

THE VOIVODINA

§ I. GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION

THE main portion of that part of Hungary proper acquired by Yugoslavia is the so-called 'Voivodina'¹—a blunt triangular chunk of 19,221 square kilometers hacked rudely off the southern end of the great Hungarian plain in such manner as to form an eastward prolongation of Slovenia and an approach from the north to Serbia.

On the west and south-west it marches with Slovenia, whence it is divided successively by the Drave to its junction with the Danube, and the Danube to its meeting with the Save. On the south the Danube separates it from Serbia. These great rivers form well-defined boundaries; but the eastern frontier with Romania, which runs north-westward from the Danube to a point just south of the Mures (Maros), and the northern, with Hungary, which runs across the Tisza and the Danube back to the Drave, are mere conventional lines drawn on a map, which only occasionally and accidentally coincide with any discernible natural feature.

Natural features are, it must be admitted, hard to find outside the rivers, which dominate the landscape. Besides the frontier rivers of the Danube and the Drave, the Tisza flows through the very heart of the country to its junction with the Danube a score of miles above Belgrade. The land is simply a great flat alluvial plain drained, watered, and at times inundated by these vast and imposing streams, which are at once its benefactors and its terrors, but at all times its masters. The fields have to be protected by great dikes, drained by canals. Left uncared for, they speedily degenerate into fever-haunted marsh. But once reclaimed and protected, they yield fruits in incredible abundance. This is the famous black-earth belt, the old-time granary of Hungary and Austria too, the country of the Gypsy Baron, where chickens grow

1. The title of 'Voivodina' or 'duchy' was bestowed by Yugoslavia on the area after its annexation, was abolished when the new system of Banovinas was introduced in 1929, but will be used here in default of an alternative, since the boundaries of the new Banovinas cut across the old frontiers between Hungary, Slovenia, and Serbia. The name is a reminiscence of the 'Serbian Voivodina' which at one time existed in Hungary; but this, as will be shown, was a short-lived creation, to equate which with such an historic unit as, say, Croatia or Slovenia would give a false impression of the extent to which South Hungary as such ever enjoyed a separate constitution and status.

as big as turkeys and pigs as big as ponies. Purely agricultural for it has no minerals, not even stones for its roads, nor any large woodlands—the Voivodina supports no industry, except mills, distilleries, and other processes directly dependent on agriculture; but, given accessible markets, it is the farmer's dream.

The country falls into three natural subdivisions: the Baranya, between the Drave and the Danube; the Baèka, between the Danube and the Tisza; and the Bánát, on the left bank of the Tisza. Each of these has its own character, its own local atmosphere and feeling, and to some extent its own private history, which differentiate it from the other two, although it must be remarked that these characteristics are not proper to the three components of the Voivodina, but to the larger units of which they form only parts. The Baranya is merely the south-eastern corner of the Hungarian County of that name; the Baèka, the southern and central portions of the County of Bács-Bodrog; and the Bánát, the westernmost third of the area once, officially, and still commonly, so designated.

The population of the present Voivodina was given by the Hungarian census of 1910 and the Yugoslav census of 1921 respectively as follows:

	1910	1921
Serbs	383,198	
Bunjevci, Šokci, Croats.	71,708	514,121
Slovenes		7,949
Magyars	441,787	382,070
Germans	311,162	328,173
Romanians	71,788	74,099
Other Slavs.	58,051	67,886
Others	12,783	6,162
	1,350,477	1,380,460

No words can, unfortunately, do justice to the distribution of the population. The Romanians are mostly to be found in the east, the Magyars are strongest in the north, the Serbs in the south; but the three intermingle hopelessly, a wedge of Serbian settlements pushing in one place far northward, while Magyar advanced posts run to its right and left well to the south, and outlying Magyar islets are found, even in the country-side, in the extreme south, as well as in all the towns. The Šokac and Bunjevac settlements are near the northern frontier, islands in a non Slavonic sea, the Slovaks and Ruthenes rather farther south. The Germans are everywhere. The distribution can be appreciated, if at all, only from the map, and the reason for it can be learnt only from history.

§2. HISTORY TO 1914

In early days the Baèka—still the bleakest, least sheltered of the three divisions—formed the camping-ground of nomadic Scythians, Sarmatians, Huns, and Avars, while the Baranya belonged to Roman Pannonia and afterwards to German tribes. The Banat formed part of the Dacian kingdom, then of Roman Dacia a fact which allowed Romania to claim it on historic grounds. It passed afterwards to Balkan tribelings, who provided Serbia with a counter-claim (although, whoever they were, they were not Serbs). The Magyars, on arrival, conquered all three areas with great ease, and themselves peopled them. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the population was predominantly Magyar as far south as the Danube opposite Belgrade and the foot-hills of the Carpathians. Then, however, Romanian and, in particular, Serb refugees began to drift in large numbers as the Turks advanced in the Balkans, and although the political sovereignty of Hungary remained unaffected, yet by the beginning of the sixteenth century the population of the Western Banat and Southern Baèka seems to have been overwhelmingly Serb.¹ Certain persons were, at various times, allowed to bear the title of ‘Voivode of the Hungarian Serbs’, and exercised a great degree of authority over their countrymen.

In the sixteenth century followed the Turkish conquest of South Hungary, under which the Magyar population disappeared almost completely. The Romanians seem to have survived better, and to have pushed down here and there into the plains, but there the Serbs easily outnumbered them and even flourished. A continuous immigration went on, even under Turkish rule, and they possessed four bishoprics in the Vilayet of Temesvár (corresponding to the Banat) and another important center in Pécs; although neither the density of the population nor its level of culture equaled that of the earlier Magyar period. These scattered Romanian and Serbian settlers were reinforced, just before the close of the Turkish rule, by the ancestors of the Šokci and Bunyevci who, arriving at a favorable moment when the country was empty (the Turks had gone off bag and baggage to the siege of Vienna), squatted in the areas which their descendants still occupy: the Bunyevci in the Subotica district, the Šokci on the rivers round Mohács and Baja, and in the Baranya south of Pécs.²

1. In 1483 King Matthias Corvinus wrote to the Pope that 200,000 Serbs had settled in South Hungary in four years. In 1538 Cardinal Martinuzzi wrote that Serbs formed half the population of Hungary (E. Haumont, *La Formation de la Yougoslavie* (Paris, 1930) pp. 148, 149).

2. The Šokci are believed to have originated from Dalmatis, the Bunyevci

This curious little invasion was the forerunner of one much more extensive. When the Austrian armies advanced against the Turks at the end of the seventeenth century, numerous promises were made to the Christian population of the Balkans to induce them to rise against the Turks. As a result of some years of very confused intrigue, the Patriarch of Peè (Ipek), Arsen Crnojeviæ, migrated into Hungary with a considerable body of followers, mostly Serbians.¹ It was agreed that they should be settled either in their own homes, if these were conquered from the Turks, or in such part of the Hungarian territories as might be recovered. Meanwhile, they were promised the full exercise of their religion, the right to elect an archbishop of their own nationality and language and to choose their own Voivode, and the undisturbed practice of their traditional customs under their own magistrates; and the archbishop and vice-Voivode were in fact appointed (the Emperor had already recognized a certain George Brankoviæ as Despot of Serbia, but fearing his ambitions had most treacherously had him imprisoned).

Pending the issue of the campaigns, the Serbs were settled in various parts of Hungary, some as far north as Buda, Szent Endre, and even Komárom and Györ, but most of them in a strip of land running across the then *de facto* southern frontier of Hungary, and comprising the land between the Koros and the Maros, the Southern Baëka, Syrmia, and Eastern Slovenia. Brankoviæ had at one time been accorded certain rights over these lands, and the Emperor now assigned them to the 'Rascian [i.e. Serbian] nation', and collected Crnojeviæ's followers into them as far as possible. It was not, however, an assignment in perpetuity, since both parties hoped that Serbia would eventually be reconquered, when the Serbs proposed to move back into their old homes. But the Peace of Karlowitz (1699) put an end to these hopes, and the Serbs remained where they had been put, forming thus a girdle across Southern Hungary. They now had to be considered as Imperial subjects and permanent inhabitants of Hungary, and the question of their status took on rather a new aspect. Successive Emperors repeatedly confirmed their charter, but, in practice, only the

from Bosnia. By their own tradition they were 'haiduks' (i.e. more or less brigands), but were converted to Catholicism by Franciscan monks. They arrived in x68z in style, with their families, their arms, their monks, and their Church banners, their little band (in the case of the Bunyevci, only 3,000 armed men) being reinforced by a contingent of Orthodox Serbs. The Bunyevci afterwards turned to farming, while the Šokci became fishers and lightermen, towing the barges up the rivers in the Volga Boatmen style.

1. The number traditionally given is 36,000 families; but according to Professor Caraviæ (*Istorija Jugoslavije*, Belgrade, 1931, p. 361) the Patriarch's followers numbered only 30,000 souls. On the other hand, Professor Caraviæ shows that a large number of other migrations took place which are often ignored by historians.

religious provisions of it were respected, the Archbishop receiving spiritual authority over all the Orthodox Church in Hungary. No Voivode and no second vice-Voivode was appointed. Their land was, indeed, kept distinct from the Hungarian administration, but it was ruled, not by the Serbs themselves, but by Austrians, being formed into various 'Military Frontier' districts.

While this was taking place the Turks were still in possession of the Vilayet of Temesvár, bounded by the Tisza on the west, the Maros on the north. In 1718 they evacuated also this, the last of their possessions in Hungary. The Emperor returned one County in the north to Hungary, but alleging the country to be 'neo acquisita', with which he could do as he would, he retained the rest of it under his control. This new area, known henceforward (officially, for some sixty-five years, but unofficially to this day) as the 'Banat', was made the scene of the most elaborate colonization scheme which had, perhaps, ever been attempted. Only the Magyars were forbidden to enter, since the Emperor wished to wipe out Hungary's claim to it for good and all, The largest number of colonists were the Germans, for whom the best land was reserved, while they formed the chief urban element, almost as a matter of course. But they were not the only element: the settlers included Frenchmen, Catalans, Italians, Cossacks, Armenians, Bulgars, Crassovans,¹ The Romanians, who were considered unreliable (*sehr wankelmütig*) were not made welcome and were, indeed, forbidden certain areas, but they were allowed in some parts of the plain, and continued to have the more inaccessible parts of the mountains, whither the colonization did not penetrate, pretty much to themselves. The Serbs, on the other hand, were settled in large numbers, although many of them fled to Russia, or back into the Balkans, not liking the local conditions. Nevertheless, they remained the largest element in the Western Banat after the Germans, These Serbs, it may be remarked, were not regarded as belonging politically to the 'Rascian Nation', although they were under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Serbian Archbishop.

As the Banat filled up, the country behind was gradually

1. The Crassovans inhabit half a dozen villages near Resita, in the Banat mountains, and are held to-day to be a transition people, neither pure Bulgar nor pure Serb; but Czornig, in his *Ethnographie der oesterreichischen Monarchie* (vol. iii, p. 545), describes them as Catholic Bulgars. A modern Yugoslav historian claims for them a Croat origin. There is also one Crassovan village, now Germanized, in the Western Banat. Not many of these freak minorities are to be found to day. The Bulgars and Crassovans both exist (in the Romanian Banat). The Cossacks died out, since it was part of their military tenets to eschew the unmanly act of marriage. The Italians and Catalans succumbed to the climate. The French villages ended by becoming Germanized, and are distinguishable to-day only by their surnames, by a few words which have survived in their local dialects, and by a slightly different style of domestic architecture.

restored to the civilian authorities. Parts of Slovenia were reincorporated in Hungary in 1747, the Military Frontiers of the Tisza and 'Janopol', north of the Banat, were liquidated in 1750, as superfluous. Many of their Serbian inhabitants, especially from the 'Janopol' district north of the Maros, migrated into the Banat when this was done.

Hungary was now again titular owner of the Baranya and the Baëka, but the Crown was in fact the largest and indeed almost the sole landowner, the titles of the old landowning families having vanished or been declared void. In practice, therefore, these areas were colonized in much the same way as the Banat. The existing inhabitants were left undisturbed, but the wide interstices between their settlements were filled with new settlers, most of whom, again, were Germans.¹ Only in the north the Magyars moved down to right and left of Subotica. The private landowners brought in non-Magyar labor as readily as the Crown itself, although they preferred, as a rule, to draw on the reservoir of cheap labor in North Hungary. It is to them that the Ruthene and Slovak colonies are chiefly due.

In 1778 the Banat also was restored to Hungary, except a strip along its southern frontier which had gradually been organized during previous decades into a Military Frontier. A certain Magyar immigration now began; but at first only on a very small scale, since the great colonizing era was almost over and the country filled up.

The Serb privileges, meanwhile, had been steadily dwindling, until practically nothing of them was left. In 1790 Leopold II struck the final blow when he transferred the conduct of all Serb affairs to the Hungarian Government. Only the religious and cultural autonomy remained, to be renewed and confirmed in 1868, when, however, repeated demands by the Serb leaders for the renewal of their old lay privileges were rejected by the Hungarian Parliament.

The Serbs of Hungary, however, still at this time remained a rich and nationally conscious element. Towns such as Novi Sad (Ujvidek, Neusatz), Sombor (Zombor), Pancevo (Pancsova), and Zemun (Semlin) were still mainly Serbian, and actually more important as centers of national culture and feeling than the wild Balkan principality itself. This active national feeling caused the Hungarian Serbs (unlike the local Catholic Slavs and Suabians)

1. This country had been as badly depopulated as the southern frontier itself. In 1692 the total population of the three counties of Baranya, Tolna, and Somogy numbered only 3,221 souls, 1,652 of whom were in the city of Pécs (Marczali, *Hungary in the Eighteenth Century*, p. 199). The Baëka and the Banat contained 30,000 inhabitants apiece at the beginning of the eighteenth century (*Hungarian Peace Negotiations*, vol. 408).

to take the Austrian side in 1848, when the situation held out a possibility of a revival of their ancient privileges. They fought savagely against the Magyars, and asked for their territories to be incorporated into an autonomous Voivody, which they wished to be affiliated to Croatia-Slovenia. Francis Joseph, to reward them, revived the ancient titles of Patriarch and Voivode, promising them also national autonomy. After the War was over, the Baëka and Banat were in fact separated from Hungary and formed into an 'autonomous Serb Voivodina', with its seat at Temesvár. But the Voivodina, while including the Eastern Banat, which was Romanian, excluded Eastern Slovenia, which was Serb; and it was ruled from Vienna, through a German administration; so that Serbian opinion began to look again to Hungary. The Voivodina was abolished in 1860. In their subsequent negotiations with the Magyar authorities the Serb representatives, while protesting loyalty to Hungary, consistently and vigorously demanded the restoration of their old 'privileges' and an autonomous Voivodina; but in vain, for in 1867 Hungary regained de facto control of the area, which she proceeded to organize on the usual County system, and subjected to the ordinary Hungarian administration with all its implications.¹

For Hungary, of course, this simply meant that she was entering into her own again; for she never recognized the right of the Habsburgs to exclude her parliament from complete control of all her territory. She was also able to claim with justice that if Leopold and Joseph behaved like Emperors of Austria, they were acting as Kings of Hungary, so that Hungary's constitutional title to the Banat and even to the Military Frontiers remained unimpaired. Lawyers would presumably agree that her historical title is sound; but it is worth mentioning that among the Germans and even the Serbs and Romanians of the Banat, and especially of the Military Frontier, a strong tradition of local independence lives on, and memories of the old Austrian rule are still fresh. To them the Hungarian rule is an innovation, the Magyars newcomers. 'The Magyars were never here', said a Romanian to me on the Frontier, 'and no one wants them here'—a remark which, unacceptable to the historian, and exaggerated even in other respects, yet does reflect a certain attitude of mind prevalent among part of the Frontier population. It would have been inconceivable, for example, in Slovakia. In the succeeding half-century the Magyar and Magyar-speaking elements gained considerable ground. In the north, the southward expansion of the Magyar peasantry of the Alföld continued.

1. The Military Frontier was still exempted from Hungarian control in 1867 but was 'liquidated' a few years later.

The sparsely inhabited spaces of the Northern Baèka filled up with a new population of Magyar cottagers and laborers, while in the south of that district, and in the Banat, some new Magyar villages were founded with government assistance.

In the south ethnographical conditions in the villages did not alter greatly; but the towns, which grew rapidly with the great economic development which now set in, attracted large numbers of new-comers, most of whom were either Magyar or Magyarized. The Jews, who now for the first time entered South Hungary in considerable numbers (in 1910 the Voivodina contained 18,771 persons of Jewish religion, to which number several thousands of baptized Jews must undoubtedly be added), were almost all of the Magyarone type, the Orthodox Jew of the Carpathians not penetrating so far south, while Jews speaking Serb or Romanian as their mother tongue were almost unknown. Immigration of Magyar officials, railway employees, and industrial workers also accounts for part of the phenomenally rapid increase, revealed by the official statistics, of the Magyar-speaking population. This amounted in the Baèka to no less than 21.58 per cent. in the single decade 1880—90, while between 1900 and 1910 the rate for the Baèka was still 10 per cent., and for the Banat 16 per cent. No other nationality could approach these figures, which were certainly due in some part to natural causes.

In part, again, they reflect the Magyarization to which the local 'nationalities' of the Baranya, the Northern Baèka, and even the North-Western Banat soon began to succumb. By 1914 the process was far advanced, not only among the Suabians and Catholic Slovaks, many of whom had been settled in the Northern Baèka, but also among the Bunyevci who, being largely town-dwellers,¹ as well as Catholics, were more exposed than most of the Slays of Hungary to Magyarizing influences.² A small national revival, led by a few priests, which set in at the end of the nineteenth century was making less headway than the opposite process of Magyarization to which, in the opinion of their own leaders, the

1. Nearly half the Bunyevci live to-day in the single town of Subotica (Szabadka, Maria Theresiopoli), most of the remainder in the country immediately surrounding it, while round that again is a Magyar country-side. This unusual phenomenon is due to the fact that Subotica, like other towns of the Alföld, is really an immense village, the inhabitants of which huddled together for mutual protection, while remaining peasants. The country population lives in isolated farms: these are citizens whose land lay so far from the town that they had to build shelters on it during the busy months in the fields, and ended by living there altogether when times grew quiet. The second main Bunyevci center, Sombor, is similarly constructed.

2. In the debates on the Hungarian Nationalities Law, the spokesman for the Bunyevci had opposed the Serb claim for an autonomous Voivodina and declared that he 'abhorred' ('*perhorreskálják*') the Minority draft (I. de Nagy, *Nemzetiségi Törvény, &c.*, p. 30).

whole of this little ethnographical relic would have succumbed in another generation had the War not intervened.

In the south the position was rather different. There lingered on, especially in the old Frontier, a strong local tradition of independence which fifty years were not nearly enough to wipe out. In these districts the Germans and Serbs, to the last, looked on the Magyars as intruders, combined against them, and during the earlier decades at least; before the Government had put forth its whole strength, managed with some success to keep them out of the local administration. More important still, as a barrier against the advance of the Magyars, was the strongly fortified economic position which both these two nationalities had acquired during the previous century and a half. Besides a rural class consisting largely of prosperous freeholder peasants, and even some very wealthy large landowners, they possessed a rich and old-established middle class in many towns of the Banat. The Serbs and the Romanians were also protected by their churches—again firmly founded and buttressed in earlier generations—which enjoyed complete freedom and were very strongly organized, the Serbs possessing not only their richly endowed metropolitan see in Karlovci (immediately across the river from Novi Sad), which owned over 26,000 yokes of land, but also three other local Episcopal sees.¹ Both the Serb and the Romanian churches were able to keep up a fairly extensive primary educational system in their confessional schools, while the Serbs possessed also a certain modicum of secondary education. In the Voivodina alone, besides their 179 primary schools, they had a gymnasium, a higher commercial academy, a training college, and three secondary girls' schools; but these were only part of the total organization which they possessed in the Monarchy, the center of which lay in Syrmia. Here there was a second gymnasium, two more training colleges, and a theological academy. The value of their foundations was estimated at 17.5 million gold crowns. Mention must also be made of their famous cultural society in Novi Sad, the Srpska Matica, which was the mother of modern Serbian culture.

Thus, taken all in all, the national position of the Serbs was at least far superior to that of the Slovaks, and the southern frontier districts of Hungary were slow in assuming a Magyar aspect. Even here, however, the Suabians had, by the beginning of the twentieth century, begun to fall into line with their compatriots farther north. Their political attachment to Hungary was unquestionable, and, while the villages still spoke German, most of the young men who 'bettered themselves' naturally, and willingly,

1. In Novi Sad, Vršac, and Temesvar. There was also a see in Pest and two in Croatia—Slovenia.

Magyarized. The Serbs and Romanians, differentiated by their religion, did not blend so easily with the Magyars, but while they lost only a small proportion of their numbers to the dominant nationality (the proportion of genuinely Magyarized Serbs or Romanians never approached that of the Slovaks or Germans), politically they seemed to be rapidly forgetting their old ambitions. The local Romanians took little part in the national movement which was so powerfully agitating theft compatriots in Transylvania. The Serbs, from demanding a federalization of Austria-Hungary with a Voivodina for themselves, as they had done in 1868 and even in 1869, came down to official acceptance of the unitary Hungarian State, in which they asked for no more than educational, ecclesiastical, and linguistic concessions. The proximity of Belgrade, which might have been expected to keep their national ambitions awake, had rather the contrary effect; for, since the young country was expanding and short of leaders, any Serb of initiative and active national feeling had only to migrate to Belgrade to find a welcome and a career. Thus the ranks of the more nationalist of their two parties, the Radicals (founded at the same time as the Serbian Radical Party, with which it was in constant touch), were steadily depleted, while the Liberals, who were chiefly desirous of a good understanding with Hungary, became the leaders of the people.

One little minority which withstood Magyarization with unexpected obstinacy were the Protestant Slovaks, whose stronghold is Petrovac, north-west of Novi Sad. They were, as a community, much richer than the Slovaks of the mountains, and like the Protestant Slovaks of the north, but to an even higher degree, boasted of possessing a more active national consciousness than the larger body of their countrymen. It is interesting to record that it was they who regularly returned to the Budapest Parliament one of the leading Slovak nationalists of pre-War Hungary in the person of Dr. Hođža, to-day (1937) Minister President of Czechoslovakia. Like many Slovaks, they also possessed a strong feeling of Slavonic solidarity and co-operated politically with the local Serbs.

The political unification of the country was helped by its economic development. The Voivodina remained essentially agricultural, such industries as were founded (the chief centers being Subotica, Novi Sad, and Sombor) being either of purely local character (e.g. brickyards) or else directly concerned with the primary agricultural products of the neighborhood: brewing, silk-production, flour-milling, sugar-refining. Nevertheless, it flourished greatly. Its products found ready markets both in Hungary and in Austria. Fat swine and other live stock went to

Budapest and to Western Hungary in large quantities. Vienna—a still more important market—drew a considerable proportion of its supplies of cattle, wheat, and maize from Southern Hungary, while vegetables, eggs, and poultry went still farther afield, to Switzerland and even to Paris. Imports came, again, chiefly from Budapest, West Hungary, and Vienna.

This northward and westward orientation of the local economic life was, of course, deliberately encouraged by Budapest, which developed the communications leading towards the center of Hungary, while leaving those to the Balkans as primitive as was decently possible. There was no bridge over the Danube below Not Sad, and only a single railway bridge over the Save to Belgrade. This policy was, however, welcomed in the Voivodina itself, to which Serbia, viewed from the economic angle, appeared chiefly as an undesirable competitor.

The few articles imported by Serbia from Hungary—industrial products, wood, coal, and some wool and horses—were not produced in large quantities in the Voivodina, while Serbia's main articles of export—swine, maize, and plums—were identical with those of South Hungary and of Slovenia, but produced more cheaply owing to the lower standards of living. This competition was one of the causes of the famous tariff war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia—a war undertaken largely in the interests of the producers of South Hungary, among whom it evoked no such general protests as were voiced in Transylvania against the similar war between the Monarchy and Romania.

§ 3. UNION WITH YUGOSLAVIA AND DETERMINATION OF THE FRONTIERS

Of all the nationalities of the Voivodina, only the Serbs and perhaps the Romanians seem at first actively to have resented the War, and perhaps not quite all of them. Disaffection, however, grew rapidly among the former, being inflamed by the severe repressive measures taken by the authorities. By the end of the War the great majority of them were undoubtedly hostile to Hungary and desirous of joining Serbia. When the break-down came, they seized the power wherever they could and formed local councils, with the object of seceding to Serbia. The chief Bunyevac center, Subotica, also declared for a Southern Slav State.¹ The

¹ According to Hungarian contentions (e.g. *Justice for Hungary* (London, 1928), p. 160) the Bunyevci and Šokci declared for Hungary in 1918. I was, however, informed in Subotica that on November 10th, 1918—at a moment when Hungarian troops were still in the town—the nationalist leaders decided in favor of Yugoslavia. A meeting of 6,000 people proclaimed the union and elected a provisional administration. The local Magyars, who had also formed

Šokci, however, do not seem to have moved; the Magyars were for remaining with Hungary and formed rival Councils, where they could, with this purpose. The Romanians wished for union with Romania. As for the Germans, they sat on the fence. Incited by both Magyars and Serbs to adhere to their Councils, they did neither. In fact, as I am informed from perfectly reliable sources, they had, at that time, no idea of exchanging their Hungarian citizenship for Yugoslav: their own ambitions did not go beyond obtaining genuine enforcement of the Hungarian Nationalities Law. In the existing situation, however, they preferred not to commit themselves.

The question was really decided by the arrival of the Serb troops in the early days of November, after General Franchet d'Espérey had given them permission to occupy a line which included Temesvár in the east, Subotica in the west, and Pécs in the south. The Serbs did, indeed, call a 'Congress' at Novi Sad on November 24th, which in 'the sacred name of self-determination' voted for separation from Hungary and union with Yugoslavia; after which the Serbs took over the administration from the Hungarian authorities. But the 'Congress' had no genuinely representative character; its members were drawn from a fraction only of the local population, and it was in effect merely a post-dated and nominal justification for a situation already created.¹ More important, in view of later events in Croatia, than its pronouncement

a Committee, did not resist, knowing the Bunyevci to be more numerous and believing them to be armed (erroneously, since they had failed to secure arms from the arsenal). On November 11th the Bunyevci nationalists took over the administration and formed a guard; soon afterwards the Serb troops arrived and settled the matter. Thus the town certainly declared for Yugoslavia, although this decision was chiefly the work of the younger and more determined men put over by force in a time of confusion and uncertainty; if a plebiscite of the whole Bunyevac population had been taken, I doubt whether it would have gone against Hungary; assuredly not if the local Magyars and Jews had also been allowed to vote. Sombor, according to *The Hungarian Peace Negotiations*, vol. i, p. 538, refused to send delegates to the Novi Sad meeting and affirmed the loyalty of the Šokci and Bunyevci to Hungary. Very soon after, however, as other documents make clear (ibid., p. 366), a 'National Council of Serbs and Bunyevci' was in charge at Sombor, in any case before the arrival of the Serb troops there on November 14th. This Council continued to administer the town under the Serb occupation, so it can hardly have been a pro-Hungarian body. The Bunyevci sent their delegates to the Novi Sad meeting mentioned below; but these, of course, represented only the nationalist wing of the people. As for the Šokci, nearly all of them were agricultural laborers, quite incapable of any political activity. It would be erroneous to think of them as weighing the rival claims of Yugoslavia and Hungary, and 'declaring' for either State.

1. The delegates to this 'Congress' represented 211 out of the 453 communes of the districts concerned and consisted of 628 Serbs, 62 Slovaks, 34 Bunyevci 21 Ruthenes, 3 Šokci, 2 Croats, 6 Germans, and 1 Magyar. See the article by E. Prokopy, the former Főispán in Zombor and the Bačka, *Pester Lloyd*, July 26th, 1933. The complete inadmissibility of any claim by the Congress to represent the whole local population may be seen by comparing the above figures with the population figures given on p. 381

against Hungary (which was a foregone conclusion in view of its composition) was the fact that it demanded the direct adhesion of the Voivodina to Serbia, instead of to the embryonic 'Slovene Croat-Serb' State of the day, then represented by the Zagreb National Council.

After this, the idea of restoring the Voivodina to Hungary, or of allowing a general plebiscite in it, clearly never occurred to any one. As regards the northern frontier—with Hungary—the only question was whether any of the extreme Serbian claims were to be rejected. Serbia appears to have claimed, against Hungary, a line starting at a point just south of Arad (where, according to her proposals, her own frontier was to meet those of Romania and Hungary) and running thence almost due westward to the Danube, thus passing just south of Szegeed, north of Subotica, and southward again of Baja. West of the Danube, the proposed line ran south-westward along the hills south of Pécs to Point 408 on the Tenkeshegy, and thence roughly parallel with the Drave but some miles north-east of it, until it met the Mur above Murakeresztur. The line was justified partly on ethnographic grounds (it gave to Serbia practically all the Bunyevci and Šokci) but even more, and particularly as regards the sector west of the Danube, on grounds of strategic necessity.¹

Although the broad outlines of the Serb claim had been admitted from the first, it was at first considered exorbitant in detail. In the area claimed west of the Danube, it was obvious that Magyars and Germans greatly outnumbered all the Yugoslavs put together. As regards the Baèka, although the population was admittedly so mixed as to make a clear-cut division impossible, yet the line proposed was obviously disproportionately favorable to Serbia. It left a few Yugoslavs, of various types, on its north; but it included, immediately inside it, not to speak of the areas farther south, a large number of minorities. Even persons friendly to Yugoslavia, who did not admit the distinction between Serbs and Bunyevci to have any real validity, criticized severely Serbia's claim to Subotica, the *New Europe* writing that 'it is impossible to justify the inclusion of Subotica—a mere Slav island in a Magyar sea'.² The American Intelligence Department also, in its original

1. I have been unable to find the official Serb statement of claims. The *H.P.C.*, vol. iv, p. 208, describes it shortly as above. A more detailed claim, which appears to be identical with that laid before the Conference, is contained in a pamphlet entitled *The National Claims of the Serbians, Croats and Slovenes*, presented by the Serbian Brothers to the Brothers of the Allied Countries (Paris, Edition l'Emancipatrice, 1919). This pamphlet lays strong emphasis on the strategic justification of the whole line, including that to be drawn across the Baèka.

2. *New Europe*, February 23rd, 1919, p. 148; cf. also *ibid.*, January 1st, 1920, p. 18, for a criticism of the decision when taken,

suggestions, proposed a line running much farther to the south, excluding all territory north of the Drave, and in the Baèka, running east and west from the Danube just north of Bezdan, Sombor, Kula, Novi Vrbas, and Stan Becse, thence turning northward, east of Ada and Nagy Szentmiklós, to the meeting-point of the three frontiers.¹ Nevertheless, these hesitations seem soon to have been dispelled as regards the Baèka, for on February 28th, 1919, the Committee on Yugoslav Claims reported that 'the American, British, and French representatives found themselves in substantial accord on a line in the north which would follow substantially the line proposed in the Serbian memorandum', while the Italian reserved his decision,² but does not seem to have pressed his opposition, for the line was unanimously recommended on May 8th to the Conference of Foreign Ministers, adopted by them in turn, and included in the Peace Treaty. It was stated at the time that the line left considerable masses of Slavs north of it, but not enough to justify further concessions.³

It appears that in this case the Allies had been easily convinced by the arguments of the Serbian general staff, for the historian of the Peace Conference, although admitting that the frontier was 'highly favorable' to the Serbs and even 'exceeded their expectations',⁴ yet considers that the attribution of Subotica to Yugoslavia had its advantages from the strategic point of view.⁵

The claim to the Baranya was not admitted so easily. The committee on Yugoslav claims referred it to a sub-committee, and the report to the Conference of Foreign Ministers which they, again, adopted unchanged left the whole territory north of the Drave to Hungary.⁶ The records at this point are very incomplete but they contain a message from M. Pasic to M. Clemenceau enumerating the Magyar villages in the Baranya which would fall to Yugoslavia, from which it appears as though Serbia had dropped her request for the western strip above the Drave, but was trying to get French support for her claim to the Drave—Danube triangle. ⁷ It must be remembered that Serbia was at this time in military occupation of Pécs. Then, after all, the Peace Treaty assigned the triangle to Yugoslavia, the frontier being justified on strategic

1. Hunter Miller, *Diary*, vol. iv, p. 239.

2. *Ibid.*, vol. xvii, p. 95.

3. *Ibid.*, vol. xvi, p. 227.

4. H.P.C., vol. iv, p. 211.

5. Temperley, *How the Hungarian Frontiers were Drawn*, p. 439:

The claim here [sc. in the Baèka] was primarily strategic and is practically the only instance of such a concession. The old Serbian capital of Belgrade was so near the frontier that in former days any threat of war by a neighboring power produced at extreme state of nerves in the capital, Belgrade.

6 Hunter Miller, *Diary*, vol. xvi, p. 227.

7. *Ibid.*, vol. xviii, p. 358. At the same time, M. Pašić made a gallant effort to get for Yugoslavia Baja and the surrounding district.

book (since it does not cover Italy outside Flume). Not that the Serbs are deficient either in ability or in qualities. On the contrary, they are probably better natural administrators than the Romanians, more honest and more efficient; and they possess a certain manliness which endears them to the Magyars in particular. It is curious but certain that Hungary resents the bludgeon blows which she receives from the Serbs far less than the pin-pricks of the Czechs; the two countries have often, ever since the War, been on the verge of a *rapprochement*.

But the Serbs have passed through a rough schooling under the Turkish Pashas. Then came seven years of almost uninterrupted war, in the course of which they lost a great part of their manpower. Among the survivors, the better men chose the army for their career; and there came into politics and into the administration, both in Serbia itself and still more in the, Voivodina, a new class of men. The subordinate officials (among whom the local elements are more strongly represented) still maintain certain standards of decency, and in some places the inhabitants give them a good name enough.¹ The higher officials, especially those from the old kingdom, have proved far less satisfactory. There have been certain grave financial scandals. But worse than the venality, which is only occasional, is the habitual brutality of method, and worse than that again has been the despotic, even terroristic character of the régime itself. Only a faint idea of the entire absence of any kind of political liberty is given by the bald statement that no local or communal elections were held until 1927; that all popular representation was abolished early in 1929 in favor of a naked personal absolutism, and 'that the few concessions made since that date to popular representation have been little more than nominal.'² A dictatorial rule may yet be reconciled with a fair degree of personal liberty for at least the majority of the population; but in the Voivodina, even the brief intervals in which constitutional government of a sort prevailed were darkened by the sinister shadows of the military commandant and the police spy. During that year or two they only retired a pace into the background; for the remaining period their rule has been unchecked and undisguised. In no other part of Europe with which I have had any personal acquaintance since the War has the atmosphere of terrorization been so unrelieved.³ In these respects,

1. I was much struck (which I think it only fair to record) by the frequency with which people said to me that 'in our village the officials are not so bad— but this is an exception'.

2. It is fair to say that a certain improvement has recently set in as regards local administration.

3 incidentally, it made my own task of gathering information extraordinarily difficult. The amount of labor, ingenuity, and money spent on spying upon

the dictatorship has proved no worse, if it has been no better, than the régime during which constitutional government nominally prevailed. The incidence of the terrorism changed slightly; it weighed, perhaps, more heavily on the Serbs, relatively less on the minorities, but its degree remained unaltered. The corruption is said to have improved for a time, but afterwards the old ways were resumed.

Besides political terrorization, all sections of the population have complained, and apparently with some justification (although perhaps less than they think), of economic exploitation. For the first ten years of Yugoslavia's existence, the taxation systems previously in force in her various constituent provinces were maintained, and among the heaviest of all these was that of the Voivodina, while a special, very heavy tax (the so-called *doharnia*) was also levied on those districts of Yugoslavia which had not been ravaged in the War.¹ The taxes were unified throughout the kingdom on January 1st, 1929, after which, according to the official version, taxation has been based solely on capacity to pay. The land-tax—the most important from the peasant's point of view—is admittedly highest in the Voivodina; but the land there is richest. The Voivodinians, on the other hand, say that the differentiation is far more than is justified by the differences in yield. In Serbia it is 70 dinars per yoke, in the Voivodina 320—a huge sum when it is considered that the total rental value of a yoke of land is only 499 dinars.²

Not only are the taxes in the Voivodina heavier, but they are also much more punctiliously collected. A statement circulated to the Yugoslav Parliament in 1936 regarding the taxes levied and collected in the Danube Banovina showed some remarkable contrasts. Of the taxes plus installments of arrears, 103·7 per cent. were collected in Panëvo, 98·3 per cent. in Darda, 94 per cent. in Ruma, 90 per cent. in Subotica, 88 per cent. in Sombor, 84·2 per cent. in Apatin, &c. The general figure for the Voivodina ranged between 75 and 90 per cent., the only two towns with a bad record being Baèka Topoler (32 per cent.) and the Romanian center of Alibunar (33 per cent.). Of the towns of Serbia included in the Banovina, only one reached the 70 per cent. mark; most ranged between 45 per cent. and 65 per cent.; Smederevo had only 47·9 per cent., Belgrade (district) only 27 per cent., and Rudnik

my movements and in shutting me off from sources of information would, it often seemed to me, have amply sufficed to remedy so many abuses as to make caution unnecessary.

1. Although the tax has long been discontinued, its arrears, which are immense, are still being collected. These account for much of the extra payments still being demanded from the Voivodina.

2. Since the outbreak of the agricultural crisis, this tax has been reduced several times in all parts of the country, including the Voivodina.

only 24.8 per cent. The range of figures for the percentage realized of assessment for the year was wider still; Darda had 134.3 per cent. to the 26 per cent. of Rudnik.

Whether they can afford it or no—and they are at least better off than the inhabitants of many inland areas—the Voivodinians have to pay heavily, and do not feel that they have received corresponding benefits. The money has gone on the army, on building ministries in Belgrade, on strategic roads and railways in Macedonia or towards the coast, and, too often, into the pockets of Belgrade and Zagreb public men. One may doubt whether the Voivodinians are really so much worse off as they believe than the rest of Yugoslavia; but then, the consideration that the whole of their new country is in a rocky condition is not particularly consoling.

Against all these grievances one may possibly set, as an asset to the bulk of the population, the comparatively popular spirit of the Yugoslav State, in which social differentiation as yet hardly exist. Thus the peasant (and most of the Voivodinians are peasants) is not considered, or treated, as a person whose interests must always be subordinated to those of the landowner. In emphasizing the tyranny of the police, one must remember that at least the overwhelming pressure of the landowner has been removed, so that in the settlement of their local affairs the population may in some respects be more free than before the change. Labor conditions are, however, no less primitive than in Hungary, and any form of left-wing political agitation is even more severely repressed. A single important social measure has been carried through, in the shape of the agrarian reform which Yugoslavia, like all the other Successor States, carried through after the War. As we shall have to refer on various occasions to the effects of this measure, a short account of its main provisions may be given here. Before turning to details, it will be well to emphasize the essentially national and political character of this reform. It is true that the land distribution, as elsewhere in the old Hungary, was very uneven. Three thousand nine hundred and seventy-seven large landowners held 3P2 per cent. of the total area, and there was a large class of landless agricultural laborers and dwarf-holders. These conditions prevailed chiefly in the north, in the Magyar districts; the Germans, and even the Serbs and Romanians, were far more favorably situated. There was, therefore, much social justification for the reform; but the satisfaction of the land-hunger of the local population was only one of the objects of the reform; another—openly and frequently admitted—was the weakening of the minority landowners and the establishment of a frontier cordon of reliable national elements. For this reason,

colonization played a particularly large part in the reform, to the detriment of ordinary social and even economic considerations.

The land reform was initiated (for all Yugoslavia) by a proclamation by the Prince Regent in January 1919, which was followed on February 25th, 1919, by a series of 'preliminary enactments', which laid down the general principles of the reform.' A Ministry of Agrarian Reform was established to carry these into effect, and worked hard, although with great confusion, for several years. Various administrative decrees were issued under its auspices. In 1931 ten previous enactments were summarized and partially modified by 'a Law relating to the liquidation of the Agrarian Reform on Large Estates', dated June 19th, 1931. This was again modified by two supplementary Acts of December 5th 1931, and June 24th, 1933. These Acts rendered subject to expropriation any property held by one landlord (whether consisting of one estate or more) in excess of 521 yokes (300 hectares) of cultivated land or 896 yokes (zoo hectares) in all (meadows, forests, and pasture were not counted as 'cultivated'). Flood areas, artificially drained (including swamps which the landlord promised to drain), might be retained above the maximum, and a landlord producing breeding stock or selected seed might also, under certain conditions, retain a 'super-maximum' enabling him to carry on these activities. Under the earlier enactments agricultural industries also gave a claim to exemption, but the 1931 Act did not maintain this concession.

The expropriation applied equally to individual landlords, corporations, &c., but public corporations, especially if formed for religious objects, might be granted super-maximal areas as required for the maintenance of their institutions. Church estates could, however, be appropriated with the consent of the Ministerial Council. The estates liable to expropriation in the Voivodina covered 751,149 hectares (1,302,392 yokes), 435,812 of which were cultivated, out of the total area, for the whole territory, of 3,528,800 yokes. The small number of estates affected is remarkable: in all the northern areas of Yugoslavia (Croatia—Slovenia, Slovenia, and the Voivodina) only 850 estates suffered under the reform. Six hundred and seventy-five of these were private, 29 belonged to the State, 117 to communes, 29 to co-possessorates. In the Voivodina 367 estates were subjected to the reform; 120 of these belonged to minority landowners, 79 to the State or the Serbian Orthodox Church, and 150 to communes.

1. The best account in English is contained in a series of articles by Dr. von Frangeš in the *International Review of Agriculture*, Year XXV (1934), nos. 3-9 (March—Sept.). Dr. Frangeš is favorable to the national aspects of the reform, but strongly hostile to its economic operation.

Under the preliminary enactment, the owners retained 441,651 r yokes, 149,693 of which were cultivated (100,313 narrower maxima, 31,869 super-maxima, 17,511 flood areas), the rest being made up of 44,605 yokes of 'extended maxima' and 247,353 yokes of uncultivated land.¹

Estates belonging to the Habsburgs, to the dynasties of enemy countries, and to foreigners who had received them for services rendered to the Habsburgs were originally declared expropriated without compensation (these enactments had to be modified later). For the rest, the land was at first simply temporarily leased to the beneficiaries at a rent of five times the cadastral net return, of which the landowners received four-fifths and the State the remaining fifth. The landowner also received a small compensation payment for cultivated arable land. In 1920 this arrangement, originally concluded for one year, was prolonged for another four, the landlord now receiving a rent of six times the cadastral net return. Meanwhile, totally inadequate as this rent was, he paid all taxes, rates, contributions to local drainage societies, &c., on the entire property. After July 1st, 1923, the State collected the taxes and rents from the beneficiaries and paid over a share of the latter to the landlord.

From 1925 onward beneficiaries were enabled to buy the land assigned them at an agreed price, direct from the former owner, the State intervening to protect the purchaser where necessary. In this way some 50,000 yokes of property changed hands in the Voivodina.² The 1931 Act then at last regulated the question properly. The land was assessed on the basis of the cadastral net return ascertained some years previously for fiscal purposes, the figure in pre-War crowns being multiplied by no for conversion to dinars. Where the land was inferior, a lower rate was taken. The actual valuation is said to have varied from 3,240 dinars per yoke of 'Class I' land in the best district to 768 dinars for 'Class IV' land in the worst, but in fact more than 1,600 dinars was rarely paid, and sometimes as little as 600. The owners were given state bonds bearing 4 per cent. interest and redeemable in 30 years. Compensation was to be paid also, in the same bonds, for expropriated crops, implements, live stock, &c. The owners, however, had to pay 10-20 per cent. of the total received to a Land Compensation Fund.³ The compensation price was admittedly low

1. Figures in Frangeš, *op. cit.*, April 1934, p. 134.

2. The total sold in this way was 95,000 yokes in the 'Northern Districts', i.e. the Voivodina, Croatia-Slovenia, Slovenia, and the Prekomurje. As the total area expropriated in the Voivodina was slightly over half the total expropriated in the whole Northern Districts, I put 50,000 at a guess.

3 The 'optants', including the Habsburgs, who made good their claim to compensation after years of negotiation, were to be repaid out of a separate fund, but little of this has been received, as one part, at least, of the contributions ceased when reparations payments were suspended.

at the time it was fixed. The purchase price of arable land in the Voivodina varied between 10,000 and 8,600 dinars per yoke, having at one time stood as high as 30,000 dinars or more. In addition, the bonds soon sank to about 50 per cent. of their nominal value, thus making the actual sums received lower still.' It is true that the previous valuation of the land had been well below its real value.

The low rate of compensation did not, of course, nearly exhaust all the losses of the landlords. In the early days the tenants often neglected to pay any rent whatever, and the State afterwards was neither punctual nor scrupulous in handing over the sums due. The rates and taxes thus amounted in some cases to many times the landlord's actual receipts. Finally, only a fraction of either the bonds or the compensation had been paid by 1937. Generally speaking, the reform amounted to ruin for most of the ex-landlords.

The beneficiaries were of three categories: local applicants holding either no land at all, or less than they could work themselves, the latter amount being calculated at 1 yoke per member of the family, without distinction of age or sex; the so-called *dobrovoljci* or war volunteers (i.e. persons who deserted during the War to the Serbian or Montenegrin armies or legions); optants, refugees, and other colonists from the interior of Yugoslavia. The *dobrovoljci* and colonists were normally allowed to receive 8.5 yokes apiece. The *dobrovoljci* received their land free; other beneficiaries, so far as they did not buy their land under the 1925 Act, had to pay the price passed on to the ex-owner in compensation in 30 annual installments at 5 per cent. interest.

In the Voivodina, by the end of 1928, 12,265 families of *dobrovoljci* had received 100,689 yokes; 4,730 families of colonists, optants, &c., had received 30,088 yokes, and 58,193 families of local applicants, 171,950 yokes. Further, 12,862 families had received small building-sites. Thus a total of about 88,000 families, 70,000 of whom were local, received some benefit under the reform. Sixty-one thousand six hundred and twenty new dwarf-holdings (1-5 yokes) were created with a total area of 163,554 yokes, and 16,541 medium holdings (5—20 yokes) with a total area of 135,442 yokes, the remainder of the land going to enlarge existing holdings.

The land granted to the local applicants certainly represents an assuagement of land-hunger and a real advantage to the beneficiaries. This result was not, however, achieved without much mortification and suffering due to the rough and ready methods employed, the haste with which the distribution was begun, and the long delays before it was made definitive. In the early years

1. I am informed that they have risen since this was written.

grotesque situations arose. Sometimes the land had been so notoriously apportioned among the supporters of a single political party that the beneficiaries did not care to maintain or improve it, or sometimes even to cultivate it at all, as they felt that at the next elections it might be taken from them and given to members of a rival, party. In other cases applicants received land but no implements or capital, so that they could not work it if they would.¹ Sometimes the parcels lay too far from the applicants' homes to be workable; they were usually much smaller than had been expected. It was only after some years that matters were put on a rather better footing by the organization of credit and the operation of the Various 'Land Settlement Offices'. In the meantime, many high hopes had suffered shipwreck.

But the greatest cause of dissatisfaction was the favor shown to the *dobrovoljci* and other colonists, who, although far fewer in numbers, received almost as much land as the local applicants, and, on far more favorable terms. Most of the land assigned to the *dobrovoljci* 130,000 yokes out of the 170,000 in the northern territories—was, indeed, the property of the Hungarian optants; but this land itself was coveted by the local population, while in quite a number of cases they were also settled on the communal land belonging to villages and towns. Many communes had in the past divided up all or part of their lands, some of which were very extensive, and leased them to their own members as orchards, market gardens, &c. The colonization thus approximated to the expropriation of the local peasantry. Magyar communes were the chief sufferers, but Bunyevac and even some Serb communes were also affected. In spite of all complaints, the Act of 1931 sanctioned the situation, leaving the communes only with a maximum of 100 acres of arable land, and such pasture-land as had not been appropriated under the reform. The losses of some of the larger communes have been enormous.

The *dobrovoljci* themselves, and particularly the colonists from such mountainous areas as Montenegro, passed through in exceedingly difficult time. Many of them gave up their land in disappointment and returned to their homes. Great efforts were, however, made, and considerable expense incurred, to get them established on a sound footing. Particular pains have been taken with the new villages established, in the frontier zone. There are probably about seventy or eighty of these,² chiefly on the northern

1. It was not at all uncommon, in the first years, for the beneficiaries to approach the old landowner and ask him to work the land as their tenant.

2. The head of the Novi Sad Agricultural Office, who looks after colonists in 130 communes, told me that 40 of these were new villages (the remainder are suburbs of existing towns or villages). There are x a in the neighborhood of Vršac, and I have guessed the odd 20 for the Petrovgrad (Veliki Beèekerek) office,

frontier round Subotica, but some also in the east of the Banat. After long years of struggle, helped by every sort of concession, including large-scale remission of debts, they are beginning at last to make some headway.

This, in itself, is satisfactory, but not to the local population, whose discontent at the preferential treatment of the strangers is enhanced by the fact that the latter form a decidedly turbulent element in the population. Many of them come from the more lawless districts of Yugoslavia, such as the Lika; and as they are secure, within limits, of the support of the authorities, they have often behaved with scant regard for the feelings, or even the rights, of their neighbors.

Against the eighty or ninety thousand families who have ultimately benefited by the reform must be set a considerable number who have undeniably lost by it. Apart from the direct losses to the expropriated landlords, which are heavy enough, the dissolution of the big estates also dealt a severe blow, at least for a time, at the agricultural industry, which again had its repercussions on agriculture.¹ The reform was also definitely disadvantageous to the dwarf-holders in the neighborhood of the large estates and to the laborers formerly employed upon them. Of the reform in Croatia, Dr. Frangeš writes that where they received any land at all, the income which they earned from it was nearly always considerably smaller than what they had earned by supplementary work on the large estates. The supply of surplus agricultural labor was so greatly increased by the reform that wages fell to one-third and one-fourth of their former level, and the Government, to prevent further falls, had actually to prohibit the use of machinery for harvesting.² Conditions in the Voivodina, if not quite so bad, were yet analogous. There are still to-day at least 90,000 landless agricultural laborers in the Voivodina, and their condition presents a very serious problem. Finally, we must not forget the considerable costs in which the whole operation involved the State—costs which must ultimately be met out of taxation.

§ 5. THE SLAV PEOPLES SINCE 1919

The lack of political and personal freedom, and above all the sense of economic exploitation, combined with a feeling of disappointment at what they felt to be the insufficient recognition afforded them in the matter of appointments and other perquisites,

1. Details of the estimated losses incurred in this way by individuals and the State (through falling off in receipts from taxation) are given by Frangeš, *op. cit.*, April 1934, pp. 134, 135. I have not reproduced the figures, as calculations made in 1919 and 1920 in crowns have little meaning to us to-day.

2. Frangeš, *op. cit.*, April 1934, p. 132.

have had their effect even upon the most favored class of the local population—the Serbs. They began as centralists of the centralists —‘bigger Serbizers than the Serbs themselves’, as one writer puts it;¹ sided with Belgrade against Zagreb even in November 1918; protested in 1925 when Pašić concluded an agreement with the Croat leader, Radić; and were mainly responsible for the non-introduction of elections in the Voivodina until 1927.

These feelings have undergone a very notable transformation. The Voivodinian Serbs have a little ditty which is immensely popular wherever it can be sung with safety:

‘I gave four horses
To bring the Serbians here—
I would give eight
To take them away.’

They have swung right away from centralism. In the summer of 1932 their principal leaders, at a secret meeting in Sombor, proclaimed the principle of ‘the Voivodina for the Voivodinians, with the same rights as the other regions and the same constitutional régime as is to be introduced elsewhere’.²

In 1934 talk of a ‘Voivodina front’ was fairly widespread. One gentleman told me that all the local Serb leaders were agreed upon it. The main point of the program was that local taxation should be levied by and spent on the local inhabitants. Its advocates accepted, however, the monarchy and the common army, and were willing to contribute out of state taxation to the passive regions of Yugoslavia. I did not at the time feel that this movement was very strong. One must form one’s judgements, not only by what is said on a given subject, but by the frequency and eagerness with which it is brought up; and by that standard the ‘Voivodina front’ was still embryonic. It seems, however, to have developed since. In the 1935 elections there was a large Serb vote against the Government and for Dr. Maček’s list. In 1936, to judge from certain newspaper articles, the movement for federalization was growing increasingly persistent.

Thus the Serbs of the Voivodina—or some of them—have come the same circle as M. Pribičević’s followers from Croatia. There is, however, little foundation for a genuine regionalist movement among them. They are too few, and too near Belgrade. One can imagine Yorkshire demanding federalism on the slogan ‘away from London’, but hardly Surrey. Actually, the separate local spirit of the Voivodina seems to be decaying since the change of frontiers. The *Srpska Matica* is no longer important now that there are the

1. A. de Mousset, *Le Royaume serbe-croate-slovene* (Paris, 1926), p. 94.

2 Pribicevic, op. cit., p. 142.

museums in Belgrade; the local press is hardly required when the Belgrade papers reach Novi Sad by breakfast-time. And since there is absolutely, no cultural, religious, or linguistic difference between the Serbs of the Voivodina and those of Belgrade, there is no bar to the former seeking their fortunes in the capital. Most of their more able and energetic members are, in fact, drawn into the larger national life, and are doing extremely well there; the number of Serbs from the Voivodina holding high office in Serbia to-day is remarkable, and probably exceeds that of the Serbs from other parts of the kingdom now employed in the Voivodina. The remainder, perhaps, are hardly capable of much initiative.

It is thus impossible to speak of a Serb problem in the Voivodina in the sense in which there is a Croat or a Slovak problem, or even a Romanian question in Transylvania. The revolt, such as it is, is against the character of the government, and would quickly die away, apart from the chronic grumbling which is always to be expected and must not be taken too seriously, if the methods of Belgrade were, by some happy chance, reformed. It is not a national question, much less a movement in favour of Hungary. It has not even led the local Serbs to seek an understanding with the minorities among whom they live.¹ Those members of the minorities with whom I have spoken on the subject generally agree that, while the Serbs from the Old Kingdom are less civilized in their methods, they are also less chauvinistic. The few friendly gestures made to the minorities since the War have come not from Novi Sad but from Belgrade and have been more frequent under the régime of the Democrats, and under the Dictatorship itself, than during the terms of office of the Radical Party, to which most of the Voivodinian Serbs belong. Few as are the crumbs which fall to the Voivodina, it is the local Serbs who get the first lick at them, and they show little inclination to share the dish with their German and Magyar neighbors.

National feeling among the Serbs is, moreover, stiffened by the dobrovoljci and colonists, who to-day form a not inconsiderable element among them, and are the spoilt children of the Government, which has made many economic sacrifices for their sake and allows them much liberty—in some respects even license—in their capacity of guardians of the gate. They are, as a class, fanatical and tumultuous chauvinists, who would die rather than yield an inch of soil to Hungary.

The remaining inhabitants of the Voivodina may be divided into

1. Since writing these words I have been informed that the Serb leader of the Voivodinian front now claims to have reached an understanding with the local Magyars. If this maintains itself, it may, of course, prove a most hopeful development for the whole Voivodina.

three classes: the non-Serbian Yugoslavs (viz, the Šokci and Bunyevci), the other Slavs (who, by a fiction accepted by both parties, are neither regarded nor regard themselves as minorities, but as part of the 'Staatsvolk'), and the minorities properly speaking. Between the position and the political feeling of all these there are many gradations.

The Šokci and Bunyevci have not had such a happy time as the Orthodox Serbs. They have certain grievances, which they share with the minorities. To begin with, as one of them said to me simply, 'We object to theft and corruption, and we feel that we belong to the west and are being ruled now by Orientals'—words identical with those which the Croats so often use. They have suffered rather than profited by the land reform, since, although some of them received small allotments, their big communal properties were laid heavily under contributing for the benefit of the colonists and *dobrovoljci*. They have even educational grievances, although they do not constitute a linguistic minority, since in some of their centers, at least, the authorities have enforced upon them the use of the Cyrillic alphabet in the schools and in official intercourse.

Their religious susceptibilities, which are very tender, have been hurt in various ways. The laicization of the schools (to be described later) was much resented, particularly as many of their own teachers were dismissed and Serbs put in their places. Then they have suffered, perhaps more than any other peoples in Yugoslavia, from direct pressure against their religion. As we shall see presently, the religious question is not very acute in Yugoslavia. The Serb tends to regard religion as an unalterable attribute of nationality, and his instinct is less to assimilate than to discriminate—placing the non-Orthodox populations in a position of inferiority, but not attempting to convert them. This holds good in his relations both with the minorities and with the Croats and Slovenes; one of the few forms of persecution not practiced in Croatia is the religious. But the Šokci and Bunyevci are in a peculiar position. They are admitted anomalies. Their religious tenets are those of the Croats, while their dialect and certain popular customs, folk-songs, &c., are more closely akin to those of the Serbs. The Serbs thus regard them as they regard the Macedonians, as Serbs *in posse*¹ and susceptible to assimilation, the chief outward sign of which would be conversion to the Orthodox Church, while the Croats claim them for their own. Something of a civil war goes on between the

1. In 1866, however, their spokesman protested very vigorously against this appellation 'Catholic Serbs', insisting that they wished only to be regarded as 'Hungarian nationals of Dalmatian stock' (*nep-fajul dalmatak, nemzetül Magyar*), I. de Nagy, loc. cit.

claimants, in which the prospective prizes are the chief sufferers. There have been certain much resented instances of encroachments by the Orthodox Church in the Šokaz and Bunyevac districts: excessive building of Orthodox churches (for the benefit of the newly arrived and unpopular colonists), restrictions on the development of the Catholic organization, even half-forced conversions.

Nevertheless, the struggle, although a struggle it is, is already to-day essentially a family quarrel, an internal affair between the different branches of the Yugoslav people. This is true even of the religious question, since the former Magyar Roman Catholic hierarchy has been replaced almost entirely by Croats. The Bunyevac question has become a sort of variant on the Croat question, which means that the national problem has been solved in the Yugoslav sense. The Magyarone Party, which would welcome a return to Hungary, is confined to day to the older generation and is naturally growing weaker year by year. The younger generation is overwhelmingly Yugoslav and rejects *a priori* the idea of returning to Hungary which, in their belief, would expose them to renewed Magyarization (I have not heard them discuss the possibility of receiving cultural autonomy within Hungary). Thus, although their position within the Yugoslav State is yet unsettled, though they have much to resent in that State, and express their resentment openly enough, yet they must be counted as partisans of the State in its ideal form and opponents of revision.

The strange, indeterminate position of the north Slavs (Slovaks and Ruthenes)¹ has already been mentioned. They have not been exempted from the uniform necessity of using Serb in official intercourse, nor from the ungenerous character of the minority school regulations to be described below; but the wind is tempered to them. They are allowed to use their language locally in oral communication with the authorities, and the Slovaks have been allowed to maintain a cultural society and a secondary school of their own, besides certain alterations in the régime enforced in the primary schools, and a satisfactory statute for their religion, for which they now possess an autocephalous Church, with bishop and general inspector. Their own leader (they have but one, who acts as chairman, secretary, or both to all their organizations, political, cultural, and economic) told me that his flock did not mind learning Serb, which, indeed, they had used even before the War as the local *lingua franca*, and learnt easily; they regard the present position, in fact, as facilitating a real cultural renaissance, easily to be reconciled with loyalty to the Yugoslav State.²

1. There is also a considerable colony of White Russian émigrés, who have been treated with great generosity and are largely employed in minor official posts,

2 A subsidiary cause of their content was, until recently, their extraordinary

I believe the same position to hold good of the local Ruthenes; all in all, the position of the non-Yugoslav Slays thus appears to be satisfactory.

§ 6. YUGOSLAV MINORITY POLICY

We come now to the real minorities, admitted and treated as such—the Magyars, Suabians, Romanians, and Magyarone Jews. The treatment of them, in general, is probably worse than that accorded to any other minorities with which this work deals. They have to undergo not only the seventies under which all Yugoslav subjects have had to groan, but also quite special sufferings of their own; for the Yugoslav law and practice regarding minorities, as our description will show, is more ruthlessly illiberal than that of any other Successor State, outside Italy. If less is heard about the sufferings of the Voivodina than of Slovakia or Transylvania, this is due to a variety of causes, none of which reflect any particular credit on Yugoslavia: the relatively small area involved, its comparative unimportance to Hungary, who has not troubled to make much propaganda on the subject, the severity with which the authorities deal with persons suspected of making complaints to the outer world, and the cynical indifference with which they themselves receive such complaints, till these fall silent for very weariness.

Finally, Yugoslavia struck her blows at the minorities at the very outset, while Czechoslovakia and Romania still hesitated. Thus some wounds have already cicatrized in the Voivodina which are still bleeding in Slovakia and Transylvania.

The chief mitigation which can be found lies in the fact that although individual exceptions, such as M. Pribièevîæ, have appeared on the scenes, with often disastrous results, Belgrade is not, at heart, interested in the minority question. It is preoccupied with its main problem of adjusting the relations between the various branches of the Yugoslav race, and has had, as a rule, little thought to spare for anything else. Ignorance has spelt indifference, so that it would be difficult to rouse Serbian public opinion to a really consistent anti-minority campaign, such as occupies the thoughts of the more civilized nation of the Czechs. Many of the laws denounced by the minorities as oppressive (and rightly so, to

prosperity. These Slovaks are hop-growers, and after the War experienced an astonishing boom, so great that a single village boasted no less than fifty cars. The collapse of the boom brought with it a number of bitter complaints over the heavy taxation, and the Slovaks are said to have declared that 'they would do without festivals and banquets if they might have passports for Czechoslovakia or America instead' (cit. *Nation und Staat*, Dec. 1928, p. at x). Nevertheless, they remain, so far as I could judge, docile and loyal supporters of Yugoslavia.

judge by their texts) are not aimed at them at all, but only at the Croats and Slovenes, the minorities being simply ignored. Violent and active persecution, where it occurs, is not usually perpetrated by Government officials but by *èetniki*, members of the 'Narodna Obrana', and other juvenile desperadoes, who are, indeed, often instigated and encouraged, and practically never punished, by official circles. The more notorious governmental exponents of the iron hand have usually been sent, not to the Voivodina, but to Macedonia or Montenegro.

In certain respects, moreover, the minority problem in the Voivodina has been simpler than in either Transylvania or Slovakia. The Serbs set themselves to achieve precisely the same goal of complete national domination as the other new masters, but they had less far to go.

As a nation, the Serbs before the War were by no means in such a state of national inferiority as the Slovaks or the Romanians. Their peasants were largely freeholders, and occupied some of the best land in the Voivodina. They boasted an old-established and prosperous merchant class in many of the towns, and even some rich landed proprietors. In the south there were a fair number of Serbian officials. Economically and socially they stood on much the same level as the local Germans and Romanians. The Magyars, indeed, possessed a richer upper class, but it was not very numerous, and below it lay a very wide space until one came to the majority of the local Magyars, most of whom were laborers or dwarf-holders, far poorer, as a class, than the Serb or German peasants. This frail Magyar top-layer melted almost in an hour, largely by the action of the Magyars themselves, when their officials migrated across the frontier to avoid taking the oath of allegiance to Yugoslavia. The land reform destroyed most of what remained. What remained behind was neither so economically powerful nor politically so formidable as to call for any sustained or systematic effort to cope with it.

Some of the minorities, too, have profited by considerations similar to those which have guided both Czechoslovak and Romanian policy. The Germans have, at certain periods, been allowed very considerable cultural concessions, where it has seemed possible to play them off by this means against the Magyars. The Jews have been offered similar concessions to divorce them from the Magyars, although treated with increased severity when the advances have been repelled. Consideration for her ally has made Yugoslavia from time to time don a velvet glove even in her treatment of the Romanians; only the Magyars, as the enemy *par excellence*, have always had to meet the full brunt of every repressive measure.

But these concessions, where they have occurred, have been

incidental and often impermanent. It remains true that Yugoslavia's treatment of her minorities has been harsh; and this added severity comes, as we said, on top of a régime exceptionally unenlightened even in its handling of its own people.

§7. THE MINORITIES: POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONDITIONS

As regards political life, Yugoslavia's policy towards the minorities has been one of simple repression, on the whole uniformly applied, although the Germans have been treated a little less brusquely than the Magyars and Romanians. During the elections to the Constituent Assembly, the Germans and Magyars were not admitted to the voters' lists at all, under the pretext that, until the period laid down in the Peace Treaties for option had expired, it could not be said whether they were Yugoslav citizens or not. In 1922 all three minorities organized parties of their own. In the 1923 elections the Magyars were so terrorized by Serbian nationalists that they had to drop the idea of an independent candidature; but the Romanians got a Deputy into the Skupština, and the Germans, who had drawn up a discreet program loyal to the State and in detail not displeasing to the Radical Party, secured 7 mandates in the Voivodina, besides one in Slovenia.

In 1924, however, the German party, stung out of its calculated subservience to the Government by M. Pribičević's educational policy, committed the indiscretion of voting with the Opposition on the crucial question of the verification of the Croats' mandates. As it happened, their votes just tipped the scale against the Government. In rage, M. Pašić dissolved the parties of all three minorities (on which occasion some of the German leaders were assaulted with cudgels, revolvers, and even, in one or two cases, bombs). M. Davidović, who succeeded M. Pašić, allowed the parties to be reconstituted, but the pressure in the 1925 elections was so heavy that the representation of the Germans was reduced to five, while neither the Magyars nor the Romanians secured a mandate.¹ In 1927 the Magyars made a compromise in one district with the Radicals, and in another with the Democrats, which allowed them to enter Parliament for the first time with three mandates, the Germans, who stood independently, securing six. In 1929, however, all parties were again dissolved under the Dictatorship, and under the electoral laws issued since that date it has been impossible for the minorities to put up lists of their own.

1. According to the Magyars, nearly half their voters had even at that date not been registered, while many others (6,000 in Zenta alone) were struck off the rolls before the elections. Three members of the party executive were imprisoned a few days before the polling, following a charge (subsequently proved unfounded) of receiving foreign financial assistance.

The Germans were allowed one Senator and one (afterwards two) Deputies on the Government list, and the Magyars one Deputy. It is, however, clear that these are no more than spokesmen, or supplicants, who can state their case to the Government, for the latter to listen or not, as it pleases; neither can they indulge in any sort of real independence. The Magyar Deputy is denounced by the leaders of the original Magyar Party as a renegade and no true representative of his people. His attitude towards the State is certainly different from that of the official party leaders. I am less sure whether his more conciliatory policy is unwelcome to the peasants and laborers who form the great bulk of the Magyar minority, but obviously neither he nor any other minority's representative can speak in the least freely.

In local government the minorities have been equally powerless. There has, indeed, only been one period, of slightly over a year - 1927 to January 1929—when any sort of representative local government, has existed, and then the three Departments set up under the Vidov Dan Constitution were so arranged that the majority was always safely in Slavonic bands. In the communal elections of 1927, which were fairly free, a large number of Magyar and German representatives were elected; but an agitation promptly arose in local Serb circles, consequent on which the results of the elections, where favorable to the minorities, were largely annulled. The Prefect of the Baèka Department on his own responsibility annulled the mandates of all Magyar notaries in his Department, generally on 'the ground that they had not sufficiently mastered the language of the State. In 1928 there were in the whole Voivodina only 10 German and 6 Magyar village notaries, against 114 Slays (nearly all Serbs).¹

After 1929 the Voivodina was united with Northern Serbia in the Danube Banovina, thus ensuring a Serb majority,² and a return was made to the system which had prevailed until 1927, and all officials of local government, including villages, towns, and larger units, were appointed, the majority being Slays. Thus the Banovina Council appointed in 1930 contained only 2 Magyar members; the City Council of Zenta, which is over 86 per cent. Magyar, had only 4 Magyar members out of 38; that of Petrovgrad (Veliki Beèkerek, Nagy Becskerek), where the numbers of Serbs, Magyars, and Germans are about equal, had 2 Magyar members, 2 German, and the rest Yugoslav, &c. Communal elections were restored in 1933, but only those lists were passed as valid, the first 6 members of which in the communes, or all members in the case of municipalities,

1. Die Nationalitäten in den Stamen Europa:, p. 358. The Magyars were all dismissed in 1929.

2 The Baranya was attached to the Save Banovina.

were able to read and write the language of State. The decision whether this condition is fulfilled is taken by higher authority. In any case, the notary is not elected but nominated. Similarly, under the municipal government Decree of September 15th, 1934, one-third of all Municipal Committees are nominated by the Ban, while the other two-thirds are elected, by open ballot, from parties founded on a basis of 'national unity'. The minorities can thus get representation, as in Parliament, only by standing on a 'national' list. In spite of this, it must be admitted that the new system brought about a real and substantial increase in the minority representation.¹

In local as in central government Serbian is the only official language. An attempt by the Magyars in 1927, after the departmental elections, to obtain leave for the minority languages to be used equally with Serbo-Croat in the Backa Department was rejected. In the communes, as in the larger bodies, all resolutions must be brought forward and minutes kept in Serb; although no similar rule is, clearly, enforced as regards the oral discussion, at least in the purely minority communes.

More galling, in practice, than this rule—since self-government has in any case played only a very small part in Yugoslav life—is the strict regulation whereby the sole language of administration is Serb. This applies throughout the entire Governmental hierarchy from the central Ministries in Belgrade down to the lowest instances. All official documents, notices, &c., are issued in Serb alone, and written communications to the authorities drawn up in any other language are simply thrown into the waste-paper basket, or at best returned to the sender. I have heard of cases in which communications from lawyers on behalf of clients have been returned, although written in Serb, because the paper used bore the lawyer's name and title in Magyar as well as Serb.² In the towns and larger villages, and in general, wherever the population is mixed, officials are sometimes actually forbidden to speak to the public in a minority language; cases are quoted where minority officials have been dismissed their posts for infringing this rule.³ In some purely minority villages, oral communication in a minority

1. I am officially informed that in the Serb Council included Magyars and 4 Jews; that of Petrovgrad, 3 Germans, 4 Magyars, and 2 Jews; that of Vršac, 14 Germans; and that of Bela Crkva, 11 Germans—an undoubted improvement on the previous figures.

2. Quoted in an account of the position of the Magyar minority which I must cite as 'Hungarian MS.', since it has not yet, so far as I know, been published. The author is a Magyar and strongly anti-Serb, and I have not used his information unless either I have been able to corroborate it, or my own experience has made it seem a priori probable. A petition to the League of Nations, dated 1935 and covering much the same ground, is quoted as 'Petition'.

3. Hungarian MS.

language is allowed; but in others even this is forbidden, and villagers ignorant of Serb have to use interpreters.

In the Courts, defendants and witnesses are allowed to use their own language only if totally unacquainted with the language of State. All official proceedings are conducted, sentences promulgated, and records kept in the language of State only.

The language rule applies, of course, to public services such as posts and railways; nor will the reader be surprised to learn that Yugoslavia has followed the popular practice of Serbizing all local names, either by translating the original (if this was a Magyar or a German name) or by re-baptizing it boldly after some Serbian notability. Thus we get Pašièevo (a German village), Ninèièevo, and Pribièevièevo—the last name constituting a somewhat ironical comment on the mutability of human fortunes, since M. Pribièeviaè, after whom it was proudly named, died in exile a few years later, a bitter foe to the régime. Street names, &c., are, of course, in Serb. Letters, under a decree of 1934, are not delivered if the old names are used in the addresses.

The insistence on the use of Serb in all public life has been made a pretext for excluding the minorities, almost without exception, from official careers. The higher posts have been filled from the first with Yugoslavs, chiefly Serbs from the Old Kingdom. A certain proportion of the railway employees, &c. (90 per cent. of whom were Magyars), were at first retained in their posts, even after they had refused to take the oath of allegiance (which in Yugoslavia, as elsewhere, was demanded before the territory had been legally transferred). The great majority of these were, however, dismissed as soon as Serb substitutes had been trained to take their places. The Vidov Dan Constitution actually made admission to public service for a Yugoslav citizen of nationality other than 'Serb-Croat-Slovene' conditional (unless by special exception) on ten years' residence in the Kingdom.¹ It is to-day very exceptional for a non-Yugoslav to be found in an official post, except in purely local administration, and practically unheard of for him to be appointed to one.² Pensions are now paid to the former Hungarian officials, but the final settlement was only reached in 1936, and many persons appear to have encountered extreme difficulties in making their claims good.³

1. Art. 19.

2. I am officially informed that 88~ Germans, 632 Magyars, 276 Slovaks and Ruthenes, and in Czechs were employed in the Voivodina in 1937 by municipal and communal councils. Unhappily, my figures do not give the number of Yugoslavs so employed. There are said to be thirteen Germans, two Magyars, and one Jew employed in the office of the Banovina in Novi Sad. I personally only remember encountering two non-Yugoslav employees during my wanderings in the Voivodina, as against certainly several scores of Yugoslavs; but I was dealing chiefly with higher employees.

3. *Hungarian MS.* See also *Die Nationalitdten in den Staaten Europas*, p. 367.

Unlike the other Successor States, Yugoslavia has even severely restricted the use of any other language than Serb in public, although non-official, life. Names and callings of shopkeepers, professional men, business firms, &c., goods in shop-windows, advertisements, the headed paper of businesses, &c., all have to be in Serb, and, in some places, in Cyrillic characters to boot (the use of Latin script underneath being sometimes, but not always, permitted).¹ The books of businesses must be kept in Serb, and in some cases practically all business correspondence. In one town the Prefect of Police ordered all shopkeepers to greet customers entering or leaving their shops in Serb. Only if the customer could speak no Serb whatever might the sale of the packet of soap or ribbons be conducted in Magyar.²

In cinemas only Serb captions may be used, &c.

A certain number of cases have occurred in which members of minorities have been threatened and even attacked by members of nationalist societies (with the tolerance of the authorities) for using their own language in the street or in public places such as cafés. The chief sufferers in these cases have been the Magyarone Jews. None of the outrages have (so far as I know) been so bad as the worst cases in Rumania or Italy, but that is the best that can be said for them. All clubs, associations, &c., were 'Serbized' from the very outset, where they were not closed down altogether. Statutes must be drawn up, minutes kept, &c., in Serb alone. Concert programs have to contain a proportion of Serb numbers; dances may not include more than one or two Hungarian national dances, &c. Sometimes even societies existing for the sole purpose of fostering minority culture, e.g. Magyar-reading circles, have been ordered to conduct their meetings in Serb, as though a society for the reading of the Welsh classics had been compelled to read and speak English only. An attempt has now been made (to which we shall return later) to regulate the question by leaving all general societies (with their accumulated capital) to the Serbs and founding quite specific minority cultural societies for the exclusive use of the minorities. It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that the Press, particularly the Magyar, stands under the strictest censorship.³

1. The practice varies. In some places a surtax is imposed on Magyar or German signs: in some, the use of them is prohibited altogether; in others, it is free.

2 *Hungarian MS.* These are, it is true, acts of individual officials and not sanctioned by law; but they have been very numerous, and some of the officials perpetrating them have held very high posts.

3. The art of censorship varies curiously in the different Successor States. In Czechoslovakia, if a passage is censored, the paper has to appear with the offending columns left blank, thus displaying its shame. In Yugoslavia, on the

§ 8. THE MINORITIES: EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL QUESTIONS

Yugoslavia's cultural policy has been a compound of pure repression (with very occasional bursts of comparative enlightenment) and of the usual playing off of the non-irredentist against the irredentist minorities. Sometimes the one tendency has prevailed, sometimes the other. Immediately on entering into possession, she took over for herself practically the entire Magyar higher educational system, leaving only the elementary schools in the purely Magyar districts. The Romanians were not even so well off as that, since their schools were simply taken over and the teachers ordered to learn Serb within a year. Seventy teachers and priests fled to Romania and were replaced by Serbs, Russians, and Bulgars, so that for the time the Romanian education in the Banat simply ceased to exist. Other Romanian intellectuals were interned in Belgrade, or in their homes.¹

The Germans, on the other hand, were at that time positively courted. The Magyar schools in German districts were hurriedly turned into German schools, and new German schools actually built in the Baranya. The gymnasium in Novi Vrbas, an originally German foundation which had afterwards been Magyarized, was re-Germanized, a second German private gymnasium was allowed in Vrsac, and German parallel sections were established in the Serb gymnasium of Novi Sad, Panëvo, Bela Crkva, and Petrovgrad. While the Yugoslav troops were occupying Temesvár, a German was actually made civil governor of the district, and was promised a German university if the local Suabians would use their influence to secure the attribution of Temesvár to Yugoslavia.²

Something of a cultural renaissance began among the local Suabians, who, as we said, had been at the time 90 per cent. Magyarized. In June 1920 a 'Schwäbisch-Deutscher Kulturbund' was founded in Novi Sad and by 1924 had established 128 local groups in the Voivodina and Syrmia, with a total membership of 55,000. Both parties seemed satisfied, since the motto of the 'Kulturbund'—'Staatstreu und Volkstreu'—expressed the abandonment of the old Magyarone attitude in favor of active support of the Yugoslav State.

contrary, fresh matter has to be inserted, so that the reader shall not suspect that any disloyal sentiments could ever have been entertained; and that matter has to make sense of a sort. Thus the article is closed up and an account of a football match or a note on bee-keeping appears at the end. In Romania the space has to be filled, but it does not matter how, so that a political article appears intersected with Mutt and Jeff strips, printed in any old order, often upside-down, and tantalizingly unfinished if the whole series is not required.

1. V. Vârâdean, 'Die Rumänen aus dem Jugoslawischen Banat', in *Glusul Minoritatilor*, February 1930, p. 70.

2. G. Grass, 'Das Schulwesen der Deutschen in Südslawien', in *Nation und Staat*, July—August 1928, p. 794.

The motives prompting this indulgence were, of course, purely political; in which connection it must be remarked that, in so far as German culture has been protected in Yugoslavia, this has been the work of the Serbs alone, and has been absolutely confined to the Voivodina and Sylvania. The Slovenes, who have enjoyed *de facto* autonomy in their own districts since the War, have consistently striven to repress the German element there, and the Croats, although less violent, have been little more lenient. The question is really governed by the religious situation. In Croatia most of the Germans are Catholics, like the Croats, and as the two nations share also many cultural and historical traditions, linguistic assimilation also follows easily enough. In fact, the local Germans do not themselves strongly resist the assimilation which the Croats desire, since without it they can have no hope of an existence more spacious than that of a peasant.¹ It is therefore still proceeding fairly rapidly to-day. In the Voivodina, the religious difference between the Catholic or Protestant Germans and Magyars and the Orthodox Serbs forms a much wider gulf. The German will only naturally assimilate to the Magyar, and conversely the Serb does not regard any non-Orthodox as genuinely capable of assimilation. Thus, in the Voivodina, the only real alternative to a German with Magyar culture is a German with German culture, or else a totally uneducated German;

As soon as the immediate need for German support had passed, with the definitive settlement of the frontiers, the early complaisancy towards them vanished. In 1924, after the unfortunate *gaffe* of the German political party, Pribièevia even suppressed the Kulturbund, and sequestered its entire property, stating that the permission to found it had been 'a boon of which the Germans had proved themselves unworthy'. Its suppression was alleged to be 'also a measure of reprisal against the oppression of the Slovene minority in Carinthia'. Davidovia cancelled his predecessor's action, but so many difficulties were put in the way of the Kulturbund that it was not able to resume work at all until 1927, and had only recovered a little of its lost ground when the proclamation of the dictatorship made it necessary to begin the whole story over again. During this period also the Yugoslav scholastic legislation for the minorities took shape. The Vidov Dan Constitution merely stated, in this connection, that 'racial and linguistic minorities will receive elementary education in their mother language under conditions to be laid down by law' (Art. 16, para. 13). For the time,

1. In this connection it is interesting that most of the German schools in Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia were opened under the 'Great Serbian' dictatorship. This policy was strongly resisted, especially by the Croat clergy.

however, owing to the difficulty of transacting business in the Skupština, the matter was left in the hands of successive Ministers of Education, who merely issued administrative decrees, and no law was enacted until December 5th, 1929, when the Dictatorial Government promulgated an Act which did little more than consolidate the earlier decrees. This Act has not since received any substantial modifications in principle. The Germans have, however, secured a few alleviations for themselves, while a special bilateral convention between Romania and Yugoslavia, concluded in 1933 after years of fruitless negotiation, introduced a special régime for the Romanians of the Yugoslav Banat in return for corresponding concessions to the Serb minority in the Romanian Banat. Even this agreement did not alter the fundamentals of the Yugoslav system, which is most easily described as a whole, the modifications applying to different minorities being cited where they occur.

It may be observed that these laws apply also to the Slav minorities of the Voivodina (Slovaks, Ruthenes, &c.).

All education in Yugoslavia is, in principle, State education. In accordance with this principle, all minority schools in the Voivodina were taken over by the State, with their property, soon after the occupation, the teachers being declared to be State employees. It was provided at the time that existing private schools might be allowed to continue, but although Croat, Slovene, and Mohammedan schools in other parts of the kingdom received the benefit of this concession, no private or confessional minority school in the Voivodina was exempted under it, except a single German girls' burger school in Vršac. The 1929 Act again expressly prohibits the opening of new private schools, other than in quite exceptional circumstances.¹ Only the Romanians are allowed under the Convention, if they wish, to open at their own expense private elementary schools, ranking as public schools, supervised by the State but with the examinations conducted, and certificates issued, by the Romanian teachers. Thus, by a measure of very doubtful legality,² the chief minorities lost all their independence in educational matters, besides a great deal of valuable property.³

1. e.g. on lighthouses, very small islands, or mountain observatories.

2 When in 1934 Albania declared all her education to be State, the question whether this measure was compatible with her Minorities Declaration (which in this respect is identical with the Yugoslav Minorities Treaty) was laid before the Permanent Court of International Justice, which decided that she was not entitled to abolish the private schools (Advisory Opinion No. 64).

3 The Petition gives a long list of the property in foundations, &c., simply seized and used either for Serb schools or for other purposes. It includes 20 Catholic Convents of one Order alone. In addition the Churches lost under the Agrarian Reform large estates, the proceeds of which had been used for the upkeep of schools.

Elementary education lasts for 8 years, but the schools are divided into two categories: lower (for the first 4 years) and higher (for the latter 4). In the latter, all instruction is given exclusively in Serb,¹ since Yugoslavia interprets her obligation under the Minority Treaty as applying only to the lower elementary schools.

In the latter, 'special sections' may be opened for the linguistic minorities where they reside in 'considerable numbers'. These are, for the Germans and Magyars, 30 per cent. (25 per cent. in exceptional cases), for the Romanians under the Convention, 20 per cent.

Under the law, instructions in these 'sections' is given in the mother tongue, Serb being taught as a subject from the first class upward, while in the third and fourth years history and geography are also taught in Serb. In the Romanian schools, the instruction in Serb begins only in the third year; a similar concession was granted to the Germans in 1931 but repealed in 1933. The instruction is always in Serb, i.e. with the Cyrillic alphabet, and many children spend their years mastering this alphabet without acquiring a word of Serb in the process.² Kindergartens, under the law, are in Serb only, but the Romanians are allowed kindergartens in their own language, and the Germans also obtained a similar concession in 1931. So far as I can gather, the Magyars have also a few kindergartens. In some places there are special 'preparatory classes' for minority children, but these are exclusively Serb and fulfil the purpose only of giving preliminary instruction in the Serb language.³ In 1931 the Germans also obtained permission to organize courses for illiterates, under State control and on condition that they also gave instruction in the language of State.

Instruction in housekeeping, and apprentices' schools and lower special schools is exclusively Serb.

The syllabus in minority sections is the same as in the Serb schools. All teachers must know Serb perfectly (many minority teachers are said to have lost their posts on this score; but it may be with justification). Children of one minority language may not enter the school of another; if there are not enough children of one minority to justify their receiving a section of their own, they must attend the Yugoslav school (in any case, where both a Yugoslav

1. In 1931 the Germans were allowed the concession that instruction in their schools should be in German for the first two years; but this was repealed in 1933.

2. I was personally acquainted with a highly intelligent young Magyar mechanic in a garage in Belgrade who was just picking up Serb from his colleagues. He had read and written it at school for eight years without learning to understand one word of it.

3 The *Hungarian MS.* describes these schools as compulsory, which, however, is officially denied; but it is curious that one of the concessions made to the Germans in 1931 was that these schools were not compulsory for them.

and a minority section exist, minority parents may always send their children to the Yugoslav section, but not vice versa). Jewish children, whatever their language, must attend the Serbian schools.

These provisions, which are similar to those in force in Romania, are, of course, primarily directed against the Magyars in the Voivodina, and as such were rather welcomed by the local Germans, although in Slovenia they have been applied very severely against the Germans to the benefit of the Slovenes. They have, however, been utilized for a campaign of Slavization easily exceeding any Romanization practiced in Transylvania. In 1922 M. Pribičević issued a decree to the effect that the nationality of the child was determined by the authorities, who were to judge by his surname. Children with Slav names were forbidden to enter minority classes, and inquiries were often extended for some generations back (particularly in Slovenia) to see whether a Germanized Or Magyarized name was not originally Slavonic.¹ In 1927 this rule was altered for the Voivodina (the amendment being extended to Slovenia in 1928) allowing children to be entered for minority schools 'according to their nationality, their habitual language and the declaration of their parents', and in 1931 the declaration of the parents was accepted—for the Germans but not for the Magyars—as the sufficient criterion; but in 1933 it was decreed that children of mixed marriages must enter Yugoslav schools if the father was of 'Yugoslav nationality', and the analysis of names was resumed on a considerable scale, to be abandoned once again in the autumn of 1936.² For Romanian schools the declaration of the parents is accepted.

It is difficult to obtain statistics of schools, particularly since the Voivodina no longer constitutes an administrative unit. The Magyars possessed in 1934, according to official figures quoted by them, 132 parallel sections of elementary schools and 25 kindergartens,³ as compared with the 645 elementary schools and 48 burger schools which were theirs before the War (the larger figure, of course, covering many schools established to Magyarize non-Magyar children). According to their own estimate, their present numbers would entitle them to 212 schools.⁴ Yugoslav statistics

1. In the Bačka an order was issued that children of mixed marriages were to be entered only in Yugoslav schools if either the father or the mother was a Yugoslav. (*Nation und Staat*, October 1927, p. 1 17.)

2. *Danubian Review*, December 1936, p. 19.

3. A Yugoslav official source gives me the figures for 1936, of 581 classes = 170 sections?), Magyar and mixed kindergartens.

4. Hungarian MS. According to the 'Petition', the number has decreased since. Even children with Walloon, Italian, &c., names, descendants of old, long since assimilated settlers in the Banat, have been subjected to the analysis. They are sent, of course, to Serb schools, since no Walloon schools are available. An earlier order still decreed that children must enter Slav schools if their parents spoke a Slavonic tongue, even badly.

given me in 1934 claimed that there were then in Yugoslavia '54 German sections of elementary schools, with 580 classes, 38 kindergartens, and 6 burger schools. Five of the 6 burger schools were, however, closed in 1931, so these figures were already out of date. Some of the kindergartens are, moreover, really 'preparatory courses' teaching Serb only. On the other hand, the number of elementary schools has recently increased, and about three-quarters of the German children probably receive elementary instruction to-day in their mother tongue.¹ According to the same Yugoslav statistics, the Romanians possessed 1 schools with 78 classes, and 4,807 pupils, which seems roughly the same proportion of pupils to total population as for the Germans.

A further grave deficiency is that the instruction even in the mother tongue is often given by Slav teachers who do not know the language properly.² This may not at first have been entirely the fault of the Yugoslavs since many Magyar and Romanian teachers left the country voluntarily in the first days, and few local German teachers were available, owing to the Magyarization of their schools before the War. The situation, however, instead of improving subsequently, got steadily worse as the remaining teachers were retired, dismissed, or transferred to Macedonia, Montenegro, &c. No attempt was made to remedy the shortage until 1931, when the Germans got permission to start a private training college in Novi Vrbas for teaching in their elementary schools; the Romanians were, under the Yugoslav-Romanian Agreement, allowed a section in the training college at Vršac, and even the Magyars, after long negotiation, secured a single class of a secti9ri in a college in Belgrade. Progress seems, however, to have been very slow; for it was reported from German sources in December 1936 that although 33 German teachers had by that time become qualified, only one had been appointed to a post. According to official sources, 289 out of the 506 teachers in Magyar sections were Magyars.

The situation as regards secondary and higher education is less satisfactory still.

The authorities have always denied that the minorities possess any right to secondary education in their own language. The early concessions made to the Germans were cancelled by M. Pribièeviaè in 1925, only the four lower classes in Vršac and Novi Vrbas being

1. According to official statistics, the Germans possessed in 1936 766 classes (= about 192 sections) with 48,872 pupils and 675 teachers.

2 *Die Nationalitäten in den Staaten Europas*, p. 347, quotes the case of the town of Ruma in Syrmia, where 1,232 German children are said to have had in the 'German' schools 6 German teachers and 24 Slays, of whom 8 spoke German very badly and 9 not at all. In 1934 I was told that 'one-quarter of the teachers in the German schools spoke no German at all, one-quarter spoke it badly, and the other half was untrained'. The Magyars estimate that 'at least one-third' of the teachers in their schools are Slays.

allowed to continue; and soon after, the German instruction in Vršac vanished also. The Act of 1929 provides only for secondary education in the 'language of State' and an Act of December 5th, 1931, lays down the same rule even for burger schools. Besides the training college and sections mentioned above, the Germans now possess only a private burger school for girls in Vršac (which they were allowed to start in 1933) and the gymnasium or half-gymnasium in Novi Vrbas; the Romanians, parallel classes in the Vršac gymnasium; and the Magyars, parallel classes at two secondary schools: a 4-class gymnasium at Senta and an 8-class gymnasium at Subotica, in which, however, only the Magyar language and religion are taught in Magyar.¹

The inadequacy of these provisions is enhanced by the fact that Yugoslavia makes it more difficult even than Romania for a minority student to attend a high school abroad. The German and Magyar students thus depend exclusively on the Universities of Zagreb and Belgrade.

Finally, the tone of the instruction given is, according to the minorities, excessively nationalist in the Yugoslav sense, no consideration being paid to the special susceptibilities of the minorities. Requests by the Germans to use their own text-books have been refused. The provision of the 1931 Constitution that education must aim at inculcating the spirit of 'national unity', unexceptionable in itself, is often used as a pretext for denationalization. A particular grievance alleged by the Germans is that pressure is put on their children to join the 'Sokols', an institution which, admirable in many respects, is also specifically Slavonic in spirit and fundamentally unsuited to any other nationality.

It remains to describe the development of the general cultural life of the minorities. After the dissolution of the Kulturbund, a period of general pressure followed, under which all the minorities suffered. Under the Dictatorship the situation was at first even aggravated, as all associations had to re-submit their statutes for approval, which was often refused, and granted only after long delays.

Towards the Germans, indeed, Yugoslavia has recently shown a tendency (assuredly not unconnected with the increasing political rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Germany) to revert to the more liberal policy characteristic of 1919 and 1920. The Kulturbund, after a long wrangle over the question of the official language (during which it lost even some of the ground which it had gained since 1927) got its statutes re-approved in April 1931. Since that time it developed very rapidly indeed. It has a large head-quarters in Novi Sad and many branches (210 in December

1. *Petition.*

1936). It organizes lectures, training courses, theatrical representations, and picture shows, has founded a great number of popular libraries, issues several periodicals, and engages also in various social activities, assistance to poverty-stricken communes, labor exchanges, apprentices' courses, &c. Affiliated to it are an association of German University students, a choral association, an association of sports clubs, and a medical section. The organization of the Youth Groups is particularly active. In December '36 there were no less than 142 of these. Thus an extremely vigorous national life has developed which has largely made good the great shortcomings of the official school policy.¹

Incidentally, the organization has been able to expand its activities geographically since the reorganization of the country in 1929. Syrmia is now included in the Banat of the Danube, and the German villages there share in the work of the, Kulturbund. It is also slowly beginning to penetrate Slovenia, where a German weekly paper is printed in Osjek. I was, however, informed that the local Germans themselves do not welcome its activities there, as tending to disturb their relations with the Croats.

It must be emphasized, once again, that this comparative toleration of German culture is confined to the Voivodina and its neighboring territories. It has no counterpart in Slovenia, where the hostility to the local Germans remains undiminished, and the Slovene question naturally affects the feelings of both parties in the Voivodina. Nor is the position idyllic, even in the Voivodina. Cases are still common of arbitrary official prohibition of what would appear, on the face of them, to be entirely harmless activities. Moreover, the school legislation has remained substantially unchanged. Nevertheless, even the qualified 'cultural liberty allowed the Germans has, as will be seen, had important effects on the local political situation.

The Magyars have had a far more difficult time, owing perhaps to faults on both sides. Yugoslavia is not anxious to see Magyar culture or influence flourish, and is very quick to smell the political rat behind every arras, while the Magyars undoubtedly find the task of dissociating politics from culture as difficult as it is, to them, unaccustomed. It is also true that the general cultural level of the Magyars in the Voivodina was not high before the War.

The Dictatorial Government allowed them to open a Popular Cultural Association, similar to that of the Germans, with headquarters in Veliki Beèkerek and permission to open branches in all

1. According to the Yugoslav official document previously quoted, the Germans possess in all 'more than 415 different cultural, recreative, intellectual and humanitarian societies'; most of these are probably affiliated to the Kulturbund. They also issue 26 newspapers.

tons and villages with Magyar populations. During the next two years a number of branches were opened, while a second association, the People's Circle of Subotica, also displayed much activity. There was promise of a real, if modest, development of local cultural life, whereby a Magyar of the Voivodina could at least hear a lecture in his own tongue, borrow a book from a library, and even see a play. The police, however, watched the associations jealously, and in the spring of 1934 the Ban of the Danube Banovina closed them both on the ground of alleged political activity. Long-drawn-out negotiations ensued, during which the cultural life of the Magyars vegetated dismally. Only in the autumn of 1936, when the Government, for the first time for many years, showed signs of a more liberal policy in cultural questions, particularly towards the Magyars, were the two associations allowed to re-open, and permission given for twelve more to be formed.

The Romanians have a cultural association of their own—an unpretentious and struggling shrub over which the storms have passed which struck down the loftier trees.

A word must be added on the Church question which, from a situation which up to the War closely resembled that of Transylvania, has since developed quite differently. In the Hungarian Voivodina, as in Transylvania, the national life and cultural activities of the different nationalities were built up on their respective churches, the two branches of the Orthodox Church almost personifying the Serb and Romanian nationalities, while the Roman Catholic Church, although it included Germans and Slavs as well as Magyars, was representative in chief of the Hungarian State and a strong Magyarizing influence.

By taking over the Confessional schools, with their property, Yugoslavia at one blow divested the Churches of most of their national-cultural importance, while the losses to which they were subjected under the land reform weakened them still further.' Their relationship with the State, as purely religious organizations, was regulated by a Law of Cults, the chief provisions of which are as follows:

No one cult in Yugoslavia enjoys a privileged position, and all are subordinate to the State. 'Recognized' cults (these are the Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Uniate, Islamic, Calvinist, Evangelic (German and Slovak), Old Catholic, and Israelite) constitute legal personalities, enjoy autonomy in the conduct of their own affairs,

1. The *Petition* estimates the losses of the Reformed Church (the oldest of them all) at about 24 million dinars. The Orthodox Church itself, however, has also suffered considerably. When taking over church buildings for lay schools the civil authorities were, in theory, bound to pay rent, although they did not always do so. On the other hand, the payment of the teachers had often proved a heavy burden to the poorer churches and from this they were, of course, now released.

are competent to acquire, retain, and freely dispose of property of all kinds, within the limits of their respective Statutes and subject to the control of the State (one of the limitations being that their property must serve exclusively for church needs and not be used for any other purpose). They are entitled to levy for their own needs surtaxes on the State taxes, besides which they also receive subsidies from the State. Representatives of the Churches may not engage in any political activities or propaganda.

This law could not, of course, in itself divest the various Churches of their national character, but Yugoslavia has been remarkably successful in paralyzing the minority Churches as national factors. The Protestant Churches of various denominations and the Israelites have formed national organizations without any constitutional link with any corresponding bodies outside Yugoslavia. In any case, these Churches are too small to constitute an important problem. The Roman Catholic Church is a much more powerful body, but here, too, Yugoslavia has proved very successful. Under her Concordat with the Holy See, the boundaries of the dioceses have been remodeled to coincide with the State frontiers, and a Papal Nuncio resides at Belgrade, to whom the Roman Catholic bishops are directly responsible. They are thus removed from the influences of Vienna and Budapest. More important still is the fact that Yugoslavia, unlike Romania, is itself half a Catholic State, and in Croatia and Slovenia is able to draw on a large supply of nationalist, even fanatical clergy (for the Croat clergy had never been Magyarized as the Slovaks were). The Magyar bishops and clergy have gradually been replaced by Croats, so that to-day the Catholic Church in the Voivodina is a Yugoslav rather than a Magyar influence. The process has even gone so far that in some places Magyar and German children are unable to receive religious instruction in their mother tongue, owing to the lack of Magyarspeaking priests (although elsewhere, it is true, one may still find a Magyar priest officiating in a mixed commune).¹ In this Yugoslavia seems, as so often, to have overshot the mark, for the result has been rather to estrange the people from the Church than to reconcile them, through the Church, to Yugoslavia.

The only Church to-day not completely under the control of the State is the Romanian Orthodox Church, which by special arrangement belongs to the Romanian See at Timi^ooara.

There remains the question of the relationships between the various Churches, which is not wholly satisfactory. If the minority

1. The position of the Protestant Church (which is two-thirds Magyar, one third German) is worse still. Here there is great difficulty in getting pastors trained at all, since they are forbidden to attend the College in Hungary. In 1930, according to the *Petition*, 24 out of their 54 parishes had no pastor.

Churches have largely lost their national character, the same cannot be said of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which still regards itself in the Voivodina as the embodiment of Serbian national life. The rule against political activities is notoriously not enforced against the Orthodox bishops and priests, who pose as the champions of the State, while the State has in return granted the Orthodox Church many quiet favors, including what appears to be a disproportionate share of State subsidies.¹ The situation is, in fact, very similar to that in Transylvania, only, so far as I could judge, less acute. In some places there have been bitter complaints of the encroachments by the Orthodox Church; a case which has caused particular resentment is in Senta, where the Catholics have been prevented by the authorities from building a new church for which they had subscribed, and which they had even begun to build in 1914.²

In other places where I made inquiries, the local Orthodox Church was given a clean bill by the minorities.

'Forced conversions' have occurred, but they have been rare; but a law is said to have been promulgated in 1933 that children of mixed marriages must be brought up in the Orthodox faith alone.

§ 9. THE MINORITIES: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL QUESTIONS

The economic readjustment has been less sensational and perhaps less painful than the corresponding process in Transylvania, for the reasons which have already been stated: the Serbs had less leeway to make up, the minorities fewer advantages to lose. In

1. The following table shows (I) the number of adherents of each of the main creeds in Yugoslavia (according to the 1921 census); (II) the financial support (in dinars) accorded to each, under various headings, by the State in the 1929/30 budget; (III) the sums which would have been allocated had a strictly numerical proportion been observed; and (IV) the resultant + or — accruing to each Church.

	<i>I.</i>	<i>II.</i>	<i>III.</i>	<i>IV.</i>
Orthodox . . .	5,602,227	61,561,613	47,600,455	+ 13,961,158
Roman Catholic and Uniate . . .	4,776,845	35,612,363	40,320,782	- 4,708,419
Mohammedan	2,337,637	29,983,954	11,390,391	+ 7,593,563
Protestant.	226,849	1,155,000	1,852,345	- 697,345
Israelite	64,204	1,131,220	542,399	+ 588,821
Old Catholic.
		119,679,550

The grant to: the Orthodox Church was made up of: (1) ordinary subsidy 46,3 12,61 3 D, (a) special contributions, x 5,240,000 D. The position as regards the other Churches does not appear to have changed for the better since the above date.

2. This particular question has, however, certain peculiarities too complicated to be stated here; but the case is not one of pure religious persecution.

essence, however, Yugoslavia has followed the same policy as Romania in Transylvania or Czechoslovakia in Slovakia and still more obviously in Bohemia: to transfer the wealth of the country from the minorities to the majority. She has even carried this policy out more brutally than either of her allies.

In view of the agricultural character of the Voivodina, much the most important question in this respect is that of the land reform. The national purpose of this measure, as enacted in the Voivodina, has never been denied; for the Serb has at least the merit of frankness. Thus Dr. Šeèerov, an ex-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finance, wrote in a work published in 1930 that the real object of the reform was the destruction of the big landed proprietors in the Baèka, Banat, and Baranya, who were regarded as an 'a-national element'.¹ A typescript MS. given to me by the Press Section in Belgrade repeats this statement in almost the same words;² and I only refrain from quoting further evidence, because the point is generally admitted.

We may therefore take it that the reform was aimed directly at a class conceived to consist mainly of minorities who were made to suffer because they were minorities. The Serbian landed proprietors were not, indeed, entirely exempted; certain individuals, communes, and Church foundations suffered important losses. Nevertheless, official instructions have been preserved showing that in this respect also a degree, at least, of discrimination was intended,³ and even the fact that some Yugoslav elements were involved does not affect the political purpose of the whole measure: the deliberate destruction of the big landowning class on the ground that it constituted an 'a-national element'.

But far more serious is the inequality in distribution, in which respect Yugoslavia has easily outdone Romania or even Czechoslovakia. By order of the Government, no members of minorities were allowed even to buy land within a zone of 50 kilometers from the frontier without the consent of the Ministries of War and the Interior. In spite of careful inquiry on the spot, I failed to find

1. Cit. *Die Nationalitäten in den Staaten Europas*, pp. 359—60.

2. 'The big estates in the north had to be broken up on national as well as social grounds' and colonized from the interior 'in order to replace the national-politically unreliable element of the big landowners (who were mostly Magyars) by the particularly valuable colonist element and thus to set up an ethnical cordon against unfriendly Hungary'.

3. The Hungarian *Petition* quotes two such orders, one from the Minister of Agrarian Reform, the other from a Chief of Section in the Ministry of the Interior. Both of these are of early date (1920 and 1921) and the policy may have been modified later; but it does not appear to have been quite abandoned. The *Hungarian MS.* quotes several cases of Serbs whose lands were spared; an official Yugoslav source, on the other hand, informs me that 'no single estate belonging to Yugoslavs, whether privately owned, Church or State, did not come under the Agrarian Reform'.

a single case in which such consent had been given, or any land granted to minorities at all, within or without the 50-kilometre zone.¹ On the contrary, it has often happened that Magyar peasants, who had bought land from communes, &c., out of their own savings have had the transfers cancelled and the fruit of their thrift and industry simply taken away and given to Serbs.² Thus the Magyar laborers and dwarf-holders who, as a class, needed land more urgently than any other section of the population, came away empty-handed. There are to-day probably anything between 80,000 and 100,000 landless agricultural laborers in the Voivodina, and some three-quarters of these are Magyars.³

The replacement of the landlords by the colonists has plunged this unhappy class into the deepest misery. Ironically enough, some of them now scrape a living by renting, unofficially and more or less illegally; the farms of *dobrovoljci* and colonists who are unable to cope with the local conditions.

Their position has been still further impaired, since the outbreak of the great agricultural crisis, by the systematic employment of Serbs and other Yugoslavs from the interior on such public works as are undertaken, and on harvest labor. Cases are even alleged in which private industries have been forced to dismiss their Magyar employees and employ Slavs instead.⁴ A certain

1. It was suggested to me that a few Germans had applied successfully for colonists' portions on, the remote Albanian frontier and others had bought some land from estates in Slovenia. After leaving the Voivodina I heard, from a Hungarian source, of one village, said to be the only one, in which the local Magyars had received land. According to an official Yugoslav source, some Magyars were also able to buy land in Slovenia.

2 Both the *Hungarian MS.* and the *Petition* quote cases of this kind. One case is also given in *Nation und Staat*, October 1927, p. 117.

3. The *Danubian Review*, April 1936, p. 30, gives two figures in two consecutive notes. According to the first, 'official data record between 75 and 80 thousand landless agricultural laborers and natives in the Voivodina, the majority of whom are Hungarians'. The second quotes an estimate for 1932 by M. Savic, former Departmental Chief in the Ministry of Commerce, of about 120,000 landless laborers in the Danube Banovina, three-quarters of whom are Magyars. For the Government policy, cf. also a statement by M. Pavle Radic, Minister of Agrarian Reform in the Uzunovid Cabinet of 1926, that 'the minority peasants and landless persons are not to benefit by the land distribution under the reform' (cf. *Petition*). I was also informed, by a Magyar in the Voivodina, that Magyar peasants had refrained from applying for land owing to threats from Budapest that if they did so, they would suffer for it when the revision came. This allegation has been very hotly denied by Hungarian sources, and I should not have recorded it had it not been repeated to me, when I inquired further, by a source I consider worthy of belief. Proof, in either direction, is impossible to day. Any such threats cannot have been made in conspicuous fashion, or the Yugoslav propaganda would have made much play with them.

4 *Danubian Review*, loc. cit. The *Hungarian MS.* also states that cases have occurred in which firms before receiving contracts have been forced to dismiss their minority employees. I have been officially informed that the allegations quoted above are without foundation; but I have myself read nationalist propaganda urging such steps; and no propaganda is allowed in Yugoslavia which is displeasing to the Government.

number of them have found alternative employment in other parts of Yugoslavia, especially Belgrade, where national discrimination is not so strong. The Suabian maids and nurses, in particular, are a familiar and almost a cherished spectacle of the Belgrade streets, and some Suabian and Magyar masons and mechanics have found a new livelihood in the capital. There are said to be several thousand Magyars living in Belgrade to-day. There has also been some emigration to Macedonia, and waiters from the Voivodina are popular throughout Yugoslavia, owing to their courtly manners and wide linguistic attainments. The position of a large proportion of the Magyars remains, however, really desperate.

In other fields of economic life one hears exactly the same complaints in the Voivodina as in Transylvania. Minority undertakings have in some cases been 'nationalized', i.e. compelled to take on Serbian Directors, or to place a certain number of shares at the disposal of the Government. Credits are not granted to minority concerns, members of the minorities (although not taxed differently from the Serbs)¹ have to pay up their taxes promptly and in full, failing which their property is distrained on—whereas the light-heartedness with which the *dobrovoljci*, in particular, regard such obligations, and the indulgence shown them by the authorities are proverbial through the Voivodina. The minority banks were in any case impoverished by the collapse of their investments in Austro-Hungarian War Loan, &c. Owing to these difficulties, many of them have had to close down or to merge with Serb institutions.

The economic life of the minorities now centers chiefly round their co-operatives, and round small banks which devote themselves 'chiefly to operations connected with the local agriculture. The Germans have managed to develop these activities with reasonable success; they possess in Yugoslavia, according to official figures, 'more than 140 economic and financial societies, of which over 60 are banks, the remainder being organized on a co-operative basis. Their total capital is more than 100 million dinars.'² The Romanians have 10 banking institutes which, according to the

1. Except for the local taxes imposed in certain towns on shop names and signs, &c., written in Magyar. As regards credits, it is impossible to distinguish between the discrimination practiced against the minorities, and that under which the whole Voivodina suffers. The *Petition* gives figures showing that in 1919—27 the Voivodina paid 24.07 per cent. of the total direct taxation of the kingdom, but only received 6 per cent. of the credits from the National Bank. For 1928 the figures were 25.72 per cent. and 6.5 per cent. They would probably be even more unfavorable if separate data were available for the Yugoslav and minority concerns in the Voivodina.

2 From a type-written account of 'La Politique minoritaire en Yougoslavie', issued by the Press Section of the Yugoslav Foreign Office.

same source, 'entirely replace the co-operative institutions'. The Magyars are probably the worst off for national institutions, partly owing to the greater hostility reigning between them and the authorities, partly because they do not possess, and never have possessed, so large an independent peasant class. Their co-operative system originally depended on a head-quarters in Pest, which continued to support it until 1930; but in that year the Pest Institute withdrew its support, so that the Magyar co-operatives had collapsed under the weight of taxation,¹ while of their 168 banking institutions the majority had been crushed out of existence altogether, the small remainder having been 'nationalized' without exception.

§ 10. THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM

Not much need be said on the general economic position of the Voivodina. As we saw, its previous connections lay all to the west and north, and it was then very favorably situated, possessed of assured markets and lying immediately on the lee side of a tariff wall which protected it from its most dangerous competitor.

Even if we leave aside as temporary phenomena such factors as the fall in production owing to the land reform, the disturbances through currency devaluation, &c., the change of frontiers and the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy have undoubtedly proved disadvantageous. Markets abroad have no longer been safe or easy to find. 'Until 1924 there was no trade agreement between Yugoslavia and Hungary, and although for some years thereafter economic exchanges were quite brisk, the economic crisis brought about another abrupt reduction which later compensation agreements could only partly remedy. Trade has also been affected at times by the strained political relations between the two countries, and has always been made more difficult by the reluctance of Yugoslavia, in particular, to grant visas and give passports.

Better relations were maintained for some years with Austria, to which the Voivodina continued to export very largely. But Austria's efforts to make herself agriculturally self-supporting affected this trade considerably, and the Rome agreements of 1934 between Italy, Austria, and Hungary dealt it a further blow, since under these Austria diverted a large part of her imports from

1. *Die Nationalitäten in den Staaten Europas*, p. 367. According to the *Petition*, 17 agricultural co-operatives survived, while 213 disappeared. This does not mean that the Magyar peasants are debarred from the co-operative movement, since many of them now belong to the Yugoslav Credit Co-operative, with its center at Petrovgrad (Veliki Beèhereli). Co-operatives are not taxed if they belong to a recognized association; the old Hungarian system does not appear to have been 'recognized'.

Yugoslavia to Hungary. Czechoslovakia has never been a good customer to Yugoslavia, the 'Economic Little Entente' remaining more of a pious wish than a reality; and since she embarked on a deliberate and purposeful policy of autarky, in the interests of her own peasant proprietors, she has naturally been unable to take much of the surplus from the Voivodina. Rumania's structure is too similar to that of Yugoslavia for much trade to be conducted between the two.

Two countries outside the old Monarchy have done considerable trade with Yugoslavia, these being Italy and Germany. Italy, however, although occupying an extremely important place in Yugoslavia's foreign trading account, yet takes rather the products of the western half of the country. Her imports from the Voivodina were for a time affected by Signor Mussolini's 'battle of wheat' and, again, by the Rome Agreements.

Germany, on the other hand, has been a steady purchaser of the wheat, maize, and live stock of the Voivodina, especially since 1934,¹ and thanks to her, these products have always found their markets since the War.

Clearly, however, the welfare of the Voivodina must depend increasingly, as time passes, on its position within Yugoslavia. Hitherto the internal market has been comparatively unimportant. This is due in part to the forlorn state of communications² which, being itself partly a relic of Hungary's pre-War policy, may be expected to improve gradually; the bridges over the Save and Danube, only recently opened, must bring Belgrade several hours nearer. A more serious difficulty, however, is that inner Yugoslavia is itself an agricultural country which does not greatly need the produce of the Voivodina. There are, indeed, parts of it which cannot feed themselves, but most of these areas—Montenegro, the Lika, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia - are so desperately poor that neither can they import to cover their deficit; they simply go short. The industrialization which is beginning to take place in parts of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia has not so far made any great difference; the workers earn such miserable wages that their purchasing power is negligible. Most of them are half peasants, whose families keep them in food, while the few pence which they earn go on salt, tobacco, and petroleum.

1. Germany has taken, under the clearing agreements, much Voivodinian wheat which she has not herself consumed, but sold on to Holland for spot cash.

2. In 1934 I was told in Vršac that the railways were so bad and so expensive that the local dealers preferred to take their goods 40 miles by road and then up the Danube by water. This may sound reasonable to English ears; but the usual local means of transport is the ox or buffalo wagon, which takes about 3 days to cover 40 miles, and the road a mere track through sand dunes, much of which I did on bottom gear, along the level, in the height of summer. I shudder to imagine it in wet weather.

So far, therefore, the Voivodina has remained the naturally richest agricultural area in an agricultural country, and its role has simply been that of a milk cow. The position is really more dismal if the heavier taxation which it now bears is justified by natural conditions than if it is discriminatory. In the latter case a fit of wisdom in the Government might bring about a remedy in the former, there is nothing to be done about it, until the whole country has reached a different stage of development.

Against this, it must be remarked that the local industries of the Voivodina, sheltered as they are to-day by the new tariff wall, have in many cases enjoyed considerable prosperity. There is clearly a future within Yugoslavia for the agricultural industry of the Voivodina; although the absence of non-agricultural raw material must always leave it somewhat confined in scope.

Clearly the Voivodina does not present an economic problem anything like so difficult as Slovakia or Ruthenia. If the great economic unit of Austria-Hungary had to go, then it is hard to say whether it would ultimately find more difficulty in marketing its produce abroad as part of Hungary, or of Yugoslavia. As regards internal markets, if Yugoslavia were able to develop a dense population and a large consuming power, the Voivodina might fare better in Yugoslavia than in Hungary, while it is not essential to the economic structure of either country (perhaps Yugoslavia needs it the more of the two). For itself, it can exist under almost a régime. The change of frontiers has inflicted no irreparable damage on its inhabitants as it has, for example, on those of Ruthenia. They can live wherever they are placed; which is more than can be said for many of the peoples under our survey.

§ II POLITICAL FEELING AMONG THE MINORITIES

The political feelings of the Magyars are easy enough to describe. There is, so far as I could judge, no class of the population which is at all reconciled to Yugoslav rule. The chance of conciliating the peasants was missed when they were excluded from the benefit of the land reform, which, in fact, made the position of the hired laborer class far more difficult. The workers are too few to count greatly; and, in any case, Yugoslavia has not made any advance to them.

The leaders of the Hungarian party have always been correct in their official attitude—and, for that matter, in their utterance toward myself. Nevertheless, it is perfectly clear to any one not blind that the Magyar party never succeeded in changing its heart and becoming genuinely attached to Yugoslavia; nor can I see an reason why they should have done so.

In the 1931 'elections' a new leader—one M. Szántó—came forward with a program of 'loyalty', on the strength of which the authorities allowed him to be elected on the Government list. The older Magyar leaders, without exception, refer to M. Szántó as a renegade, and a Jew at that, in the pay of the Government and without any following in the country. M. Szántó, on the other hand, maintains that he is as good a Magyar as any other; but he explained to me frankly that he thought the leaders of the official party mistaken. They were obviously in perpetual, barely concealed opposition to the State, and conceived their mission to consist in finding occasions for complaint against it at home and abroad. He himself accepted the State and worked to improve the lot of the Magyar minority within it on that basis; and he felt convinced that he could secure far more real benefits for his constituents by that method than by any other.

In this respect there is no doubt whatever that he is right. The needs and wishes of the poor laborers who make up the greater part of the Magyar minority are very modest. M. Szántó has certainly obtained much more for them than his predecessors ever did, including the rudiments (if they are no more) of a teachers' training college, and many minor local alleviation. Nor is it true that he has no following. I accompanied him on a tour of his constituency and received a very strong impression of the gratitude borne to him by these poor men, and ample proof that he had bettered their position in many small ways. Even the Yugoslav authorities are capable of coming, if not half-way, yet part of the way towards those who wish to meet them; and the ordinary peasant and laborer would much prefer to make the best of a bad job than to live in a state of perpetual feud with the authorities, who will always have the last word. The old Magyar leaders, in Yugoslavia as in Slovakia and the Crisana, have much to answer for. In some respects, as in the question of the land reforms, they have ignored or even injured the interests of most of their followers in defending those of a class, and they have kept alive a spirit of hostility by proclaiming their grievances to the outer world, in the hope of thus hastening on the day of revision, instead of seeking a remedy for them.

M. Szántó's attitude could, of course, be highly inconvenient to Hungary if the question of revision ever became practical politics; for it is his habit to assure the Government and the outside world of the loyalty and contentment of the Magyar minority. Clearly, Yugoslavia would use this as an argument against any territorial concession, and this is why she encourages M. Szántó in many ways.

I must therefore record my conviction that while nearly all the

Magyars of the Voivodina much prefer to be left in peace by all parties, and are profoundly grateful for any alleviation which a more conciliatory policy may get for them, yet in their hearts they find Yugoslav rule profoundly antipathetic. Were revision ever to become practical politics, M. Szántó's following would melt away like butter in the sun, and the great majority of the local Magyars would rally round the nationalist leaders. In this respect the new generation differs no whit from the old. Yugoslavia has not succeeded in Serbizing their hearts—nor, for that matter, their tongues. To bring about a true reconciliation, to imbue the hearts of the local Magyars with a genuine preference for Yugoslav rather than Hungarian rule, would need a long period of a very different government than Yugoslavia has yet known. The régime under which they have lived hitherto has been such as to make impossible even the beginnings of a reconciliation; it has, indeed, destroyed such sympathies as the Serbs had formerly enjoyed when Serbia was still a peasant democracy. Given a free choice, the vast majority of the Magyars of the Voivodina would, I am convinced, wish to return to Hungary.

Of the remaining minorities, the Jews have remained the most faithful to the Magyars. This is, perhaps, rather surprising, for, in contrast to Romania, pre-War Serbia always lived on exemplary terms with her Jewish population, the great bulk of which are Sephardim, or Spanish Jews. Anti-Semitism in Serbia was, and is to this day, almost unknown, and the Jews in return have always been excellent Serbian patriots. The Jews of Serbia, led by the Chief Rabbi, have used all their influence to alter the attitude of their brothers in the Voivodina, but hitherto, so far as I could gather, with little success. Although encouragement from their fellow Jews and threats from Serbian nationalist organizations have been lavished upon them, most of them, particularly in their chief center, Subotica, have continued to speak, feel, and act as Magyars.¹

The result, incidentally, has been very unhappy for the Jews. The outbreaks and agitations against the so-called 'Judaeo Magyars' have become in recent years hardly less violent in the Voivodina than in Transylvania. Deplorable excesses have occurred on several occasions. Naturally, however, these have had the contrary effect from that intended by their authors and have cemented the bond between the Jews and the Magyars.

The Germans are different. One need not pay too much heed

1. See E. Prokopy, 'Wie die Juden der Vojvodina dem Ungartum entfremdet werden' in *Gland Minoritator*, January—February 1934 pp. 35 ff. My own observation fully bears out what M. Prokopy writes; also his conclusion that the various threats and complaints which he quotes 'amount to a testimonial that the local Jews, despite all obstacles and distress, remain attached to their Magyar mother tongue and Magyar culture'.

to their continual protestations of loyalty to the Yugoslav State, nor to their genuinely correct attitude. The Germans are no Catos, and could hardly, in their position, act otherwise.

They have, however, passed through a real transformation, analogous to that of the Suabians in Romania. The process was slower to begin in Yugoslavia, and is still less complete, since Yugoslavia has tolerated less liberty, either cultural or political, than Romania, even in the Voivodina, while the whole situation has always been poisoned by the open sore of German-Slovene relations in the north-west. Thus the number of Germans of the old generation who long remained, and remain, pro-Magyar at heart is still considerable.

Among the younger men, however, the national awakening which Yugoslavia had encouraged during the first years proved permanent. In 1933 an official representative of a changed outlook, appeared on the scene in the person of one Herr Hasslinger, who headed an 'Erneuerungsbewegung' (Renewal Movement). Herr Hasslinger not only protested absolute and even vociferous loyalty to the Yugoslav State: he went so far as to reject even the idea of a minority political party, not to speak of an appeal to Geneva, saying that a minority could have no separate political or economic interests from the majority, but only separate national cultural interests.

The Yugoslav Government naturally countenanced and generously encouraged these theories. They encountered much opposition among the Suabians themselves, who believed that Herr Hasslinger's activities were prompted by pure personal ambition, and were detrimental to the local German cause, both as breaking up its unity and as encouraging the Government through their over-complaisance; for, they said, 'a minority leader should never, say that he is satisfied'. In fact, Herr Hasslinger failed to depose the old leaders and seems to have vanished from the scene.

Nevertheless, an 'Erneuerungsbewegung' of a sort, emotional if not intellectual, has taken strong hold of the younger generation. The majority of them, even in the villages, are more or less Nazi in their sympathies, and although up to the end of 1936 the 'Erneuerer' (who had since found a new Führer) had not yet managed to get official control of the local German movement had, indeed, suffered official defeat—yet the future seems to be with them. The gain is Yugoslavia's, the loss Hungary's. The Suabians of Yugoslavia complain bitterly enough of the shortcomings of Yugoslav rule; but in the main they feel not otherwise than their cousins across the Romanian frontier. The cultural liberty, which they enjoy, is small enough, but at least it is more than Hungary permits. They are allowed to be Germans, and even to be Nazis, and they would not willingly sacrifice this license for

a return to Hungary where the Government still makes every effort to assimilate the non-Magyars and the Jewish press fans the flames against everything German. In fact Nazi theories, which place the preservation of 'Volkstum' above every other objective, are far more easily compatible with the Yugoslav idea of the State, which allows a minority to exist so long as it is powerless, than with the Hungarian, which is dominated by the idea of assimilation.

The Germans of Yugoslavia, like those of Romania, are probably in for some years of very complete political confusion. Nor can we be sure that their militant spirit and often truculent manners will not end by involving them in many a conflict with the authorities. On balance, however, the intelligentsia must be counted as standing to-day for Yugoslavia rather than for Hungary on the revision issue, and the peasants may be relied on to follow their leader.

The Romanians are neutrals. They have little cause to love the Serbs, who until the conclusion of the 1933 Agreements treated them perhaps more harshly than they did the Magyars themselves. Yet by all their history and tradition, and above all by their religion, they stand nearer the Serbs (with whom they intermarry freely enough) than to the Magyars. They would be happiest if that part of the Banat in which they live could be joined to Romania, but as regards the Hungarian-Romanian dispute, as one of them said to me: 'the revision question is no concern of ours. We struggle for our human rights; where we get them is quite indifferent to us.'

§ 12. THE POSSIBILITIES OF REVISION

The development of political feeling among the different nationalities of the Voivodina has put a somewhat different complexion on the question of revision. In 1918, if we take as basis the 1910 statistics, probably not more than 35 per cent. of the population really wished to join Serbia; I compose this figure of all the Serbs, half the Bunjevci and Šokci, the majority of the 'other Slavs', and half of the 'others'. Close on 60 per cent. would probably have voted for remaining with Hungary; one may fairly make up this figure out of the Magyars, the Germans, the Jews, half the Šokci and Bunjevci, and a few others. I leave the Romanians aside, as hostile to either solution.

It is true that this calculation takes the Magyars' figures for their own numbers at their face value; but the majority of the Magyarspeaking Slavs, Germans, and Jews included in the rubric felt Hungarian, if they were not genuine Magyars.

If for calculation of opinion to day we take, as we must, the 1921

figures, it is the number of Serbs, and not of Magyars, that is suspiciously large. Immigration of colonists, *dobrovoljci*, and officials certainly accounts for part of the increase of 'Serbs', among whom, however, the Catholic Slavs are now also reckoned. The striking decrease of the Magyars is due partly to the emigration of refugees and optants,¹ partly to the changed attitude of some other nationalities, particularly the Germans and the *Bunyevci*, many of whom, especially of the latter, had been entered in the 1910 census as Magyar-speaking.²

Giving the Serbs practically the whole of their alleged figure, and adding nearly all the 'other Slavs', we get a figure of about 580,000 out of 1,380,000 or 42 percent who can be counted as definitely in favor of Yugoslavia, with perhaps 400,000 (the Magyars and a few others), or just under 30 percent, as decidedly for Hungary. If the Germans, who still make up 24 percent of the local population, sided with Yugoslavia, that State would have an easy majority; if they sided with Hungary, Hungary would have just over 50 per cent, of the local votes. As we have said, given the present policies of the two states in national questions, the Suabian vote would go to Yugoslavia; but it must be emphasized that theirs is essentially a 'floating vote', and that an altered policy in Hungary towards her national minorities might bring about a complete reversal of the German attitude. A few years ago the same thing could have been said of the *Bunyevci*; to-day the assurance of cultural autonomy might still tempt a few of them back, but not, I think, many.

It may be remarked here that the old local spirit, which might once have led the population of all nationalities to welcome a federal arrangement such as might still prove the best solution for Transylvania, no longer exists in the *Voivodina*. The Magyars never possessed it; the latest-comers to the country (for, in spite of Hungary's thousand-year-old constitutional claim, the present Magyar population is only two hundred and fifty years old in the north, and under a hundred years old in the south), they regularly and even consciously represented the idea of the unitary Hungarian State against all regionalism. The Serbs have lost most of it in the fifteen years of their union with Serbia. The Germans retain it more fully than any other nationality, but even their mental horizon has grown far wider in recent years.

1. These numbered about 35,000 between 1918 and the taking of the census. (*Glasul Minoritatorilor*, April—May 2932, p. 121.) The number has probably risen since to at least 45,000. There has also been a considerable Magyar emigration to Brazil.

2. In each of the two chief *Bunyevac* centers the figure of 'Magyars' fell by some 50 per cent.; in *Subotica* from 55,587 to 27,730, and in *Sombor* from 10,078 to In the Magyar town of *Senta*, on the other hand, it fell by 600 only, or about 3 per cent., and in the District of *Senta* it increased.

The situation as regards local revision has been altered both by the change of attitude of the Catholic Slavs and by the colonization. The former is probably the more important factor, for I doubt whether more than 25,000—30,000 persons can have been settled on the frontiers, and of these certainly not more than half are established and maintaining themselves by their own efforts.¹

Even this, however, is not a negligible number; and, in addition, we must now calculate that most of the Bunjevci would probably vote for Yugoslavia to day. According to the 1931 census, two of the three frontier districts of the Baèka showed a Yugoslav majority, only the eastern district still showing the Magyars in a large majority.

Even so, the Magyar element in the Northern Baèka and the North-Western Banat is very strong, and it should be possible to draw a line, which, while leaving the main Serb centers in the south with Yugoslavia, would yet restore to Hungary many more Magyars than it sacrificed Slavs.

As regards the Darda Triangle the case for revision seems to me strong. It is true that the population immediately south of the frontier (and in part also north of it) is Slavonic; but the local Šokci who form the bulk of the indigenous Slavs have little national feeling, and they are in a minority. The 1910 (Hungarian) figures for the Triangle gave 20,937 Magyars, 14,770 Germans, 1,896 Croats, 6,436 Serbs, and 5,436 Šokci; the 1921 census showed 21,609 Yugoslavs, of whom 10,461 were Serbs, 13,973 Magyars, and 15,751 Germans; Pécs remains the more important market, although further from the apex of the Triangle than Osijek; and the Germans, young and old, with whom I was able to speak there, expressed a decided preference for Hungarian rule. The shifting beds of the Drave and the Danube do not seem very formidable (so far as a layman can judge) and the strategic argument smacks far too much of a compromise with force to leave one fully convinced either of its justice or its moderation.

The Land Office in Novi Sad had under its charge in 1934 130 communes, with a total population of 9,671 families, 5,136 of whom were of local origin. 40 of the 130, with 6,800 houses, were new villages, something over half of which, say 4,000 families, were on the northern frontier. The Land Offices of Veliki Beèkerek and Vršac probably account together for about as many persons as that of Novi Sad.