

ROMANIA

TRAN SYLVANIA

§ I. GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION

ROUMANIA'S share amounts to no less than 102,787 square kilometers - an area actually larger than that left to Hungary herself. It comprises the entire eastern end of the ancient kingdom, thus taking in the whole of the ancient Principality of Transylvania, the eastern half of the Banat, and to round these off, parts of the mountainous area of Maramures (Máramaros) in the north, and below it the so-called 'Cri^oana', viz, the western slopes of the Bihar mountains and a strip of lowland at their foot.

Transylvania, the heart of the whole territory (to which the other areas are mere outlyers), is a natural fortress much in the shape of a capital D, the arch of which is formed by the Carpathians where they take their great sweep southward and then westward (now in their continuation the Transylvanian Alps). The old frontier with the Bukovina, Moldavia, and Wallachia ran roughly along the crest of these mountains, which constitute a sufficiently formidable natural barrier. There are few passes across them, particularly in the north and east. To the south access is slightly easier, the more so as one large river, the Aluta (Alt), instead of taking the natural course westward, most perversely and unexpectedly cuts its way southward through a tremendous gorge to join the lower Danube in Wallachia.

The cross-bar of the D, which formed the old boundary between Transylvania and Hungary proper, is in reality more of a dotted line, consisting of a series of massifs intersected by the valleys of all the main rivers of Transylvania, except only the Aluta. These western mountains are on the whole lower than those of the north, east, and south, but the central massif rises to considerable heights. This is the old Great Forest, whence Transylvania took its Magyar and Latin names.'

The slopes of these mountains, which are reinforced in sundry places by spurs running out from the main chains, take up a considerable portion of the area of Transylvania, but by no means all. Within this natural fortress, 'girt, as it were, with a crown of mountains', as a writer of antiquity puts it, lies an open plateau across which numerous large rivers wind their way through open valleys, separated one from the other only by modest hills.

1.) *Magyar Erdõ* - a forest, -*elve* -in front of: *Erdély* -the land beyond the forest

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The valleys, spacious and fertile, are excellently adapted for agriculture, and are broad enough to support considerable cities. The lower slopes of the hills between them are covered with fields of corn and maize, while the gentle summits, where too lofty for agriculture, are crowned with woodland. The mountain slopes themselves, beautifully clad with beeches on their lower flanks and conifers on the upper, and with bare, grassy summits, are neither precipitous nor lofty. In summer, sheep pasture on the highest altitudes. Thus Transylvania is no mere poverty-stricken hunger area, dependent on the outer world for its existence, but has a self-centred economic life of its own which, combined with its isolation from the outer world, has made possible its long history of political semi-independence.

The 'partes adnexae' are in different case. The rivers of the Maramurq, the Bihar mountains, and the Banat run down into the plain which is itself, looked at from the east, their continuation and complement, but, to the traveller approaching it from the west, quite indistinguishable from the flat plain which he has been traversing since he quitted Pest. This narrow strip of plain, averaging perhaps twenty miles in width, contains several important towns which guard, from a discreet distance, the various gates of the hills: Satu Mare (Szatmár Németi), Oradea (Nagyvárad, Grosswardein), Arad, Timi^oara (Temesvár). Through these towns run the communications which link them with one another, and join Rumania with the west and with her allies. Czechoslovakia cannot be approached at all by rail from Transylvania, except via Satmar, and although a road traverses the mountains between Transylvania and Maramure^o, it is, to-day at least, only to be negotiated at the expense of the utmost tedium, discomfort, and mechanical peril.

The population figures given by the Hungarian 1910 census for this area were as follows:

<i>By Language.</i>	<i>Total.</i>	<i>Transylvania only.</i>
Magyar . . .	1,704,851	918,217
German . . .	559,824	234,085
.Slovak . . .	30,932	2,405
.Roumanian	2,800,073	1,472,021
.Ruthene	16,318	1,759
.Croat . . .	2,141}	944
.Serb . . .	54,874}	

See K-rolyi, *Gegen eine ganze Welt*, p. 391, and Jászi, op. cit., p. 62. a Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians*, p. 432.

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.Other languages	96,431	48,937
Total ..	5,265,444	2,678,368

The Romanian census for 1930 (by nationalities) gave the results shown in Table on p. 253.

It will be seen that, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, the census

taken under the two different regimes arrive at somewhat different results. The explanation, once again, is to be sought in a variety of factors: change of régime; emigration (chiefly of Magyars)¹ and immigration (chiefly of Romanians); the introduction of separate rubrics for Jews and gypsies, and the re-awakening, natural or forced, of national feeling among certain elements, notably the Suabians. It is impossible here to judge exactly between the rival claims, but it is necessary to give some explanation of the peculiar

	Transylvania.	Cri ^o ana and Maramure ^o .	Banat.	Total.
Romanians	1,657,923	1,037,463	570,825	3,206,261
Magyars	826,7962	429,076	97,803	1,353,675
Germans	237,266	83,226	223,330	543,622
Czechoslovaks	3,199	29,231	13,731	46,361
Ruthenes, Russians and Ukrainians	4,506	26,348	5,922	36,576
Bulgars	844	524	10,012	11,380
.Serbs . . .	616	2,338	40,500	43,454
Jews . . .	63,123	102,042	11,256	178,423
Gypsies . . .	68,567	21,272	17,910	107,749
Others . . .	5,861	1,742	8,348	15,951
Total	2,870,751	1,733,062	939,437	5,543,250 ²

national distribution, which a glance at the map will show to be even more daedal than the average of Central Europe. This involves, unfortunately, reference to some extremely obscure and controversial historical issues; but these loom so large in the polemical literature of today that they cannot in any case be burked. We must begin with Transylvania, which has a different history from its present adjuncts.

¹ According to *Dia Nationalitden in den Staaten Europas* (a collection of reports issued by the *Europäische Nationalitäten-Kongress*), p. 403, 397,000 Magyars were expatriated before the end of 1924.

² 540,000 Székely.

³ These figures are given by S. Dragomir, *La Transylvanie et ses minorités ethniques*. Further (official) figures appeared in the *Buletinul Demografic al Romaniei*, 1936, no 3, pp. 153—4, and no.6, pp. 346—7. This gives figures both by nationality and by mother tongue. The tables are as follows (000s omitted):

Language	Transylvania		Banat		Crisana-Maramures.		Total.	
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	
Romanian	1,876	58.2	521	59.3	840	60.4	3,237	98.3
Magyar	998	31.0	107	11.2	378	27.2	1,483	26.7
German	248	7.7	232	24.6	63	4.5	543	9.8
Russian	2	0.1	1	0.2	1	0.1	4	0.0
Ruthene	1	0.0	5	0.5	10	1.4	25	0.5
Serbo-Croat	41	4.3	1	0.2	42	0.8
Bulgarian	1	0.0	9	1.1	. .	0.0	10	0.2
Czechoslovak	9	0.3	10	1.1	23	1.6	42	0.8
Jewish	52	1.6	1	0.1	58	4.2	111	2.0
Gypsies	30	0.9	0	0.0	7	0.4	46	0.8
Other	1	0.0	6	0.7	. .	0.0	7	0.1

See K-rolyi, *Gegen eine ganze Welt*, p. 391, and Jászi, op. cit., p. 62. a Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians*, p. 432.

	3,218	100	942	100	1,390	100	5,550	100
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§ 2. HISTORY OF TRANSYLVANIA UP TO 1867

Transylvania - or the region now bearing that name - first appears in history as the centre of a powerful kingdom of barbarians, the Dacians. Rome conquered Dacia in the first century AD and colonised the interior with large numbers of settlers from all parts of her Empire. Two centuries later, under the pressure of continued attacks from Germanic tribes, she withdrew the garrison and 'citizens'; after which all records regarding Transylvania cease for nearly 1,000 years. We know that Germanic, Turk, and Slavonic invaders overran it and at times occupied it, but in what force and with what effects, if any, on the indigenous population (if any survived) we do not know.

At the end of the ninth century the Magyars entered Hungary, and a century or so later achieved the conquest (or occupation) of Transylvania. They pressed up the valleys of the large rivers, notably the Some^o, and established themselves in the more fertile portions of the western half of the 'land beyond the forest'. They did not, however, attempt to occupy themselves the whole country, or even the whole of what was in those days its habitable areas. They themselves remained in the west, while leaving the frontiers to other national groups. The first of these were numerous German settlers, known to this day as the 'Transylvanian Saxons' (although most of them seem to have come in reality from the Rhineland and Luxembourg) whom various early kings of Hungary invited to Transylvania and assigned to them a goodly portion of the land: the whole cultivable area lying within the southern mountains and bordered roughly by the Mure^o (Maros) and the Târnava Mica (Kis Küküllő) on the north and west of the Aluta on the south-east. Other 'Saxon' settlements centred round Bra^oov (Brassó, Kronstadt) in the far south-east and Bistriþa (Bistritz, Besztercze) in the north-east. There was also an outlying settlement round Reghinul Sâsesc (Sächsisch Reen, Szász Regen), south of Bistriþa, which although not forming part of the Saxon organisation proper, has preserved much of its national character to this day, while even in the west, the towns such as Cluj (Kolozsvár, Klausenburg), were originally German, although they became Magyarized after a few centuries.

It was the normal practice of the time to grant such peoples who were assigned the dangerous position of frontier guards, special privileges which should hearten them in their task and ensure their loyalty. The Saxons, thanks to their importance (they were relatively far more numerous in the Middle Ages than they are to-day) were able to make exceptionally good terms. In 1224 they were granted a remarkable charter which constituted

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them a single 'nation' under their own elected Count, who held office directly under the king, allowed them almost complete self-government in their internal affairs, and made of their territory, the 'Sachsenboden', a strict national preserve, on which no other nationality was allowed to encroach.

The second great group was that of the Székely—a people of mysterious origin, who have been variously claimed as true Magyars, as Dacians, Bulgars, Avars, Goths, and Romanians, while medieval Hungarian tradition, which still lives on among them, made of them the descendants of a group of Huns under Attila's youngest son, Csaba, who is alleged to have remained behind in Hungary when the remaining Huns fled eastward after Attila's death. As the Magyars themselves, by the same learned tradition, claimed descent from Attila's hordes, this tradition made of the Székely the senior branch of the family. Old documents, however, distinguish them quite clearly from the Magyars. The original Székely were almost certainly a people of Turk origin, at least closely akin to the Magyars. Whether they preceded the latter, or were settled in their present homes by them, really does not matter. At all events, we find them, many centuries ago, occupying in compact masses the head-waters of the Mure^o, the Aluta, and the Târnava Mare (Nagy Küküllő), in the extreme east of Transylvania; and there we find their descendants to-day, doubtless reinforced, as the Romanians claim, by a certain Romanian element which they have assimilated, but equally certainly wholly Magyarized (if they were not always Magyar) in their speech and national sentiment. They retain, indeed, a strong local and 'tribal' patriotism; but this takes the form of somewhat despising the other Magyars as a mere bastard stock, and late-comers. They differ, in their own eyes, from the other Magyars only in being more Magyar than they.

The Székely enjoyed privileges somewhat similar to those of the Saxons, although rather less extensive. They were, however, all 'free men' and elected their own Count, who held office direct from the king. Their social organisation long preserved many traces of the early 'tribal' system followed by the Magyars themselves before their settlement and political reorganisation. Thus all their land was held in common, private property being vested chiefly in cattle.

The Magyars, the Saxons, and the Székely had thus occupied, by the twelfth century or so, practically all the agricultural, and, by their standards,

See K-rolyi, *Gegen eine ganze Welt*, p. 391, and Jászi, op. cit., p. 62. a Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians*, p. 432.

habitable area of Transylvania. The question so ferociously disputed to-day is—where were the Romanians at that time?

This question involves the whole problem of the origin of the

Romanians, concerning which they and the Magyars hold theories which are diametrically opposed. The Magyars assert that when they entered it, Transylvania was still uninhabited, unless the Székely were there, or a few Bulgars and Slays. The Romanians, they say, are of Balkan origin, and entered Transylvania only after the twelfth century as refugees, vagabonds, and wandering shepherds. The Romanians claim with passion that their ancestors have, on the contrary, inhabited Transylvania, in unbroken continuity, since its days of Roman greatness, having been merely ousted from their heritage by the barbaric, Asiatic Magyar intruders.

I have no intention of attempting to judge between these rival views. It would take volumes to describe the arguments and counter-arguments, and the truth of the matter is that neither party has proved its case with complete certainty. The only result of so many efforts to bridge this yawning historical abyss has been the engulfment therein of many a promising academic reputation. We do not know for certain that Romanians were in Transylvania in the year AD. ; and we do not know that they were not. And I cannot see that it matters, except to this extent, that their belief in their autochthony has given the Romanians an added sentimental stimulus to press their claims to it to-day, while the conviction that the pretension is false has made the Magyars demand restitution more boldly. But when Transylvania was assigned to Rumania in 1919, this was not because any 1,000 year-old historic right was admitted as valid to-day; and if it is ever handed back, I hope it will not be because the statesmen have decided that the Magyar controversialists were right after all.

Whether, in any case, there were no Romanians in Transylvania in the tenth century, or one, or thousands: whether they constituted a quorum within the meaning of the act or no, they cannot have been either numerous or important, See K-rolyi, *Gegen eine ganze Welt*, p. 391, and Jászi, op. cit., p. 62. a Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians*, p. 432.

neither can they have possessed any ordered social or political society, for the organization which Hungary adopted for her new possession took small account of them; at most, perhaps, accepting the allegiance of certain mountain chieftains, who were, presumably, held responsible for the conduct of their followers. They were not, however, granted any status as a 'nation' nor do we find any record even of isolated groups possessing 'privileges' in the interior of the country.

This does not mean, as their historians are apt to suggest, that they were set aside, under a sort of national anti-privilege, as a race of serfs. They were excluded from the Saxon and Székely areas; but so were the Magyars themselves. The interior of the country had meanwhile been organized on the ordinary Hungarian

County system, with its division of the population into freemen, or 'nobles', and villeins. Like the other less important or desirable non-Magyar populations of Hungary, the Romanians were merged in this organization. Any individuals who might be ennobled formed part of the unitary Hungarian nation, on an equal footing with the Magyar-born nobles, while the remainder were in the same position as the Magyar serfs.

There certainly were such Romanian-born nobles. One of the greatest figures of all Transylvanian, and indeed, of all Hungarian history—John Hunyadi—belonged to this class. They were, however, not numerous, and when they rose in the world they duly joined the ranks of the Hungarian nobility; they did not attempt to raise the status of their fellow Romanians.

A further consequence of their lateness in arriving, if they did arrive late, or of their weakness in resisting the Hungarian conquest, if they were there to resist it, was that they were excluded from the fertile valleys and had to exist as best they could in the mountains.

We must now turn for a moment to the political history of Transylvania, since it had the effect of perpetuating the national distribution and relationships of the Middle Ages, preserving them like a fly in amber into modern times, and setting the present century a dire problem in liquidating them.

As we have said, the grant of special privileges to frontier populations was a normal Hungarian practice. It was also usual for frontier districts to be placed under a special governor. Usually, this office was abolished, and the ordinary County system introduced, as soon as Hungary's hold on the area in question became more secure. In the course of this process, the privileges usually went the way of all things. In Transylvania, however, the privileged peoples were too powerful for such cavalier treatment; moreover, the country was so large, so remote, and so dangerously placed as to postpone indefinitely the normal constitutional assimilation. Until about 1560 it was treated separately as an appendage of some junior member of the reigning Hungarian dynasty. After that date the office of 'Voivode', or governor, came to be held by some great Hungarian noble, but it could not be abolished. Transylvania remained a semi-independent state, within which the representatives of the Hungarian 'nation' (viz. the nobles of the Counties) were obliged to concede equality of status to the powerful privileged nationalities. Gradually there developed a separate Transylvanian constitutional life. In 1437, after a great peasant jacquerie, the three 'nations' formed a 'brotherly union', which was really a sort of defensive alliance against all social, political, and foreign enemies: peasants, Turks,

and royal encroachments. This 'union' developed into a sort of Federal Diet for settling the common affairs of Transylvania (each of the partners continuing to enjoy self-government in its internal affairs).

This national development was carried a stage farther after the Turks had defeated the Hungarian arms in 1526 and occupied all Central Hungary. Thereafter Transylvania was *de facto* independent for nearly two hundred years, although its princes at times owed a nominal allegiance, now to the Sultan, now to the Emperor. Its constitution continued to be based on the division of power (under the Prince) between the three 'received nations'. At the end of the seventeenth century it came again under the Habsburgs with the rest of Hungary, but retained both its separate status and, in part, its constitution. The Habsburgs, while recognizing it as *de jure* part of Hungary, yet in practice governed it as a separate unit through imperial lieutenants, Maria Theresa creating it a Grand Principality, with herself as Grand Prince. The union with Hungary was proclaimed in 1848 but cancelled in the following year. It was only consummated in 1867, when its separate constitution was finally abolished. Thus although Transylvania formed part of Hungary for some eight hundred years, it was integrally united with the rest of the country only for the last half-century of that period.

It is fair to mention, at this point, that this long separate history has left profound marks on the entire population, the Magyars included. Up to **1918** a Magyar of Transylvania would refer to the land 'west of the forest' as 'Hungary'. This particularist Transylvanian feeling is both strong and real: no invention of Romanian propagandists. It was, perhaps, stronger still among the Saxons who, from the hour of their settlement, had to fight not only against wild Cumans, Turks, and Tatars from over the passes, but also against the encroachments of the Hungarian nobility. Only the separate position of Transylvania enabled them to keep their privileges and their Germanic character alive, and the preservation of the latter, at least, was far easier when their sovereign resided in Vienna and not in Budapest. During the last two hundred years they were, therefore, on the whole (although there were, it is true, two parties among them) far more 'Austrian' than 'Hungarian': in 1848 they voted for the union with Hungary only dubiously and under pressure, and took sides with Austria in the subsequent fighting, and they were never 'Magyarone', preserving throughout their history (in striking contrast to the Suabians) a strong Germanic national feeling.

It would, however, be mistaken to draw exaggerated conclusions from what has been said in the preceding paragraph. There have

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always been spiritual and historical differences between Transylvania and Hungary proper. Some of these have even grown stronger in modern times than they were in antiquity. The fact is of great importance that when the Counter-Reformation passed over 'Royal Hungary' Transylvania remained very largely Protestant. At the same time, even when Hungary was partitioned between the Turks, the Habsburgs, and the Princes of Transylvania respectively, there was no genuine separation between Transylvania and that true Hungary which was at the time more of an ideal than a reality. The Princes of Transylvania were themselves Magyars, and the preponderance of the Magyar element among their subjects was accentuated by two important facts: one, that the Székely at this period lost most of their ancient privileges and became entirely assimilated to the Magyars, except for a few local peculiarities; the other, that the Transylvanian Princes held during long periods large tracts of predominantly Magyar territory outside the western frontiers of Transylvania proper. They regarded themselves, indeed, and were regarded, as the bulwark of Hungarian national liberties; laid claim, when opportunity offered, to the Crown of Hungary, intervened frequently on behalf of their fellow countrymen in 'Royal Hungary', and made of their courts the centers of such Hungarian culture as survived. Amid all the changes of the time, Transylvania was ruled only once by a Romanian prince from beyond the Carpathians, and he held it only for a year; and at that, he proclaimed himself the Lieutenant of the Emperor, showered favors on the Magyar nobility and swore fealty to the peculiar Transylvanian constitution, which had come to be largely based on the exclusion of the Romanian element.

For the organization which may have been applicable in the twelfth century soon ceased to be so. The Romanians may have been few in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; but whether by natural increase, by immigration, by the fact that in their mountain fastnesses they suffered relatively little from the Turkish and Tatar inroads, or, what is most probable, through a combination of all these causes, they increased very rapidly. By the fifteenth century they were certainly already numerous; by the eighteenth, during which there was much immigration from across the Carpathians, they were probably the largest single element in the population, if not in an absolute majority against all others combined. Gradually they had filtered in, filling the mountainous areas on the frontier, the western mountains and the high-lying parts of the central table-land, so that the Saxon and Székely settlements, and even some of the Magyar groups in the west, had become islands in a Romanian sea—a singularly unfortunate

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matter for the Székely in particular, who, being by now, at least, true Magyars, found themselves isolated from their kinsfolk. By the nineteenth century the Romanians had become almost the sole inhabitants of nearly all the highlands; had encroached considerably on the old Saxon and Székely lands in the plain, and were even beginning to penetrate the suburbs of the towns. But in the eyes of the rigid old constitution they were still as naught. There was no question of giving them 'national' status. Unless they could become nobles, they remained 'misera contribuens plebs'.

As such they were still, in theory, no worse off than the Magyar serfs of the Counties. Indeed, the great peasant revolt of 1437 had been the work of Magyars at least as much as Romanians; the downtrodden of both nationalities joining hands in a brotherly union of their own against their common oppressors. There were, however, certain special factors which made the position of the Romanians peculiarly hard. The first was their religion. All Romanians belonged to the Orthodox Church, while, under St. Stephen, Roman Catholicism became the dominant religion of Hungary. Now Transylvania has had a very peculiar and interesting religious history. Like the rest of Hungary it became largely Protestant at the Reformation, but it was spared the full force of the Counter-Reformation. The result of some centuries of religious vicissitudes was to leave the Saxons Lutheran to a man; the Magyars divided between Roman Catholicism and Calvinism; the Székely partly Catholic, partly Protestant, partly Unitarian.' In 1571 a compromise was concluded between these four religions, whereby all four were admitted as 'received', i.e. as enjoying official status, mutual toleration being practiced between them. To the three 'recognized nations' were now added four 'recognized religions', the whole forming what a Magyar writer once described, in a burst of candour, as the 'Seven Deadly Sins of Transylvania'. The Orthodox faith was specifically and firmly excluded from the benefits of this compromise. Thus a Magyar serf, if he counted for nothing politically, was at least 'recognized' in the House of God. The Romanian was merely 'tolerated' in either case. And even this 'tolerance' was political rather than spiritual. It is necessary to record that a peculiar national hatred appears to have reigned between the Romanians and the other nationalities of Transylvania. Old documents and literature abound in scathing

The Székely have always been addicted to queer religions. At one time many of them became converts to Sabbatarianism, and two of their villages still practice that unusual creed to-day. There are also among the Székely a certain number of Magyar-speaking persons of the Orthodox or Uniate religion. These are almost certainly Magyarized Romanians. They are to-day the object of violent controversy—see below, p. 286.

and venomous references to the Vlach vagabonds, thieves, and whores. They were regarded as an alien element and, if in theory membership of the Hungarian 'nation' was open to them as to every Hungarian subject, in practice the vast majority of them remained outcasts, an element deliberately excluded from the body politic.

Nor did the Romanians, on the whole, seek assimilation. Notably un-sedentary in their habits, and practically unencumbered by the ownership of things, they seem only to have lived with one foot in Hungary. Many of them were shepherds, whose periodical migrations took them regularly across the frontiers; but even the agriculturists decamped readily across the Carpathians if times were hard—just as they immigrated, as casually, when conditions were unusually severe in Wallachia or Moldavia. Of all the nationalities of Austria-Hungary, the gypsies only excepted, the Romanians seemed to be the least firmly linked with the Monarchy.

Thus whatever its original justification or purpose, the system in Transylvania had come to rest on a basis of national inequality, in which the largest single element was treated as inferior in every way to the privileged minorities. In the eyes of the haughty Magyar noble and the honest but smug Saxon bourgeois, the 'Vlach' was a mere savage, hardly distinguishable from the gypsy. It is true that most of them were, as they are to-day, desperately poor; for a legacy of the colonization era was that the Saxon, Székely, and Magyar agriculturists possessed between them nearly all the best land, the Romanians being relegated to the less fertile hills or mountain slopes. Measured by the standards of Western Europe, which regarded only the squalor of their wooden hovels, the semi-starvation of their diet, their illiteracy, and their superstition, the Vlachs remained to the last among the most backward races of the notoriously backward Dual Monarchy (although their percentage of literacy was still superior to that of their kinsfolk in the Regat). It would take a more sympathetic observer than old Transylvania could produce to appreciate their impeccable color sense in costume and pottery, the plaintive sweetness of their melodies, the extraordinary physical beauty of their children, and the perfect manners of their old people, and to conclude that, measured by a different scale of values, the Vlach might possess something that both German and Magyar lacked.

Their position improved a little when the Act of Union between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches was passed in 1699. The Orthodox priests who accepted the Union (and these were the overwhelming majority) received a certain status with exemption from serfdom. The Act of Union was not, however, a conspicuous

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success in Transylvania from the point of view of its authors. Unlike the Ruthene, the Romanian Uniate priests remained obstinately nationalist, and made of their church a center of the Romanian national movement, working in disappointing harmony with their Orthodox brothers. The inadequacy of the concession, either to improve the conditions of the Romanians or to conciliate them, was shown by Horia's savage rebellion of 1784, which was still more savagely repressed. This occurred during the reign of Joseph II, who pitied the Romanians' deplorable condition and wished to remedy it. Joseph actually abolished the Transylvanian Constitution, but his successor Leopold promptly restored the old order of things, with the single exception that the Orthodox religion became 'received' in Hungary (although left under the control of the Serbian ecclesiastical authorities). Things remained unchanged until 1848 when the Union of Transylvania with Hungary was voted, first in Hungary, then in Transylvania, where the Magyars possessed an overwhelming majority in the Diet.

In the fighting of the following year, both Saxons and Romanians took the Austrian side against the Magyars, the Romanians being encouraged by promises of self-government. These were never fulfilled, since, after the fighting had ended, Transylvania was indeed again separated from Hungary, but ruled from Vienna on absolutist lines. In the brief semi-constitutional era of the sixties, however, during which the Magyars abstained from cooperating, the Saxons and Romanians, left alone together, established the Romanian 'nation' and its two churches on a footing of equality with the other 'received' nations and churches, and proclaimed the equality of the Magyar, German, and Romanian languages in official business. The Compromise of 1867, however, re-united Transylvania with Hungary and, while retaining the autonomy of the received Churches (among which the Romanian Orthodox Church now at last found a place), abolished all special national privileges and proclaimed the equality of all Hungarian citizens, irrespective of their race or language. The last phase before the War had opened.

§ 3. THE NATIONAL MOVEMENTS, 1867—1914

This last half-century is entirely dominated by the clash of two advancing and aggressive national movements: the Magyar and the Romanian. The Saxons had ceased to count. Canny and non-prolific, they had for centuries been steadily losing ground both in numbers and importance. Magyars and Romanians nibbled away the fringes of their old national preserve, and even invaded

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its cities; and what the Hungarian nobles left to them of the substance of political power the Imperial Commissioners took away. They retained the shadow until 1867, and the Act of Union itself laid down that account should be taken of ancient rights. The Hungarian Government, however, reduced the powers of the 'University' to the control of its property, made the office of Saxon Count a government appointment and then abolished it, and even deliberately weakened the Saxon voting-strength by redistributing the Counties. The Saxons had laid the foundations of their communal life too truly for the edifice to crumble easily. The autonomy of their church, round which their life centered henceforward, was buttressed by a solid income derived from foundations and from self-imposed taxation, and, with the help of this, they were able to keep up a remarkably high cultural standard. Economically, too, they prospered. If great wealth was unknown among them, this was because so very large a proportion of all their gains was devoted to communal purposes. Their sedate, old-world city streets, their coy farms and well-stocked yards told of the conscientious practice of every Victorian virtue, the successful achievement of every Victorian ideal. But they had become purely self-regarding, save that they watched, as in a mirror, the progress of events in the far-off German countries of which they always felt themselves the outpost. In 1919 they were destined once more to play a part as the tongue which sways the balance, but in the Hungary of 1867—1918 they had lost both the ability and the desire to count in politics. They had become interesting.

The Magyars, on the other hand, were bursting with new energies. The Union had deprived them of the special position which they had held in Transylvania, where they had wielded a power out of all proportion to their numbers. It had placed the whole population, the Romanians included, on a nominally equal footing. On the other hand, it had removed the danger of interference from the Crown and it had given to the local Magyars the whole weight of the Hungarian State, which stood solidly behind them. It was therefore with a good courage that they attacked the gigantic task of molding Transylvania in the Magyar image. Justice and administration, in its higher grades, were to an overwhelming degree in Magyar hands, except for such local concessions as were still allowed the Saxons. An ingeniously devised franchise practically excluded the Romanians from parliamentary representation, while all the forces of the courts and the police were mobilized to repress any local political activity.

Thus a super-structure was erected. The ultimate goal could, of course, only be reached through the schools. As usual, higher education was taken in hand first, and by 1914 the Government

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had built up a very imposing organization, crowned by the University of Cluj. The Magyarization of primary schools, which in 1867 were entirely denominational, and thus benefited by the autonomy of the churches, lagged behind, but even here the various measures and devices described in an earlier chapter were applied, so that the non-Magyar schools dwindled steadily, besides being forced to devote an ever-increasing fraction of their curriculum to Magyar instruction, while a large number of Magyar State schools invaded the non-Magyar as well as the Magyar regions. In 1914 the educational establishments in Transylvania were divided as follows: ¹

	<i>Magyar</i>	<i>German</i>	<i>Romanian</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Primary school</i>	1,265	254	1,145	2,664
<i>Apprentice schools</i>	61	13	1	75
<i>Burger schools</i>	55	7	3	65
<i>Training collages</i>	8	3	3	14
<i>Secondary schools</i>	30	9	5	44
<i>Special schools</i>	23	3	1	27
<i>High schools</i>	7	..	3	10

It is worth mentioning that all these Romanian High schools were theological academies. All the Romanian schools, without exception, were denominational. When a State school was founded in a minority district, it was always purely Magyar.

Among the further measures taken to strengthen the Magyar element, two must be mentioned. Colonization was practiced, but only on a very small scale (much more extensive schemes were promulgated during the closing years of the War). The development of industry was used much more systematically as a means of Magyarization. As the figures quoted above show, apprentices were Magyarized as carefully as young intellectuals, so that industrial and commercial life should be as Magyar in their upper ranks as the free professions and the administration itself,

These labors were not entirely unsuccessful, as the census figures show. Taking only the main nationalities, the numbers and percentages of the Magyars, Romanians, and Germans developed as follows:

See K-rolyi, *Gegen eine ganze Welt*, p. 391, and Jászai, op. cit., p. 62. a Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians*, p. 432.

	1848 (Fényes)		1857 (Ficker)		1880	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Magyar	368,540	24,35	569,743	26,21	630,477	30,25
German	222,159	14,68	202,114	9,3	211,748	10,16
Romanian	916,015	60,53	1,287,712	59,24	1,184,883	56,86
n	6,601	0,44	114,096	5,25	54,040	2,73
Others						
	1,513,312	100,00	2,173,704	100,00	2,084,048	100,00

1.) *Hungarian Peace Negotiations, vol. iii A, p, 91*

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	1890		1900		1910	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Magyars	697,945	31.00	814,994	32.00	918,217	34.28
Germans	217,670	9.67	233,019	9.40	234,085	8.80
Romanian	1,267,890	56.72	1,397,282	56.40	1,472,021	54.92
s	58,711	2.61	30,703	1.30	54,044	2.00
Others						
	2,257,216	100.00	2,476,998	100.00	2,678,367	100.00

These figures show a small but steady increase in the percentage of Magyars. They show, however, that this gain was rather at the expense of the Germans and the minor nationalities than of the Romanians. Moreover, the gains were almost exclusively registered in the towns,¹ many of which showed during the last decades before the War a large increase, mainly booked to the account of the Magyar element. The following figures are taken at random from a long list: ²

	1880		1910	
	Total Population	Magyar	Total Population	Magyar
Cluj	30,363	24,199	60,808	30,704
Bra ^o ov	29,584	9,827	41,056	17,831
Bistri ^{ba}	8,063	574	13,263	2,824
F ^{ag} ar ^{as}	5,307	1,734	6,579	3,357

The total urban population rose from 217,926 in 1880 to 350,268 in 1910. The Magyar element rose from 105,824 (48.6 percent.) to 205,728 (58.7 per cent.). The Germans sank from 23.8 percent, to 16.1 percent; the Romanians from 24.0 percent. to 23.4 percent.

See K-rolyi, *Gegen eine ganze Welt*, p. 391, and J^{as}zi, op. cit., p. 62. a Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians*, p. 432.

Hungary had succeeded in giving the towns of Transylvania (except, to some degree, the ancient Saxon centers) her own characteristic impress. She had imposed on Transylvania a Magyar or Magyarized upper and middle class, including under the latter designation not only the officials, tradesmen, industrials, and members of the free professions, but also even the artisans and skilled workmen in the factories. But she had not conquered Transylvania.

For the Romanians had simultaneously been making most remarkable progress: less apparent than that of the Magyars, but more solid. The Magyars were advancing (slightly) with the help of assimilation and immigration; for their later figures included not only many assimilated Jews, Germans, gypsies, and Armenians, but also Magyar officials from Central Hungary, but the Romanians

1.) *The Székely Counties, however, have enjoyed a relatively high birth-rate, both before and since the War.*

2.) *Hungarian Peace Negotiations, vol. iii A, pp. 74 if.*

were increasing their absolute numbers, and maintaining their percentage almost intact, in spite of assimilation and emigration.¹ Withal, they showed a remarkable resistance even to the forms of Magyarization, and much more to the spirit. The proportion of Magyarones among them was probably lower than that of any other nationality in Hungary.

Far from allowing themselves to be assimilated, they both extended their area of settlement and developed their social structure. A Magyar writer, Dr. A. Balogh, who investigated demographic questions for the Hungarian Government at the beginning of the nineteenth century, concluded that, of all the nationalities of Hungary, the Romanians were the largest gainers on balance, and were responsible for more of the Hungarian losses than any other race.² Another writer complained in 1913 that, while the Hungarian colonization schemes had only affected 67,000 yokes in twenty years in all Hungary, the Romanians had in ten years, in Transylvania alone, bought 160,394 yokes, counting only purchases of properties exceeding 50 yokes.³ Count Stephen Bethlen himself wrote in 1912 that 'the Magyarization of the towns is a temporary phenomenon which will last only so long as the Vlach leaders do not carry the struggle into the towns as they have hitherto in the villages'.⁴

And the invasion of the towns was already beginning. If the Romanians had few higher schools of their own, they were not excluded from the Magyar establishments which, indeed, largely existed to Magyarize them. They attended them, absorbed their lessons, and rejected their spirit. Others went to Bucharest where, of course, they learned lessons far more dangerous to Hungary than they would have absorbed in any Transylvanian school. As lately as 1910, 72 per cent. See K-rolyi, *Gegen eine ganze Welt*, p. 391, and Jászi, op. cit., p. 62. a Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians*, p. 432.

of their population was illiterate, and the vast majority (1,246,639 persons out of 1,472,021 whose profession was recorded) were still peasants or herdsmen. The members of the 'public services and liberal professions' (which included posts in the railways, &c., as unskilled as that of the famous man who tapped wheels with a hammer for 30 years without knowing why he did so) were listed as 22,153 persons only, the 'professional people' as 6,683, of which only 6,093 were 'intellectuals proper', compared with 15,000 Magyars.⁵ Nevertheless, the

1.) *Between 1901 and 1914 inclusive 209,786 persons emigrated from Transylvania. Of these, 143,325 were Romanians, 30,386 Germans, 35,546 Magyars, and 529 other nationalities.*

2 Cit. A. Popovici, *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Gross-Oesterreich*, p. 110.

2.) D. L. Tokay in *Eladó Ország*, cit. V. Jinga, 'La Transylvanie économique et la these révisionniste hongroise', in *Revue de Transylvanie*, vol. i, no.. 3, Nov.—Dec. 1934, p. 314.

3.) Cit. Jinga, *loc. cit.*

5 *Hungarian Peace Negotiations*, vol. iii, pp. 108, III.

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development was already sufficiently far advanced to alarm Hungarian observers; and it was only in its beginnings.

It is necessary to stress the importance of this social struggle, for in its new phase it has, as we shall see, largely dominated the history of Transylvania since the War. Three of the cardinal factors in the whole Transylvanian situation for a century past, but particularly during the years immediately before and after the War, have been the immense arrears which the Romanians have had to make up in the social and economic field; their determination to do so; and the resentment which their efforts have aroused among the other nationalities.

This social struggle has deeply colored and at times dominated the more purely political movement, which began its modern phase a few years after Horia's revolt, when the Uniate bishops of Transylvania petitioned Leopold in the famous 'Supplex libellus Valachorum' for political and civil rights for their 'nation'. Interestingly enough, they justified this demand by their alleged historic priority, thus light-heartedly introducing into Transylvanian politics the horrid spectre of the 'Vlach controversy' which has haunted them ever since. The request was referred by Leopold to the Transylvanian Diet, which rejected it out of hand; but, from that day onward, the Romanian national movement grew steadily stronger, and, if we need not describe it here in detail, this is because it is so simple and clear-cut. A deep hostility to Magyar policy dominated it. Up to 1867 the Romanian principalities hardly counted as a factor in politics, the two protagonists being the Austrian Emperor and the Hungarian nation. The Romanians naturally supported the Emperor, and their demands were such as he might be expected to grant. Thus in 1848 they petitioned for recognition as a 'nation', proportionate representation in the Diet, and the extension to Transylvania of the Austrian Constitution. Disappointed in 1867, when Francis Joseph, in effect, handed them over to the mercies of Hungary, they were not at first sure of their course, and a party among them at first favored 'activism', i.e. collaboration with the Hungarian State. Soon, however, their experiences convinced them that this policy was futile. The activists, denounced as national renegades, soon dwindled away. Thereafter practically the entire Romanian population of Transylvania was in fundamental opposition, not merely to the ruling Magyar system, but to the Hungarian state. The only question was whether a solution could still be found within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, or whether it must be sought elsewhere. It was natural that so long as Austria-Hungary remained one of the world's Great Powers, while Romania was still a young, struggling, and none too reputable half-Balkan kingdom, the former solution

should count its convinced adherents. Most of the public demands made by the Romanian leaders were for some such solution. They varied from the restoration of Transylvanian autonomy, with political and national rights for the Romanians (the program drawn up by the national party in 1881), to the plan put forward by M. Popovici in 1906, in his famous book, for a federalization of 'Great-Austria' on national lines. In the last decade before the World War the hopes which the Romanians placed in Vienna were strengthened by the obvious sympathy with which the Archduke Francis Ferdinand regarded them. They saw in him a possible savior; and, that being so, it is true to say that 'in 1906, as in 1848 and 1892, the "Pan-Slavs" and "Daco-Romans" still looked to Vienna'.¹

This attitude was imposed on them, moreover, by the official policy of Romania herself. In the late sixties Romania had undoubtedly intrigued busily in Transylvania. Afterwards, however, King Charles adhered to the Triple Alliance, and all official activities directed against the integrity of her ally were naturally abandoned. Public opinion in Romania, however (led in part by émigrés from Transylvania), became increasingly conscious of the national unity of all Romanians and increasingly desirous of translating this into political union. The chief element of uncertainty was whether this should be accomplished within the Monarchy or outside it; there were parties both in Austria and in Romania itself prepared to attempt the former. In any case, it would involve the separation of Transylvania from Hungary and its union with the Principalities; and it is enough for our purpose to say that the great majority of Romanian opinion in both countries was at heart in favor of such a readjustment.

A word must be said on the other nationalities of Transylvania, unimportant as they are by comparison with the three protagonists. There are a few thousand Ruthenes in the far north, a few Slovaks, even fewer Bulgarian market-gardeners. There is a gypsy quarter in every town, gypsy fiddlers in every village; for Romania and Hungary are the classic lands of the gypsies.

'Now, in your land Gypsies reach you, only
 After reaching all lands beside...
 But with us, I believe they rise out of the ground,
 And nowhere else, I take it, are found
 With the earth-tint yet so freshly embrowned.'²

See K-rolyi, *Gegen eine ganze Welt*, p. 391, and Jászai, op. cit., p. 62. a Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians*, p. 432.

1.) Seton-Watson, *History of the Romanians*, p.459. See, however, the criticism of this book by Z. Szász in the *Nouvelle Revue de Hongrie*, Nov. '934., with quotations from Romanian public men boasting that their real and ultimate object was always irredentist.

2) I once tried to date and place 'The Flight of the Duchess' by tracking down the local allusions. Alas, these are so contradictory that no one solution fits them all, but I have no doubt that, generally speaking, Browning was thinking of Transylvania (which he never visited).

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The Jews, almost exactly as numerous as the gypsies (according to the figures, some 70,000 in each case) are far more localized. They have never penetrated the Saxon districts of the south, and are rare among the Székely. In each of the three northernmost departments there are some thousands, forming about 4 per cent. of the population in each case. Most of these are recent arrivals from Moldavia or Galicia, and Orthodox in tenets and garb. In the Department of Cluj there are some 15,000, mostly in the capital itself, and other colonies in the other Hungarian towns of the west. These are mainly neologs, and most of them had become completely and even enthusiastically Magyarized by 1918. In Alba Julia (Gyula Fehérvár, Karlsburg) there was a tiny colony of Karaites.

The Armenians, who played a large part in the commercial life of Transylvania in past centuries, and still exist in considerable numbers in a few centers (notably Some^o = Szamos Ujvár) had become completely Magyarized in all respects except their religion.

§ 4. THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF TRANSYLVANIA UP TO 1914

Economically, Transylvania is a land of considerable resources. It is less well adapted for extensive agriculture than the plains either of the Hungarian Alföld, or of Wallachia. The soil is, however, fertile in the valleys, and the ordinary peasant proprietor is able to maintain a higher standard of living than the average Slovak or inhabitant of the Western Balkans. The hills are well adapted for the pasturing of sheep and cattle. The forests, which cover 35 percent of the total area, constitute an important source of wealth. The mineral resources include gold and salt (both of which have been worked from early times), coal, iron, methane gas, and mercury.

We are concerned here, not with the economics of Transylvania as such, but rather with its place in relation to Hungary on the one hand and the Danubian Principalities on the other. Of this, it must be said that the relative ease of the communications to the west was largely neutralized by the very long distances to be traversed. The Saxon merchants, who enjoyed extensive privileges in medieval Hungary, traded, not without success, as far as Budapest, and even Vienna, but this trade was never a very important element in the national economy. The trade to the south-east, running via Wallachia to the ports of the lower Danube, has, on the other hand, always been considerable, from the days when Dacia purveyed abundant and excellent slaves for the Roman and Athenian markets, through the later age when the merchants of Kronstadt acquired the

See K-rolyi, *Gegen eine ganze Welt*, p. 391, and Jászi, op. cit., p. 62. a Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians*, p. 432.

choice collection of Turkey carpets which still adorns the interior of their beautiful Black Church, down to

modern times. The close traditional connection between the mountains of Southern Transylvania and the Wallachian plain is shown also by the frequent movements of population, both seasonal and more permanent. There is ample record in the past of big movements in either direction, affecting not only the Romanians but also the Székely: the population tending to retreat into the mountains when the plains were unsafe and to flow down again when conditions improved. The seasonal migration was also important, and again affected the Székely as well as the Romanians; many of the former regularly spent a part of the year beyond the Carpathians.

As a matter of fact, Transylvania, until recent times, when the growing population began to press on the means of subsistence, probably flourished best as an autarky. The days of its glory were the days of its independence, when its princes kept their court in Kolozsvár, and the city contained no less than twenty-three craftsmen's guilds. Its prosperity declined markedly when it came under direct Austrian rule and was treated, like the rest of Hungary, as a colony to receive Austria's products and supply her with raw materials. The Saxons, who were favored for national reasons by the Austrian officials and received a share of state and army contracts, retained a certain modest prosperity, but generally speaking the country was relatively far less prosperous in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries than in the sixteenth and seventeenth.

In the modern era, industry began to develop on a larger scale than previously. The forests were exploited extensively for timber. The coal-mines and methane gas deposits of the south were opened up, and certain industries, notably the woolen, made appreciable progress. At the same time, the railway system was developed, as usual, in such manner as to facilitate communications with Budapest. In 1867 Transylvania had not a single railway; but in the following decade the main lines were laid, passing chiefly through the Magyar and Saxon areas. Railway communications with Rumania remained scanty.

Nevertheless, the industrial development of Transylvania lagged far behind that of Northern and Western Hungary, and its turn had not come by 1914 for full incorporation in the planned autarkic Hungarian system. The importance which its eastern trade still retained is shown by the vigorous protests lodged by See K-rolyi, *Gegen eine ganze Welt*, p. 391, and Jászi, op. cit., p. 62. a Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians*, p. 432.

the Saxon towns against the tariff war waged from 1886 to 1892 between Hungary and Rumania in the interests of the Hungarian landed proprietors. Thus the position acquired in earlier centuries had not altered appreciably. Transylvania stood with one hand stretched out to Hungary, the other to Rumania; but her two feet were firmly planted on her own soil.

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§ 5. CRI^oANA, MARAMURE^a, AND THE BANAT IN THE PAST

Cri^oana and Maramure^o have a comparatively simple political history. During the partition of Hungary, the Princes of Transylvania persistently endeavored, often successfully, to enlarge their possessions to the west. Thus large parts of the areas under consideration, and even regions lying much farther to the west, were often attached to Transylvania as 'partes', and some of these were only restored to Hungary proper in the nineteenth century. It must, however, be remembered that in laying claim to these territories the Princes of Transylvania were always acting as Hungarians. Hungary's historic claim cannot be questioned.

The racial history is more controversial. During the first centuries after the arrival of the Magyars, the population of the plains seems, to judge by the place-names which have survived in documents, to have been overwhelmingly Magyar, with here and there a German town. The mountains were probably at this time almost uninhabited: they constituted the Great Forest beyond which Transylvania began. Gradually, however, they filled up, although the population was probably exceedingly sparse at first. Except for a few Ruthenes in the far north-east, on the extreme eastern limit of their national area, the Romanians had the entire mountain area practically to themselves. Thus, apart from the small Magyar or German colonies, they were sole occupants of both flanks of the chain of mountains which form the cross-bar of the Transylvanian D.

Then came the Turkish advance, the depopulation of the plain, the subsequent retreat and the influx into the recovered areas. The Magyars, who had remained in a majority on the plain of the Tisza, expanded eastward; the Ruthenes came down to meet them from the north, the Romanians from the east. The advancing floods met and mingled along a line which in the latter half of the eighteenth century (the first period, after the Turkish retirement, for which we have any reliable data) probably did not differ very greatly from the political frontier of to-day,' although it was not at all clearly marked. There were Magyar villages well to the east of this line, and there were certainly substantial Romanian and Ruthene populations far west of it.

To add to the confusion, certain Hungarian landlords settled large colonies of other nationalities on their estates. There was a big Slovak colony centering round Békéscsaba, and a German settlement, comprising no less than 32 communes, in the County of Szatmár, in and round Careii Mare (Nagy Károly), with smaller

1.) See E. Manciulea, 'La Frontière de la Roumanie à la lumière des édes statistiques hongroise' in *Revue de Transylvanie*, vol. ii, no.3, pp,344 ff.

German, Slovak, Czech, Armenian, &c., colonies. The large towns, such as Arad and Oradea, were chiefly German. There was the usual sprinkling of gypsies, and of Jews. The latter, comparatively few in the eighteenth century, multiplied vastly in the nineteenth in the Maramures and Szatmár districts, where conditions were (and are) very similar to those in Ruthenia, the local Jewish population being gaberlined, ringletted, Yiddish-speaking, and Orthodox, with a sprinkling of Chassidim. The present department of Maramures contained in 1931 33798 Jews (20.9 per cent.) of the total, and Szatmár 23,907 (8-i per cent.). Farther south, the towns contained important Jewish colonies, these being of the neolog and Magyarone type.

This position had probably not altered very substantially before 1869. The Magyar statistician Fényes calculated for the County of Szatmár, 76 purely Romanian communes, 112 purely Magyar, and 72 mixed; for Bihar, 318 Romanian, , 115 Magyar, 36 mixed; for Arad, 150 Romanian, 6 Magyar, 32 mixed.¹ This shows a compact Romanian mass in the bills, a Magyar mass in the west (part of which belongs today to Hungary), and a mixed race in the middle. After 1880 a change set in. First and foremost, the main towns, which Hungary designated for industrial, cultural, and national centers, expanded rapidly and became almost entirely Magyar, the German and Jewish populations easily surrendering their individuality.

In the country-side the progress achieved was far smaller, but still considerable, particularly among the Catholic population of the plains, and most notably of all among the Szatmár Germans, most of whom, while still remembering their Suabian origin, had become entirely Magyarized in speech.

The Uniate population of the plains was far more resistant. There can be no doubt that all or nearly all of the local Uniate and Orthodox populations were originally either Ruthene, Romanian, Serb, or gypsy, ² and the charge of it was divided between the Ruthene Uniate bishopric of Mukacevo and the Romanian Uniate bishopric of Oradea. Here, too, the local language gradually changed by what was probably an entirely natural process, since

1.) *Magyarország Geographiai Szótára*, cit. Manciualea, op. cit., pp. 345 if.

2.) The Hungarian delegation to the Peace Conference recalled that some Magyars had embraced the Greek faith when the nation was first converted to Christianity. This is true. Greek missionaries were active in Eastern Hungary in the tenth century, and it was a near thing whether the whole nation would not adopt the Byzantine creed. St. Stephen, however, opted for Rome and, although we have record of Orthodox monasteries, &c., existing even after this great event, it is extremely doubtful whether the claim put forward by the Peace Delegation (*Hungarian Peace Negotiations*, vol. i, p. '53) that the present Magyar Uniates and Orthodox are descendants of this ancient population could be substantiated historically.

See K-rolyi, *Gegen eine ganze Welt*, p. 391, and Jászi, op. cit., p. 62. a Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians*, p. 432.

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the influence of the Romanian priests at least must have been rather on the other side. There thus grew up a considerable Magyar speaking population. According to the Hungarian Peace Delegation¹ these 'Greek Orthodox Magyars' numbered 304,000, and the majority of them (991 per cent. in the County of Hajdu, 82.1 per cent. in Debreczen, 77.4 per cent. in the County of Szatmár, &c.) spoke no language except Magyar. In 1912 the Hungarian Government obtained from the Holy See permission to establish for this population a Greek Catholic Bishopric in Hajdudorog, with a Magyar Vicar-General and Magyar language of liturgy. 184,000 'Magyar Uniates', including some 12,000 from the Székely districts (where there existed also a small Magyar-speaking Orthodox and Uniate population), were transferred to the jurisdiction of this new see, with 32,000 Uniate Ruthenes or Romanians. The Romanians protested violently, even to the extent of sending an infernal machine to Hajdudorog by post, but Hungary was not deterred, and the activities of the new See, if the War had not interrupted them, would certainly have continued the Magyarization of the Uniate population of the plains.

One way and another, the lowland population of the Counties of Máramaros, Szatmár, and Bihar (round Arad the Romanian line ran farther out and into the plain, perhaps owing to the proximity of the Banat) were being very rapidly Magyarized, and even the non-Magyarized population contained many elements which were politically Magyarone, as the remaining Szatmár Suabians, and the Orthodox Jews of Máramaros and Szatmár.

The Magyar line ran also up \the chief valleys leading into Transylvania, but the population of the hills remained purely Romanian. It is, however, quite true that these Romanians had little connection, economic or spiritual, with their kinsfolk in Transylvania. National feeling was much weaker among them and, although they tagged after the national movement, they would never have initiated it.

Moreover, the chief economic connections of this area, mountain and plain alike, were with the west. In the north, conditions were much as we have described them in Ruthenia and Eastern Slovakia. There was the same timber industry, depending on the floating of logs down the rivers, the same seasonal migration to the plains. There was a similar seasonal movement from the Bihar mountains, while the inhabitants of the lowlands drove their swine up into the hills in winter to fatten on the acorns. The local life of the hills depended on the markets of the plains, and these again were intimately connected with the lowlands farther west, and with the general economic life of Hungary. They contained several large

1.) Hungarian Peace Negotiations, loc. cit.

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See K-rolyi, *Gegen eine ganze Welt*, p. 391, and Jászi, op. cit., p. 62.a Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians*, p. 432.

factories of great importance both for themselves and for Hungary at large: the asphalt works at Tataros, which supplied the needs of Budapest, the railway and carriage works at Arad, the mills of Satu Mare, the salt-mines of Sziget, and many others.

The history of the Banat is sketched in the section dealing with Yugoslavia, and need not be recapitulated here. Rumania's share consists of the mountainous hinterland (the frontier in the south running right through the foothills) and the north-eastern portion of the plain. She thus salvaged the majority of her own kinsfolk and also acquired, as the figures quoted above show, very substantial minorities. The mountains are chiefly Rumanian, with a few German and Magyar islands, and the Cra'ovan villages round Re'ipa. The Department of Timi'o-Torontal, on the other hand, contains in its population of 500,000, 180,000 Germans, over 70,000 Magyars, nearly 30,000 Serbs, and 30,000 'others', against little over 192,000 Romanians. In itself the Germans number 30,000, the Roumanians and Magyars close on 24,000 each, the Jews nearly 10,000.

The minorities, particularly the Germans, thus constituted a large and important part of the population: particularly as nearly all the local wealth was in their hands up to 1918. It is necessary to emphasize the very strong difference which then existed between the Suabians of the Banat and the Transylvanian Saxons. The Suabians were not pioneers, but late-comers to a land already inhabited, and with a long history behind it. They had no national 'privilege' to shelter them, and their religion—they are all Catholics—was different from that of the Saxons, but the same as that of the local Magyars. So long as the Banat preserved its separate status, the Suabians were, of course, in no danger of losing their national characteristics, and even up to 1918, not only Temesvár itself but much of the country-side was thoroughly German. A rapid change had, however, begun. The bourgeoisie and intellectuals were Magyarized with extraordinary speed and enthusiasm. It is credibly, and with relish, reported of one of their national leaders of to-day that shortly before the change of sovereignty he had declared in a public meeting that 'if, by opening his veins, he could let out every drop of accursed German blood, he would do so'. Thus the people had already lost its potential national leaders, and, if the peasants still kept their old tongue and customs, the rapid Magyarization of even the primary schools was beginning to affect them also.¹ Politically, they were as good Hungarians as any in

1.) In 1879/80 they had possessed in what is to day the Rumanian Banat, 106 purely German primary schools and 111 bilingual: by 1913/14 the bilingual schools had disappeared and the purely German had dwindled to 34.

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the country, and seem always to have allied themselves with the Magyar element against the Romanians and Serbs.

Like the Cri^oana, the Romanian Banat possessed a flourishing industry. The Re^oita iron and steelworks (which belonged to Viennese banks) were among the largest in the country, and Timi^ooara, one of the towns on which Hungary had lavished most attention, possessed a large variety of industries. All of the economic life of the Banat gravitated towards Budapest, on whose markets it depended and which, in return, had assigned it an important place in the national economy.

§ 6. THE UNION WITH ROUMANIA AND THE DETERMINATION OF THE FRONTIERS

We need not concern ourselves closely with the intrigues and agreements of the World War because, although numerous, they had little ultimate effect. Every one except Hungary seemed agreed that Transylvania must be the price of Romania's adherence to either side, but while the Central Powers were prevented from offering this by the stubborn refusal of the Hungarian Government, the Allies were able to buy her over at a perfectly scandalous price, which included Transylvania, the whole Banat, and a line in the west reaching far out into the Hungarian plain, to within a few miles of Szeged and Debreczen. The Treaty stipulated, however, that Romania should not conclude a separate peace, and this she did in January 1918, thus absolving the Allies in their own eyes of any legal obligation towards Romania. The get-out was a dirty one, but so was the deal.

Some of the Romanian leaders in Transylvania had sat on the fence during the War, and most of the troops had fought like dutiful cannon-fodder, but there is no doubt that the leaders were really only waiting their chance. Incidentally, events occurred during the War which raised the mutual national animosity to a very high pitch. When the imminent collapse of the Monarchy became apparent to all, the Romanians of Hungary constituted a National Council, first at Oradea (October 12th, 1918) then at Arad (October 27th), which claimed the right of self-determination. On November 10th, during the final collapse, this Council notified Budapest that it had taken over control in the twenty-three Counties of Hungary inhabited by the Romanians, and parts of three others. Count Károlyi recognized this Council as representing the Romanians of Hungary, and sent Jászi, his Minister of Nationalities, to negotiate with it. Romania subsequently claimed that by this action Hungary had recognized Transylvanian independence. The Hungarian Government denied this strenuously, and, in fact,

See Károlyi, *Gegen eine ganze Welt*, p. 391, and Jászi, *op. cit.*, p. 62. a Seton-Watson, *History of the Roumanians*, p. 432.

Jászi's whole aim was precisely to save the integrity of Hungary by concessions to the nationalities. The Roumanian leaders were, however, far more obdurate than any of the similar Councils with which he negotiated' and Maniu, who presided over the Roumanian Council, had a unanimous party behind him in demanding complete separation.¹

Meanwhile, Károlyi had on November 8th negotiated the Belgrade armistice (signed on November 13th) which provided an extraordinary line of military occupation, running along the upper valley of the Some~ (Szamos), then south-west via Bistri~a and Marosfalu to the Mure~, which it followed till that river's confluence with the Tisza. This line was purely military. It did not prejudice the final political settlement, and left the Hungarian administration in charge of the areas behind *it*. Moreover, it was clearly dictated by one interest only. General Franchet d'Espérey, who laid it down, cared nothing for Roumanians or Magyars, but he wished to ensure that General Mackensen's army, which was in Roumania, should not return to Germany as a fighting force. With the same object, France instigated Roumania to declare war again on the Central Powers (November 9th). At the same time, Serbian troops were authorized to occupy the entire Banat.

On December 1st a great meeting at Alba Julia proclaimed the union of all Roumanians in a single state. A number of resolutions called for a purely democratic régime, general suffrage, liberty of press, radical agrarian reform, and advanced social legislation. Article 3 of the resolutions laid down:

The National Assembly declares as fundamental principles of the Roumanian State the following:

- 1) Complete national liberty for all the peoples which inhabit Transylvania. Each people to educate, govern, and judge itself in its own language through the medium of persons from its own midst. Every people to have the right of legislative representation and of participation in the administration of the country in proportion to the number of the individuals of whom it is composed.
- 2) Equality and complete autonomous liberty for every denomination in the State.

The Assembly then established a 'Directing Council' composed of leading Transylvanian politicians, telegraphed to the King and Queen of Roumania announcing union with the Regat as an accomplished fact, and sent a deputation to Bucharest.

The Alba Julia meeting seems to have been a clear enough expression of the will of the Roumanians of Transylvania. Its

1. See Károlyi, *Gegen eine Welt*, p. 391, and Jászi, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

2. Seton-Watson, *History of the Romanians*, p. 432

representative character is not seriously questioned. Of the other nationalities, the Magyars seem to have been opposed, almost to a man, to the union with Romania. There was not even the bait of superior social conditions which attracted some peasants and workers to Austria and Czechoslovakia, while the old hatred between Magyar and Romanian played its part. The only Magyars who had any truck with the Romanians were the reactionaries who afterwards organized the White Army under their shelter.

The Saxons had formed a National Council of their own at the same time as the Romanians, but did no more at first than raise a civil guard, keep order in their own districts, and watch the situation. They saw, quite correctly, that they would be unable to influence the course of events, and as they have never thought very much about any one but themselves, their obvious course was to wait and see which way the cat would jump. They soon perceived that the animal in question was leaping eastwards' and their leaders favored joining Romania at once, on the best terms obtainable. In private negotiation, the Romanians promised them complete national autonomy, with minority rights where they formed 20 per cent, of the population. On the strength of this they decided, by a majority, to join Romania, but a delay was caused by their very prudent desire to get the promises put into writing. The Romanian leaders put them off with vague words, and at last said that the Alba Julia Resolutions were so generous as to make further promises unnecessary. On January 21st, 1919, the Saxons accordingly voted for union with Romania on the basis of the Alba Julia Resolutions.

No other group of the population seems to have expressed an opinion. The Suabians of the Banat, as we have said, also waited to see how the situation would develop, being, in fact, not at all anxious to leave Hungary, but unwilling to antagonize their new masters, whoever those should prove to be. The Romanian Delegation to the Peace Conference produced a manifesto from the Suabians to say that if there must be any change, they would prefer the Romanians to the Serbs. The sentiment does not sound enthusiastic, and I am informed that the manifesto was not authoritative (although it may well have expressed popular opinion).

In terms of voting, then, one may say that the Romanian population (roughly 55 per cent. of the total) was actively in favor of the union; the Magyars (25 per cent.) actively against, while the remaining 20 per cent. was unwilling to commit itself either way, although given a straight plebiscite under normal conditions the majority would probably have voted for Hungary, giving to Romania roughly 60 per cent. of the total votes.

1. It is said that one of their leaders was shown the draft peace terms in Paris

Meanwhile, Romanian troops from the Regat had entered Transylvania. In the middle of December, alleging danger to the lives and properties of Romanians west of the demarcation line, they crossed it in several places, and presently obtained from Paris permission to occupy the line Satu Mare, Careii Mare, Oradea Mare, Békéscsaba, while French troops occupied the Bánát, to avert conflicts between Romanians and Serbs. The Romanians were thus in occupation of the territory subsequently allotted them when their frontiers were being discussed in Paris and had, indeed, already installed their administration there. Afterwards, as is well known, they occupied Budapest and indeed, practically all Hungary.

The details of these movements can, however, be passed over here, and so can the minutiae of the negotiations in Paris, for the reason that they had little effect on the final settlement. M. Bratianü began by claiming the entire territory as far as the Tisza, on the grounds both of the Treaty of 1916, and of ethnography. He renounced only the Debreczen area. In the territory claimed (excluding the Bánát) there were, he said, 1,000,000 Magyars and 2,500,000 Romanians, according to Hungarian figures; but in reality, 2,900,000 Romanians and 687,000 Magyars, besides 'a race related to the Hungarians' near the Moldavian frontier numbering 450,000 and 260,000 Saxons.'

M. Bratianü, however, was not so persuasive as M. Benes. Indeed, his personal unpopularity was so intense as seriously to prejudice the cause of his nation. Mr. Lloyd George declared that the 1916 Treaty no longer held, and emphasized that the Powers were impartial in the Hungarian-Romanian question. The matter was referred to a Committee, whose line was subsequently adopted. It was based broadly on ethnography, but gave Romania the main line of communications running north-west to south-east through Szatmár and Arad, in order to allow her access to her northwestern territories. It was admitted that this involved a certain sacrifice of the strict ethnographic principle, since a truer ethnographic line 'might in perhaps some cases have been 20 kilometers east'. M. Tardieu, reporter to the Committee, admitted that about 600,000 Magyars would be left in Romania, against 25,000 Romanians in Hungary.³ But to move the line would have cut the communications, and if the frontier suggested favored Romania unduly, any other possible line would have been 'all in favor of the Hungarians and correspondingly to the detriment of the Romanians'.

1. Hunter Miller, *Diary*, vol. xiv, pp. 168 if.

2. *Ibid.*, vol. xvi, pp. 225—6.

3. This seems a remarkable understatement, but the reference is presumably to the Magyar population of the western fringe only.

This decision was early taken. The arguments of M. Bratianü had little effect on it. Hungary was, of course, not consulted at the time, and when Bela Kun started an offensive against the Romanians in the spring of **1919**, the only effect was to frighten the Allies into announcing on June 13th that the frontier had been in substance already fixed. The protests of the Hungarian Delegation, when it arrived at last in Trianon, were thus mere wasted breath.

The frontier in the Bánát was an issue which lay rather between Romania and Yugoslavia than between Romania and Hungary, and is discussed elsewhere.'

§ 7. THE ROUMANIAN QUESTION SINCE 1918

The political development of Transylvania has proved, in one great respect, very much simpler than that of Slovakia. There has been no question of carefully nursing (perhaps, even, of delivering) the national consciousness of the local majority. The relations between the Transylvanian Romanians and the State have been strained, but never to the point of affecting the real and deep solidarity of the Romanian people. They have been, as it were, a violent toothache, causing intense exasperation and misery, but not a cancer threatening the life of the body politic.

This has proved a deep disappointment to the minorities, particularly the Magyars, who had been fond of stressing the considerable historical, cultural, and moral differences which existed in 1918 between the Romanians of Transylvania and those of the Regat. They had believed that these differences were fundamental and would soon reassert themselves, once the first intoxication had passed over. The Transylvanians would then come to feel that they had more in common with the Magyars and Saxons whose destinies they had shared for so long than with the Balkanized and Phanariot 'Regatler', and if not actually wishing to reverse their decision of 1918, they would at least combine with their fellow Transylvanians to set up a state which may be linked almost as closely with Hungary as with Romania.

According to the official Romanian thesis, of course, the truth lay in just the other direction. They admitted the existence of local differences, but held them to be superficial and fugitive compared with the underlying unity of race, character and, in its broadest sense, culture. The whole movement of the future, they said, would be towards strengthening this unity; local differences would vanish, and if any regional feeling continued to exist, it would stop far short of separatism.

There can be no doubt whatever that on this issue, which is

1. See below, p.355.

It is said that one of their leaders was shown the draft peace terms in Paris.

clearly one of the first importance, the Romanian prophets proved the wiser. The distinctions on which Hungary based such high hopes proved not to be fundamental, nor even to go very deep. The reason is quite simple. The culture of Transylvania up to 1918 was Magyar and Saxon. The deposed Wallach had had no hand in creating it and was not even willingly admitted to the enjoyment of it. In modern times, the Romanians had naturally emerged to some extent from their former isolation. Their small bourgeois class, and even those of their peasants who had penetrated into the old strongholds of the other nationalities, had adopted some of their ways. But they were always told, brutally enough, that they were simply enjoying what others had created, and they themselves probably felt that they were simply wearing borrowed plumes. They themselves possessed absolutely no indigenous, specifically Transylvanian, higher culture.

This statement needs qualification in one respect only. The Uniate Church was a genuine Transylvanian Romanian specialty. But as a bridge between the local Romanians and the west, a gate between them and the east, it proved a failure. The population never took kindly to it in their secret hearts. They seem to have sniffed the political purpose which lay behind its creation. Although the clergy had accepted the union, when it was first introduced, almost to a man (naturally enough, since they gained considerably thereby), yet nearly a century later, when Joseph II proclaimed his Edict of Toleration, the people celebrated it (quite contrary to the intentions of its author) by returning in masses to the Orthodox fold. And in spite of every persuasion, in 1910 the adherents of the Orthodox creed were nearly twice as numerous in Transylvania and the Bánát as the Uniates.

Politically, the Romanian Uniate clergy, in sharp distinction to the Ruthene, remained nationalist; the best proof is that many of the War-time measures taken by the Hungarian Government were directed quite impartially against the two Churches.' Since the War, Orthodox and Uniate have had their differences, which have at times been acute, but they have not affected the common solidarity against the non-Romanians. No member of a minority whom I have questioned on the subject has drawn any distinction between the attitude of the two hierarchies in national-political questions.

Thus the spiritual life of the people remained purely Romanian. Such westernization as could be found at all was chiefly in the habits of the bourgeoisie, among whom even to-day one may detect certain characteristics which differentiate them somewhat from the Regatler: more solidity and less ornament; more of the German aura, less of the Latin and Oriental.

1. Cf. Seton-Watson, *History of the Romanians*, p. 523.

But the bourgeoisie were, after all, only a small minority. As regards the peasants, who form the great mass of the Romanian population in Transylvania and the Regat alike, there is practically no difference to be remarked on the two slopes of the Carpathians. The physical type is the same, the architecture of the houses, the costume, pottery, and peasant arts, the customs, folk-songs, and way of living; also, so far as I could judge, the character. The dialectical differences are small. All these things are, indeed, remarkably homogeneous throughout Transylvania. Such contrasts as exist are rather between the mountaineers as a whole and the people of the plain, who are strongly mixed with Slavonic and Turkish elements.'

Even among the bourgeoisie, such differences as did exist vanished with unexpected rapidity after 1918—not altogether to the general advantage. The Regat and Transylvania have exercised a mutual influence, but that of the Regat, which is in many ways the less admirable, has proved the stronger. The great boast of the older generation of Transylvanian politicians was their incorruptibility. The old guard can still pride itself on its purity, but the new generation cannot. The financial political scandals which are all too characteristic of Romanian political life are now no longer a Regat specialty. They are one sign (not a happy one) of the rapid development throughout Rumania of a singularly homogeneous national character.

Who can say how different things might have been if the past policy of the masters of Transylvania had been more generous? Perhaps careful and plentiful dieting, instead of a few crumbs dropped from the table, might have produced a new breed. But the time for this has gone by. The political development has followed the same lines. Not that Hungary's prophecies of discord between Transylvania and the Regat have proved entirely unfounded; but that discord has never led to any disagreement on fundamental national questions, and even the desire for regional autonomy seems to be growing less. The development of the parties had been interesting. In the first years after the War, the Transylvanian Romanians combined quite solidly in the old National Party which had tried to defend their interests in Hungary. The astonishing degree of unity which they achieved was facilitated by the small degree of social differentiation among them, and forced upon them by their need to defend themselves, not against the Regat, but against the minorities in Transylvania, who

1. There are also certain variations in costume, &c., between the Wallachians and South Transylvanians on the one hand, and the Moldavians, Bukovinians, and North Transylvanians on the other. The latter group seems to have much in common with the Hutzuls; but whether Hutzul has influenced Vlach or vice versa, I could not say.

were numerically only a little weaker than they, and socially and economically far stronger. The party was federalist second, but nationalist first. As a matter of fact, it entered the Government in 1919, in coalition with the Peasant Party of the Regat.

Unfortunately, although this Government was popular at home and abroad, it held office only for three months, after which the King appointed General Averescu Premier. Under Averescu and the Liberal Premiers who succeeded him, a policy of rigid centralization was introduced. The National Councils of Transylvania, Bessarabia, and the Bukovina were dissolved, and the whole country divided into Departments, under Prefects appointed directly from Bucharest. The situation which now arose was something like that which we have described in Slovakia, with similar causes and similar effects. The special wishes and susceptibilities of the Transylvanians were disregarded. Officials from the Regat, mostly camp-followers of the Liberal Party and not always circumspect or admirable in their ways, filled the Government posts; Transylvania was forced to bear the brunt of the national taxation, while financial cliques in Bucharest monopolized the pickings.

The Transylvanians denounced all these abuses with an acerbity which seemed to justify every prophecy of Budapest. They have never been reconciled to many aspects of Liberal policy, particularly to its extreme centralism, and in fact, when they at last returned to power in 1928, they introduced a large measure of decentralization, remodeling Romania into seven large Directorates, based on the historic units, and each enjoying wide local autonomy. All the time, however, things had been changing. The party divisions of the immediate post-War period, with their historic and regional bases, had been breaking up. The Liberals introduced their party organization into Transylvania, and the National Party itself fused in 1926 with the Peasant Party of the Regat. The two wings retained something of their distinct characters; nevertheless, this was a very important sign that the country was feeling its way back to the two-party system, based on social and economic interests, which Romania had striven on the whole with success to maintain before the War. Broadly speaking, **it** has now returned to that position. There is a multiplicity of minor groups, but the great voting mass of the country is divided between the Liberals and the National Peasants, and these are tending more and more to represent social rather than regional interests. It is true that the former still regard the Regat, and the latter Transylvania, as their strongholds, but each has many adherents in the other's camp, and the National Peasants, which are no longer a regional party, certainly cannot be said to

be specifically decentralist. They still officially advocate devolution, but have taken no steps to reintroduce it since their reform of 1928 was cancelled by the Government which succeeded them. Their first interest to-day lies elsewhere.'

There remains a small Old Guard of very violent regionalists, their leader being M. Boila, Dr. Maniu's nephew. On the other hand, the newer political parties which have pullulated in recent years seem quite to have outgrown such feelings. The Communists (who exist secretly) stand for the equality of all nationalities in all parts of Romania. The other groups, which between them command the allegiance of most of the Romanian youth, are all 'Fascist' in one form or another. They are all intensely nationalist, and although some of them favor decentralization for purely administrative reasons, not one of them seems to make, or indeed to feel, any distinction between one brand of Romanian and another. Whether their 'Leaders' are from Transylvania or from the Regat (and there are some from each) seems to mean no more to their followers than it would matter to an Englishman whether his chosen leader came from Devonshire or Essex. Among the intellectuals of Romania, the true line of cleavage is not regional, but one between the new generation and the old. The young men, all over the country, are struggling to form a new Romania, more national, more united than the old. Moreover, some of the previous causes of dissatisfaction are disappearing; not that the Regat has greatly altered its ways, but that the Transylvanians have shown themselves able to counter-attack. If there are still many officials from the Regat in Transylvania, the Transylvanians are now beginning to fill the posts in the Regat. I have heard no complaints of unfair discrimination against them. Transylvanians are beginning, too, to take their full share in the business life of Bucharest. As time goes on, they will doubtless play a larger part still.

Other grievances remain: most notably, the marked decline in the general standards both of technical efficiency and of honesty in the administration. For there is no doubt that in these respects the annexation has meant a distinct change for the worse; and the older generation remembers and regrets the higher standards that used to prevail. The younger men, however, take the present state of things for granted, or if they revolt against it, their reaction takes the form of an increased nationalism, since, quite mistakenly, they delude themselves into the belief that the foreigner (usually the Jew) is to blame for any scandal which may arise.

1. In the foregoing account I deliberately abstain from giving any electoral figures in support of my statements, since the Romanian electoral practices are such as to deprive such statistics of any meaning.

In all this there is little room for any irredentist feeling; and it will not probably be disputed by any observer acquainted with the facts that feeling in favor of a return to Hungary is as good as non-existent among the Romanians of Transylvania. I remember one politician of the old school who regaled me in private with anecdotes of the Regat with which I may not, alas! sully these pages, but declared with unmistakable sincerity that 'better the most miserable Regat cesspool than to come again under the heel of a Bethlen or an Apponyi!' This would certainly be the general feeling among all classes of Romanians; the Magyars themselves hardly dispute it to-day.

Nor have I been able to find any greater sympathy in Romanian circles for the alternative plan now popular among many Magyars, both in Transylvania and in Hungary, for an independent Transylvania. Whatever their differences among themselves, Regatlers and Transylvanians make common cause against Hungary. The members of the minorities whom I have questioned whether a political feeling of 'Transylvanian solidarity' exists have invariably admitted, frankly and ruefully, that they can find no trace of it. Most of them, indeed, have said that the Regatlers on the whole respect the liberties of the minorities better than the Transylvanians. True, it was the National Party which adopted the statesmanlike Alba Julia Resolutions, and the Regatler who refused to ratify them; but things have changed since then. I have talked with many members of every possible minority on their experiences at the hands of Transylvanian and Regat Romanians respectively, and the answer has, more often than not, been more favorable to the latter. The Transylvanians used to be praised as more honest; they have certain familiar ways, understand local feelings and problems better—'But,' many have said, 'by that very fact, they understand better how to find the joints in our armor.' Dr. Maniu himself has always been popular with the minorities, who hoped great things of his term of office as Premier, but they complained at its close that they had been disappointed, although still conceding that his comparatively negative record was not all his fault. The two Romanian Premiers since the War of whom I have heard most praise from the minorities are Professor Jorga and M. Duca, who paid for his principles with his life.

§ 8. ROUMANIAN MINORITY POLICY

The national problem in Transylvania has thus been relieved of one of the great complexities which burden the situation in Slovakia. The further situation is the same in its essential elements as the Slovak. Like the Czechoslovaks, the Romanians have a

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purely national conception of their State—termed in their Constitution the ‘unitary national Romanian State’. Their problem, as M. Maniu put it in a speech soon after the Armistice, is to ‘Romanize Transylvania’—that is, to secure for the Romanian element a position of unquestioned superiority. And, as in Slovakia, the political enemy in chief consists of the Magyar minority, whose power, influence, and numbers must be weakened by all possible means.

The Romanians have, rightly enough, never considered that they had any serious chance of conciliating the Magyars—and it is worth noting, also, that unlike the Czechs, they have not even thought it worth while to attempt to detach from them any particular social element, such as the workers or the peasants. Their chief attacks have, of course, been directed against the politically active classes, and they have even allowed the Magyar peasants a share in the benefits of the agrarian reform; but generally, speaking, they have regarded the Magyar minority as an irreconcilable enemy, towards which no other policy is possible than one of restraint, if not repression.

Not so the non Magyar minorities, to whom Romania, like Czechoslovakia, has adopted a liberal enough cultural policy, with the object, of course, of detaching them from the Magyar cause, but aiming rather at dissolving the Magyar and Magyarized bloc into its component elements than at simply substituting Romanization for Magyarization. In choosing this policy she has been guided, no doubt, by a sage realization that the suddenly awakened national feeling of the smaller minorities was a force which could not be ignored, and that the attempt to repress it would only defeat its own ends. In any case, however, national distinction between Romanian and non-Romanian is very clearly marked, not only by language, but by religion also. Creed, in Transylvania, is a national mark as distinctive and by tradition almost as immutable as color might be, and there is in the eyes of every one something unnatural about a person whose language or other national attributes are at variance with the creed with which those attributes are usually identified. The Romanian churches and Romanian public opinion accept as an unalterable natural phenomenon the non-Romanian character of the Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish population. Moreover, the very idea of the feasibility—even the desirability—of assimilation is somewhat foreign to the Romanian mind, especially to the Regat. It is essentially a Central European conception, which was born in Germany and developed to its highest point, perhaps, in Hungary. Romania, with her lingering Oriental tradition, has never been equally affected by it.

In general, then, Romania has sought to recover for herself only that proportion of the population which she claims, either on the evidence of surnames (still Romanian or recently Magyarized) or of religion (in the case of Magyar-speaking adherents of the Orthodox or Uniate churches) to be Magyarized Romanians. It is true that, as the views of the local politico-savants on their national past are something really grotesque, the share which she has claimed on these grounds is inordinately large. This applies not only to the case of families which, even if their Romanian origin is indisputable, have yet been Magyarized for generations past so that 're-Romanization' is now a real act of violence. Still more it applies to the campaign which has recently been opened against the Székely. To enter the Székely in the census and other official lists as a separate nationality is perhaps defensible, so long as the outer world is not deceived as to the true nature of their national feeling. Some Romanian scientists, however, not content with arguing that there must be Romanian blood among the Székely—who have lived for centuries as an island in a Romanian sea, and must, to some extent, have intermarried with Romanians in the past'—now seek to ascribe to them a purely Romanian origin.² The only law yet passed on the Romanization of names is comparatively mild. As originally brought forward by its author (in 1934) it provided that all alterations of names which had occurred in the last ninety years should be cancelled. The Government, however, allowed the persons concerned to appeal against the decision. In practice, both census officials and educational authorities have been far more arbitrary, often constructing the most grotesque etymologies to prove that a Magyar name was originally Romanian. The whole question is, however, somewhat less important in Romania than in the Slav districts, owing

1. These mixed marriages have, however, not been frequent in modern times. In 1909—12 in historic Transylvania, only 1,059 out of 34,407 Magyar bride-grooms married Romanian brides, and only 990 out of 34,642 Magyar brides married Romanians. The proportion was lower still in the Székely Counties, where it did not amount to o~ per cent. of the total number of marriages. It may well be that intercourse was less restricted centuries ago; but this cannot be proved.

2 The zeal with which this campaign is prosecuted is due to a very unfortunate circumstance. The suggestion was negligently thrown out a few years ago by Professor Jorga, the Grand Old Man of Romanian learning. Now Professor Jorga is perhaps the most voluminous writer now living, certainly easily the most voluminous historian. He is also possessed of a singularly fertile and errant imagination, and there is practically no conceivable hypothesis connected with the obscure past of Eastern Europe with which he has not toyed, often to lay it aside in his next volume. As, however, he possesses immense authority, his lightest *obiter dicta*, which coming from any other writer would be scattered like dry leaves, bore their way into Romanian politics like armor-piercing shells; and it is now an article of faith among many Romanians that the Székely are lost sheep from the Romanian fold.

It is said that one of their leaders was shown the draft peace terms in Paris.

to the fact that the Romanians had Magyarized much less extensively. In any case Romania, as we said, has aimed, at least nominally, solely at 'Re-Romanizing', not at Romanizing nominally non-Romanian material.

Among the Germans and Jews are no Romanized elements of any importance. Instead, therefore, of seeking to Romanize them, Romania has adopted the wiser and certainly more successful policy of encouraging their own national cultures; since the gains which they may record are solely at the expense of the Magyars. Her purely cultural policy towards these nationalities has been very liberal. The praise to be accorded to it must be qualified only by the fact that it is negative rather than positive, and the liberality is moral and not material. The nationalities, that is, are dissuaded from being Magyars and encouraged to be Germans or Jews; but they have had to pay for themselves, since the material resources of the State have been devoted in overwhelming proportion to developing Romanian education; this being done on the plea that the Romanian nation was in the past the poorest and the most neglected and has the farthest leeway to make up.

This brings us to the second aspect of the national problem in Transylvania, which is, in some ways, even more important than the first: the social and economic aspect. We have seen how, thanks to its very peculiar past history, the social stratification of Transylvania coincided closely with its national divisions. In a sentence, the Romanians formed the national proletariat, and now that they have the power of the State behind them, they are bent on creating for themselves a national middle and upper class— an ambition which can be achieved only, or most easily, at the expense of the Magyar, German, and Jewish national aristocracy and bourgeoisie. The history of Transylvania since **1918** has consisted very largely of the efforts to carry through what amounts to a complete social revolution on national lines; and the struggle has been a very bitter one. It has, indeed, been conducted in more or less legal forms, since the proletariat has been in a position to lay down the law (whether the laws have been either equitable or compatible with Romania's international obligations is another question), but it has often been very intense—not less so, we may be sure, because of its dual character. The acres of the Magyar Council or the Saxon Chapter, the director's fees of the Jewish banker, the magistrate's or panel doctor's or railway porter's job are prizes desirable enough, in any case, to eyes grown sore and belts grown slack with long waiting; bow much more desirable when the acquisition of them can be hallowed by the name of national policy!

Under this assault the minorities have suffered simply in proportion to what they had to contribute. Political considerations have, indeed, intervened to some small extent; thus where there has been a question of sparing Germans or Magyars, the Germans have usually received the benefit of the doubt. Essentially, however, the aim has been to take what the minorities had to give, and none which stood between the Romanians and their desired goal has been spared. The most vigorous assault of all has, indeed, been made not against the Magyars but against the Jews—in consequence of the influence of the Regat Romanians, who cherish no particular animosity against the Magyars, but have for decades been at loggerheads with their own Jewish population.

In her treatment of the national problem, and, indeed, in her whole policy, and above all, in the execution of it, Romania has proved herself much less 'western' in her methods than Czechoslovakia. The influence of the Regat has been dismally apparent. Not, indeed, that the Regatlers have been, on the whole, more hostile to the minorities (except the Jews) than have the Transylvanian Romanians. As we said, the idea of assimilation is perhaps less natural to them. But the Regat has, unhappily, preserved other traditions of its Turkish and Phanariot past besides that of national indifference. While in Czechoslovakia or in Austria, even where individual measures are oppressive, the whole picture is always lightened by a general atmosphere of western methods, so in Romania everything is darkened by the shadow of Levantinism—as when a photograph, which may be good in itself, is taken on a bad negative, dirtily developed, and smudgily printed. The heaviest burden on all the nationalities of Transylvania (the Romanians themselves not excepted) is not imposed by the laws' themselves. Like all Latin and Latinized races, Romanians excel in enacting the most idealistic general measures, which they can roll on their tongues when quoting them in Geneva as a true picture of the general situation. Their laws are usually better than the Czech, infinitely better than the British. But while the Briton does not usually enact a law unless he means to keep it in the letter and the spirit, and the Czech unless, while evading its spirit, he can yet prove that he has kept its letter, to the Romanian the law and its execution stand in no discernible relationship. 'The Romanians', said a Saxon to me mournfully, 'have no legal sense (*Rechtsgefühl*) whatever,' adding, since he was a just man, that the Magyars had too much. But he was right. There reigns among the Romanian officials and politicians (who are all too intimately connected) a contempt for their own laws which is positively startling. From the Prefect to the Gendarme, the official does in practice exactly what he likes.

It is an everyday occurrence for some local despot to inflict upon his subjects some perfectly arbitrary decree or prohibition which is in flat contradiction to the express law of his country. And his victims are at his mercy. Redress can occasionally be obtained from the Courts, but these are so overburdened that it may take years before the order comes for some quite illegal measure to be cancelled; and years more, or eternity, before the order can be reversed. In such cases there is no practical way out but bribery.

To be fair, this very lawlessness has its silver lining. If the good laws are often not enforced, neither are the bad ones, for while the general measures are nearly all good, the enacting legislation is sometimes almost comically unjust. In particular, bribery can secure a very great deal. 'The corruption of the Romanians', said an old Jew to me, cynically, 'is our Geneva.' Moreover, the average Romanian is an easy-going fellow. He is not brutal by nature; he does not even require very heavy bribing. It is astonishing what a long way a few lei will go. Even unbribed, he will often waive the strict application of some burdensome regulation, especially if it would cause him trouble to enforce. He lacks altogether the iron tenacity and national purposefulness of the Czech, or the brutal forcefulness of the Serb. Give him enough to live on, let a dash of eye-wash be added, and no actual trouble, and he is content for people to go their own way. One is often struck in Transylvania by the cynical and good-natured way in which local Romanians refer, for example, to rabid Magyar nationalists in their midst. It is largely slackness, but the fact remains that in some respects, at least during the first years after the War, life was more tolerable for the minorities in Transylvania than in the far better conducted Slovakia.

It is interesting and symptomatic that the younger generation of Romanian nationalists are in open revolt against this very tolerance. 'The minorities', they are fond of saying, 'are much too well off with us. They snap their fingers at their laws, and do in practice exactly what they please.' The growing desire for national regeneration in Romania, for more legality and less corruption, thus works in, most unhappily, with the increasing anti-minority feeling and brings much evil out of what is in itself largely an idealistic movement.

The growth of this anti-minority movement, particularly of anti-Semitism, has been very marked in recent years. Things have become in every way worse since about 1931 or 1932. One may argue about the reason and indeed I have heard many different causes adduced. Many say that during the first years after the War, Romania never really believed that she could keep

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Transylvania, and was reluctant either to provoke later reprisals or to create a situation the inevitable reversal of which would leave its beneficiaries in a worse position than before. Others lay the blame on the Rothermere campaign. My own belief, which is shared by many, is that the change is due to the appearance on the scene of the young Romanian 'intellectual' class, which hardly existed before the War, and is now being turned out by the thousand from the High schools. The peasant has his own economic situation, which is humble but comparatively secure, and he is little interested in national politics. Even to-day the Transylvanian peasant is quite tolerant towards other nationalities, including the *Jews*. Not so the young students, nurtured on an intellectual pap which consists very largely of national self-gratification, and then thrown on the world without an assured future, never taught the harder lesson that places in the sun can be created by honest work, and always the easier one, that they are the original and rightful owners of Transylvania, whose fruits would fall into their laps if they were not filched by a gang of Jacobs. The influence of this new element is growing stronger, almost month by month. Many concessions have been made to it; others will certainly follow. Thus, unfortunately, any sketch of the minority situation, even if true when written, will probably prove too rosy by the time it is read.¹

1. Startling examples of the lengths to which this agitation now goes are to be found in certain articles which appeared in the Romanian press in the autumn of 1936, threatening the Magyar minority with a 'Saint Bartholomew's night' if the campaign for revision continued. One article, passed and stamped by the censor, ran as follows (translation from the *Danubian Review*, December 1936):

'While the Hungarian revisionist jackals contented themselves with howling at the moon, the Rumanians were content to spit in contempt. But to day this concert of many curs has been joined by one whom, until now, we had considered as our brother.

'While the jackals howl, Mussolini increases their appetite by playing the barrel organ. Mussolini has become a revisionist, but only an opportunist revisionist. Otherwise he would have started his revision at home. Budapest will strike on the face of Mussolini that match which is to set Europe on fire and Mussolini may then kiss with his full force the prominent posterior which Hungary will then turn towards him.

'The howling jackals of the plains who turn their muzzles towards us may know that we shall nevermore be their serfs, that we shall nevermore populate their prisons. The worms may draw marrow from their bones and the spirits may make soap from the rotten fat of these fools of the plains.

'God help the Hungarians on that day when the Rumanians consent to revision; because they will kick up the frontiers with the points of their boots and will wipe from the face of the earth that dirt which a fly blew unto the map of Europe and which vitiates the air.

'We shall sit down in the Royal Palace of Budapest and stay there.

'The many curs of the plain may know. The Rumanians are not intimidated by Mussolini's barrel organ or by anything else. The Hungarians will get their land, not for the purpose of ruling over it but to be buried in it.

'Let the Hungarian packs of the plains know that the Transylvanian Rumanians will delay the crossing of the Tisza by one night, by a St. Bartholomew night, in which they will extirpate every single Hungarian.'

In this book I have as a rule refrained from pillorying the extreme brutalities and vulgarities of any national press. I make an exception here, reluctantly, partly because the articles aroused such a sensation, partly also because they are, unfortunately, typical of the language in which many young pseudo-educated Romanians are beginning to indulge.

§9. THE MINORITIES: POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONDITIONS

No Romanian Government has considered giving any minority an effective share of political power. During the first few months the Transylvanian Romanian 'Directing Council', backed by the Regat troops, exercised a national dictatorship, leaving the Saxons, within limits, to manage their own affairs, but keeping a tight hold over the Magyars. The Parliamentary system was then introduced, but with a single Parliament in Bucharest, in which the Romanian parties have always formed an overwhelming majority. The unitary and national character of the State is emphasized by the Constitution, which also states specifically that minorities, as such, are not recognized as forming corporate bodies. They are, however, permitted to form associations, and Romania, like Czechoslovakia but unlike Yugoslavia since 1929, has allowed the minorities to form political parties on a national basis. All the chief minorities have done so. The Germans led the way, simply carrying on with their old organization from Hungarian days. The Magyars, with few exceptions, refused to recognize the existence of enlarged Romania until after Hungary had ratified the Treaty of Trianon. They then formed two parties, which in 1922 fused into a single body, the 'Magyar National Party'. The Jews followed suit some years later; even the Serbs founded a tiny party in 1932.

The Magyars suffered considerable obstruction, intimidation, and even violence in the early years. At the first elections, for example, 30 of the 33 candidates, which they put up, were disqualified and only one elected. Their claim to represent the Moldavian Csángós has also been consistently rejected. Apart from this, the minority parties have enjoyed a reasonable degree of freedom, measured by local standards, in drawing up their programs, establishing their organization, and conducting their propaganda.' The surveillance exercised over them by the political police has probably been no stricter than that from which the Romanian opposition parties have suffered (and far less effective, owing to the inability of the honest Romanian gendarmes to understand what the Magyars are talking about). In elections, they have usually held their own and returned to both Chambers in Bucharest a certain number of representatives, partly because the Germans always, the other parties occasionally, have formed cartels with the Romanian parties before the

1. The dissolution of the German National Socialist Party in '934 was certainly not disagreeable to the other Germans, and the party was allowed to reconstitute itself soon after, with very mild modifications of its published aims. Certain elections, notably in 1931, have also been cynically unfair, but not to the minority's parties alone.

elections. These arrangements, however, have related to elections only, and no minority party has ever been represented in the Government.' It is worth noting that the minorities only once (in 1927) formed a cartel between themselves. The constituencies are not 'weighted' against the minorities, although the system (lists by Departments) is unfavorable to the scattered Germans and Jews. It is favorable enough to the Magyars, with their solid blocs of population.

The meager representation which the centralized Parliamentary system allows them is naturally regretted by the minorities, and all of them wish for decentralization, which would give them proportionately a much larger voice in affairs. What weighs on them more heavily still is the curtailment of their rights and powers in local government. Under the Romanian system the old autonomy of the County (Departmental) and Municipal Councils has, in any case, been very largely reduced, since the real power in the Departments rests in the hands of the Prefects, who are appointed by the Government and are, without exception, Romanians. The burgomasters of the larger towns with 'municipal rights' are also Government nominees, while the Prefects appoint the notaries who, in practice, are the autocrats of the villages. I have been in villages where the entire population belonged solidly to one single minority, except the notary, his clerk, and the gendarme. In others, these three lonely Romanian officials are reinforced by the Romanian teacher of a State school (whose pupils all belong to minorities) and the Orthodox priest of a church without a congregation.

The elected Councils are also reinforced by nominated members who, again, are nearly always Romanian. In Sighisoara, for example, the municipal elections of 1934 gave 14 elected members to the Saxons and 14 to the combined Romanian-Magyar list. There were 9 nominated members; 8 of these were Romanians, and 1 a Saxon. On top of this, Transylvania has passed much of its time since the War under a species of martial law, during which the elected Councils have been suspended and local affairs have been conducted by so-called 'Interim Commissions', nominated by the Government, which has always ensured a Romanian majority. In the Magyar-Jewish city of Arad, for example, the Council in 1934 was composed of 8 Romanians, 2 Magyars, and 1 Zionist Jew, the Burgomaster being a Romanian. Târgu Mures (Maros Vásárhely), which is 75 per cent. Magyar, had only

1. The only Cabinet post ever held by a member of a minority has been that of Under-Secretary of State for Minority Questions.

2 Under the latest (1936) administrative reform, the term of office of the Interim Commissions is to be limited to four months.

2 Magyars against 6 Romanians; in the Department of Tréi Scaune (Haromszék) (87.6 per cent. Magyar) 5 Romanians and no Magyars were appointed, &c.

The Saxons were for some years more indulgently treated, but they, too, have been gradually driven out of the municipal government of their ancient cities. One Saxon burgomaster after another has been replaced by a Romanian. In 1933 there were still three left; in 1934 the last survivor (the burgomaster of Bistrita) disappeared. The loss was very bitterly felt, for the Saxons have always taken a keen interest in their local self-government, and Hungary had respected their rights. To be without a single burgomaster of their own nationality was an experience which the Saxons had not undergone during their 800-year history, and many of their cities, such as Sibiu (Hermannstadt, Nagy-Szeben) had been ruled by Saxons uninterruptedly since their foundation. And the grievance is not only sentimental, for the Romanian régime is not only one-sided in its national policy, but in many cases quite patently less efficient and less honest than that which it has replaced. Thus the abolition of the system of Interim Commissions and the restoration of a wider measure of departmental, municipal, and communal self-government are among the demands most commonly voiced by the minorities, and with the greatest justification.

The national question in the administration has become very acute in recent years, and is at the time of writing one of the foremost problems. The higher political grades of the administration were Romanized quickly and thoroughly, the old county and communal bodies being dissolved, and the old Hungarian Foöispáns removed, as early as January 14th, 1919. I know of no higher political officer of non-Romanian stock holding office in Romania to-day, although one or two may possibly be tucked away in some remote corner of the Dobrudja or Bessarabia. With the subordinate officials, State and local, Romania behaved at first more generously than either Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia. Like both those countries, she exacted from them an oath of fidelity to the new régime before it had any legal existence, and expelled many of those who refused to take it, as also those who put up any sort of resistance (there was a certain amount of sabotage, although no such widespread movement as the Slovak postal and railway strike). There were also, undoubtedly, excesses and acts of individual injustice. Generally speaking, however, those officials who wished to remain and who took the oath were allowed to remain in the State service. Some were transferred to the Regat, but most simply carried on in their old posts. Incidentally, Romania behaved comparatively generously over the vexed

question of pensions to the retired ex-Hungarian officials who had refused to take the oath of allegiance. After dragging on for several years the question was regulated in 1928 by M. Maniu, who accepted the argument that the oath had been required before this was legally justified, and even allowed pensions to officials who took the oath some years later.

The reason for this comparative leniency need not perhaps concern us. The Romanians ascribe it to their own sense of justice; the minorities suggested that they never expected the annexation to be permanent and were afraid of provoking retaliation. But the most reasonable explanation seems to be that there were simply no alternative candidates for the jobs; for the Romanian, unlike the Czech, is no born *rond-de-cuir*, and the Regat had no stock of ex-Austrian officials flocking back from Vienna and looking for re-employment. Thus, until the educational system had been Romanized and reorganized, and the first generation of students passed through it, there was no alternative but to carry on with the old personnel.

In any case, for ten or twelve years (about the time required to train up the new generation) the position did not change in any important respect. As minority officials died, retired, or were 'hinausgeekelt' (this expressive German word has no exact English equivalent) their places were quietly filled by Romanians, but the survivors were left in peace. About **1932**, however, a systematic drive against them set in, in consequence of which large numbers of them were dismissed with more or less of formality and their places filled by Romanians. The pretext given was political. It was alleged that the Magyar officials, in particular, were behaving as though the annexation had never taken place, openly deriding the Romanian State as a flimsy contraption bound to fall to pieces sooner or later—and the sooner the better; treating the Romanians in the old style as an inferior race and bidding them, with oaths; to speak Magyar; and themselves refusing to take the trouble to learn Romanian.

The minority officials had already (in 1929) been examined in the Romanian language, but consequent on this agitation, an order was issued in 1934 to re-examine all non-Romanian officials, the order applying not only to officials in the strict sense, but to technical and auxiliary personnel. After each examination, which, for the higher officials at least, includes questions on Romanian history, geography, and institutions, a proportion of unfortunates is ploughed and dismissed the service.

This question has caused intense feeling on both sides. The Romanians argue that the question is a political one: that the

1. Literally 'disgusted out'.

State has a right and a duty to require of a person claiming to receive from it a salary and a pension that he shall, in the course of 12 or 14 years, have mastered the elements of the official language; particularly as that language is an easy one, which every waiter, hotel porter, prostitute, or other person whose work brings him or her into professional contact with different nationalities, speaks fluently as a matter of course. The examination, they say, is not at all searching, every consideration being shown to elderly or uneducated persons. Persons who do not pass the examination, they say, are either so stupid or so hostile to the Romanian State as to be no fit servants of it,

The minorities reply that the question is not political at all, but economic. The examinees of to-day have been doing their duty faithfully enough for many years, and are being thrown out now simply because a horde of hungry ex-students of the Universities want their jobs. The examination, they say, is a mere pretext and a farce, any person being foredoomed to failure whose job a Romanian happens to want.

It is difficult to judge between the two theses, for each side can substantiate its argument with some irrefutable examples. There have certainly been some cases (although not, I think, many) in which minority officials have behaved with singular disregard of the altered map of Europe, and some where the examination has been lenient enough. Nor can the justice of Romania's general argument be denied. On the other hand, there have also been many cases of great individual hardship and injustice. Men who have done their duty for years, without giving cause for complaint, and have perhaps already passed an examination, have been called up again and deprived of their work. In other cases, searching tests have been applied in cases where no more than an elementary knowledge of Romanian seems necessary, e.g. for employees in railway workshops.

Since the process of elimination of minority officials is now in full swing, there seems little point in giving statistics of the relative proportion of Romanian and minority officials, particularly as these are extremely hard to obtain, and any figures given by either side are immediately queried by the other. A recent writer from the Romanian side gave some 1934 figures which seemed to show that at that time the proportion of minority officials was still above their percentage of the population: thus, in the postal and telegraphic services in 14 towns, the percentage of Romanians was never higher than ~, and in 5 towns 25 or under. In the three chief Székely Counties, 470 Magyars were still employed in the administrative services, against 98 Romanians, &c.¹ These figures

1. A. Gociman, 'Les Fonctionnaires hongroise de l'etat romain' in *Revue de Transylvanie*, vol.i no.3, Nov-Dec. 1934, pp. 375-81.

are, however, attacked by the minorities as misleading if not inaccurate.' I myself have heard innumerable generalities from both sides, but have only very occasionally obtained figures, which I could regard as accurate. I obtained, however, the religious statistics for the city of Arad, which show a much less favorable picture than the above figures. In the city administration, 273 officials were Romanian Orthodox and 10 Uniates (283 Romanians), 11 Serbian Orthodox, 70 Catholics, 9 Protestants, and a Baptists (81 Magyars and Germans), and 2 Jews. In the upper judicature the senior judges were all Romanians; of the junior magistrates, about two-thirds Romanians; of the lower staff, all Romanians. The only service with at all a high proportion of minority officials was the financial administration, where all the senior officials after the two heads, and about half the clerks, were Magyars or Germans. In another office I saw a framed photograph of the cadets who had passed through the gendarmerie college in a certain year (I think 1927). Four of these bore German names, 2 Bulgarian, 1 a Magyar, the remaining 40 odd were all Romanian. This was in the summer of 1934, when the new examinations were just beginning. In January 1936 the German leader, Dr. Roth, stated that over 580 German officials had lost their jobs through the examinations. The losses of the Magyars must have been far greater.

In any case, there seems to be no question that it is next door to impossible for a member of a minority to enter the Romanian public services to-day. Here and there may be an exception: a skilled workman might get some technical post for which no Romanian could be found—a Bulgarian might get into the gendarmerie, a Saxon might be given a small post in a purely Saxon district. Family influence might even place a Magyar in some corner where the Romanian nationalist press did not notice him. But broadly speaking, the younger generation of the minorities must renounce all hope of a State career.

The Romanians usually contend that the present exclusive preference given to Romanians will go on only until the balance is reduced and the Romanians represented in the public services in proportion to their numbers. It seems more likely that the end will be the establishment of an administrative service exclusively Romanian, with only a few very rare exceptions.

Romania has no comprehensive legislation regulating the use of the different local languages in local government and administration. The Constitution lays down simply that Romanian is the official language of the State, but provides that the existing law in the different provinces, where it does not directly conflict with the

1. *Nation und Staat*, April 1935, pp. 464—5.

A. Gociman, 'Les Fonctionnaires hongrois de l'état roumain', in *Revue de Transylvanie*, vol. i, no. 3, Nov.—Dec. 1934, pp. 375—81.

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Constitution, should remain in force until harmonized therewith. Occasional attempts have since been made to draft more detailed laws, but with small effect. In 1928 M. Maniu, when he took office, sent M. Popp, one of his followers, abroad to study minority questions with a view, it was understood, to drawing up an up-to-date comprehensive law. If, however, M. Popp's foreign studies bore any fruit, it rotted un-gathered. Again, in x 931, when Professor Jorga created the post of Under-Secretary for Minorities and appointed Dr. Brandsch, the Saxon leader, to it, a general Minorities Statute was expected, but again the expectations were disappointed. Dr. Brandsch passed from office spiritually intestate, and under his successors the post seems to have lost much of its significance. Its present occupant is a Romanian.' Meanwhile, the position remained vague. Characteristically, the Romanians attached more importance to putting a lick of paint on the outside of the building than to making laborious alterations in its structure. Thus all the names of towns and villages were Romanized and all street names laboriously adapted to the Romanian Valhalla, medieval or modern—a measure, it may be remarked, which has entirely failed to alter the habits of the local population. If you ask the way in a Magyar town, you are invariably told to cross the Kossuth Tér, go down the Vorosmarty utca and turn left into the Szabadság Ut, and it is left to your native genius (if any) to divine these time-honored names under their present guises of the Piata Uniriei, the Strada Carmen Sylva, and the Calea lui Vintila Bratianu. Letters are, however, only delivered (if at all) to Romanian addresses. Government notices and communications are almost always issued in Romanian only, even in solidly minority districts, and the population, in its written communications with the authorities, has to use Romanian, paying, if necessary, for translations. The oral use of minority languages in local administration and self-government depended, however, largely on the whim or the linguistic acquirements of the local officials, and oscillated madly from one extreme to another. During the short-lived period of decentralization in 1930, the Governor of Transylvania forbade the use of any minority language in Departmental or Communal Councils, and in 1931 the Director of State Railways forbade his employees to answer travelers in minority languages, even if they understood them. All railway stations and post offices are plastered with notices enjoining the public to

¹ Dr. Brandsch's failure seems to have been due partly to dissensions among the minorities themselves. Dr. Brandsch favored the principle—which would naturally, perhaps, appeal to a scholar and to a member of that particular minority which has always done best for itself—that each minority should be treated differently, according to its special circumstances. The Magyars, in just the opposite position, wanted one law to apply to all.

'speak only Romanian'. On the other hand, the minorities officials, of course, gladly spoke to the public in their own language, and some knew no other. In one town which I visited, although the official notices were all in Romanian, the town crier went about the streets chanting German and Magyar translations. During the first years, at least, it was usual for members of minorities to be able to use their own languages in all Councils, Departmental, Municipal, &c., Romanian being the exclusive language of Parliament.

Only as we write, preparations are being made to regulate the use of minority languages in local government. The first draft of the Bill provided that in all Departmental, town, and communal Councils, Romanian should be used exclusively in discussion and the keeping of records; that only persons able to speak, read, and write Romanian should be eligible for election to such Councils; and that if any person used a language other than Romanian, the body in question should be immediately dissolved. In response to protests from the German minority leaders, some of these Draconian provisions were modified. Minority languages may be used in the rural communes, and persons able to read and write their own mother tongue are eligible for election. Even so, the provisions are ungenerous, the Czech legislation being far superior. No steps have yet been taken to give any minority language an official status in administration; this is clearly a considerable hardship. It must not, indeed, be assumed that no Magyar or German will ever be able to speak his mother tongue to an official, but the practice is certainly growing more strict and serious grievances may easily develop. The facilities provided in the Courts of Law are also inadequate. A defendant has no legal right that any part of the proceedings shall be conducted in his mother tongue. I was informed that interpreters were usually provided, but this question seems one of those where legislation, on liberal lines, is most to be desired.

The use of minority languages in unofficial intercourse has never been restricted, with the sole exception that the Romanian names of towns must be used in newspapers, &c., the local name being added, if desired, in brackets. Recently, too, a surtax of 12 per cent. on the tax on trade and industry has been imposed on firms keeping their books in any other language than Romanian, the pretext being that the books are to some extent official documents, since they are subject to the control of the Inland Revenue Authorities. In general, however, Romania is right when she claims that she does not interfere, directly or indirectly, with the use by the minorities of their own language among themselves, i.e. outside official intercourse, and outside the schools which, as will be seen, are not always what they should be.

§ 10. THE MINORITIES: GENERAL CULTURAL AND
ECCLESIASTICAL QUESTIONS

The general principles guiding Romanian cultural policy have already been discussed. It remains to consider their application, and in doing so one must emphasize once again the overwhelming importance of the Churches in the national-cultural life of Romania. The separate existence of each local nationality is very largely bound up with that of its particular Church or Churches, and even identified therewith. 'Lutheran' and 'Saxon' are, for example, almost interchangeable terms. Such exceptions as still existed in 1918 were of the sort which proved the rule, for the Serbians—the one important national minority which had no Church of their own—were fast losing their nationality for that very reason. Moreover, the Church is not merely the symbol of each nation's existence, but also its most important cultural institution. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century, all education had been exclusively denominational. After that date the State began to intervene, in increasing measure as time went on. The State institutions were always purely Magyar; and thus the situation arose that, while such education as the minorities still retained was solely denominational, Magyar education was about equally divided between State and denominational establishments.' The latter were, for the most part, those situated in Magyar districts, rural or urban; the former existed as much, or more, for the benefit of the non-Magyars as of the Magyars. They comprised the higher establishments which served the needs of the country at large, and the primary or burger schools established in non Magyar districts for purposes of Magyarization. They included, however, also a number of Magyar schools, formerly denominational, which the State had taken over under various complicated arrangements. A high proportion of the social and charitable activities of each nationality is also traditionally conducted by its national Church, the freedom and security of which is thus vital to the nationality in question. On the other hand, the vast political power which lies in the hands of the ecclesiastical leaders must cause the State concern, if it is not sure whether that power will be loyally used.

The Romanian legislation on the Churches represents a compromise, which each party thinks unduly favorable to the other side, between the claims of the Churches and the State. Roughly

1. Of the total Magyar establishments in 1918, 1,497 out of 2,588 primary schools, 66 of the 109 burger schools, 25 of the 52 lycées and gymnasia, 12 of the 22 commercial colleges, 10 of the 24 training colleges, and all the High schools belonged to the State.

speaking, the position obtaining up to 1918 is reversed. Under the Romanian Constitution, the Orthodox Church becomes 'the predominant Church in the Romanian State', while the Uniate Church, as the second Romanian Church, 'takes precedence over the other Churches'. The special privileges of the Orthodox Church are not very numerous, except that the Royal Family must belong to it. The two Romanian Churches, however, enjoy an important political advantage over all others in that all their bishops sit, *ex officio*, in the Senate, while only the heads of the other denominations enjoy that privilege, and then only if their congregations number at least 200,000 adherents.

The Constitution guarantees liberty of conscience, and equal freedom and protection for all cults consistent with public order and morals. The position of the minority Churches is regulated in detail by the Law on Cults of 1928, which repeats these guarantees, but also lays down a number of restrictions limiting, not liberty of conscience, but the freedom of action of the Churches. Religious belief cannot exempt any person from the obligations imposed upon him by the law. Political organizations may not be formed on confessional bases, nor may political questions be discussed within ecclesiastical corporations or institutions. A Church may not be subordinated to any authority or ecclesiastical organization outside Romania, except in so far as its dogmatic or canonical principles require. Churches and religious associations are forbidden to receive any subsidies from abroad, directly or indirectly, without informing the State. Members of the clergy and ecclesiastical authorities must be Romanian citizens and must not have received any sentence involving the loss of civil rights. The heads of the Churches must be approved by the Crown and take an oath of loyalty to the Crown and obedience to the Constitution and the law. All instructions and orders from ecclesiastical authorities to their subordinates must be communicated to the Ministry of Cults, which can veto them if they are contrary to public order, morality, or the law, or endanger the security of the State.

The Statutes of each Church, again, must be submitted to Parliament, to see that they contain nothing contrary to the Law on Cults. The State retains a control over the expenditure of the subsidies granted by it, and the education given by the Churches in their schools must fulfil certain requirements, notably, the curriculum must include instruction in the Romanian language, literature, history, and constitution. The limits of dioceses may not be altered, nor new ones created, without legal authority.

Within these limits the Churches enjoy considerable freedom. A Church as such has no legal personality, but its constituent bodies (metropolitan and Episcopal Sees, Chapters, Orders, Corn-

munities, &c.) have such personality. The Churches administer their internal affairs and their property of all kinds in accordance with their own Statutes. They have the right to found and maintain schools, charitable institutions, &c., subject to their compliance with the general requirements of the Law. They can collect from their congregations the sums necessary for their expenses. It is the members of each Church who are responsible in the first instance for its maintenance, the State furnishing only certain subsidies.

The Law adopts the old Hungarian idea of 'received religions', and enumerates the following cults as 'received' or 'historic', besides the Greek Orthodox:

The Greek Catholic (Romanian Uniate).

Catholic (of Latin, Greek, Ruthene, and Armenian rites).

Reformed (Calvinist).

Evangelical (Lutheran).

Unitarian.

Armeno-Gregorian.

Mosaic (various rites).

Mohammedan.

Other cults can only become 'received' after fulfilling certain conditions. The Baptists have now become 'received'.

The position of a minority 'cult' is thus not wholly unfavorable, although it suffers by comparison with the autonomy enjoyed by the

A various Churches in Hungary before the War.

The various minority Churches have gradually succeeded in drawing up their Statutes and agreeing them with the Government. The Lutheran Church (i.e. the Saxons) remodeled their previous Statute without much difficulty. The Church now includes the German Lutheran communities from the other parts of Romania. The tiny number of Magyar Lutherans have organized themselves separately. The Calvinists, Unitarians, Serbian Orthodox, Baptists, and Armenians have all established their own organizations, while the Jews have three bodies: Orthodox, Neologs, and Sephardim. The chief difficulties arose, naturally, with the Catholic Church, the hierarchy of which was purely Magyar, or Magyarized, in 1918, and which from the first adopted an extremely militant attitude towards Romania. The position of this Church was very peculiar, for the Catholic Church in Hungary, unlike any other important Church in the country, was not autonomous, its position in the State being too commanding, its relations with the State and the Apostolic Crown too close, to make autonomy either practicable or, in the eyes of many of its adherents, desirable. In Transylvania, however, there existed a

special body, partly clerical, partly lay, the 'Status Catholicus', which enjoyed a sort of *de facto* autonomy and administered the local Church property. Neither the Hungarian Government nor the Vatican was ever willing to grant it full autonomy. The Status has not had a smooth passage since the War, having been involved in conflicts both with the Romanian Government and with the Holy See. By an agreement of 1932 between the Government and the Vatican supplementing and interpreting the Concordat, it has now been recognized as 'Council of the Catholic Diocese of the Latin Rite of Alba Julia', and has been allowed to administer all the property formerly belonging to the Status.' The Roman Catholics of Transylvania are further protected by the Concordat concluded in 1927 and ratified after the adoption of the Law of Cults in **1929**. The Concordat, incidentally, regulated in a manner favorable to the Catholics a question which had been hotly disputed: the indemnity for the large estates of which the Hungarian Government had assigned the usufruct to the Catholic Church, while retaining the ownership. These lands have been expropriated, but the Government consented to pay the indemnity to the Church, and the fund thus constituted is now administered, under the name of 'patrimonium sanctum', by the Council of diocesan bishops. The Government has also ceded to the Church its rights of property in the buildings, &c., owned by the Hungarian Crown in its capacity of Patron. In both these cases the Romanian State renounced important funds to which it could probably have made good its legal claim.

Although the minority spokesmen opposed the Law on Cults as a 'retrograde step', on account of the control which it allowed the State over the Churches, the application of it seems to have given rise to few well-grounded complaints. Were it possible to separate genuinely religious questions from national, and national from political, it would probably be found that the minorities had to-day few genuine and purely religious grievances. The Romanian is naturally indifferent in religious matters, and the Orthodox Church, as such, is not a proselytizing body. Unhappily, since every Church regards itself, and is regarded, as a national institution, political quarrels over apparently religious questions have been frequent, and the minority Churches and their representatives have had to undergo assaults which are in reality part of the national struggle,

1. Cf. 'Der katholische "Status" von Siebenburgen und seine Kämpfe', by Senator N. E. von Gyárfü, in *Nation und Staat*, May 1935, pp. 513 *if*.

2. As an example of the difficulty of drawing the dividing line may be quoted the cases of SS. Stephen and Ladislaus, duly canonized Catholic Saints of special local repute, and at the same time great figures in Hungarian national history and obnoxious to Romania owing to their military operations in Transylvania.

but which have made their position less favorable than that of any other religious minority with which this work deals. In the early years there were numerous cases' in which Catholic, Calvinist, and Unitarian pastors were maltreated and their congregations hindered in the exercise of their devotions. Some of these outrages were assuredly not unprovoked, since the Catholic clergy, in particular, was openly hostile to the Romanian State and refused to take the oath of allegiance to it until 1931. After this had been regulated, 'the systematic personal persecutions ceased'.² Membership of a Romanian Church is, however, a strong advantage to any one desiring governmental favor, and there have been a considerable number of cases in which the Orthodox or Uniate religion has been forced on members of minorities. The mission sent to Romania in 1927 by the American Committee on the Rights of Religious Minorities reported a number of such cases, particularly in connection with orphanages,³ and in recent years there have been a good many cases of conversion under duress among persons of supposedly Romanian ancestry. The chief sufferers have been the Székely, and the Church chiefly affected has been the Unitarian (which has lost some hundreds of 'converts'); the Calvinist Church comes next, the Catholic Church being little affected, the Lutheran not at all. The victims are usually Government employees, who are blackmailed into apostasy by the threat of losing their posts.

In certain cases, also, official pressure has been used (contrary to the law) to ensure that the children of mixed marriages shall be brought up only in the Greek Orthodox faith.

Another edict against which the minorities have protested is one passed in September 1936, that no lay person shall give religious instruction. It is claimed that this law, although in appearance equal for all religions, in effect bears much more heavily on the non-Romanian Churches. Reference is made elsewhere to the compulsory training of juveniles on Sundays which hampers their religious instruction.

Perhaps more serious, at any rate more systematic, have been the encroachments on the material position of the minority Churches, which have suffered enormous losses. The agrarian reform deprived the Lutheran Church alone of 35,000 yokes, the Hungarian Protestant Churches of 36,000, the Roman Catholic Church of 277,000 yokes, not counting the estates of parish priests

1. Cf. de Szász, *The Minorities in Romanian Transylvania* (London. 1927), chs. xi and xii.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 209. There was, however, a strong recrudescence of agitation after the conclusion of the Concordat.

Romania Ten Years After, issued by the American Committee on the Rights of Religious minorities (BMioston, 1928), pp. 96—7

and the school endowments.' In each case the losses amounted to by far the greater part of the wealth of the Church in question. According to the law, 32 yokes should have been left to each parish, but of the 240 Saxon parishes only 42 received their full quota.² One hundred and nineteen Catholic parishes were left without any land at all.³

The Orthodox Church which, by contrast with the vast endowments of the minority Churches, had only owned 1,012 yokes of real property in Transylvania before the War,⁴ naturally escaped almost scot-free under the agrarian reform. Even though the endowments of the minority Churches had come, not from the Hungarian State, but from the piety and self-sacrifice of their own members throughout past generations, a certain equalization of this vast difference in the material position of the different Churches was inevitable and perhaps desirable, and even to-day the minority Churches are still richer than the Romanian. On the other hand, both in the application of the land reform and in other ways, the Romanian Churches, particularly the Orthodox, have been forced upon the people in a way which has caused much dissatisfaction. There have been several cases in which the parish endowment of a minority Church has been given, in whole or in part, to a Romanian community with a smaller number of adherents than its previous owners. The commonest and most conspicuous grievance has been in connection with the building of Orthodox churches. In towns and villages in which the overwhelming majority of the population belongs to minorities, building-sites have been allotted to the Orthodox Church from requisitioned land, or in public parks, &c., and churches erected on them. Thus a huge Orthodox Cathedral has been built at Cluj, which had in 1910 only 1,359 Orthodox inhabitants (it is true that the number has greatly increased with the influx of officials from the Regat).

Târgu Mures, again, where the Romanian population numbered under 10 per cent. of the total of 1910, is now dominated by an enormous Orthodox church, which clashes hideously with the surrounding architecture. These are not isolated instances; I have myself passed dozens of new Orthodox churches, many of them in purely minority districts. The minority population has a double grievance in such cases, for, apart from the national-political-religious aspect of the question, the churches are usually erected

1. Memorandum from the Hungarian Party to the Under-Secretary of State for Minorities, 1933. The figures for the Catholic and Calvinist Churches are estimated in the *Erdélyi Magyar évkönyv*, 1930, vol. i, p. 72; those for the Lutheran Church are given in various Saxon publications.

2. *Die Nationalitäten in den Staaten Europas*, p. 416.

3. *Romania Ten Years After*, p. 100

4. V. Nistor, 'Les Cultes minoritaires et l'église orthodoxe roumaine', in *Revue de Transylvanie*, vol. ii, no. 1, Aug.—Sept. 1935, pp. 7—40.

either out of taxation, of which the minorities pay the lion's share, or else by 'private' subscription, which is collected under strong official pressure.

In 1935, then, the Government decided to introduce a new method of calculation and to take into account the 'private resources' of the clergy. As the minority Churches still possess larger endowments than the Romanian, this meant that very large cuts were made in their subsidies. But the point which evoked the chief complaints was that among these 'private resources' was reckoned the special tax which each Church is entitled to levy on its adherents, and which the State, if required, collects for it. The minorities complained that this method of calculation penalized those Churches which imposed sacrifices on their own members for the benefit of those which allowed the State to do everything. The argument will probably go on for some years.

As regards the State subsidies to the various Churches, each side declares the other to be unduly favored, but the budget figures seem to show that in fact, during the earlier years, the Orthodox Church received smaller subsidies per head of the population than either the Uniate or the minority Churches (except the Jewish, which has always been left almost entirely to its own resources).¹ The proportions have, however, steadily been changing in favor of the Romanian Churches. Thus, taking Transylvania alone, the share going to the Orthodox Church rose between 1930 and 1933 from 30.1 per cent. to 38.8 per cent., that of the Uniate Church from 31.3 per cent. to 33.46 per cent., while that of the Magyar Churches sank from 33.9 per cent. to 24.5 per cent., chiefly owing to drastic cuts in the Calvinist grant.² This is the more painful to the Magyars because the subsidies granted by the Hungarian Government before the War to the various Churches were very fairly apportioned. Thus in the fiscal year, 1914/15, the 'Magyar Churches' of Transylvania, with a membership of 1,665,805 persons, received subsidies (excluding school subsidies) of 1,748,603 gold crowns (1.05 gold crowns per head), while the 'non-Magyar Churches', 3,446,327 strong, received 3,552,349 gold crowns (1.03 per head).³

As an interesting sidelight on Romanian cultural policy, it may be mentioned that of the three Roman Catholic dioceses in the ex-Hungarian territories, only that of Alba Julia, whose See consists of historic Transylvania, still possesses a Magyar as bishop, and his coadjutor, appointed 'cum jure successionis', is a German. The

1. Nistor, *bc. cit.* The Jews, incidentally, only received land under the reform in one commune.

2. A. R. Szeben, 'Die Staatssubventionen', in *Glásul Minoritaţilor*, September 1933, p. 220.

3. See *Magyar Kisebbség*, 1933, p. 315.

dioceses both of Timisoara and of Oradea-Satu Mare are in the hands of German bishops, and in the lower grades of their hierarchies, particularly in the Banat, the Magyar priests are being gradually replaced by Suabians. The little Armenian Catholic community has also been removed from the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Alba Julia and given its own spiritual chief.

§ II • THE MINORITIES: EDUCATIONAL QUESTIONS

The educational system again represents a compromise, which each party considers to be too advantageous to the other. Romania, whose own educational system in the Regat had been (and is) exclusively State-owned, took over for the State all the Romanian confessional schools in Transylvania, and also, in her capacity of legal successor to the Hungarian State, all the establishments maintained by that body. The higher educational system was made as completely Romanian as it had formerly been Magyar; for the elementary schools, the Directing Council at first adopted the principle of allowing the population concerned to choose the language of instruction for itself. Thus some of these schools became Romanian, some were left Magyar, others were taken over by the Suabians or by smaller minorities. The non Romanian confessional schools were left, for the time, untouched.

The State elementary educational system was reorganized under the Primary Education Act of 1924. This provides that a State school shall be established wherever there are 60 children of age to attend classes 1—4, with a second room and teachers for 40 children of classes 5—7. The language of instruction is, in principle, the mother tongue of the children, and where the numbers of children of any one language are insufficient to justify the maintenance of a whole school, mixed schools may be set up with parallel classes for the different nationalities. There is, however, one very important qualification to the equality which the minorities enjoy under this law: under Article 8 of the Act, 'citizens of Romanian origin who have lost their mother tongue may not send their children to any school, public or private, other than a school in which instruction is given exclusively in Romanian'. A second qualification provides that special treatment is to be accorded to a so-called 'cultural zone', which comprises the Székely districts and some of the mixed Departments on the western frontier. In this zone, in which many new Romanian schools have been created, the teachers are given additional pay and other inducements to encourage them in their uncomfortable task.

In State schools, the State contributes the teacher's salary, the commune being responsible for all other expenditure.

In non-Romanian schools, the Romanian language is taught as a subject for at least one hour a week during the first two school years, and at least two hours a week thereafter. Instruction in Romanian history and geography is given in Romanian.

The diplomas issued by training colleges existing in **1918** have been recognized and the colleges allowed to continue, but all teachers in State schools have to pass an examination in Romanian, and those teaching Romanian history, geography, and institutions must also qualify in those subjects.' The teachers' examinations have acquired a dismal notoriety comparable to that enjoyed by the examinations of officials, and, as in the latter case, a tragically large number of examinees has fallen by the wayside—sometimes, no doubt, by their own fault, but assuredly not always.

By what Romania regards as a considerable concession, State education was not made compulsory. The status of the former Confessional schools was regulated in 1925 by a further Act which lays down that children may be educated, if their parents prefer, in 'private schools', or at home. 'Private schools' may be established either by individuals, who must be Romanian citizens, or by juridical personalities, which must not be dependent on foreign organizations. The right of the Catholic Church to found and maintain schools out of its own resources is specifically guaranteed under the Concordat, and the same right is enjoyed by the Lutheran, Calvinist, and Unitarian Churches. The minimum number of pupils required is 20 for a primary school or an average of 10 pupils per class for higher establishments.

The authorities establishing a 'private school' are free to determine what its language of instruction shall be, but Romanian history, geography, and institutions must always be taught in the Romanian language. Pupils may only be admitted whose mother language is the language of instruction in the school in question. Thus, not only 'persons of Romanian origin who have lost their mother tongue' are excluded from minority private schools, under the 1924 Act, but a German or Jewish child is debarred from attending a Magyar school. If he cannot find a school of his own language, he must attend a Romanian State school.

For primary schools, the State syllabus is obligatory. Secondary schools may draw up their own syllabus, but if they wish to rank as 'public schools', i.e. to have their certificates and diplomas recognized by the State, they must, besides fulfilling certain other requirements, adopt the State syllabus. At the end of the school year the children are examined by a State inspector, and before

1. In 1935, however, complaint was made that the German teachers for the State schools in the Banat had to attend the Romanian State Training College, making up the necessary German instruction in their spare time.

obtaining the higher certificate for admission to a High school they have to pass the 'baccalaureate', an examination re-instituted in 1925 in imitation of the French model. The subjects required for this examination have been changed several times, but they always include an oral examination, conducted in Romanian, in the language, history, and geography of Romania. This examination is particularly dreaded by the minorities, and there have been many complaints that it has been made a simple pretext for excluding the minority students from the Universities, and thus damaging their chances of State and professional careers. In fact, the examination seems to have varied greatly in severity in different years, although it is safe to say that a Romanian student stands the rosier chance of satisfying the examiners. In any case, however, under present conditions, the value of a university degree is less than it was, since a member of a minority, whatever his degree, can hardly hope to enter Government service.

In 1934 the minorities in Transylvania possessed the following educational establishments.¹

	<i>Confessional.</i>	<i>State.</i>	
<i>Magyars</i>			
Primary schools	. 783		no schools plus 232 sections
Lycées . . .	7 }		
Gymnasia . . .	18 }		7
Conunercial classes.	4 }		
Training colleges . . .	7		o
<i>Germans</i> (Sa. = Saxon, Su. = Suabian)			
Primary schools	. 345 (26o Sa., 85 Su.)		54 schools plus 75 sections (all Su.)
Lycées . . .	7 (6 Sa. 1 Su.)		
Gymnasia . . .	18 (9 Sa., 9 Su.)		6 (all Su.)
Commercial schools	1 (Sa.)		
Training colleges . . .	5 (3 Sa., 2 Su.)		
<i>Serbs</i>			
Primary schools	. 42		o
<i>Cra^ocovani</i>			
Primary schools	. 5		o
<i>Poles</i>			
Primary schools	. 1		o
<i>Czechs and Slovaks</i>			
Primary schools	. 2		3 plus 1 section
<i>Ruthenes</i>			
Primary schools	. 1		o
<i>Croats</i>			
Primary schools	. o		1 section
<i>Armenians</i>			
Primary schools	. o		1 section

1. A. Caliani, 'L'Enseignement minoritaire en Roumanie', in *Revue de Transylvanie*, vol. i, no. 3, Nov.—Dec. 1934, pp. 300—8.

A. Gociman, 'Les Fonctionnaires hongrois de l'état roumain', in *Revue de Transylvanie*, vol. i, no. 3, Nov.—Dec. 1934, pp. 375—81.

The Romanians in 1926 possessed 3,611 elementary schools, 44 burger schools, 40 lycées and gymnasia, and 10 commercial schools, besides the University of Cluj.¹ In 1932 these figures had risen to 675 kindergartens, 4,100 elementary schools, and 199 middle schools.²

The difficulties of drawing reasonable conclusions from school statistics is notorious. To compare the number of Magyar establishments in 19x8 with those of to-day would be misleading, since many of the former were pure instruments of Magyarization. One should not even quote the number of confessional schools which have been closed without remembering that as soon as Romania took over the State schools, the Magyars created an enormous number of new Confessional schools, often in districts where there were hardly any Magyar pupils, and many of these afterwards faded away without any official pressure, simply from lack of money and pupils.

In favor of Romania, one must grant her ungrudging retention of the Confessional school system as the general rule in the annexed territories,³ and also the comparatively high degree of liberty which those schools enjoy. The amount of compulsory instruction in Romanian required is not unreasonable, and is less than the Magyar instruction which Hungary introduced under the Apponyi Act of 1907.⁴

On the other hand, it would be easy to draw over-optimistic conclusions from the statistics of the numbers of minority schools, both State and private. Quite a high proportion of the Confessional Secondary schools have either never received, or have gradually lost their public status. All of them are carrying on under much harder material conditions than before the War, owing to the impoverishment of the Churches under the land reform, and the currency devaluation and the increased taxation. The State subsidies do not even begin to make up for these losses. ⁵ Moreover,

1. S. Dragomir, *The Ethnical Minorities in Transylvania* (Geneva, 1927)~ p. 93.

2. *Annarul Statistic al Romaniei*, 1933.

3. Under her Minorities Treaty she was, of course, obliged to allow members of her minorities an equal right with the majorities to found and maintain their own schools. Yugoslavia, however, although subject to a similar obligation, disregarded it completely.

4. The subjects to be taught in the State language are practically the same under the Apponyi law and the Romanian law. Each side, of course, maintains that the other is the more oppressive in the application. Myjudgement is based on what has been said to me by local Germans, who are the persons most likely to speak impartially on the subject.

5. According to minority sources (*Die Nationalitäten in den Staaten Europas*, p. 392) the German schools received only ~ million lei in subsidies in ten years, whereas the average annual cost of maintaining the schools, all the rest of which was borne by the population, was about x08 million lei. The Magyars in the same period received only 14 million lei from the State. In 1932 it was stated that the Magyar Calvinist Church spent 64 million lei annually on its schools, of which the State contributed 3 million only (*Nation und Staat*, Jan. 1932,

p. 267). In 1935 and 1936 the subsidy stopped altogether.

many difficulties appear to be placed in the way of the Confessional schools. Apart from the provisions already quoted, forbidding pupils of one language to attend the schools of another, there are restrictive laws and practices. Parents whose children attend Confessional schools have to produce certificates (stamped at a cost of 27 lei) annually that their children have passed the due examinations. Children are forbidden to attend primary Confessional schools outside their own communes; children who have begun to attend State schools may not change over to private schools; Confessional schools are closed or taken over by the State on trivial pretexts, &C.¹

It is also very often, and I believe very credibly stated, that the State schools of the minorities are only minority in name. They probably vary greatly, but in more than one place I was assured that only religious instruction is given in them in the minority language. In an official complaint from the German Party to the Government in 1935 it was stated that in the State German schools the 5th, 6th, and 7th classes were entirely Romanized, and, in many Communes, the lower classes also.² The teachers are said often to be Romanians who know little of the minority language; in some cases, nothing at all. Some of them seem to conceive their duties to be simply that of Romanizing their pupils, by fair means or foul. It seems quite certain, in any case, that these schools are less genuinely 'minority' than the Confessional schools. I have heard many circumstantial tales of pressure being brought to bear on parents to send their children to the State minority school in villages where both State and Confessional schools exist; and of excuses being sought to close the latter. Unless (as seems improbable) the Romanian Government is actively desirous of spending money rather than saving it, there is no point at all in this, unless the State school is more Romanian than the Confessional. Certainly the large number of schools which the official statistics allege the Magyars, in particular, to possess, is partly due to the fact that many villages possess both State and Confessional schools, where there is really only room for one; but neither party will leave the field clear for its rival.

The independence of all education, and also the religious instruction of minority children, have further been seriously affected by a recent decree (September 1936) which compels all young people to spend the mornings from 7.30 a.m. to 1 p.m. of twenty-six Sundays in the year in semi-military, semi-religious training (gymnastics, &c.). This training is carried out under State supervision, and the

1. *Informations sur la situation de la minorité hongroise en Roumanie* (Geneva, 1934), pp. 35—44.

2 *Nation und Staat*, March 1935, p. 404.

object is to ensure that the children grow up 'good Romanians'. This further interferes with the Sunday schools of the minority churches, which had already been laboring under difficulties.

If we come to consider the positions of the different nationalities, we find the Magyars, as was to be expected, the chief sufferers, and that even if we discount their 'shrinking pains' and measure their possessions only by their present requirements. Their numbers and social structure would justify them in claiming a considerable amount of higher education, but they have been left only with a single Chair of Hungarian Literature at Cluj. Moreover, Romania, like the other Successor States, does not recognize the degrees given by Hungarian Universities.

In secondary education they are better placed, but here, too, they have to struggle with great difficulties. In primary education, the western districts seem to have been reasonably well served, at least until recently, but apart from the fact that in the numerous cases of doubtful nationality the benefit of the doubt has always been given to the non-Magyar language, they have genuine grounds for complaint in the way in which the children of many families, which had been completely and honestly Magyarized, have been forced to attend Romanian schools on the pretext of their real or alleged Romanian ancestry. The pressure has been particularly strong in the Székely districts.

It is impossible to give accurate statistics; but I have heard it estimated that as many as 20 per cent. of the Magyar children in the 'cultural zone' have recently been obliged to enter purely Romanian schools. The result, incidentally, is not to Romanize these unhappy mites, but to leave them complete analphabetes, for they quickly forget their Romanian and never learn Magyar. Even outside this zone, a not inconsiderable number of Magyar children have to attend Romanian schools.

An inquiry conducted in 1934/5 by the Magyar minority leaders resulted in the conclusion that instead of 271 State schools and 218 sections with Magyar language of instruction (as shown by the Ministry of Education for 1933) there were in reality only 55 such schools and 57 sections. The remainder 'did not function', had been closed, or were staffed entirely by Romanian teachers. Some of the last named may perhaps keep up a pretence of giving Magyar instruction, but the reality is clearly far from what the official figures paint it 211 teachers had died, retired, been dismissed or transferred, and 161 had been appointed, the new appointments having in every case been given to Roumanians.¹

1. Magyar Kisebbség, September 1, 1936, vol. iii, pp. 460, 461 (for summary of results; details are given, school by school, in several numbers of the review in 1936).

The German position is different. The Saxons have to-day almost exactly the same number of establishments as in 1914, and if the upkeep of them has called for far heavier sacrifices from the population itself, this is partially compensated by the more genuinely national character of the instruction which they can now give.

The Suabians, on the other hand, are very large gainers on balance. Under Hungary, their German schools had been melting like snow in spring. In 1879/80 the Germans of the Banat had possessed 124 primary schools with exclusively German language of instruction, and 174 bilingual schools; in 1913/14 the mixed schools had vanished altogether, and the German schools had been reduced to 34. To-day the Banat has 115 German primary schools or sections, ii kindergarten, 2 lycées, 1 training college, and several other schools.

The case of the 'Szatmár Germans' requires special mention. Their schools had been reduced under Hungary to two, and the population had been almost entirely Magyarized, although many of them, even when speaking no word of German, still described themselves as Suabians. The Magyarization was, moreover, sincere, for when Romania took the new census, with its rubric of 'ethnic origin', quite a number of them insisted, in the face of all pressure, on putting themselves down as Magyars. Orders given to introduce German into the Confessional schools were boycotted by the local clergy, who carried through three unofficial 'plebiscites', all of which resulted in favor of Magyar. The German local organization protested, and in 1927 German was at last introduced into all the Suabian primary schools of Szatmár and Salai, while in 1929 a German section was opened in the State Lycée at Careii— another 'national gain' for the Germans which they value extremely highly, as they now possess an extra 30,000 sheep which they had thought strayed for ever from the Germanic fold.

Where the issue has lain, not between German and Magyar, but between German and Romanian, the position of the Germans has been less satisfactory, and certain complaints have been heard from the Banat, especially as regards the kindergartens. As, however, few Romanian families had become Germanized under Hungary, collisions in this field have been rare. The analysis of names has not, so far as I know, been applied at all against Germans.

In higher education, the greatest loss incurred by the Germans of Romania has been the Romanization of the University of Cernaupi (Czernowitz). This does not, however, greatly affect the Germans of the ex-Hungarian districts. No obstacle seems to be placed in the way of Germans receiving higher education abroad.

On the whole, therefore, the German cultural position is much more satisfactory to-day than it was under Hungary.

The Jews have less cause for rejoicing. Like the Germans, they are excluded from the Magyar schools, since they are never allowed to count Magyar as their mother tongue; nor may they give instruction in their own schools in either Magyar or German; these languages may not even be taught as subjects. The Jews are thus thrown back, if they wish to go to schools of their own, on Hebrew, a language which very few of them wish to learn at all, and one which is, in any case, utterly useless to nine-tenths of them. There remains the Romanian school, which the Jew is in theory free to attend; but owing to the anti-Semitic tendencies of both students and professors, his admission is in practice difficult, especially to a University; and if he does get there, he is subjected to innumerable vexations, if not to actual persecution. Jews thus find it difficult to obtain any higher education whatever, and what they get is of doubtful use to them, or has at best to be supplemented by strenuous private study, since the business life of Transylvania (and a Jew cannot hope for any other career) is still largely transacted in Magyar.

Of the remaining minorities, the Serbs passed through some years during which their educational system practically broke down, owing to the migration of teachers and priests after the disputed Banat frontier with Yugoslavia had been fixed. Only twenty-two teachers remained at one time. Attempts were made as early as 1921 to reach a settlement on the question of educational facilities for Serbs in the Romanian Banat, and Romanians in the Yugoslav Banat, but these were many times delayed by political and other difficulties. At last in 1933 a Convention was signed between the two States providing that each of the minorities concerned should receive instruction in its own mother tongue, with certain subjects taught in the language of State, and arranging for a supply of qualified teachers.' The Serb schools are Confessional, and seem adequate for the needs of the population.

Another minority which has benefited, rather unexpectedly, is the tiny group of 'Cra^ovani', who converted their half-dozen schools to the local dialect in 1919 and have since been left undisturbed, perhaps because the Government is unwilling to do either Serbs or Bulgars the favor of endorsing their claims to this little people. The Armenians have got in on the de-Magyarizing program, the Czechs and Slovaks as allies. The Ruthenes and Bulgars seem, however, to be scantily served.

It will be observed that neither the Saxon nor the Székely 'communities' enjoy the autonomy promised them in the Romanian

1. See *Revue de Transylvanie*, vol. i, no. 4, pp. 477 ff.

Minorities Treaty. The fault lies partly in the loose wording of the Treaty, for if the Saxon 'University' might fairly claim to represent the Saxon 'community' or 'communities', no corresponding Székely organization has existed for centuries past. The Magyars have from time to time made courageous efforts to convince the world that the whole Magyar population of Transylvania should be included for this purpose under the term Székely. If, however, the authors of the Peace Treaty meant this, they did not say so, and the name Székely has a perfectly definite, although unofficial connotation. By no stretch of imagination can it be stretched to cover the Magyars of Crişana, nor even of the Cluj area. The Romanians are, therefore, on absolutely sure legal ground in rejecting this claim. They might conceivably grant the Székely, in the strict sense of the name, a certain limited autonomy, but if so, they would certainly use this concession as a means of driving a wedge between the Székely and the remaining Magyars; and being clear sighted enough to see this, and anxious to avoid a national split, the Székely themselves have refrained from pursuing their claim. As for the Saxons, they have on the whole inclined in the past to accept the Romanian claim that the Statute of the Lutheran Church gives them all the autonomy which they could expect under the Treaty. In recent times they, too, have been unwilling to weaken their new national unity with the other Germans of Romania by pressing their separate claim.

The general cultural life of nearly all the minorities in Transylvania is lively. Two general points must be said in Romania's favor: she has been less pedantic than either of her allies in the matter of literary and cultural associations, and she has in theory an extraordinarily liberal Press law, which contrasts very favorably with that in force in Transylvania before the War.¹ This law has often been partially suspended under the martial law which has so long prevailed, but even during these periods, the Press has enjoyed considerable freedom—compared to many countries of the Continent—in its political utterances and almost complete liberty in other fields.

The cultural life of the Germans is probably more active than at any time during their long history. Among the Saxons it has experienced a renaissance, after its visible decline during the last decades of Hungarian rule, while among the Suabians it is almost a new birth. The importance of this very vigorous movement, which has found its expression in a host of literary, educational and social publications, societies, &c., can hardly be exaggerated, and it should be emphasized that Romania has encouraged it strongly,

1. The Transylvanian Press was until shortly before the War different from, and stricter than, that in force in the rest of Hungary.

The Transylvanian Press Law was until shortly before the War different from, and stricter than, that in force in the rest of Hungary.

only intervening very occasionally against extreme manifestations of Nazi ideas.

The Magyars have not been encouraged like the Germans, but they have, on the whole, been allowed pretty well to go their own way. Romanian authors are able to point to some impressive figures. Thus the Magyars of Transylvania possess to-day a large number of periodicals, most of which are new since the annexation.¹ It is true that this pullulation of local growths is due largely to the fact that the great Budapest dailies, with very few exceptions, can no longer enter Transylvania; nevertheless, the figures are quite impressive, the more so when it is recalled that they represent the genuine voice of the Magyars themselves, since none of them are subsidized Government publications. The Magyars have 255 bookshops, 147 printing-presses, and 6 regular theatrical companies, and between 1919 and 1933, 5,000 literary and scientific works appeared in Magyar—more than were produced during the whole period 1807—1918. Most of the big literary and cultural societies date from before the War, but one extremely interesting society, the 'Helikon', has been founded since the War, and has become the rallying-point of the new Magyar Cultural movement, reflecting the new political outlook to which we shall return, which is turning more and more to a specifically Transylvanian outlook not necessarily hostile to the local Romanians.

Romania has also been the most generous of the Successor States in allowing Magyar literature to cross her frontier. Up to 1926 the restrictions were severe, but they were then greatly relaxed. Thereafter, on an average, Romania received over 50 percent of Hungary's total exports of printed literature, while between 80 percent and 90 percent of her own total imports of books and newspapers came from Hungary.²

§ 12. THE MINORITIES: THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STRUGGLE

But although Romania's first attention has necessarily been devoted to securing her political control over Transylvania, and although this involves also far-reaching cultural measures, yet the center of gravity of the Transylvanian problem has lain rather in the readjustment of the social and economic relationships of the different nationalities—a readjustment to which political and even cultural measures are really no more than the essential

1. Transylvanus, *The Ethnical Minorities of Transylvania*, p. 36, gives 312 periodicals, 53 of which are dailies, 250 of them, including 38 dailies, being new since the annexation. Another source, however (*Transilvanie, Banatul, Crișana, Maramureș*, p. 1307), gives the figure at only 221 periodicals, including 25 dailies.

2 *Revue de Transylvanie*, vol. i, no. 4, pp. 505 ff.

The Transylvanian Press Law was until shortly before the War different from, and stricter than, that in force in the rest of Hungary.

preliminaries. The national-social revolution which has been carried through since the annexation, partly by legislative action, partly outside the law, has affected the lives of all the peoples concerned far more profoundly than the mere change of sovereignty.

Of the legislative measures, the earliest and, in many ways, still the most important, is the agrarian reform, which was enacted almost immediately after the War. It must be remembered that in any case, Romania could hardly have avoided carrying through a measure of this kind, owing to the deplorable agrarian conditions in the Regat, which had led in 1907 to perhaps the most savage peasant revolt of modern history.¹ The Romanian Parliament had decided as early as 1917 to undertake a large-scale redistribution in the Regat. This was duly carried through under an Act of 1921, the sufferers being almost exclusively Romanian individuals and corporations, and the Romanian State.

On political grounds alone, therefore, it would hardly have proved possible to exempt Transylvania from the application of the reform, even if it had been considered socially desirable to maintain the existing distribution of land. If, however, a reform were carried through at all, most of the sufferers were bound to be members of the minorities, and most of the beneficiaries must be Romanians; since, while the majority of the population (say 55 per cent.) was Romanian, they owned only about 24 per cent. of the land, the large estates were overwhelmingly in non-Romanian hands.²

1 It has been estimated that 10,000 Romanian peasants were killed in the repression of this revolt.

2 I have purposely left my figures approximate, as exactitude seems impossible to achieve. According to official figures (cit. Dragomir, op. cit., pp. 246 ff.) there were in Transylvania, in 1919, 14,933,841 yokes (1 yoke = 0.575 ha.), 7,613,555 of which were arable land. 61.05 per cent of this belonged to private individuals, 395 per cent. to the State, communes, societies, co-possessorates, &c. There were 8,435 owners of property of zoo yokes or over, owning a total area of 5,926,734 yokes. Of these, 209 Romanians held in all 550,067 yokes, while 8,226 members of minorities held 5,876,667 yokes. Of the small properties under 100 yokes, according to M. Dragomir, 'the Romanians, although numbering 3,356,345, held only 3,448,602 yokes, while the minorities, numbering 1,891,933, possessed 5,407,141 yokes. In all, then, Romanians held 3,598,669 yokes and the present minorities 11,233,819.'

The attentive reader will observe: (a) that the last two figures do not, as they should, equal the first; (b) that the first figure (total area of Transylvania) is nearly 4 million yokes too low; (c) that the numbers given for the Romanian population are larger than the figures given by the Romanian census of 5930 for that population, while the figures for the minorities are smaller; (d) that State lands are apparently counted as minority-owned. In any case, according to Hungarian critics, no exact figures are or ever have been available for the land distribution in 1919 in the total area annexed by Romania; nor was the number of Romanians so low as would appear from these figures. Thus N. Móricz, *The Fate of the Transylvanian Soil* (Budapest, 1934), quotes the following figures for those Counties transferred in their entirety to Romania (omitting,

The Transylvanian Press Law was until shortly before the War different from, and stricter than, that in force in the rest of Hungary.

Whether the measure was carried out in such manner as to involve national injustice seems therefore to depend chiefly on three points: whether the Transylvanian law was more severe on the landowners than the corresponding measure in the Regat: whether, within Transylvania itself, the Romanian landowners were treated more indulgently than the minorities; and whether the minority claimants participated equally.

As regards the first point, the Transylvanian law was undoubtedly more drastic than that of the Regat. The fact that the compensation given was slightly lower in Transylvania (an average of 2,181 lei per hectare, against 2,215 lei in the Regat) is comparatively unimportant, since the prices in either case were so low as to amount to confiscation, particularly as they were paid, not in cash, but in ~ per cent. bonds which sank swiftly below par; but other differences are more serious.

In the Regat the expropriation applies to the property, so that a single owner of several estates can keep a part of each; in Transylvania, to the proprietor. In the Regat, only arable land and pasture are subject to expropriation; in Transylvania, forests also. In the Regat, the minimum left to the proprietor is 100 hectares in the mountains, 150—250 hectares in the plains, according to the local demand for land, while 200, 300, or even 500 hectares may be retained in certain cases. In Transylvania the minima are 50 yokes (29 hectares) in the mountains, 100 yokes (57 hectares), in the foot-hills, and 200, 300, or 500 yokes in the plains, according to demand. It has, however, been very rare for more than 200 yokes (115 hectares) to be left to any one proprietor. In certain cases the minima are reduced to 50 yokes for estates farmed by their owners, and even to ~0 yokes where neither the owner nor his parents were agriculturists.

The law was, therefore, clearly more severe in Transylvania,

therefore, the Counties of Bihar, Csanád, Máramaros, Szatmár, Tini⁹-Torontal, and Ugocsa):

	<i>Magyar.</i>	<i>Romanian.</i>	<i>German.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
Producing population	497,253	965,361	142,766	1,657,843
Estates of over 1,000 yokes	209	19	14	244
100—1,000 „	1,832	830	376	3,046
50—100 „	3,585	4,195	5,374	9,211
10—50 „	63,010	167,861	29,413	264,141
5—10 „	42,752	178,963	16,106	242,137
0—3 „	49,070	213,602	13,501	279,208
Landless agricultural population.	91,022	229,900	10,197	347,941

Other Hungarian sources, however, admit that 87-52 percent of the owners of properties exceeding 100 yokes were Magyar (*Informations sur la situation de la minorité hongroise en Roumanie*, p. 26).

The Transylvanian Press Law was until shortly before the War different from, and stricter than, that in force in the rest of Hungary.

where nearly all the persons expropriated belonged to minorities, than in the Regat; where the big landowners were Romanians (the fact that the expropriation was more drastic still in Bessarabia does not affect our point). As regards the relative treatment accorded to minority and Romanian landowners, I myself heard no specific instances of discrimination; but it is quite possible that I never visited any of the few regions where large Romanian estates existed. Hungarian writers claim that in two Departments (Some^o and Turda) the Romanian properties were left quite untouched, but they do not mention the number or size of the estates.¹

In all, up to the end of 1929,² 2,906,073 yokes of private property had been expropriated, and 212,497 yokes of State land ceded. 935,283 yokes of this were arable land, 563,378 pasture, and 1,516,971 forest. The State retained about one-third of the forest-land; communes received nearly 700,000 yokes of forest and over 900,000 yokes of pasture, and 632,923 yokes were distributed to small proprietors in plots ranging from 1 to 7 yokes; 300,196 in freehold and 332,727 on lease. The whole question had been desperately complicated for years by the famous 'optants dispute', perhaps the most wearisome that ever troubled the League of Nations, as the clause providing for complete expropriation of non-Romanian citizens conflicted with the provisions of the Peace Treaty safeguarding the rights of optants. A settlement was only reached at the Hague Reparations Conference, when it was agreed that the 'Hungarian Optants' should lose their land, but be compensated out of an obscure Reparations fund.

As regards the distribution, according to Romanian figures, 454,673 applications were received, 337,082 (74 per cent.) from Romanians, 117,591 (26 per cent.) from minorities. 310,583 persons actually received land, of whom 227,943 (73 per cent.) were Romanians, 82,640 (27 per cent.) minorities.³ Thus a slightly smaller proportion of Romanian applicants were satisfied than of the minorities. Hungarian writers have caviled at these figures, but have produced, so far as I know, no alternatives. According to Dr. Móricz's figures for the individual Counties, quoted above, one could have expected a somewhat higher proportion of applicants from the minorities, since Romanians represented only 68 per cent. of the two categories (landless men and holders of 5 yokes or under) who might expect to benefit from the reform, against 32 per cent. of minorities. Probably, therefore, there was a certain discrepancy in the application of the law, but none in principle. The disproportion might, however, appear

1. Informations sur la situation de la minorité hongroise en Roumanie.

2 These figures are from Dragomir, *op. cit.*, pp. 247 *if.*

3. Transylvanus, *op. cit.*, pp. 41, 42.

greater if account could be taken of the land respectively taken from and attributed to communes, where much more discrimination seems to have been applied. In the matter of building-plots it seems, unfortunately, well attested that Romanian officials, army officers, and political hangers-on benefited pretty largely.

57,365 yokes were set aside for 'colonization of refugees', and of these 42,748 yokes were distributed to 4,271 families of colonists.¹ The colonization question has not, however, excited anything like so much ill feeling in Romania as in Slovakia or the Voivodina. In general, Romania appears to have stuck sensibly enough to the principle of reserving the land for the local population.

Much more ill feeling was aroused by the question of the ex-Magyar colonists. Some 1,700 families in all had been settled by the Hungarian Government, during the decades before the War, on 40,000 yokes of Crown land, which they themselves had cleared. They were still in 1918 not yet legal owners of their land, and the Romanian Government, in its capacity of successor to the Hungarian Government, ordered their expropriation down to the limits fixed for applicants under the Agrarian Reform. Legally the Government had a case, but its action bore an unfortunate appearance of vindictiveness, and it did wisely when, after prolonged negotiations before the League of Nations, it consented, 'as an act of grace' to compensate the colonists.

The minority landowners certainly lost very heavily under the reform. For the Saxons, the chief loss fell on their Church and communal property. The 'Saxon University' and 'Seven Sees' lost their entire foundation of 35,000 yokes, with the exception of 100 yokes. The Lutheran Church lost large portions of its estates; over 4,000 yokes of land in the 14 communes of the Bra^oov district alone. It must be remembered that these losses fall very heavily on the Saxons, who pay large sums for educational and charitable purposes and during the past decades often gave up parts of their individual holdings to form or enlarge foundations out of which these expenses could be met. The loss is particularly heavy, since the minority schools are nearly all Confessional, and depend for their very existence on the Church property. The Romanian Churches have also been expropriated; but the Romanians have the State schools to fall back upon. There were few large estates belonging to individual German proprietors, and the peasants owning medium estates were treated more indulgently than the Magyars, although there are cases enough where both individuals and communes have been deprived

1. J.Rusu, 'Quelques considerations sur Ia reforme agraire en Transylvanie', in *Revue de Transylvanie*, vol. ii, no. 3, March—April 1936, p. 378. Colonists were allowed 14 yokes, instead of the usual maximum of '7.

of land for the benefit of Romanians. There were certainly a large number of smaller abuses which caused much ill feeling.

The Magyar Churches (under which title we include the Roman Catholic) and cultural institutions lost even more heavily, while in addition, a considerable class of individual estate owners suffered what amounts to confiscation of a large proportion of their estates. It is true that owing to their greater tenacity and adaptability, the Magyar landowners of Transylvania, as a class, weathered the storm better than the boiars of the Regat,¹ so that many of them still enjoy a certain modest prosperity. Their losses were, however, enormous, and the national gains of either the German or the Magyar peasant beneficiaries certainly cannot begin to compensate for the losses of the big landowners and institutions of the same nationalities. The second big loss which the minorities have incurred has been in the public services. We have already referred to this question in its political and administrative aspect; but the social and economic effects of the replacement of minority officials by Romanians are at least equally important. It must be remembered that in most countries of Central and Eastern Europe the State, which controls not only the strictly administrative services, but nearly all the transport system as well as the production and sale of the various Government monopolies, is easily the largest employer of labor, and not only the political influence and social standing of any national group, but also its collective income depend very largely on the extent to which it is able to avail itself of State employment. Romania's new national policy in the question of officials has therefore had devastating effects for the minorities. These effects are not yet fully apparent, since the new policy is not of long standing, and the minorities of the older generation, the bread-earners of to-day, are still reasonably well represented in the Government services, while the minority pensioners probably outnumber the Romanian. The proportions are, however, changing with every year, and the younger generation of the minorities has to accept the situation that it cannot possibly look forward to anything except private employment.

It is the question of private employment which to-day holds the front of the stage. As we have seen, the position of the Transylvanian Romanians in the non-official life of Hungary was hardly better than in the official. They were only just beginning by 1914 to develop a small lower middle-class, and that had hardly begun to influence the economic life of the country. Its activities were confined almost entirely to the specifically Romanian national enterprise: the editing of Romanian newspapers, the manage-

ment of Romanian local banks and co-operatives, the defense of Romanian clients. The whole general business life of Transylvania was in the hands of Jews, Magyars, and Germans.

The natural revolt against this inferiority has been carried further since the War, and it has been reinforced, and its direction somewhat modified, by two other movements, both originating outside Transylvania. The first of these is the old anti-foreign movement born of the peculiar economic position of the Regat. For Roumania⁴ which is at once one of the newest, the richest, and the least business-like of all European States, has been more in the position of an 'economic colony' than any other European country. When the Phanariot régime ceased, it was only to give place to another form of foreign exploitation—in the form of the ownership and control by foreign capital of the great natural resources. One of the chief objects of Romanian policy, ever since the formation of Romania, has been to prevent this exploitation. The desires of the nation are reflected in the provisions of the Constitution that Romania may not be colonized by people of an alien race, that only Romanian citizens may acquire rural landed property, and that the sub-soil and mineral deposits are State property, and in various attempts which have been made to keep the control over the oil-fields in Romanian hands. The reality has been that while the provisions regarding land are honored, the execution of the laws in other respects have been continually thwarted by Romanians themselves, who have lent themselves for a consideration to every kind of evasion. The oil-fields and the rest of the large Romanian industry is still to an overwhelming extent foreign-owned, and not only the Directors and the administrative and technical staff but even the skilled workers are still to a large extent foreigners. The revolt of the Regat Romanians against this situation is a second element in the Transylvanian position, since the Romanian, not altogether unnaturally, fails to distinguish between the 'străini' (foreigners) who are foreign subjects in the Regat, and the 'străini' in Transylvania who are non Romanians, and have only become Romanian subjects since 1919.

Thirdly, there is the purely anti-Semitic movement, which is completely foreign to Transylvania (where, except in Maramure^o and Bistrița, the Jews inhabit almost exclusively non-Romanian districts) but has been imported, again, from the Regat. Parts of Wallachia, Northern Moldavia, and now the Bukovina and Bessarabia, harbor a Jewish population denser than that of any part of the world, except Poland. These Jews are at once a very powerful element in Romania, much of whose finance and commerce they control, and a truly exotic one. Orthodox almost to a man, they have remained almost entirely unassimilated, and the people

regard them as 'străini' Moreover, successive Romanian Governments have done their best to keep them technically in that position. For decades after Romania's formation she struggled to refuse them citizenship, and succeeded very largely, in the face of great pressure from the Powers. Thus the anti-foreign tendency works hand in hand with a very strong anti-Semitic movement, which has always existed in the Regat. In its modern form, this movement dates from 1910, when Professor Jorga and M. Cuza. founded a 'National-Democratic Party', the central plank in whose program was contained in its 45th Article: 'Solution of the Jewish question through elimination of the Jews and development of the creative forces of the Romanian.'

The complaints of the minorities concerning the discrimination practiced against their economic life would fill volumes. Government and municipal contracts are placed, wherever possible, with Romanian firms—a matter of very great importance, in view of the predominant role played by the State as purchaser for heavy industrial products. The minority banks passed through exceedingly difficult periods. Both Hungarian and German sources complain that the cheap rediscount credits granted during the early years by the Romanian National Bank were, given almost entirely to Romanian banks; thus in 1923 four Bucharest banks received rediscounts amounting to Over 200 per cent. of their capital, while 98 Magyar banks could obtain rediscounts only up to 4 percent of their collective capital:¹ this on top of the heavy losses which they had already incurred through their subscriptions to the Austro-Hungarian War Loan, The difficulties of the banks affected the whole economic life of the respective minorities, whose business men and farmers have also found it very hard to get credit elsewhere. Thus it was reported in 1930 that the 'Creditul Industrial', founded in 1924 with Government participation, for the purpose of giving cheap long-tenure credits to small industries, had not granted a single credit in the purely Székely departments of Ciuc (Csik) and Odorheiu (Udvarhely).²

Taxation has undoubtedly been discriminatory. Certain taxes exist which affect minorities almost exclusively, such as a tax on non-Romanian shop-signs and a surtax of 12 per cent. on the tax on trade and industry applied to firms keeping their books in any other language than Romanian. In other cases, it is the levying of taxation which is unequal. I was shown details of a case in which the Romanian engineers in a certain town were taxed 5 per cent, as professional men, while their Magyar colleagues had

1. *Die Nationalitäten in den Staaten Europa.*, p. 410 (German complaint on the same score, *ibid.*, p. 424).

2. *Ibid.*, p. 4.09.

'to pay 16 percent as merchants,. This was certainly no unusual occurrence; Hungarian sources report many similar cases.¹ And even where the taxes are equitably distributed, they are collected very differently. The minority taxpayer has to be punctual and complete, or he is sold up unmercifully; the Romanian can let his arrears drag on for years, and can probably get out of paying many of them altogether. Since import and export restrictions have multiplied, and all, or nearly all, Romania's foreign trade is subjected to the contingent system, a further means of discrimination has been open to the authorities, who grant the lion's share of all permits to Romanians.

On top of the innumerable injustices and chicaneries, of which the above are only examples, have come a series of more direct interference. The Romanian tendency towards, centralization has involved the imposition of a multitude of controls on such institutions as co-operatives, Chambers of Commerce, &c., which formerly worked quite autonomously. Further, the so-called 'Comisia Economica Speciala', which was set up for the purpose of 'nationalizing Romanian industry' (i.e. turning into Romanian companies the Romanian branches of foreign companies), concerned itself in practice with all important minority firms in Transylvania, which were obliged to take Romanian directors on to their boards, or in some cases to submit to the control of Romanian Government Commissioners.

Thanks to those various measures, a Romanian middle class is beginning to grow up side by side with the minorities. There are far more Romanian banks, Romanian shops, Romanian doctors, lawyers, and journalists than there were fifteen years ago. And much of this progress has been made at the expense of the minorities.

The extraordinary feature in the situation is that the agitation against the economic superiority of the minorities, instead of abating as these successes are registered, is growing stronger from year to year. Moreover, while the minorities complain quite truth-fully of abuse and injustice, the Romanian nationalists retort that the stranglehold of the minorities on the economic life of the country is stronger than ever. And it is quite true that all the progress of the minorities has not been downhill. The Saxon banks, for example, have expanded very greatly, extended their operations far beyond Transylvania, and now can rival the most important institutions of Bucharest. Even the Magyar banks, who found the initial period of adaptation much more difficult, have recovered in remarkable fashion.² Moreover, the minorities still possess the

1. Ibid., p. 411.

2. See the figures quoted by Transylvanus, op. cit., pp. 44 ff.

lion's share of the industries of Transylvania, some of which have expanded considerably since the War.¹

The explanation lies partly in the immense start which the minorities possessed in 1919. They had the capital, the goodwill, the experience, and fifteen years have simply not been enough to make up the arrears. But there appears to me to be another and deeper explanation.

The Liberal Party has controlled Romania since the War. They have actually been in power most of the time, while the other parties which have from time to time held office have either, like General Averescu's party, been little more than stopgaps, or else they have existed more or less on sufferance. Only Dr. Maniu's first Government was able to carry out a truly independent policy, and most of his work was immediately undone again as soon as the Liberals succeeded him. Now, the Liberals represent the outlook and mentality of the Regat, in which, as we said, the business life has always been in the hands of Jews or foreigners. True, they have revolted against this situation, but they have never seriously attempted to transform it. They have instead adopted a sort of glorified gangster policy, allowing the Jews to do the work while contenting themselves with a substantial rake-off. And, as they are essentially an oligarchic party, this policy has suited them admirably, nor has it been altogether unsatisfactory to the minority. The richer the Jew, the bigger the rake-off.

The 'national' policy which the Liberals have applied to the minorities in Transylvania has been just the same. The 'nationalization' of the minority firms has consisted in the practice of putting in a few Romanian directors, who are given a packet of free shares, or allowed to buy them at a nominal rate. After this, the average Romanian director has been perfectly content to fill the role of guinea-pig, his contribution to the business being to protect it against the Government. As most of these directors are Liberal politicians, they have usually been able to do so effectively. The activities of the 'Special Economic Commission' have thus, paradoxically enough, been the strongest defense for the minority firms.

The minorities, meanwhile, have pursued a tenacious and systematic policy, along the lines practiced for centuries by the Saxons, which are now being successfully imitated by the Magyars. This policy has not been oligarchic, but national. They have had to sacrifice some of their directors' fees, and to submit to various exaction, but they have seen to it that in all other respects their own nationals should benefit. They have bought from their own producers, sold as advantageously as possible to their own

1. Dragomir, op. cit., pp 234 ff.

consumers, and above all, they have staffed their businesses with their own men.

Thus, up to the present, they have kept their end up not too badly, and that thanks largely to the protection of the Romanian Liberals themselves, which partially neutralized the measures taken in the opposite direction. In Transylvania itself, moreover, there was no great revolt against this position for the first ten or twelve years. Some of the leading politicians were unwilling on grounds of principle to move against the minorities beyond what was already being done; others had entered the cozy hutch offered to the guinea-pig director.

About 1931, however, the pressure of the new generation began to grow much stronger. The State could not offer employment to nearly all the ex-students, and most unhappily, the sudden growth of the numbers of persons grimly determined to lead bourgeois lives coincided with a moment when no accumulation of capital was taking place which would have enabled them to find shelter in new or enlarged enterprises, but rather a shrinkage owing to the world depression. Thus a new assault on the economic position of the minorities began, which has certainly not yet reached its climax.

This attitude is far more serious than anything which has yet taken place, for it aims at realities, not appearances; it is national, not oligarchic. The young peasants' sons cannot be bought off like the Liberal politicians; for one thing there are too many of them. What they want is work, and their demands, if granted, would cut at the roots of the minorities' economic life.

The most prominent spokesman of this movement is Dr. Vaida Voivod, one of the leading Transylvanian politicians and twice Premier of his country. It is possible that to the three motive forces directed against the minorities we should add a fourth, for in denouncing the position in which the Romanians find themselves as compared with the minorities, Dr. Vaida is also castigating his political opponents of the Liberal Party, who have failed to remedy the evils in question. The ideas which, Dr. Vaida now advocates are, however, in full accordance with his past.' At all events he took up the cause of the unemployed Romanian youth with great fervor. During his own most recent term of office as Premier (January to November 1933) he made several endeavors to introduce some reforms, but met, according to his own account, with complete non-success ;² the employers of Romania, tacitly

1. Dr. Vaida preceded Hitler by some decades in introducing the term 'Aryan' into politics, although the 'non-Aryans' against whom he tilted in his youth were not Jews but Magyars.

2. Dr. Vaida himself told me that when Prime Minister, he circularized 550 large enterprises, asking them what proportion of Romanian and minority labor they employed. Only two even answered, and they were firms of which he was himself a director.

supported by the Liberals, simply boycotted all his endeavors, and it is an open secret that his toleration of other organizations holding similar ideas was what led to his fall from power. Naturally, therefore, he pursued his policy all the more vigorously after his fall, and at the Congress of the National Peasant Party in February 1935 he formally proposed the introduction of the now famous 'numerus Valachicus'.

The 'numerus Valachicus', as its author himself kindly expounded it to me, is intended to apply to State employment and employment closely connected with the State: that is to say, besides the Government services themselves, it would apply to those professions, such as that of medicine, much of whose work is conducted for the State and those industries which are of national importance. In all these branches of life, equally, the Romanians and the national minorities should be represented in proportion to their numbers. Proper education should be organized accordingly. Intelligent children should be selected from the different nationalities, in the same proportions, and taken into the State secondary schools, whence they would pass automatically into State employment, or into one of the - scheduled professions.

Outside these limits, Dr. Vaida would allow the minorities as many schools as they like, and would place no restriction on their economic activities. In home respects, therefore, his plan would seem to promise advantages even to the minorities themselves. It must, however, be remembered that given the dependence of Romanian industry on the State, there are few branches of economic activity which could reckon with any certainty on not coming within the scope of the 'numerus'; and it is obviously unlikely that if Romanians replace Magyars and Saxons in minority districts, they will be equally ready to make way for them in the heart of the Regat. Certainly the Romanian youth which hails Dr. Vaida as its leader does not envisage any sort of reciprocity; all its talk is simply of turning the minorities out.

At the Congress in question, the majority of the Party did not accept Dr. Vaida's program. He withdrew it, and soon after left the party. The proportion of the party which followed him was not very large, but his supporters increased rapidly when he began an independent agitation in the autumn, and by 1936 he commanded a large following. For his ideas are naturally enormously popular among many Romanians, whose attitude towards them is exactly the same as that of the manufacturer in a country changing over from free trade to protection. The interest of the consumer does not count; all that matters is that the individual producer should be relieved from the pressure of more efficient competition from outside. Resolutions from various professional

organizations in Romania have poured in on the Government, demanding national protection for this trade or that Perhaps the most original is the demand of the Romanian chimney-sweeps that members of minorities should not be admitted to their calling; for, they say, a chimney-sweep 'can see everything, hear everything, go freely anywhere'.¹

Meanwhile, the anti-Semitic feeling which we have mentioned as endemic in Romania had been growing rapidly since the War. Its appeal was increased in particular by two factors. Firstly, the unsettled economic conditions after the War enabled the experienced and agile-minded Jews to profit very largely, while the slower-witted Romanians were helpless in face of them. The land reform in the Regat, in particular, transferred enormous sums from the pockets of the Romanian landowners into those of the Jews. Secondly, the number of Jews in Romania itself was greatly increased through the annexation of the Bukovina and Bessarabia—both old Jewish strongholds—while it is also persistently alleged that there has been a great influx into Romania of Jews who are not Romanian subjects. It is certainly true that Romania contains at this moment scores of thousands of Jews who do not hold Romanian passports. In the majority of cases, the fault is not theirs; they are persons who ought, according to the stipulations of the Minorities Treaty, to have been given Romanian citizenship, but have been refused it under various quite unjustifiable interpretations of the law. There are, however, also many refugees from other countries, who have stepped into Romania and established themselves there, generally by bribing the authorities. Romanian anti-Semitic opinion, of course, lumps both categories together, and uses to the full the cry that 'you are being exploited by the alien Jew'.

Thus, although Professor Jorga abandoned anti-Semitism after the War, M. Cuza found no difficulty' in carrying on his movement, which altered its name into the 'Nationalist Democratic Christian Party' and in 1923 to the 'National Christian Defense League', since the Romanian nationalists, like their confreres elsewhere, regard themselves as a 'movement' rather than a 'party'.

In 1927 the younger and more radical members of the 'League' forsook M. Cuza, who is a philosophical old gentleman, to follow a new and far more 'advanced' leader in the person of M. Codreanu. M. Codreanu is a true and legitimate representative of the line of extreme nationalist leaders, who, for some reason, are nearly always strangers to the race to whose advancement they devote themselves. He is, in hard fact, not a Romanian, nor even a Coclreanu, for his worthy father was a Ukrainian named Zilinski, his excellent

1. Danubian Review, April 1936, p. 4.

mother a German called Launer From the day, however, when he shot a gendarme in Jaçi for defending two Jews, and was acquitted by a sympathetic jury, his career has never looked back. The 'Iron Guard' which he founded soon became a force in the country, commanded the devoted allegiance of hundreds of students, and perpetrated a series of anti-Semitic acts of violence which have darkened the name of Roumania.¹

In December 1933 a member of the Iron Guard murdered M. Duca, the Liberal Prime Minister, and the Guard was then dissolved. The measure was, however, hardly more than nominal. The title has been dropped in official parlance, but is currently used, while the organization goes on unchanged, and is probably stronger to-day than ever before. Meanwhile, MM. Cuza and Codreanu have been reinforced by a number of further groups and parties. M. Octavia Goga, the Transylvanian ex-Poet, founded a 'National Agrarian' Party, the program of which closely resembled that of M. Cuza, with whom he then combined in the summer of 1933, the combined parties taking the title of the Christian National Party. The Iron Guard has also found a large number of imitators whose shirts almost exhausted the spectrum.

The strength of all these parties lies outside Transylvania, into which they only make Occasional raids. Most of them were at first almost absorbed in the Jewish question, and if they interested themselves in other minorities, it was from a purely political point of view. Thus the Transylvanian Saxons are almost popular with many of the young nationalists, partly because a reflected glory shines upon them as members of the stock which bred Adolf Hitler, partly because of the common bond of a shared anti-Semitism. Gradually, however, they are moving towards Vaida's ideas, as he towards theirs. In 1935 a member of the Christian National Party explained to me his minority policy as follows: He divided the minorities of Romania into three groups: (a) The 'Germans, English, French, &c.' who are 'not dangerous to the Romanian State or people' are to have the same rights as Romanians; (b) The 'potential irredentists'—Magyars, Bulgars, &c.—are to have the right to engage in commerce, industry, &c., in proportion to their numbers, and also to enter State service, but not the Army, justice, or State education; (c) Jews born in Romania are to have the same rights as group (b), while the post-War immigrants are to be expelled. In November 1935 this *rapprochement* was carried a step farther,

1. The worst of these were at Oradea, Cluj, Ruedin, and certain other towns. In December 1928. A full description of these is given in 'La Situation de la minorité juive en Roumanie', presented to the League of Nations by various Jewish associations in March 1928.

when Vaida's Parliamentary group and the Christian Nationals formed a single Parliamentary bloc, with a common slogan 'Romania for the Romanians' and a common program, the chief points of which are the following: application of the national principle in all State and private enterprises, in the army, justice, administration, and education; reinstatement of the Romanian Church in its calling of 'creator and judge'; alteration of the Constitution to 'anchor the national idea in the structure of the life of the State'; abolition of trusts and cartels; securing the predominance of Romanian labor; removal of 'foreign elements' from economic life by checking lists of Romanian citizens and expelling foreign tiled labor. A number of social measures are also advocated, particularly measures to improve the economic, intellectual, and physical status of the Romanian peasantry.

The numbers of these combined parties are still not very great, but they have grown considerably in recent times. In the election of 1934 the Cuza-Goga parties obtained about 300,000 votes out of 2,000,000 votes recorded. In the next elections, if the agreement with Dr. Vaida can be consolidated, the extreme right should be strongly represented even in Parliament. Moreover, they work harmoniously enough, each in its different field, with the Iron Guard. 'Nous sommes enchantés de l'esprit de la Garde', said one of M. Cuza's followers to me; adding that the Guard would assuredly come after them and do the things which they cannot themselves do. Ninety percent of the students of Romania are Fascist after one fashion or another, and the movement seems to be growing stronger every day. .

As the nationalist parties have usually been in opposition, the amount of actual anti-minority economic legislation has been small. A law for the protection of national labor, enacted in 1926 and amended and strengthened in 1930, referred only to non-Romanians, who were forbidden to engage in any gainful occupation in Romania if an adequate supply of Romanian labor was available. In fact, these laws remained for some time something of a dead letter, although they were enforced much more severely in 1935, when a very large number of aliens were expelled, and several firms fined heavily for contravention of the law. The chief sufferers among the minorities (as distinct from the aliens) were large numbers of Jews who should have been Romanian citizens under the Minorities Treaty, but had been prevented by chicanery in various forms from completing their nationalization papers.

Nevertheless, the Liberal Government, driven on, perhaps, by the pressure of public opinion and constrained by political necessity to take some of the wind out of the Opposition's sails, has been much less indulgent towards the minorities in recent years. In

May 1935 the Liberal Minister, M. Jamandi, announced with some pride that 'while Dr. Vaida was disquieting the public with his "numerus Valachicus", the Government was quietly carrying out a program which went beyond it'.¹

A long step in this direction is the Act for the utilization of Romanian staff in enterprises, adopted on July 3rd, 1934. This law provides that every undertaking carrying on business in Romania must have Romanian staff to the extent of at least 80 per cent. in each of the groups into which the Act divides employed persons. (responsible administrative staff, responsible technical staff, subordinate administrative staff, subordinate technical staff, skilled workers, unskilled workers). All chairmen of boards of directors, at least 50 per cent of company boards and committees, and at least 50 per cent of auditors must be Romanians. Where an undertaking employs less than twenty persons, the proportion of Romanians who must be employed will be fixed by the Government. New industries may receive permits to employ a larger number of non-Romanians for two years.

The proportion of Romanians and non-Romanians to be employed in undertakings directly connected with national defense is prescribed annually by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. A list of these undertakings, including State undertakings and public services, is drawn up by the General Staff of the Army. It includes munitions plants, chemical undertakings, and undertakings generating power. The head of each undertaking has to submit annually a list of his staff, showing their names, nationalities, duties, remuneration, &c.

Technically speaking, this law, again, is directed only against the non-Romanian citizen. At the same time, that a distinction is intended between Romanians by race and members of minorities is shown by the fact that the schedule of staff not only distinguishes between Romanian and non-Romanian citizens, but also requires the 'ethnic origin' of the former to be stated. The minorities thus complain that the law is used as a further means of evicting them from employment, particularly in the enterprises 'connected with national defense'—a very elastic term, the definition of which depends solely on the pleasure of the War Office. It seems clear that the intention is to exclude from these undertakings the so-called 'elemente de incredere', viz. Magyars, Bulgars, Jews, and Russians.

Parallel with the pressure exerted under this Act by the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and the War Office, is a further pressure in the same direction by the Ministry of Labor I have myself seen a circular (marked 'confidential') which was sent to many

1. Nation und Staat, May 1935, p 541.

firms (I believe, all large firms in Transylvania), asking for a list of their employees, divided as follows:

Cetateni Români, Români:
Cetateni Români, Minoritani:
Cetateni Straini.¹

How far members of minorities have already lost employment under the above Act, or in response to pressure, I should find it difficult to say. I have heard expressed many more fears for the future than actual grievances. I have no doubt,; however, that strong pressure is being put on many firms to replace their minority directors and workers by Romanians, and the Act clearly gives the authorities a handle which, if they are unscrupulous, they can use unmercifully.

As I write, I am informed that new legislation is being prepared under which heavy penalties are provided for firms not employing the requisite proportion of Romanian citizens, while the proposal is also being entertained that the employees of all private enterprises shall be made to pass an examination in the Romanian language before a State Commission.

In the spring of 1937 it became known that the Government was preparing an Emergency Decree on still more drastic lines. According to well-informed sources, it was proposed to enact that in undertakings working with national capital, 50 per cent of the directors, &c., and 75 per cent of all other employees must be Romanians by race; in undertakings with foreign capital, the figures rise to 60 per cent, and 80 per cent respectively. The threat to all the minorities is grave indeed.

§ 13. THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM

The inhabitants of Transylvania, like those of Slovakia, complain that their country is treated as an 'economic colony'; and, it would appear, with some substance. Taxation has regularly been much heavier in Transylvania than in the Regat. Figures are not easy to obtain, but it seems common ground that not only is taxation higher in Transylvania, but it is collected far more strictly; according to one of my informants, 85 per cent of all taxes due are collected in Transylvania, and only 30 per cent in the Regat. Many firms have moved their head-quarters to Bucharest, in the hope of escaping this discrimination.

It is also very freely stated that no money is spent on public works in Transylvania, the yield of taxation going mainly to the

1. Romanian citizens, Romanians
- Romanian citizens Minorities
- Foreign citizens

Regat. Here again I can give no figures, but my general impression would be that the statement is quite correct. One seldom sees in Transylvania a public building of post-War construction, except only Orthodox cathedrals and churches, or elementary schools— for most of their other needs, the Romanians have contented themselves modestly with appropriating the second-hand buildings of the minorities. Both the road and the railway system are almost entirely heritages from the past, much the worse for their post-War experiences. There is in Transylvania only a single modern road— the Oradea—Braşov section of the Transcontinental road—and that is only half finished. Most Transylvanian roads surpass nightmares. An ambitious program of railway construction was planned, and is badly needed to fill in the gaps in the economic connection between Transylvania and the Regat which had been purposely left by the Hungarian Government; but so far as I know, not a single kilometer has been constructed. It is fair, of course, to remember that Romania, under the Liberal régime after the War, was nothing like so lavish in raising loans as most East European countries, and has in general followed a restrictive monetary policy. No part of the country has been generously treated in the matter of public works, and Bessarabia and the Dobrudja have perhaps come off worse even than Transylvania; but the Regat, and Bucharest in particular, have undoubtedly got such pickings as have been going.

It is also true, as we have mentioned before, that financiers and politicians from the Regat have managed, one way and another, to get into their hands a large slice of the natural resources and even of the businesses of the Regat, and have exploited them ruthlessly enough. In this way also much of Transylvania's wealth has flowed into the pockets of Regatler. Nevertheless, one may logically conclude that if this process goes on much longer, the seven' devils of Regatler company directors will at least expel the devil of unequal taxation. The extreme disorganization, corruption, and inefficiency of the whole Romanian system have also made the conduct of any business much harder than it would be in a country with higher commercial standards and greater legal security. If, however, we disregard such considerations and look rather to the natural factors in the position, it is doubtful whether Transylvania has lost by the annexation. Its communications to the west are, indeed, easier than to the east, and so long as the West European market continues to be so much more important than the Russian, it would seem a *priori* that any area must lose which had to adopt an eastern instead of a western orientation. On the other hand, the distances by road from Eastern Transylvania, at least, to the Danubian and Black Sea ports are

comparatively short, far shorter than the journey across Hungary to Fiume; and Bucharest is much nearer than Vienna or even Budapest. But in reality, it is impossible to consider the position of Transylvania as a whole. Generally speaking, the western half of the country has lost and the eastern half has gained. The west had in any case been much more closely connected with Budapest, whence it is now divided by the frontier, while Bucharest is a long and expensive journey away. There was, moreover, a close economic connection between the hills and the lowlands, including seasonal migration similar to that of Slovakia and Ruthenia. In the Maramureç, in particular, conditions are very much the same as we have described them in Ruthenia. The harvest labor has ceased, the timber, under present conditions, is unsealable, and the population in the mountains has been reduced to the greatest misery. In the Criçana the agricultural conditions are somewhat better, but the industry of the whole western strip (except only that of the Resiça ironworks, which have been largely occupied in munitions) has gone steadily downhill. The milling industries of the northern towns, and certain other factories which had entertained close relations with the Budapest market, have lost their *raison d'être*. An indication of the serious situation is the large emigration into the Regat which has taken place since the War from these districts, particularly the Department of Bihor.

But perhaps the most grievous blow of all was dealt only in quite recent times. There were still certain large industries which occupied a vital place in Romania's national economy, notably the great Astra locomotive works at Arad and the similar but smaller Unio works at Satu Mare. In 1935 it was decided, for strategic reasons, to remove both of these to Braçov. The gap which they will leave is one which can hardly be filled.

Central and Eastern Transylvania, on the other hand, have undoubtedly gained on balance. Agriculture has passed through a difficult time. Protected up to 1918 by the Austro-Hungarian tariff, it has now been brought into full competition with the agriculture of the Romanian plains, where conditions are far more favorable than in Transylvania. The full fall of the blow was mitigated for a time by the fall in production resulting from the land reform in the Regat, but the effects of this have now passed away, and cereal-farming in Transylvania, except for home consumption, is now hardly a paying proposition. On the other hand, Transylvania is well adapted both for cattle-farming and market-gardening, and the Germans, in particular, are adapting themselves with some success to the new conditions.

There is, moreover, a large traditional seasonal migration from the Székely districts into Wallachia. This has been greatly

facilitated by the displacement of the frontier, while the Székely also readily seek and find employment in Bucharest as domestic servants, coachmen, and factory-workers.

Transylvania is well placed to become the industrial center of Romania. Its industries, with few exceptions, do not compete with those of the Regat, so that even where financiers from the Regat have bought them up, it has not (as in Slovakia) been in order to close them down. In fact, Transylvanian industry has developed more rapidly than that of the Regat since the annexation. Braşov, even before the migration of the factories mentioned above, had swollen to over twice its previous size (to the great detriment of its old-world charm). It is planned to make it the center of the whole Romanian munitions industry. Mediaş (Megyes), also, has become an important industrial center.

Whether Transylvania is more important for the economy of Romania or of Hungary, is a subject which would require a volume in itself. In the old days, when the present Slovakia and Ruthenia formed part of Hungary, Transylvania was of secondary importance, since most of its raw materials, except mercury and methane gas, are also found in the Northern Carpathians. To day the position is different, and the timber, coal, and mineral deposits of Transylvania would be invaluable to Hungary. It also, however, rounds off the Romanian economy very neatly since few of its natural riches, except only timber, are found in large quantities east of the crest of the Carpathians.

§ 14. POLITICAL FEELING AMONG THE NATIONALITIES

When we turn to assessing political feeling, we must count the Romanians, almost solid, as in favor of their new State. There is, as we have said, much ill feeling between the Transylvanian Romanians and the Regatler; much discontent, many accusations of exploitation. Nevertheless, the Romanians would oppose, almost to a man, any question of a return to Hungary. They would not to-day even welcome a resurrection of the old Austro-Hungarian monarchy, remodeled on a federal basis as Francis Ferdinand might have attempted. The Magyar minority is hardly less implacably unreconciled to Romanian rule. There are in Transylvania none of those little pro-Government grouplets to which the inquirer is so innocently guided in other districts by helpful officials who are anxious that he should 'see both sides for himself'.¹ There is not even any important social differentiation,

1. The parties founded in opposition to the official Magyar Party has never endured for long. The most successful hitherto has been the Magyar Peasant Party, which secured three seats in the Parliament of 1932/3. A 'Union of Magyar peasants and workers of Romania', formed in the summer of 1934 out

for Romania, as we said, has made no serious attempt to break up the national solidarity of the minorities by offering any one class of them special social or political advantages—nor, indeed, has her system very many such advantages to offer. The only class which has shown any disposition to think on social rather than national lines (except for a very few landowners who have sought friends in Bucharest to save their estates) has been the small group of workers. Among them, one can hear the relative demerits of Romanian and Hungarian rule weighed with a certain impartiality based on distaste for either, although possibly with a slight bias in favor of Romania. The Romanian reaction, one is told, is less dangerous than the Hungarian, because it is less well organized. The general social and political structure of Transylvania at least is more democratic than the Hungarian, the administration less austere anti-social. With a little *baksheesh*, a worker can get a hearing. On the other hand, the present Romanian national drive is threatening the Magyar workers as much as any class of the whole minority. It has already squeezed many of them out of their humble positions in the Government service, and is now threatening their security in private enterprise also.

An interesting effect is that many of the workers migrate to the Regat, where labor is in demand and no one is rejected for not being Romanian. Indeed, the Germans and Magyars are very generally preferred as better trained and more trustworthy. If this process continues, the result will be that the Magyar working-class element which could be reconciled to the Romanian State will have moved bodily to the Regat. There they may possibly be Romanized, but they will not be able to form a counterweight to the irreconcilable in Transylvania. And even the workers contain a good many irreconcilables.

Many of the skilled workers belong to the Social Democrat Party which exists in a state of suspended animation. More, probably, are secret adherents of the Communist Party, which flourishes underground. In any case, however, the workers form only a small proportion of the total majority. The peasants and agricultural laborers, a much larger body, still think and feel nationally. A considerable number of them benefited, it is true, under the agrarian reform; and it is often suggested that these persons would not desire to return under the feudal Hungarian régime.

of dissent from the official party, accepts the Romanian State and advocates an advanced social policy, in collaboration with Romanian democrats, but insists very strongly on minority rights. I cannot believe either of these two parties to be important, since although I discovered their existence from print (to wit, from a Romanian year-book), I never heard a single reference to them when visiting the country fairly thoroughly in 1934 and 1935.

If they believed that they risked losing their land in consequence of revision, this would probably be the case, but I have not once heard this fear expressed; no one believes in any such possibility. As things are, the gain was pocketed ten or a dozen years ago, since when the Magyar peasants have suffered much from a host of grievances which loom large in their lives; arbitrary decrees, corrupt notaries, brutal gendarmes, the burden of taxation which, rightly or wrongly, they believe to be unequally imposed and still more unequally collected, the strain and expense of having to conduct every official transaction (or at least all which require the written word) in an unfamiliar language, probably through the medium of a paid, interpreter. Moreover, the Transylvanian peasants have been hard hit economically by the great fall in agricultural prices, for which (unjustly but naturally) the Government is blamed, and the local Magyars have not the great advantage of their cousins in Slovakia of being purveyors in chief to an industrial community. Agricultural prices in Romania are even lower than in Hungary. Thus, the ownership of the land once acquired, there has been no economic consideration to set against national feeling.

The great majority of the Magyar peasants are undoubtedly nationalist to day. Some years ago, when great demonstrations against frontier revision were organized on the frontier, a couple of Magyar villages joined in them, and this was proclaimed as a voluntary gesture, showing that the Magyar peasant preferred Romania; but the very officials who told me the story did so without conviction, almost shyly, and there seems no doubt that the 'voluntary demonstration' was made under strong official pressure. Unreliable as Romanian electoral statistics are, they do not err in favor of the opposition, and when they show, as they do, that the percentage of votes cast for the Magyar parties equals or exceeds the proportion of Magyar electors,¹ this is convincing proof that there can be no defalcation of any important social element. Equally unsuccessful have been Romania's attempts to drive a wedge between the Székely and the 'true Magyars'. The Székely may continue to despise the Magyars as inferior and later imitations of themselves, but they will never admit themselves to have anything in common with the Vlachs, and they have held out against all inducements to make a 'separate peace' with Romania. The various minority churches never carry to the outer world any differences which may exist between them. Thus practically all sections of the Magyar population

1. The Romanians calculate the Magyars at 77 per cent, of the total population, and the votes cast for the Magyar parties have ranged between 75 per cent.

and 9 per cent. of the whole. Dragomir, op. cit., p. 269. . ' .

throughout the transferred territories present a common front against the Romanian and all his works.

The positive wishes of the Magyars are less easy to define than the negative. The program of the Magyar National Party, which varies little from year to year, envisages the largest possible measure of self-government compatible with the unity of the State. It reverts in fact to the medieval 'privilege' system which survived so long in Transylvania, demanding the organization of the country into 'nations'. The Magyar 'nation' is to have the right of self-government, conducting its own administrative and judicial system through the medium of its own officials. All religions are to be free, equal, and autonomous. Education is to be conducted through the autonomous churches and it is to be Magyar in all stages, although instruction in Romanian language, history, and geography is admitted. The army is to be a militia, instruction to recruits being given in their mother tongue. Communes and departments are to have wide powers of self-government.

This program is, of course, little more than a gesture. The Alba Julia Resolutions would have conceded a large part of it, but no Romanian government to day would think of granting even a tenth of it. It is, however, interesting as showing the fundamental point on which all Magyars are agreed: that they wish for as little Romanian control as they can possibly achieve.

If, however, the program is a maximum one in the sense that it asks for more than it can ever hope to get from the Romanian State, it does not necessarily represent also the real maximum wishes of the Magyars, since no party could safely put forward openly irredentist demands. Those real wishes, where revealed, show an interesting divergence which is indeed on local lines, but less between Székely and Magyars than between the Magyars of the western districts and those of Transylvania proper.

The Magyars of the Crișana, Maramureș, and the Banat regard themselves simply as part of unitary Hungary, cut out of its living body by an unjust frontier. There is no separate local feeling, no tradition of co-operation with the other local nationalities. They spend their time looking wistfully across the adjacent frontier and complaining (often with reason) of the Romanians. They do not even attempt, so far as I could judge, to live on tolerable terms with the non-Magyars. Even a tennis club which was started in Timișoara failed because the different nationalities could not play peaceably together. Their ideal is certainly a return to Hungary and, what is more, a return to the old national order, in which the Magyars and the Magyars only should rule and the minorities be kept in their places. (The Magyarized Jew who expounds these

ideals in Oradea or Arad resembles so exactly both in appearance and mentality the Magyarized Jew who expounded them in Luèenec or Košice, that the traveler wonders wildly whether the man has somehow cut across the frontier and bobbed up again to rub in the points made at the previous interview.) If, like good Magyars, they hold as their ideal the restoration of Hungary's pre-War frontiers, their immediate interest lies in their own position, and it is hardly conceivable that they would refuse local revision which stopped short at the Transylvanian frontier.

Incidentally, there is no discernible difference, over these questions, between the outlook of the older generation and the younger. If there is any development, it follows the lines of the development in Hungary, and does not affect the national outlook. In Transylvania itself there is a marked difference, due in part to altered social conditions. True, in the west the material foundations of the old social order have crumbled, but the social outlook has remained intact. In Transylvania the extreme feudal outlook characteristic of Western Hungary never prevailed. There were a few very large estates, but the average Transylvanian landowner was always a comparatively poor man, living modestly on an estate which was neither very large nor very fertile. On the other hand, in the Székely districts there were still in 19x8 many free peasants with a long tradition of independence behind them. The agrarian reform swept away the big estates—and I was greatly struck, in 1935, by the absence of repining with which this measure was regarded, so far as it affected individuals. As for the 'Hungarian Optants', they enjoyed extraordinarily little sympathy. The reform has created a society far more homogeneous than that of Hungary proper, or even of Slovakia; a community of squires and peasants whose standards of living are not so very far apart, and a small bourgeoisie whose life in the little hill-towns has not estranged them from their country cousins.

Consciously or unconsciously, this society is developing very much on the lines which the Saxons have adopted so successfully. The corporate institutions—the Churches, the political party, the co-operative societies (which have been excellently organized and conducted by a young member of the Bethlen family)—count for more than the individual. Each class seeks to help and understand the other. Very characteristic is the keen interest taken by the younger generation of townspeople, particularly the students, in the villages, where they spend much of their vacations, carrying out social and educational work and themselves learning the problems of rural life. The Churches and the political party carry on similar work. In such modest fashion, renouncing the ambition to rear an imposing super-structure, but laying the foundations

very firm and deep, the Transylvanian Magyars hope to shelter from the present storm.

In this atmosphere, the old Transylvanian spirit has revived in remarkable fashion. 'The Magyar youth of Transylvania', said a recent writer, 'is Transylvanist. It wishes to live in Transylvania and for Transylvania.' For them the party program summarized above approximates to the ideal. They would like to see a modification of the old Transylvanian system, i.e. the cohabitation of three 'nations'—now the Magyar, the Romanian, and the German—on an equal footing, each enjoying the widest possible self-government. This is by no means a return to the old order, since they genuinely recognize that the *de facto* inferiority of the largest element could no longer be defended. And it is interesting that, for this very reason, few of them would welcome an unconditional return to the Hungary of 1914. I have heard prominent men in the National Party say that no good purpose could be served by restoring Transylvania unconditionally to Hungary because 'the country has, after all, a Romanian majority. We are now under the Romanians but it would be no remedy simply to reverse things and put the Romanians under us.' Moreover, the social and political order in Hungary is severely criticized in Transylvania. There is no more wish to return to the old social system than to the old national system.

Meanwhile, there is perfect willingness to co-operate with the young Romanians, a willingness frustrated by the consistently intransigent attitude of the latter. It is tragic, although natural, that so long as the Romanians asked only for equality, Hungary refused it to them; when the Magyars ask it, they encounter only Romania's will to power and a rapid diminution of Romanian autonomist feeling which postpones the realization of their dream to the Greek Calends.

The distinctive Transylvanian feeling of the Magyars must by no means be interpreted as treachery to their Magyar nationality. They feel themselves perhaps a rather different kind of Magyar, possibly fated to a different destiny, but not less Magyar than the men of the Alföld. Clearly, if they had to choose between a Magyar and a Romanian national state, they would prefer the former. They would, however, prefer to either a Transylvania in which they could enjoy genuine national liberty and develop their particular local institutions undisturbed.

Feeling among the other minorities is nothing like so clear-cut as among the Magyars, for the Romanians have, as we have shown, made considerable efforts to detach them, both nationally and politically, from the Magyar cause, and these efforts have not

1. G Zathmecky, in *Nouvelle Revue de Hongne* July 1933, p 709

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been wholly ineffectual. The most important minority, the German, has received the largest favors. As individuals (although the losses of their Church were, as we have said, very heavy) they suffered less under the land reform than the Magyars, and in almost every other respect they have been far more leniently treated. They have been allowed to retain a considerable number of officials, and where Romanians have been sent into the Saxon districts, these have usually been picked men. The Saxon businesses have not been required to take on many Romanian employees, the Lutheran Church has not had to complain of forced conversions, elections have been conducted cleanly in the German districts, and they have been allowed to organize in *Vereine* as many and as various as they desired.

Moreover, their cultural life has not been repressed but, in the case of the Saxons, allowed practically unrestricted freedom, and in the case of the Suabians, actually fostered. The encouragement has been, it is true, more moral than material, but its value is not to be underrated. These are considerations which must weigh heavily with a people which, after all, is in a very different position from the Magyars. For the Germans, it is not a question whether they are to be the under or the upper dogs. They will always be a minority and the most they can look for is to find good masters and to make good terms with them. In this they will always be guided exclusively by their own interests, which will be unaffected by any sentiment of loyalty, gratitude, or affection. That the Saxons voted for the Romanian State in January 1919, and the Suabians accepted it some months later, is no more proof that they necessarily prefer Romanian rule to Hungarian than is the fact that at every election since 1919 they have formed electoral pacts with the Government. They have simply adopted the ingenuous but successful role of the Vicar of Bray. As a matter of fact, in several visits to Transylvania since 1919, I have always found the canny Saxons chary of expressing an opinion on the rival merits of Hungarian and Romanian rule. Even when complaining most bitterly of abuses suffered at the hands of the Romanian authorities, they have declined to commit themselves to the statement that it was better under Hungary. There were things to be said on both sides. . . . The land reform and consequent impoverishment of the churches and schools had been a grievous blow, the administration was a thing to weep over, but, on the other hand, there was much less cultural pressure; the Romanians left them pretty well alone. . . . No, it was about fifty-fifty, a choice of two evils.

The Suabians, on the other hand, were, until two years ago, very definitely pro-Romanian, on cultural grounds. Nationalism

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took them late, but, like mumps, it raged all the more fiercely when it came, and the worthy Suabians became so enthralled in the delights of building up German Culture in the far south-east as to become blind to almost any other consideration; particularly as Timisoara enjoyed also a considerable material prosperity, as the center of a fat little world of its own.

The flourishing German culture, the Church, the primary and secondary schools (crowned by the boarding-school, 'Banatia', which every visitor must inspect), the newspapers, bookshops, libraries, cultural evenings, *Vereine*, *Verb/bide*, and *Vereinigungen*—all these formed a picture which was contrasted ever and again with the position of the Suabians in Hungary, fighting so vainly for the 'B' and even their 'C' schools. It is impossible to exaggerate the effect of this comparison, and of the incidents which occurred from time to time in Hungary to drive it home; the publication of the Hungarian census of 1930, showing an apparent diminution of over 70,000 in the number of Hungarian Germans; the demonstrations against Professor Bleyer, the German leader, in 1933; the trouble over the elections of 1935, where German candidates with nationalist leanings had a most unhappy time at the hands of the authorities, &c.

The peasants were not, indeed, nearly so entranced as the intellectuals. The cultural question meant less to them than the material and administrative. With regard to the former their position had not improved (in the Banat all the peasants owned their own land) while the latter had deteriorated. Perhaps if each man's opinion had been asked separately, there would always have been a majority which thought Hungarian ways better. But the Suabians, like all Germans, are a disciplined people. They obey their leaders, and their leaders would always have voted unhesitatingly for Romania. They have, in fact, joined quite spontaneously in anti-revisionist demonstrations. In the last two years the increased pressure of the Romanians, combined with the economic crisis, has caused a certain cooling off of the first enthusiasm. This had coincided, however, with a fresh and even more violent wave of national feeling among the Germans, causing them to attach even greater weight to the comparative cultural liberty which they still enjoy.

An interesting by-product of the German Magyar cultural struggle is the bitter war waged between the two minorities for the body of the Szatmár Germans,' who have thereby acquired an importance quite out of proportion to their numbers. While the unfortunate people itself is in a state of complete confusion about itself (it is not uncommon to find a family. in which the grand

1. See above, pp. 271, 312

parents speak only German, the parents only Magyar, the elder children Magyar and the younger children German), Germans and Magyars fight like tiger-cats for the possession of them. A young German leader said to me personally that he was opposed even to any local frontier revision in favor of Hungary because this would expose the Szatmár Suabians to a renewal of Magyarization; a Magyar leader declined to mediate in Hungary in favor of the Suabians there until the Germans ceased trying to filch the Szatniár group from their Magyar allegiance. ¹

But even apart from this, the Germans and Magyars have totally failed to co-operate in the new Romania. The Saxons in particular have shown not the smallest compunction in sacrificing their fellow minorities wholesale where they could get the smallest advantage for themselves. I remember seeing an electoral proclamation issued by the Magyars of Sighisoara (Schässburg, Segesvar) (a mixed town in which the Magyars number 20 per cent., the Saxons perhaps 50 per cent.) before the local elections of 1934. For ten years, this pathetic document proclaimed, the Magyars had concluded electoral pacts with the Saxons. Not one Magyar had during that time sat on the City Council. When officials had been dismissed after 1918, Magyars had always had to go; when vacancies occurred, Saxons had always been put in. Only one Magyar was still employed by the municipality, and he had been put in by Romanian influence. Two hundred and fifty thousand lei had been received in subsidies for cultural purposes, and the Saxons had taken every leu for themselves. The Magyars had therefore turned to the Romanian Liberals, made a coalition with them, and had promptly received their share of subsidy for schools and churches, and a proportion of seats on the Couse⁹.

I quote this document, not to pillory the good city fathers of Sighisoara—the most beautiful of all the old Saxon cities—but to emphasize the complete absence of any solidarity between the German and Magyar minorities in Transylvania. As already remarked, the minorities have only once combined at Parliamentary elections; nearly always, they have attached themselves to various Romanian parties. In recent years, however, the political life of the German minority has developed along lines which makes it impossible to consider it purely under the aspect of specifically Saxon or Suabian, or even exclusively Transylvanian, interests. These new developments, incidentally, make of the German minority a far more important political factor than they were in the old days when the Saxons stood practically alone as representatives of the German spirit. All in all, the Germans of Romania number certainly not less than 700,000; for besides the 225,000

1. M. Jakábffy in *Nation und Staat*, July—Aug., 1933 p. 650.

Saxons, the 275,000 Suabians of the Banat and the 30,000—40,000 Szatmár Suabians of the old Hungary, there are some 70,000 Germans in the ex-Austrian Bukovina (a highly organized community, which under Austrian rule possessed a University of its own at Czernowitz), 80,000 in Bessarabia, 10,000 in the Dobrudja, and about 20,000 in Wallachia. These various groups, living respectively under Hungarian, Austrian, Russian, and Romanian rule, naturally had no political relations before the War, and were indeed hardly conscious of each others' existence. In 1919, however, when the Saxons put forward their own national demands at their meeting in Media^o, they expressed the hope that the same rights would be accorded to the other German groups in Romania, that the national unity of all those groups would be recognized, and that they would themselves follow the Saxons' lead. The Sachsentag of November 1919 again spoke in the name of all the Germans of Romania, and again asked for a single national statute. Following this meeting, a 'Verband der Deutschen Grossrumäniens' was established as a central political and cultural organ to co-ordinate the work of the various 'Volksrate'.

The Verband, although it met annually, accomplished little for several years. It discussed policy and suggested candidates before Parliamentary elections; but it was quite inactive in cultural matters, and showed neither the ability nor even any keen desire to foster national unity. Even the 'Volksrat' for Transylvania failed to maintain itself. The Suabians of the Banat, and even those of Satu Mare, founded separate 'Volksrate', and each group made, roughly speaking, its own policy and lived its own life, mainly under the direction of its ecclesiastical leaders; the Lutheran Church for the Saxons, the Catholics for the Suabians. Each made its own terms with the Romanians; the Saxons, under their highly accomplished political leader, Hans Otto Roth, the more successfully. In about 1930 things began to change. The leader of the new movement was Herr Fabritius, of Sibiu, who had been prominent as early as 1912, but especially after the War, in certain social activities. In 1930—I Fabritius initiated a more active 'Erneuerungsbewegung', the nature and objects of which are rather difficult to describe. He himself and his followers describe it rather as a new 'attitude towards the world' than a new policy. It includes, at any rate, a strong, if somewhat mystical German national feeling, with a social outlook strongly sympathetic to the peasant and the artisan and a general adulation of 'Jugend', the whole flavored with a dash of anti-Semitism.

Fabritius was soon joined by a much more radical group under Herr Gust, who carried his imitation of things in Germany much farther still, organizing S.A. and 5,5, and introducing into the

sedate Transylvanian press tones to which its strings had been untuned for centuries. Between them, Gust and Fabritius founded a National Socialist Party of the Germans in Romania ('Neda') which, having not much else to do, occupied itself largely with attacking the old leaders.

The latter regarded the movement with discomfort mingled with incomprehension, and hardly concealed their satisfaction when the Romanians, under the influence of Francophil circles in Bucharest who disliked any untoward spread of Nazi ideals, threatened to dissolve the 'Neda' as dangerous to the State. In the hope, however, of maintaining the national unity, they agreed to dissolve their own 'Einheitspartei' if the 'Neda' were banned.

The ban duly fell in 1934 (after M. Barthou's visit to Romania), but the 'Neda' reappeared soon after under the new title of 'Deutsche Volkspartei', this time with Gust in charge, and Fabritius as a sort of honorary Führer. Thereupon the 'Einheitspartei,¹ which had never dissolved in more than name, reconstituted itself also, and an immensely complex struggle ensued—all the winds of Aeolus in a dessert coffee-cup. To call it a fight between the old and the new would be a gross over-simplification, for on the one hand, Gust and Fabritius soon parted company, and on the other, the Conservatives were themselves rent by personal differences, which cut right across the division of principle between Suabians and Saxons. It seems unprofitable to follow the intricacies of maneuvering which went on, reminiscent of nothing so much as the children's game of twos and threes. At the time of writing (September 1936) Herr Fabritius had, rather unexpectedly, emerged as Führer-in-chief, with the tacit support of Roth, who remained head of the German Political Party and chief intermediary between the Germans and the Romanian Government, and of most of the Conservatives (who regard him as the lesser evil), with Herr Gust and Herr Bonfert (the latest pretendant to the radical leadership) in bizarre alliance with the veteran Saxon leader Brandsch (who had been deposed from his own position for showing insufficient activity) constituting the radical opposition. Meanwhile, the Church retains an immense amount of quiet influence and may outlive all the Führers yet.

In many ways, the whole thing had been much ado about nothing; for as one old gentleman, father of a young aspirant to power, said to me plaintively, the Saxons have for centuries past already practiced all the essential points of the Nazi philosophy. They have always been strongly Germanic; always placed the 'Volksgemeinschaft' above the individual; have based their power on the rich peasant and the small bourgeois, not bothered their heads about Parliament, and had no truck with Jews. The only

essential new point seems to be the determination of the 'Erneuerer' to subordinate the Church to the political control; and strong as is their argument that in no other way can complete national unity be achieved, the counter-argument is equally valid that Romania is under no obligation to give a German 'Volksgemeinschaft' any rights whatever, nor even to recognize its existence, while the Churches do enjoy considerable guaranteed rights and practical autonomy.

Certainly, however, the revitalized 'Verband der Deutschen in Rumanien', over which Herr Fabritius was presiding at the time of writing, represents a new force in East European politics— a very greatly increased feeling of national solidarity which prevails among all the Germans in Romania. They are conscious of kinship and community of interest, both among themselves and with other Germans, particularly the Germans of the Reich, and those of Hungary.

The last-named point is the more important, for even the Germans see the absurdity of claiming Romania as any part of the German Reich, nor are they numerous enough in Romania to influence its foreign policy. But in a question of frontier revision, as between Romania and Hungary, their voices might turn the scale, and it is therefore necessary to state plainly that at present, in any case, they take Romania's side both publicly and (I believe) in their hearts. They are, of course, opposite to the extreme chauvinistic Romanian policy, rejecting assimilation and claiming the right to a certain separate position in the State, with a degree of self-government under their own officials. They maintain, however, that the younger generation of Romanians are themselves moving towards the ideal of the 'Volksgemeinschaft', and regard the German ambitions not unsympathetically. They are not antagonistic to the Romanian State as such, recognizing the superior numbers of the Romanians and their right to self-determination. And their leaders have expressed to me their active opposition even to frontier rectification in Hungary's favor, on the grounds that the present Romania makes possible the unification of a large number of scattered German groups, and that frontier revision, even on a local scale, would presumably mean the loss of the Szatmár Suabians and possibly of the Banat Suabians as well. So long as Hungary persists in the policy of Magyarizing her minorities in general, and of refusing even to recognize the German nationality of the Szatmár group in particular, they actively support Romania's claims against those of Hungary.

There can be no mistaking the sincerity and depth of this feeling. Again and again, inquiring among the younger Germans

of every class and type, I have met with almost identical answers: We have nothing to gain by going back to Hungary.' 'The Germans in Hungary are worse off than we.' Not that they have any affection for Romania or Romanians. No consideration of gratitude or loyalty would bind them if the choice were theirs to make again, any more than it bound the Saxons in 1919. They would, however, never willingly return to Hungary upon any conditions short of very far-reaching national autonomy, which they would doubtless insist must be granted to all the Germans of Hungary. If she wished for their suffrages, Hungary would have to make very generous offers in this direction, and to bind herself very strictly to fulfil them.

The position of the Jews is a sort of caricature of that of the Germans. They have been de-Magyarized and restored to themselves That is, they are entered in the census as a separate nationality, allowed and even encouraged to form a political party of their own, and given the opportunity of having as many Hebrew schools as they care to pay for. But these gifts are a two-edged sword. The Hebrew school is useless to any child destined for a career other than that of a rabbi, and the Jew when he appears as a Jew is perhaps even more unpopular in Romania than when he wears the guise of a Magyar.

Political feeling among them is very mixed. The older generation of the Magyarized Jews in Cluj, Oradea, and Arad still clings to the memory of Hungary with remarkable loyalty. One of the opposite party suggested to me, indeed, that his Magyar compatriots expected revision to come and feared to compromise themselves, but I think that he under-estimated their qualities both of heart and head. The devotion with which many of them have stuck to their old protectors has made the sudden *volte-face* of the Suabians look shabby indeed. Several of them have used to me really touching language regarding their kindly treatment by Hungary in the past, and the unbreakable spiritual bond which still unites them to the fatherland Not a few have got into grievous, easily avoidable trouble for their vigorous espousal of the Magyar cause. But this attitude is getting less and less easy to keep up. The Magyars themselves do not always encourage it. If their older generation finds the Jewish alliance natural, the younger men are so far affected by the ideas of to-day as to look a little askance at it. The Magyars are not nearly so anti-Semitic as the Germans or the Romanians, but the Székely, in particular, do regard the Jew as definitely a different animal from themselves. Moreover, they get on more easily with the Romanians without him. More than one Romanian has told me that he can reach a sensible understanding with the local Magyars when they are

represented by their own men, but he simply cannot deal with the limitless ingenuity and exaggerated patriotism of the Magyarized Jew. The Magyars feel this, and are turning a little away from their old allies.

Far more bitter are the complaints which one hears of the attitude of the Hungarian Government. Rightly or wrongly, the Jews declare that Hungary has afforded them no recognition whatever for their devotion. She has used them to swell her statistics, but she has not lifted a finger to help them, 'Why', said one to me, 'should I run after a car which will not take me up as a passenger?' And another, a young man, said, 'I cannot be Hungarian because Hungary has introduced the "numerus clausus".'

The greater part of the younger generation have therefore moved away from Hungary. On the other hand, they cannot conceivably become Romanians. Their religion enjoins the large Orthodox and Sephardian communities of Szatmar and Maramures to be good citizens of Romania, while others who have found comfortable niches in the economic system (and that system offers many opportunities for enrichment, not apparent at first sight; thus the Szatmár Jews are said to make a considerable income by smuggling) have snuggled into them and would doubtless be sorry to leave them. But of any sort of sentimental attachment to Romania there is no trace, nor could it be expected; the students' excesses, the vicious propaganda of the Right, the systematic refusal to many thousands of the right of citizenship, make it impossible to look for any friendship; at the most there may be what the Germans call an 'Interessengemeinschaft' with certain circles. There is not even, among the Transylvanian Jews, any desire for assimilation to Romanian ways such as is found commonly enough in Bucharest. On the whole, the Transylvanian Jews have agreed with the Romanians to regard themselves as — Jews. The non-political 'Union of Romanian Jews' and the Jewish political party, both of which have their chief strength in the annexed provinces, represent the attitude of most of the Transylvanian Jews to-day. They are correct in their relations to the State, and for the rest they lead their own life. But they are profoundly unhappy. If they can no longer be counted as safe allies of the Magyars, neither are they pro-Romanian.

The other minorities are unimportant by comparison. The largest of them, the Serb, is the only one which could well present any danger of irredentism, and it is peculiarly situated owing to the existence of the Yugoslav-Romanian alliance, besides being culturally protected by the special treaty already mentioned. I can only say that the Serbian leaders, cultural and political, with whom I spoke (a Serbian Party was founded in Timisoara in 1934, while

the Church provides the real national rallying-point) expressed the most correct of sentiments. As for the other small minorities, whether they find life tolerable or not seems to depend chiefly on the personal character of the village notary and the gendarme.

§ 15. THE POSSIBILITIES OF REVISION

What, then, has been the balance of the last fifteen years of Transylvania? As we have seen, the story of these years has consisted, essentially, of a simple turning of the tables. In 1914, Transylvania was ruled by and for the Magyars, without and largely against the Romanians, with the Saxons occupying a sort of middle position. To day, it is ruled by and for the Romanians, against the Magyars, with the Germans still in the middle—culturally better off, socially and economically worse off. Where the Magyars formerly had the political power, the Romanians have it to day. Instead of Magyar and a few German officials, and no Romanian, there will soon be Rumanian, a few German, and no Magyars. Instead of a State-supported Magyar education, with struggling Romanian and German schools, there is now State-supported Romanian education, while the Magyars (and the Germans again) have to struggle to keep their schools in existence. Where Magyar industry and agriculture got easy credits, Romanians get them now; and so on and so on.

Since, under the old régime, only some 30 per cent. of the population were top dogs and at least per cent under dogs, whereas the proportions have now been reversed, one may perhaps say that, if one accepts as the most desirable goal the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the last state is at least better than the first. But the contention of the Magyars (with which the Saxons to some extent agree) is that the happiness of the Romanians themselves, not to speak of the minorities, is not best achieved by handing over to them the exclusive power over the country. The Romanians, they say, are the largest numerical element, but they are also far the most backward. The culture, the intellectual and civic life of the country is, exclusively, the work of the Saxons and Magyars. The Romanians have ever been uncreative, incapable of evolving even for themselves any sort, of higher existence, and totally unfitted to rule over others. Whatever they possess in Transylvania they owe to the minorities, and when given their full freedom of action, they will simply despoil the minorities and by doing so choke up the wells from which they draw their own sustenance.

Historically, the minorities are perfectly right; and as regards the present, the experience of the last fifteen years has supported

their case only too well. The whole life of the country seems, as it were, to have been dropped bodily on to a less civilized plane. Standards all round have been lowered. The administration and even the justice seem less honest, less hard-working, less efficient. The trains are less punctual, the police regulations more tiresome, the officials more brutal and more exorbitant, the streets dirtier, the very bugs in the beds bite more confidently, as though feeling that under the new order people do not mind them so much. Things go to ruin and are not repaired, either because the authorities are accustomed to second-rate, shoddy, patched materials or because some one has pocketed the money voted for repairing the damage.

Hitherto, also, the Romanians have constructed little in Transylvania. /they have simply taken over what the minorities had accumulated in past centuries, and are living on it, and often not even keeping it in its old state. As we said, it is rare to see a new building in Transylvania, except only an Orthodox church or perhaps a barracks; for the rest, all that is beautiful and almost all that is valuable seems to date from a long time ago.

Thus the prophecies of the minorities have hitherto justified themselves with dismal accuracy. Moreover, it is quite possible that the worst may be yet to come, for the Romanization of the administration is only now being completed. It is only now that the new generation of Romanians is replacing the survivors of the old system, who had still maintained some of its earlier traditions; only now that Romanian national feeling is developing its full force.

Nevertheless, it is impossible to maintain that the Romanians of Transylvania are not happier under the present régime than the old. Their position before the War was neither tolerable nor tenable. The rusty shackles of an earlier age, which they wore on their wrists, had to be snapped. For shackles they were. It is true that in theory the Romanian citizen of Hungary was equal to any other, and the way to the highest positions in the State lay open to him equally with the true Magyar, the Slovak, or the German. But the conditions which Hungary, rightly or wrongly, laid down were such as the vast majority of Romanians (unlike the Germans or Slovaks) were, rightly or wrongly, unable to accept. They were thus condemned to the narrowest local life, without hope of advancement. Even the benefits of the superior administration were probably little apparent to them, since in the last years a large part of the Government's efforts had been devoted to the purely political end of securing Magyar supremacy. To the Romanian, the State was thus simply a machine for thwarting his ambitions, just as the educational system was a machine for altering his

language—with the result of leaving him illiterate. It is an immense advantage to the Romanians to be able to develop freely along their own lines, to be able to look forward to a more spacious existence attained through the cultivation, not the repression of their national instincts. The benefit to those to whom the way now lies open, through the new system of Romanian education, to a higher career, is too obvious to need emphasizing. But even the Romanian peasant and woodcutter, who aspires to no other position in life, has acquired a new self-confidence, a new hopefulness which contrasts strongly with the mixture of fear, suspicion, and resentfulness with which he used to regard the world. This is a healthy thing, which will benefit in the long run all the peoples of Transylvania. It will be better for the Magyars and Germans themselves if their Romanian neighbors achieve a higher standard of civilization and self-respect.

Even the economic measures which we have described have their silver lining. Those who do not dissent from the almost universal prejudice in favor of peasant proprietorship will find the present system of land distribution in Transylvania preferable to the old. The total cultivable area held by proprietors of 10 hectares or under has risen from 2,536,738 ha. (34 per cent.) to 4,200,547 ha. (56.45 per cent), that held by owners of 100 ha. or more having fallen from 2,751,457 (37 per cent.) to 1,087,648 ha. (14.61 per cent.) (the medium property of 10-100 ha. remaining unchanged at 2,153,117 ha., 29 per cent. of the total).

The landless agricultural class, and the category owning too little for the support of their families, although not wiped out, has been greatly reduced. The new owners have not had a happy time, owing to the terrible agricultural crisis which has hit Romania as hard as any country in Europe. They have become deeply indebted, and the Government has had to come to their rescue by a large-scale cancellation of debts on small properties and conversion of others. Yet during the period when money was almost non-existent in Romania, the peasant proprietor, who simply retired into his shell and lived a self-contained life similar to that of his ancestors two thousand years ago, certainly suffered far less than the agricultural proletariat of other countries. If he could not sell his produce, he could at any rate eat it.

The land reform has not, on the whole, resulted in a decrease of production. There was a considerable fall during the years 1920—4, as compared with the pre-War figures; this was due partly to the effects of the reform, partly to those of the War, while in some of these years, especially in 1924, the weather was also unfavorable. Both the area under cultivation of the main crops and the total produce rose thereafter rapidly until 1929, after which the effects

of the world agricultural depression began to be felt. Since that date, they seem to have remained at approximately the pre-War level. ¹

In the long run, too, it must benefit the whole country that the Romanian acquired business experience, even that a class of Romanian skilled workers is beginning to grow up. The standards are still very low and the customer who is forced to buy Romanian products is far worse served than he who can buy, say, the produce of experienced Saxon firms. But the broadening of the basis of economic life in Transylvania cannot but benefit the country in the long run.

Thus even allowing the past to have been a Slough of Despond as deep and as quaggy as you will, it was one which had to be traversed before the life of Transylvania could be set on a sounder footing. But is firmer ground really in sight?

In one respect Transylvania holds an advantage over Slovakia or Ruthenia. The economic position is not fundamentally, unalterably unfavorable. There is nothing in its natural situation to prevent a recovery if the world situation improves and if the new masters learn to handle their material.

As to this, there are some small signs of hope. If part of the new generation is of simply excruciating quality—ininitely inferior to their delightful peasant fathers—yet one meets, nowadays, a certain proportion who, after passing through a training entirely Romanian, which owes nothing to the old traditions, yet manage to combine patriotism with intelligence and decency. Maybe Romania will breed in time a whole generation which the minorities will learn to respect.

But what then? Respect may come; liking is improbable, reconciliation to the idea of living under Romanian rule is as far off as ever. And even the non-Magyar minorities, it must be emphasized, do not like Romanian rule; the farthest that any of them go is to prefer it to Hungarian. The Romanians, on their side, are farther than ever from admitting any of the other nationalities to a partnership within the State, so that their régime continues, more than ever, to be the domination of slightly more than half the population over slightly less than half. And this, if a sounder situation than the converse, is not satisfactory as a permanent settlement.

It is impossible, then, to regard with any complacency either the present position or the future prospects of Transylvania under Romanian rule. On the other hand, a return to the past is neither desirable nor practicable; the clock does not move back so easily.

1. See on this point Rusu, *op. cit.*, pp. 371 *if.*; and Transylvanus, *op. cit.*, pp.42—3.

Hungarian official and *officieux* circles themselves recognize an essential difference between the situation of Transylvania and that of Slovakia or the Voivodina. They admit that the Romanian population is in a slight but definite numerical preponderance, that it separated from Hungary of its own accord and has not since changed its mind.¹ They seem, therefore, to admit that the Transylvanian problem would not be solved by simply restoring the country *en bloc* to Hungary, as an integral part thereof. It is interesting that, as has been noted, many of the more thoughtful Magyars in Transylvania itself hold the same view, and some of them do not even desire such an integral restitution for their own sakes.

Magyar opinion, both in Hungary and in Transylvania, inclines therefore to the view that the best solution would be the restoration of an independent Transylvania, either entirely independent or very loosely linked in some way with one or both of its neighbors, and constructed on the old model of the Renaissance State of Transylvania, with its constitution remodeled and brought up to date. There would be, as of old, three 'nations', but these would now consist of Magyars, Romanians, and Saxons. Each would enjoy complete autonomy in its internal affairs, and complete equality with the other two in the common affairs of the country.

This solution has theoretically much in its favor. Transylvania is really a unit with a very strong separate geographical, historical, and cultural identity. It has never been so glorious and probably never so prosperous as during its periods of independence. Moreover, this is the solution best adapted to the ethnographical condition. The Romanian majority, although it is absolute, is small, and it seems hardly more equitable that the Romanian 55 per cent should rule over the 45 per cent. of the remaining nationalities than it was for the privileged 'nations' of old to rule over the Romanians. The Constitution would require very careful elaboration, for the success of any such political experiment depends entirely on the just and complete application of the principle of *suum cuique*. Nevertheless, a nearer approach to a just settlement could probably be made along these lines than along any others, and it would be easier to-day than ever in history, owing to the events of the last twenty years. The old inequalities between the different nationalities have largely vanished, and it would be easier now to achieve the genuine equality which would be an essential condition, than it has ever been before. Conditions might be more favorable still in a few years' time, when the Romanians have

1. See particularly Count Stephen Bethlen's lectures delivered in England in '933 and collected under the title *The Treaty of Trianon and European Peace*, especially pp. 87-8 98, and 129 *if*.

proceeded farther in their long overdue task of creating a national bourgeoisie.

This solution would be welcomed eagerly by the local Magyars, and it is fairly safe to say that the Saxons would accept it gracefully. The difficulty lies, of course, in the fact that not only would it be rejected out of hand by every Romanian in the Regat, but not 1 per cent. of the Romanians of Transylvania themselves would look at it. The number of Transylvanian Romanians who favor any sort of federalization within Romania is, as we have said, diminishing rapidly, and the small remnant of federalists, with hardly an exception, envisage only so much devolution as will ensure their retaining the supremacy over the other local nationalities. Equality is, unhappily, never desirable to those who can enjoy mastery,

Further, it must be remembered that when Transylvania was independent, there was no Romania; only a pair of disorganized provinces under Turkish suzerainty. These exercised no attraction on the Romanians of Transylvania (who were also far weaker than they are to-day relatively to the rest of the population). The situation would be very different to-day, and it is quite possible that the mutual attraction between the Romanians of Transylvania and those of the Regat (which seems to outweigh the mutual repulsion) would prove too strong to be resisted. Probably, therefore, the plan is more desirable than feasible.

Either failing this solution, or in conjunction with it, there is a good case for some local revision. It seems to me, unfortunately, quite impracticable to fulfil the wishes of the Hungarian Revision League and to restore to Hungary the Székely districts *en bloc*, with a long narrow corridor (which would have to include Cluj) to join them to the main body of Hungary. This would leave Northern Transylvania completely in the air (since there is practically no communication across the Northern and Eastern Carpathians) and the situation would be an impossible one, economically and administratively, both for the Romanian districts of the north and for the Székely enclave itself. Transylvania hangs together.

The position of the western fringe is different. The strip of plain containing the towns of Arad, Oradea, Careii, and Satu Mare would probably never have been left to Romania but for the wish to give her a line of transverse communications by rail. It is true that there is no alternative line leading to North-Western Romania, and Professor Temperley has suggested that Hungary might offer to construct one.' I should myself go further, and say that Romania should construct her own line. Professor Temperley

1. Temperley, 'How the Hungarian Frontiers were Drawn', in *Foreign Affairs*, April 1928, p. 445.

also points out that the north-west 'could only be fed from the rich plains of the south, and their sustenance was carried by the railway through the Arad-Szatmár strip'.¹ It seems, however, to have escaped the notice of those responsible for this frontier that the population of Maramures cannot really be fed at all if it is cut off from the Hungarian plain. Its livelihood depends on this plain, and the present frontier, failing freedom of trade and migration, practically condemns it to starvation, or to charity.

I believe that there would be a good case for including the whole area north of the Rodna mountains in Ruthenia. The population of Maramures consists at present (Romanian census of 1930) of 93,200 Romanians, ix,18i Magyars, 3,239 Germans, 19,305 Ruthenes, 33,798 Jews, and 780 others, most of whom are gypsies. The numbers of Romanians could probably be reduced by certain readjustments of the frontier, both with the Bukovina (it runs at present some miles eastward of the highest crests) and with the south. Even to-day, it may be remarked, Sighet cannot be reached by rail from Romania without passing through foreign territory. The real importance of the line through Satu Mare is not that it connects the department of Maramures with the rest of Romania, but that it joins Romania with Czechoslovakia. Like Ruthenia, of which it forms the geographical continuation, this corner of the Carpathians is a dead weight economically on any country possessing it, except perhaps Hungary, but it is strategically important as joining two allies and separating Hungary from Poland.

The population of the four Departments of the Crişana consisted in 1930 of approximately 1,550,000 of whom about 880,000 were Romanians, 415,000 Magyars, 75,000 Germans, and 65,000 Jews. Broadly speaking, the inhabitants of the mountains are Romanians, while the plains and the wider valleys running up into the mountains are Magyar. Only round Arad does the Romanian population spill down into the plain. A frontier could easily be drawn which approximated to the optimum ethnographical line, and would restore to Hungary over 400,000 Magyars, with only about 40,000 Romanians. Such a line would, however, have to wind its way through the foot-hills, and would create a difficult economic situation in view of the dose economic connection between mountain and plain. On the other hand, I cannot follow the argument that the present frontier is economic, for the economic connections, not only of the plain but also of the whole western slope of the mountains, are with Hungary as a whole. There seems to me, therefore, to be a good case for restoring to Hungary both the northern strip of plain and the mountains which

1. *op. cit.*, p. 440.

rise immediately above it. This would not involve handing back to Hungary all 880,000 Romanians, for, besides the diminution to be expected from the withdrawal of troops and officials, the boundaries of the Departments themselves reach in places across the watershed and could be readjusted so as to leave a considerable number of Romanians within Transylvania; and secondly, the Department of Arad where the Romanians come down into the plain does not stand quite on the same footing as the territory farther north. Here the frontier would turn west until it reached the present line. It should be possible to draw a line which, while economically much superior to the present, would not sacrifice more Romanians to Hungary than it restored Magyars, while still leaving in Romania many more Magyars than there would be Romanians in Hungary.

In the Banat the position is different again. Here the population of the mountains is still Romanian, but that of the plains is chiefly Suabian, and under present conditions it is necessary to assume that the Suabians would resist a return to Hungary. In any case, the limits of the Banat were not divinely ordained, and most of the mountains go naturally with Transylvania.

One change in the frontiers of the Banat is desirable in any case. The decision to give Vršac and Bela Èrkva to Yugoslavia instead of to Romania was a last-minute resolve, and an unfortunate one. The local Serbs, it is true, outnumbered the Romanians but from an economic point of view the line adopted was quite singularly unhappy. Not only does it sever the mountain from the plain, but it cuts the communications in a way calculated to cause the maximum of inconvenience to both parties. On the one hand, the southward communications from Timisoara are blocked by the westward bend of the frontier north of Vršac; on the other, the line from Vršac and Bela Èrkva themselves passes once more into Romanian territory before reaching the Danube. The construction of an alternative line and port would lay no intolerable burden on Yugoslavia; for that matter, a line from Vršac to Panëevo already exists; but for Romania the alternative is far more difficult, since the hinterland is rugged and mountainous.

1. According to the 1910 census there were in the towns of Vršac and Bela Èrkva 10,653 Serbs and 2,685 Romanians. The parts of these districts assigned to Yugoslavia contained in all 40,609 Serbs and 24,520 Romanians. A large part of the local population is German.