contact with the United States Government.⁽¹³⁾ The United States was not bound by Rumanian's secret war-time treaty; therefore, she could take a position against the annexation of Transylvania by the Rumanians and could demand that final decision in this matter be conditioned upon the findings of a commission appointed to deal with this problem. Such a demand on the part of the United States would be supported by numerous members of the British Parliament.

The Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs raised this question with the representative of the United States in Budapest. The Foreign Minister emphasized to Grant-Smith that the United States' ambassador in Paris was not participating in the preliminary negotiations concerning the peace treaty with Hungary and that, consequently, the conditions of peace were being determined without the knowledge and approval of the United States. The Foreign Minister stated:

We do not know whether, under these circumstances, the United States will feel bound by that treaty. It would be most important to have the American ambassador in Paris participate in discussions of the peace conditions and to have his support on behalf of our justifiable demand for a plebiscite based on the idea of self-determination.⁽¹⁴⁾

In a reply to this request, Grant-Smith suggested that the Hungarian Government endeavor to induce the Department of State in Washington to participate in the discussion of the Hungarian peace conditions. He suggested this because it was apparent that if he (Grant-Smith) himself undertook official steps to that end, it would at once arouse the Yugoslavs and the Czechs who would doubtless effectively counteract his move. On the basis of this suggestion, the Minister of Foreign Affairs instructed the Hungarian Legation at the Hague to initiate such action at once through Consul Janos Perenyi. Also a special note was sent to the Supreme Council pointing out that owing to the fact that the United States was no longer represented in the Supreme Council, Hungary's position was different from that of the powers with whom peace had heretofore been concluded. Hungary could not leave her position toward the United States unsettled, especially as there were many thousands of Hungarians in the United States whose interests must be protected.⁽¹⁵⁾

Clemenceau's answer to the letter of the Hungarian Delegation was written in a very abrupt tone. It concluded that if the Hungarian Delegation desired to cause delay by some pretext, there was no necessity for it to remain in Paris.⁽¹⁶⁾ The first meeting of the Hungarian Delegation with the delegates of the Supreme Council took place in the office of Colonel Henry at the Chateau de Madrid on January 14, 1920. M. Jules Cambon presented the credentials of the Allied plenipotentiaries.

When he read the list of names, no representative of the United States was among them. Count Apponyi asked Cambon whether the United States was represented, and Cambon replied that they were not. The whole ceremony was rather frigid. Cambon introduced himself as well as the Allied representatives, whereupon Count Apponyi introduced himself and the other Hungarian delegates. Apart from that related above, no conversation took place. Count Apponyi accepted the credentials and that ended the ceremony. There was no hand-shaking. Thereafter Count Apponyi wrote a letter to Clemenceau. He stated in this letter:

Having taken note, through the communications made by M. Jules Cambon, of the novel fact that the United States of America are not represented at the Conference to which we were sent by our Government, entrusted with the mission of preparing peace with all the belligerents, we beg you, Mr. President, to open the way for us to enter into direct relation with the Government at Washington and its representative accredited in Paris. The Allies can in no way resent our desire to conclude peace with the United States.⁽¹⁷⁾

The letter stated furthermore that the members of the Hungarian delegation were not treated as diplomats because they could not communicate with the other diplomats in Paris. Therefore, the members could not negotiate as was usual between diplomats. In such circumstances the Hungarian Delegation could not remain in Paris, although its desire was to negotiate with the Allied Powers. Next day, perhaps because of other political reasons, the French Government relented. The new French Government permitted free communication to the Hungarian Delegation and Clemenceau himself promised to mediate between the Peace Delegation and the United States.

On January 15, 1920, the Allies handed their peace conditions to Count Albert Apponyi, the President of the Hungarian Delegation. Next day, in the name of the people of Hungary,

Apponyi addressed an appeal to the Supreme Council. He referred to the great principle so happily phrased by President Wilson. namely, that no group of people, no population. may be transferred from one state to another without being first consulted. In the name of this great principle, he said: ". . . We demand a plebiscite in those parts of Hungary that are now on the point of being severed from us; I declare we are willing to bow to the decision of a plebiscite whatever it should be."⁽¹⁸⁾ Alexandre Millerand. the President of the Supreme Council, argued that having acquired the certitude that a consultation of the people would not offer a result different sensibly from those which the Allies arrived at, plebiscites were considered unnecessary. ⁽¹⁹⁾

The peace treaty was signed between Hungary and the Entente Powers on July 4. 1920. Signed at Versailles in the Trianon Palace, it is known as the Treaty of Trianon. It was ratified by the Hungarian Parliament on November 15, 1920, but no Hungaryian could accept it as valid and Hungarian official and unofficial politics were determined by the fight against Trianon during the inter-war period of Hungary. During these years it was the aspiration of nearly every Magyar to end the sad state of affairs imposed upon them by the peace settlement. It is no wonder then that revisionism, as the movement for the alteration of the terms of the Treaty of Trianon was called, became a very important factor in Hungarian politics. It also became a declaration of faith. a measuring rod for every Magyar's patriotism and loyalty.

To serve as an instrument of this cause; the "Hungarian League for Revision" was organized. The League collaborated with the influential British politician and newspaper magnate, Lord Rothermere, and with other influential persons, who conducted a personal campaign for the peaceful revision of the Treaty of Trianon. The campaign, however, led to little, if any, visible success.

1 Of the 325,411 sq. km. which had composed the area ot the Lands of the Holy Crown, Hungary was left with only 92,963. Romania alone had received 103,093; Czechoslovakia 61,633; Yugoslavia the 42,541 sq. km. of Croatia-Slovenia and 20,551 of Inner Hungary; Austria 4,020; Italy 8 sq. km. (the area of the city ot Fiume); and even Poland small fragments. Of the population of 20,886.487 (1910 census), Hungary was left with 7,615,117. Rumania received 5,257,467, Czechoslovakia's 3,517,568, Yugoslavia 4,131,249 (2,621,954+1,509,295), and Austria 291,618. In addition, the Treaty required Hungary to pay in reparations an unspecified sum and limited her armed forces to a long-service force of 35,000 (officers and men), to be used exclusively on the maintenancy of internal order and on frontier defense.

2 Of the 10,050,575 persons of Magyar mother-tongue, according to the 1910 census, no less than 3,219,579 were allotted to the Successor States: 1,704,851 of them to Rumania,; 1,063,020 to Czechoslovakia; 547,735 to Yugoslavia and 26,182 to Austria.

3 Pre-World War I Hungary is accused by many non-Hungarian historians, especially by Hugh Seaton-Watson, of having oppressed the non-Magyar minorities. Others, like Carlile Aylmer Macartney, have a dfferent point of view. Also there is a very interesting report on the situation of the minorities in post-World War I Yugoslavia sent by John Dyneley Prince, Minister of the United States to Yugoslavia, to the State Department on June 15, 1933, which admits that pre-war Hungary did not oppress the minorities. It says:

I can state of my own experience that although the Croatians, stimulated by Pan-Slav agitators under the influence of old Russia, chose to regard the very light Hungarian rule in Croatia as a 'tyranny,' one finds many persons in Yugoslavia today who look back upon their former status as having been much better than the iron hand of Belgrade which is clutching the whole of Yugoslavia by a well organized and successful system of repression. I cannot find, for example, that the former Austro-Hungarian Government compelled the study of the Magyar language in Croatia except in the case of persons in government service, who were relatively few in number. After all there was little tyranny in insisting that railway and customhouse officials should be able to speak some Hungarian - and that is really all that was requested."

U. S., For. Rel., Department ot State, FP 864.00/786.

4 Papers and Documents Relating to the Foreign Relations of Hungary, 19l9 - 1920 (Budapest: Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1939), p. 954.

5 For full details see The Hungarian Question in the British Parliament, Speeches, Questions, and Answers in the House of Lords and in the House of Commons (London, Grant Richards Publ., 1933).

6 (London: Harcourt and Brace 19l9). see Introduction.

7 Papers and Documents, p. 1002.

8 Ibid., p. 1002.

9 Column A, p. 3.

10 Ibid.

11 Papers and Documents, p. 1003.

12 Ibid., p. 854.

13 Ibid., p. 859.

14 Ibid., p. 893.

15 Ibid., p. 859.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid. p. 857

18 U. S., For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, IX, 872 - 884.

19 Ibid.

Mark Imre Major : American Hungarian Relations 1918-1944