Mark Imre Major : American Hungarian Relations 1918-1944

On July 21, 1919, Bela Kun sent a radio message to the Supreme Council announcing that his forces were crossing the Tisza River "to try to make the will of the Entente respected by the Rumanians."⁽¹⁾ The Rumanians, however, not only won the battle but crossed the Tisza and their advance towards Budapest was quick. On August 4 they marched into the Hungarian capital without opposition under the anti-Bolshevik banner.

The next months saw a period of great confusion. The Hungarian government had previously been taken over by a self-appointed Socialist government. On August 6, however, some fifty royalist gendarmes took advantage of the apathy of the Rumanians and staged a coup d'etat in favor of the Habsburg Archduke, Joseph. Archduke Joseph became the "Head of State": the Socialist government was thus replaced by a nationalist one under Prime Minister Stephen Friedrich, who had originally been a democratic Republican and an ardent personal follower of Michael Karolyi. During the Bolshevik terror he had changed his opinions completely to become one of the most active pro-Habsburgs. The Supreme Council found itself face to face with the return of a Habsburg which was contrary to Allied policy. The Supreme Council also received reports about the Rumanian terrorism, looting

and destruction, which exceeded even their worst fears and predictions . ⁽²⁾

Two issues now faced the Supreme Council: how to prevent a "White terror" in Hungary and how to restrain the Rumanians. In accordance with a decision of the Supreme Council, an Inter-Allied Military Mission arrived in Budapest on August 7. l9l9, to save Hungary from herself and from the Rumanians. It had been decided that this mission should be composed of generals rather than diplomats. Of the latter there had already been too many. Four generals representing the four chief Allies were appointed to head this Military Mission to Hungary: General Harry Hill Bandholtz of the United States Army. General Reginald Gorton of the British Army, General G. Graziani of the French Army, and General Ernesto Mombelli of the Italian Army.⁽³⁾

The Inter-Allied Military Mission received the following commission from the Supreme Council: keep the Rumanians under control and force them to leave Hungary as soon as possible; prevent atrocities and build up a police force in Hungary; help Hungary to establish a responsible government which could be acceptable to the Supreme Council; and force Hungary to accept the new boundaries fixed by the Peace Treaties and to sign the Peace Treaty. ⁽⁴⁾

The problems of the Inter-Allied Mission were manifold. First of all, the Mission appeared to be a house divided. Although the American and British members followed strictly the instructions of the Supreme Council, and usually agreed in every case, the two Latin members were under the influence of the politics of their own governments. Furthermore, in the principal Allied countries and in the United States, public opinion was divided concerning the situation in Hungary. Liberal public opinion in England and in the United States was strongly opposed to Rumania's

invasion of Hungary, but in the French and Italian press there was a pre-disposition to justify Rumania's action.⁽⁵⁾

The differences of the Mission were evident from the very beginning. The French representative had come with the full intention of presiding over and dominating the Mission. Upon arriving in Budapest, he prepared a message requesting that each of the other Inter-Allied Generals report to him. Going to the regular meeting room, Graziani introduced himself and explained that seniority should govern in the question of chairmanship, adding that his government had undoubtedly expected him to be the presiding officer. This was not accepted by Bandholtz, who pointed out; that accidental individual seniority should not outweigh the question of national equality in representation. To secure national equality it would be better to organize the Inter-Allied Military Mission on the basis of daily rotation of chairmanship. The French general reluctantly agreed to the proposition, stating, however, that he must inform his government that he was not to be the permanent presiding officer. ⁽⁶⁾

The Mission's second problem was Rumania, who stated that her little private war with Hungary was separate and distinct from the big war. She considered her victory over Hungary to be highly significant, completely ignoring the fact that she could never have touched Hungary had not the Allies first crushed both Germany and Austro-Hungary. The Rumanians considered themselves as crusaders against Hungarian Bolshevism and, therefore, felt entitled to do as they wanted. Furthermore, they

questioned why they should obey the Supreme Council when Italy refused to do so, and even such a prostrated nation as Turkey refused obedience.

On August 12, Constantine Diamandi, the Rumanian High Commissioner to the Peace Conference, accompanied by General Mardarescu, Commander-in-Chief of the Rumanian Army, and General Holban, Rumanian Commander in Budapest, appeared before the Mission. In view of the fact that it was decided to rotate the chairmanship in alphabetical sequence, Bandholtz the American representative, presided at the meeting. Diamandi listened to the instructions which the Supreme Council had given the Military Mission. When asked if Rumania recognized them as valid and was prepared to follow them, Diamandi became enraged, jumped from his chair, and started to leave the room. Finding that his progress was not impeded by Bandholtz, he calmed down and returned to his chair. He finally agreed that the Rumanian government was prepared to accept the instructions as valid. Bandholtz handed over to the Rumanians the telegram of the Supreme Council ordering them to:

l) Immediately cease requisitioning;

2) Return all confiscated private property at once to the owners;

3) Return to the Hungarian Government the railroad, postal, and telegraph systems;

4) Evacuate as rapidly as possible all schools and colleges;

5) Cancel promptly all shipments of rolling stock or Hungarian property of any kind whatsoever to or towards Rumania, and return to Budapest any rolling stock or property already en route or held at outside stations;

6) Limit supervision over public or private affairs in the city.⁽⁷⁾

Bandholtz wired the American Mission in Paris that in his opinion the Rumanians were doing their utmost to delay matters in order to complete the looting of Hungary, and that as far as he could see, their progress to date in complying with the Supreme Council's desires was negative rather than positive.⁽⁸⁾

During the next months the Supreme Council sent several ultimatums to the Rumanians. Rumania always promised to fill them, but she never did. Eventually, the ultimatums became habitual. On August 26 Bandholtz sent a telegram to the Supreme Council in the name of the Mission, stating that:

In our opinion the Rumanians are looting Hungary as rapidly as possible, and at the same time, they are disarming everybody and refusing to organize the police. In general, intentionally or unintentionally, every move they make is in the direction of turning Hungary over to Bolshevism and chaos. ⁽⁹⁾

The next day, Bandholtz sent the following coded message to Frank Lyon Polk, Assistant Secretary of State and leader of the American Peace Commission in Paris:

"The Rumanians certainly could not continue their arrogant and haughty attitude unless backed by someone. I believe it is the French and Italians who are trying to accomplish some kind of political or other union among Rumania, Hungary, Austria, and Italy with a view of isolating entirely the Yugoslavs." ⁽¹⁰⁾

A month later on October 1, 1919, Polk reported to Bandholtz :

"It is now known that either Clemenceau himself or the French officials had always notified the Rumanians immediately after the dispatch of an ultimatum that such ultimatums could be ignored and that the Supreme Council really did not mean it."⁽¹¹⁾

Rumania, occupying Hungary, had a far reaching political plan backed by France and Italy. In August, 1919, the whole Rumanian royal family moved to Budapest. On August 21, the Crown Prince of Rumania, as "future King of Hungary", received a number

of Hungarian aristocrats. Rumania wanted to force Hungary to make with her a separate peace which practically amounted to annexation. On August 11, Archduke Joseph, as temporary head of Hungary, received from the Rumanian government an ultimatum to the effect that Hungary must yield to all Rumanian demands, give up all war material and supplies of whatever nature, agree to back Rumania in taking the Banat county from the Yugoslavs, and, finally, consent to political union with Rumania, with the Rumanian King as ruler, along the same lines as the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The Archduke sent a negative response to these demands. On August 29 Rumania sent a second ultimatum, similar to the first, and including demands for immediate peace between Hungary and Rumania, the occupation of Hungary by Rumania for one year, and, finally, the annexation of Hungary to Rumania. The Archduke handed it over to Bandholtz. It was coded and ciphered and sent to the American Commission in Paris with a request that a copy be sent to the British Commission. Then Bandholtz turned to the Archduke and told him briefly: "Tell the sender to go plumb to Hell."⁽¹²⁾

A third problem was the reorganization of the Hungarian police and the establishment of a government acceptable to the Supreme Council. On September 5 the Inter-Allied Military Mission put the task of the reorganization of the Hungarian police into the hands of Colonel Halsey E. Yates of the United States Army. The Rumanians, however, tried to prevent such a reorganization. In spite of the fact, Yates organized a police force of six thousand men in Budapest and obliged the Rumanians to give them arms. Upon completion of his work six weeks later, Yates was officially congratulated by the Supreme Council.⁽¹³⁾

The first problem in organizing a government was to decide who would be head of state. Among the three Habsburg

pretenders, the former King Charles had never resigned as sovereign of Hungary, and so long as he lived the people would have no other king, since he had been crowned. Furthermore, in case of return, he would take Croatia with him because this country was fanatically loyal. The second Habsburg who could be invested with the royal authority was Charles' popular relative, Archduke Joseph, temporary head of state. Archduke Albrecht, the third Habsbrug, had large holdings in the North and could promise to return Slovakia if he were elected, since he was in favor with the Slovaks. But it was clear that the Allies would not have permitted Charles or any other Habsburg to be King of Hungary; they did not even accept Archduke Joseph as temporary head of the country. On August 23 Clemenceau sent a telegram to the Military Mission at Budapest insisting that as long as Hungary had at her head a member of the House of Habsburg, no peace was likely to be lasting, nor could the Allied governments give her the economic support which Hungary so sorely needed. ⁽¹⁴⁾ The Archduke resigned on the same day, and Hungary was without a head for several months.

The Peace Conference wanted a permanent popular government established in Hungary. But it was impossible to hold elections in Hungary because of the Rumanian occupation. Although the Entente sent three ultimatums to Rumania to leave, she did not budge. ⁽¹⁵⁾ Yet Hungary had to organize some cabinet that would be recognized by the Entente, which would not accept or acknowledge the de facto Hungarian government as sufficiently permanent to guarantee a treaty of peace. When Archduke Joseph resigned, the entire cabinet did the same, stating that everything was now in the hands of the Inter-Allied Military Mission. In fact, there was now no government, and no one had the power to appoint a new one. To avoid this situation the Mission

informed the Prime Minister that it did not want to mix in the internal affairs of Hungary, except to such an extent as it might be definitely instructed by the Supreme Council, and added that it was the duty of the present cabinet to continue temporarily in office until a new government could be organized within a few days. Bandholtz reported to Paris on August 22 that the Hungarian political situation was believed to be critical, but not beyond remedy, provided the Rumanians withdrew behind their own recognized boundaries.⁽¹⁶⁾ But Rumania did not withdraw and Hungary was without an "acceptable" government during the next months. In the confusion, of course, many politicians tried to organize a cabinet of their own and obtain acceptance by the Entente. Bandholtz wrote in his diary on August 31 : "Business is decidedly poor in Hungary, if we do not have from three to five cabinets per week." The Hungarian cause was hopeless; the country, prostrate; the Rumanians, pillaging; the Entente, doing absolutely nothing. On September 20 the Mission sent the following telegram to Paris:

At the present rate of progress, the Rumanians will continue indefinitely with their occupation and attendant looting in which they are daily becoming more expert. The Hungarians, on the other hand, are becoming more and more discouraged; famine, suffering, and disorder are approaching. It is recommended that either the Friedrich cabinet be recognized or that explicit instructions be given as to what will be recognized. ⁽¹⁷⁾

The reply of the Supreme Council stated that it was not thought the Friedrich government was a real representation of all Hungarian parties; he should in his cabinet have a member from each party. In case Friedrich could not do so, the Entente could not recognize his cabinet nor make a treaty of peace with it. In view of the fact that there were eighteen different political parties

in Hungary from Socialists and Radicals to Royalists, it was apparent that such an order could not be carried out. The Hungarian Government responded to the order of the Supreme Council by a message sent to the Inter-Allied Military Mission on September 23 stating that there was nothing else left for Hungary but to come to terms with Rumania because otherwise she should be absolutely ruined. The Entente either could not or would not help her.⁽¹⁸⁾ This is exactly what the French and the Italians wanted. Bandholtz called the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and told him that he was very foolish for two reasons: the first being that the Rumanians would demand so much that it would ruin Hungary in perpetuity; and secondly, that the Rumanians, for their part, would not carry out any contract which they made. Then he inquired if the Minister of Foreign Affairs had been approached at all by the French. He said no, but that the Hungarians knew that the French were winking at the Rumanians in all they had been doing. Then Bandholtz asked him if he had had any transactions with the Italians. Yes, the Minister answered, General Mombelli himself had suggested that the Hungarians come to terms with the Rumanians.⁽¹⁹⁾ But the subsequent negotiations reached no agreement and the Rumanians responded with terror. They arrested some of the Hungarian officials, and the Crown Prince of Rumania himself, as the "future King of Hungary," had ordered the arrest of Prime Minister Friedrich. Such an action, of course, could not be tolerated by the Supreme Council, and the Military Mission sent a memorandum to the Rumanians calling their attention to the fact that the Mission considered it indispensable that the conduct of affairs by the Hungarian cabinet be not interrupted for a single moment. Therefore, in the name of the Supreme Council the Mission demanded that the Rumanian authorities leave the members of the Hungarian government entirely alone.⁽²⁰⁾ In any event, the attempt to

arrest the Primer Minister failed, but relations between Rumania and the Mission became so unfriendly that Mardarescu. taking the memorandum from the Mission, declared to the Allied Generals: "Gentlemen, you have four telephones but I have 80,000 bayonets."⁽²¹⁾

Meantime something changed in the relations between France and Italy On November 7, Polk sent a code telegram from Paris to Bandholtz, which indicated that the French were up to something and for some reason the French and the Italians were not working together. "It will now be up to us to see just exactly what the cause of the separation is."⁽²²⁾ It was, of course, the Fiume question. Gabriele d'Annunzio seized Fiume on September 13, 1919, and Zara on November 4, in defiance of the decision of the Allies. French and Italian soldiers were hostile toward each other, almost to the point of war.

As previously noted, the Entente did not recognize the Hungarian Government of which Friedrich, as representative of the Habsburg dynasty, was the head. So long as Friedrich was Prime Minister, even though an election was held and resulted triumphantly for him, nothing would convince the Entente to recognize the Hungarian Government. Therefore Bandholtz advised Friedrich to resign. But Friedrich was unwilling to do so and stated he thought it was the policy of the Supreme Council to allow the Hungarian people to do what they wanted and that they should have their own way. Bandholtz told him that the Hungarian people knew or should know that America had nothing whatever to gain there in the way of indemnity or territorial acquisitions, but that it was interested in a square deal for everybody, in having peace ratified between Hungary and the United States, and in having a well-organized government in control of the destinies of the country. Bandholtz proposed to speak to Friedrich frankly and in the manner of one gentleman to

another. Bandholtz stated that he did not want to defend the Supreme Council or any allied countries. He would grant Friedrich that they were all wrong. If given sufficient time, a year or two, Friedrich could by propaganda and by demonstration of his own worth convince the American and British people that he was right, but in the meantime where in hell would Hungary go? It was up to the Hungarians to organize as quickly as possible a government that would be acceptable to the Entente, so that Hungary could be recognized.⁽²³⁾ Two weeks later Friedrich resigned and a coalition government was formed under Charles Huszar, a Christian Democrat, as Prime Minister. The function of this government was to act until the people had been consulted through the medium of general elections by secret vote. This temporary government was recognized by the Supreme Council and, finally, Hungary had some kind of government!

In the meantime the Rumanians continued to loot Hungary removing all automobiles, locomotives, cars, and other rolling stock. They took possession of, and shipped to Rumania, all the arms, munitions, and war material they could find, as well as private automobiles, farm implements, cattle, horses, clothing, sugar, coal, salt, and everything of value. Even after they were notified by the Supreme Council to cease such requisitioning, they continued their depredations. They had taken possession of all branches of the government, all railroad, telegraph, telephone, and postal systems. They stole everything movable: plates, pictures, carpets, linen, furniture, even the cloth from billiard tables. They took twelve hundred locomotives, leaving the Hungarians only four hundred. In the Ritz Hotel, headquarters of the English member of the Military Mission, Bela Kun had done five million crowns' worth of damage; the Rumanians did seven millions' worth. They took literally everything! A member of the English Mission, sent into the East of Hungary to investigate the facts, said that the Rumanians had not even left the nails in the boards.

1 U. S., For. Rel., Peace Conference, VII, 236.

2 Ibid., pp. 604-5.

3 Ibid., p. 529.

4 Ibid., pp 530-33.

5 See "War of the Nations," New International Year Book for 1919 (New York: 1920), p. 748.

6 Harry Hill Bandholtz, An Undiplomatic Diary, ed. by Fritz Konrad Kruger (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), p 6. According to his diary, Bandholtz was of the opinion that the French attitude of favoring Rumania and being anti-Hungarian was on account of a desire to oppose England and make it difficult for the latter to gain headway in East-Central Europe. Italy, on the other hand, was trying to accomplish some kind of union between Romania-Hungary-Austria and Italy, with a view to isolating the Yugoslavs. See pp. 45, 331.

7 Ibid., p. 10.

8 Ibid., p. 11.

9 U. S., For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, VII, 836.

10 Bandholtz. Diary, p. 45.

11 Ibid., p. 125.

12 See the Full text Of the Rumanian ultimatums, U. S., For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, VII, 567-68.

13 Bandholtz, Diary, p. 234.

14 See the debats of the Supreme Council, U. S., For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, VII, 679-81, 604-98, 707-8, 709-10, 775-76, 791-92, 803-4.

15 U. S., For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, VIII, 110.

16 Bandholtz, Diary, p. 26.

17 U. S., For. Rel., Paris Peace Conference, VII, 777.

18 Bandholtz, Diary, p. 108.

19 Ibid., p. 109

20 Ibid, p. 155.

21 Ibid., p. 249.

22 Ibid., p. 210

23 Ibid., p . 211

Mark Imre Major : American Hungarian Relations 1918-1944