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INTRODUCTION

§ 1. THE PROBLEM

NONE of the Peace Treaties was more drastic in its terms than the Treaty of Trianon. By it Hungary was not so much mutilated as dismembered. Even if we exclude Croatia-Slovenia, which had stood only in a federal relationship to the other Lands of the Holy Crown -- although one of eight hundred years' standing Hungary proper was reduced to less than one-third (32.6 per cent) of her pre-War area, and a little over two-fifths (41.6 per cent) of her population. Territories and peoples formerly Hungarian were distributed among no less than seven states: the remnant which still called itself Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Italy; Romania alone securing at Hungary's expense an area (although not a population) larger than that left to Hungary herself. These losses were proportionately far greater than those inflicted on Germany or Bulgaria. The Austria of 1937 was, indeed, an even smaller fraction of the State which had borne that name in 1918; but the old Austria had not been a unitary state, but only a federation of Kingdoms, Duchies, and provinces, the hereditary estates of a super-national dynasty, the composition of which was seldom the same for two successive generations. The Treaty of St. Germain simply divided this federation into its constituent elements. The real losses suffered by the German-Austrian provinces, in the South Tyrol, along the marches of Styria and Carinthia and on the Bohemian border, were painful, but insignificant compared with those of Hungary. So, too, Turkey retained almost intact the Turkish core of her Empire, losing only outlying portions. The losses of Bulgaria and of Germany itself were, for that matter, nearly all comparatively recent conquests, attained in some cases by sheer spoliation.

The Hungarian State, on the other hand, had existed for a thousand years within frontiers which, if not entirely unchanged, had shown a very remarkable degree of stability. The political State enclosed within those boundaries had been unitary from long before most of the States of to-day. Moreover, its geographical structure had imposed upon it also a very close economic coherence, obviously beneficial to almost all its inhabitants. The unity of Hungary was thus something of an entirely different order from that of the Austrian or the Ottoman Empire; it was even far more firmly established than that of Germany or Bulgaria.

These things were never seriously denied, although historic

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counter-claims were, of course, advanced (usually in somewhat half-hearted fashion) in support of the demands made by the beneficiaries of the Treaty, most of whom also found that just the areas which they claimed were precisely those vital to their own economies and unnecessary to Hungary's. But the true reason for the partition of Hungary was, of course, that the racial diversity of its population was at least as undeniable as its historic or geographical unity. The 1910 census, taken at the end of a half-century during which Hungary had done everything in her power to promote knowledge of the Magyar tongue, and taken, moreover, on a basis (that of 'mother-tongue', defined as 'the language which the person speaks best and most readily) and by methods which certainly favored the appearance of uniformity, yet showed only 9,944,627 persons out of a total population of 18,264,533, *2-1) or 54.5 per cent. of the whole, who admitted Magyar as their mother language, and of these, well over half a million were Jews. The persons speaking other languages were enumerated as follows: German, 1,903,357 (10.4 per cent.); Slovak, 1,946,357 (10.7 per cent.); Romanian, 2,948,186 (16.1 per cent.); Croat, 194,808 (1.1 per cent.); Serb, 416,516 (2.5 per cent.); Ruthene, 464,270 (2.5 per cent.); other languages *2-2) 464,270 (2.2 per cent.). The number of persons entered in the census as speaking two languages showed that those whose parents, at least, had not really been Magyar-speaking were even more numerous than the figures seemed to show, for the true Magyar would rarely admit to a knowledge of Slovak or Romanian, and most of the persons speaking those languages as well as Magyar were certainly of recent non-Magyar origin.

Indeed, only the heart of Hungary, its great central plain, was in 1910 undisputedly Magyar, and here, too, there were numerous non-Magyar colonies, which near the southern frontier outnumbered the Magyars substantially. In the mountains which occupied the north, east, and a sliver of the west of the country, the Magyar speakers were represented only by one large compact body, half a million strong (the Székely), in the far east of Transylvania; by a certain number of smaller islands of population, of which the most important were, again, in Transylvania (although in parts of the north they were also not inconsiderable), and finally, by a thin upper caste of landowners and their entourage in the country districts, and in most of the towns a body, often considerable but usually of recent date, of officials, business men, and skilled

1) Excluding Croatia-Slovenia. Including those lands, the total population was 20 886,987, and the percentage of Magyar speakers 48.1.

2) These were mostly gypsy, Polish and varieties of the Southern Slav group of languages,

described in the census as Sokaz (Sokci), Bunyevac (Bunyevci), Dalmatian, Bosniak, and Illyrian.

laborers. The majority of the indigenous populations of the periphery *3-1) was German in the west, Slovak in the north, Ruthene in the north-east, Romanian in the east; while in the south there was a large contingent of Serbs, mingled with the Magyars and with German and other colonists.

It was, broadly speaking, the principle of 'national self-determination which was invoked in 1919 to bring about the dismemberment of Hungary. The German area in the west (or rather, a part of it) was assigned to Austria; the north, both Slovak and Ruthene, to Czechoslovakia; *3-2) the east to Romania, and the south to Yugoslavia, Italy pouching the port of Fiume; while the center remained with Hungary. The old State of Hungary was thus replaced, more or less, by a number of national states, either, as Czechoslovakia, new creations or, as Romania, enlargements of existing states.

The ethnographical boundaries were not, however, followed exactly, and that for various reasons. Firstly, the ethnical line was practically nowhere clear-cut. The broad divisions were fairly plain; but long centuries of interpenetration, assimilation, migration, and internal colonization had left in many places a belt of mixed and often indeterminate population where each national group merged into the next, while there were innumerable islands of one nationality set in seas of another, ranging in size from the half million of Magyar-speaking Székely in Transylvania through many intermediate groups of fifty or a hundred thousand down to communities of a single village or less; while in the great colonization area of the Banat, the national distribution was such as to defy description. No frontier could be drawn which did not leave national minorities on at least one side of it.

But, further, the line indicated by ethnography tended too often to run counter to other requirements, particularly those of economics. The mountains and the plains of Hungary, and their populations, were to a high degree mutually interdependent. Unhappily, the line between the Magyar and the non-Magyar populations tended frequently to coincide with the line between the foothills of the mountains on the one hand and the plain on the other. It was very difficult to leave this line as the frontier (although it was done m the west). It usually seemed more reasonable either to leave the mountains with the plain, or alternatively to attach to the mountains at least so much of the plain as to allow

1) By using the word 'indigenous' I do not as will be seen later, mean that the ancestors of the peoples concerned had been settled from time immemorial where their descendants are now found; but they were firmly established with that settled peasant class which forms the basic substratum of any nationality:

2) One or two small areas in the extreme north were afterwards obtained by Poland

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their inhabitants transverse communications. Either solution meant increasing still further the number of national minorities.

These economic arguments (to which various strategic considerations and what not were added in some cases) were freely adduced on both sides, the Successor States in the main claiming that the principle of their existence, within their ethnographical frontiers, was intangible, and, where they were not 'viable' without adding parts of the plain, then those parts must be added. Hungary, who fully admitted the difficulties involved, argued, on the contrary, that if the new States needed for their existence nearly as many minorities as Hungary herself had contained, there seemed no advantage in making the change at all. The Allies, however, accepted the contention of the Successor States in principle, and, in most cases, in detail also, being quite clearly actuated in this decision by an unspoken belief that Hungarian national policy had been something quite particularly oppressive, which the Successor States could be trusted not to imitate; the more so as they were being required to sign special treaties with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for the protection of the national minorities assigned to them. One point after another was conceded; and in the end Romania was given an area in which the Romanians formed only 55 per cent. of the total population. The Slovaks in Slovakia were 60 per cent., the Ruthenes in Ruthenia 56 per cent., the Serbs in the Voivodina only 28 per cent., or 93 per cent. counting all the Yugoslavs together; while the Magyar-speaking persons in each area formed close on one-third of all the inhabitants: over one million in the territory assigned to Czechoslovakia, over 1,650,000 in that given to Romania, 450,000 in Yugoslavia's portion. *4-1) And many of these were living in compact blocs contiguous to the new frontiers. Hungary herself retained no considerable frontier minorities except in the west, where Austria had not been treated with the same generosity as the other Successor States. The few other non-Magyars left to her were mostly scattered minorities, living far from the frontiers.

It is the existence, in particular, of the Magyar bloc immediately outside her frontiers on which is based that Hungarian claim for revision for which the most sympathy is probably felt abroad; for if we admit the justification of dividing up Hungary on national lines, then at least, one may say, the principle ought to be equally applied. Hungary to-day commonly divides her demands into the so-called 'lesser' or 'narrower' revision and the 'larger' or 'integral' revision; meaning by the latter the restitution of her pre-War

1) These figures are based on the Hungarian census of 1910. As we shall see, they were queried in some cases, and do not always correspond to national condition to day

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frontiers (with certain qualifications to be explained later), and by the former a strict and impartial application of the ethnographic 'principle. In the sections which follow we shall explain in each case to what extent, and on what grounds, the ethnographical principle was modified, and shall venture to suggest how far the demand for the 'lesser revision' seems justified. The question of the 'integral revision' demands more detailed treatment. For this question also has two sides. For the Successor States and their advocates it was, of course, plain. They took their stand on the simple 'right of self determination of the peoples', which, according to them, automatically justified the non-Magyars in leaving Hungary to form their own national States. This right seemed so obvious that it was hardly argued at Trianon, but it was, in fact, stated to have been proved by certain popular manifestations made and resolutions taken at the end of the War; while, in addition, evidence was brought to show that Magyar rule in Hungary had been unjust, oppressive, and tyrannical. That some of the nationalities concerned were comparatively recent immigrants, that others had lived for many centuries without serious conflict with the State, was regarded as equally irrelevant. In the former case, they had at least been there long enough to make up their minds, in the latter, 'an injustice did not cease to be unjust because it had existed for a thousand years'.

Hungary did not altogether deny the 'right of national self-determination, but she protested very warmly against the conclusions drawn from it. She admitted as valid only the decision taken by the Sabor (Diet) of Croatia-Slavonia. For the rest, she questioned the representative character of the popular meetings referred to above, and maintained stoutly that the nationalities never really wished to separate from her at all. If the point was uncertain, it could be settled by plebiscites, which she requested, vainly, might be held. She was confident that their result would be favorable to her, for, she said, the nationalities had no reason to desire a change. The geographical and economic unity of the country was so marked that every material consideration had always drawn its peoples together, as was proved by the remarkable cohesion shown by the Hungarian State throughout history. And although the Magyar nation had predominated in Hungary, by virtue of its numbers, its central position, and its cultural superiority, yet it had never in any way oppressed the non-Magyars. The only postulate had been the political unity of the State. A non-Magyar had been left entirely free to enjoy his own national culture in private and local affairs; only if he wished to share in the larger life of the State must he transact its business in the language of the State, and observe its unity. Any Hungarian citizen, be he

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Magyar, Slovak, German, or Serb, who was ready to conform to these moderate requirements, was not only allowed but encouraged to live the rest of his life in his own way. Therefore, to speak of oppression was absurd, and to parcel up the old historical and economic unit of Hungary was to inflict not merely injustice but also disaster upon the peoples concerned.

Which of these opposite theses was the true one? This is the fundamental question to be answered if we are to pass judgement upon the justification of the major issue or its contrary: on whether Hungary ought to have been dismembered at all. In each of the ensuing sections we shall sketch the national movement among each of the nationalities concerned and try to judge whether it did in reality involve any ambition to separate from Hungary. It will, however, save some duplication, and also possibly help to correct the balance, if we preface these several stories by some account of the national question in Hungary as a whole, and particularly its development during the last crucial century. Only then shall we be able to see the whole question in its true perspective.

§ 2. THE ORIGINS OF THE QUESTION IN HUNGARY

The national conflict in Hungary, which led to the break-up of the ancient kingdom, was the result of the impact of new ideas, new ambitions on a situation which, in its essentials, had existed since time immemorial. For although the Middle Danube Basin forms in many respects a singularly perfect, compact, and self-contained geographical unity, it has always been a meeting-place of many peoples; and peoples, what is more, of particularly diverse origin. The outliers of the Alps which form its western rim have been Germanic for fully 1,500 years; the hills and valleys to its south have been inhabited for almost as long by Southern Slavs; on the north, peoples of different branches of the Slavonic stock penetrated the Carpathians long ago; and a race of quite different origin from any of these inhabited Transylvania two thousand years ago and -- whether the occupation has been continuous or not -- such a race inhabits it again to-day. The central plain, which from the demographic-geographical point of view constitutes the prolongation and last outlier of the great belt of open plain which runs along the north coast of the Black Sea and thence into the heart of Asia, has harbored a whole succession of invaders of wholly different origin and habits again: nomadic warriors and huntsmen from the east: Scythians, Sarmatians, Huns, Avars. Of these the Magyars, although not the last, as they were not the first, were alone able to establish themselves permanently -- an achievement which they owed partly, no doubt, to exceptionally favorable

circumstances, and partly also to the presence among them of elements socially and economically more advanced than were found among their predecessors or their successors. The population which the Magyars found on their arrival (which is usually dated at AD 896) was no doubt sparse, but it existed; and they themselves reinforced it thereafter by the admission of elements kindred to themselves, by inviting colonists and by slave-raiding.

Therefore, although almost from the very first Hungary was organized as a unitary political State, only Croatia and, to a lesser extent, Transylvania enjoying separate dispensations, *7-1) yet racially it was never at any time a unity.

During its first centuries, however, this racial diversity did not constitute a national problem in the form in which we know it to-day. The position is not easy to explain in modern terms, nor even to see with modern eyes; but we must attempt to understand it, for a true understanding of the modern position is incomprehensible without some knowledge of its origins.

The Magyars themselves, when they entered Hungary, were not a homogeneous nation in the modern sense of the word. They were themselves a mixed race in which former Turk overlords had blended with the more numerous Finno-Ugrian stock to form the main body of the nation. Several of their seven tribes were of pure Bulgaro-Turkish stock, and they were accompanied by one Turk tribe whose distinctive origin was still remembered. Nevertheless, they were already far more nearly a nation than any contemporary western community. Their social and political system had not developed the differentiation which so largely destroyed western nationality in the Middle Ages. Its basis was, and long remained, the body of free men -- the *nemesség* -- a term somewhat inaccurately rendered by the Latin 'nobilitas' and afterwards known collectively as the 'Hungarian nation'. Among all these freemen, differences in wealth and status notwithstanding, there prevailed a high degree of equality; each one of them, rich or poor, enjoyed 'one and the same liberty', and between them and all others a great gulf was fixed.

The true basis of association between them was thus social rather than racial, but in practice the distinction between them

1) The frontier districts were usually governed on a special system, as much military as political; but as the frontiers were gradually pushed outward, each region, as it ceased to be in the danger-zone, was successively incorporated into the ordinary administrative system. When political conditions became stable, this was extended to the frontier districts also. This happened in the north and the west, but Transylvania really remained a frontier district until the nineteenth century, and the south had to be reconstituted as such against the Turkish danger. Croatia was the only territory which from the first was attached to Hungary on a federal basis.

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and the other peoples whom they encountered was very near a 'national' one in the modern sense; for the invaders had achieved a very substantial degree of unity in many of the modern attributes of nationality, such as religion and habits, and even language. In all these respects they differed widely from most of the other inhabitants of the Middle Danube Basin. And the State which they founded can fairly be described as a primitive national State, for it was founded by and for the invaders, the local population of other nationalities being conquered and enslaved or put to tribute.

But its national character was primitive and not modern. Although as a general presumption the Magyars regarded themselves as overlords and the other peoples as underlings, yet from the first they admitted certain alien elements to their ranks, in virtue either of their social status or of their fitness on other grounds (e.g. military prowess). This was a purely social process. It would never have occurred to either party that such admission implied an obligation upon the new-comer to give up his native tongue, alter his name, or disguise his origin.

Still less was there any question of enforcing uniformity on the disregarded underlings, who were entirely free to speak their own tongues, labor, or make merry in their own fashions and even to settle their small affairs under their own customary law. Larger groups, in time, had their rights fixed in written charters; and the same system was adopted in the case of the immigrants or guests who were invited into the country in large numbers by some of the Hungarian kings.

Some of these privileges were so important and far-reaching as to constitute a real derogation from the political unity of the country; but this was only in the outlying districts. Normally speaking, the new-comers were simply absorbed into the body of the people, and where they were admitted to the ranks of the 'nobles' this was on the principle that omnis nobilitas Hungarica, i.e. that the political unity of the State was preserved. Croatia, as we said, was on a different footing; but although there were many nobles of Slovak origin there was, and could be, no separate, specifically Slovak nobility just as there was no specifically Magyar nobility, but only a Hungarian nobility which was de facto preponderantly Magyar.

And in course of time such distinction as had existed between the conquering Magyar and the conquered Slav or German ceased very largely to be real. With the change in the national mode of life from horse- and cattle-breeding, varied by raids, to agriculture an increasing number of Magyars sank into servitude. The social distinction was as rigidly enforced as ever, but it had largely ceased to be national. At the same time, a process of natural assimilation

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was going on, not only among the nobles, but also among the villeins in all save the more remote corners of Hungary, or those (chiefly in the south and the east) where unorganized immigration was going on a particularly large scale. Magyar historians estimate that, in 1900, four-fifths of the population of Hungary was Magyar by birth or assimilation.

Most of the remaining fifth were treated just as though they had been Magyars; if nobles, like the Magyar nobles, if villeins, like the Magyar villeins. The chief exceptions were a few chartered communities, most notably the Transylvanian Saxons, who clung to their special privileges. On the other side, there were certain nationalities who were not readily admitted to nobility, or even to equal treatment. Such were the Jews, the gypsies, and, to some extent also, the Romanians. Had Hungary's life continued undisturbed for two or three centuries longer she might, like France, have achieved a substantial national unity, in the modern sense, throughout by far the greater part of her territories. Unhappily for her, the position was entirely transformed by the Turkish invasion and by her acceptance of Habsburg rule.

The Turks not only made havoc of Hungary's civilization; but the brunt of their attack and subsequent occupation fell full upon the unprotected central plains which were the stronghold of the Magyar population, the German, Slavonic, and Romanian areas of the periphery escaping far more lightly. They thus altered the balance of the population very greatly to the disadvantage of the Magyars. The motives of the Habsburgs were different, but the effects of their action very similar. For the Habsburgs were not, as the Árpáds and even the Angevins had been, national Hungarian kings, but rulers of an enormous empire of which Hungary was only a part, and not one of the easiest to deal with. They would defend its territory, which was also their own, against outside enemies; they even refrained from tampering on any large scale with its frontiers for their own benefit (a forbearance which is one of the causes why Hungary's historic case was so very strong. in 1918). But they had no personal or family reasons for valuing Magyar nationality higher than German or even Slavonic, while the strong Magyar spirit of national independence was, in their eyes, the very embodiment of truculent rebellion.

The Habsburgs waged a long war against this spirit, by methods which ranged from massacre to flattery. Some went out against them with fire and sword; some forced the Protestants, by terror and persuasion, back into the Catholic fold; some enticed the high nobility to Vienna, loaded them with favors, and estranged them from their people, Nearly all sapped at their constitutional liberties.

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By one means and another, they managed to reduce very greatly both those liberties and the will to defend them.

But besides this, when the Turks retreated, the Habsburgs filled up the waste spaces of Hungary with settlers of non-Magyar nationality, while they weakened the political unity of Hungary, not only by keeping Transylvania separate from it, but by detaching further portions along the southern frontier and ruling them directly from Vienna. *10-1) So there arose a situation entirely different from that before the Turkish invasion: the Magyar population of Hungary had sunk to 45 per cent. after the Turks retreated, and to 39 per cent. by 1778, when the colonization was far advanced. Of the remainder, a substantial fraction felt themselves more Austrian, or Imperial, than Hungarian subjects, and were prepared at any time to seek support for their claims or their wishes in Vienna.

Thus the foundations had been laid for the growth of the modern national problem. Yet even as recently as the eighteenth century the question was still not truly national, but political, social, and economic. Hungary was still struggling, not with Romania or Serbia, where Turkish pashas still held sway and irredentism was still unborn, but with the Emperor. The Hungarian 'nation' was defending its privileges, the Emperor was attacking them, not because they were of Magyar national character, but because they impeded the exercise of absolute power, hindered the uncontrolled levying of soldiers, and were held also to prevent the economic development of the Imperial possessions; since among the privileges enjoyed by the Hungarian nobles was that of the exemption of their lands from taxation. Even when Joseph II, the most enterprising and autocratic of the Habsburgs, attempted to substitute for the Latin language of Parliament and administration the German which he designed as the lingua franca of his empire, this was done purely out of administrative considerations; and the real conflict which broke out between him and the Hungarian estates revolved not round the linguistic problem, but round the social reforms which he desired to introduce.

1) One must, however, be careful not to impute to the Habsburgs exaggeratedly national motives, or even any deep purposefulness at all. Their first object was to fill up the land, in order to increase their own resources and fighting strength. A Magyar peasantry was simply not available for the purpose, owing to the depopulation of the country. German settlers were preferred being considered the best material. The Magyar landowners were prevented from returning to their estates in order that these might be given to Imperial Generals, &c. The support which the Crown gave to elements such as the Serbs was always most irregular and half-hearted, so much so as to throw them repeatedly into the arms of the Magyars. Finally, much of the colonization of Central and Southern Hungary with non-Magyars was done, not by the Crown, but by the landowners themselves, some of whom were foreigners, but others Magyars. The native landowners, however, drew for their labor less on Germany than on the Slavonic north of Hungary itself.

The true nature of the conflict is shown not less clearly by the composition of the parties resisting it than by the assault. Many of Hungary's most fervent champions during this first phase of her renaissance (as, indeed, to-day) were wholly or partly of non-Magyar origin -- Kossuth himself is the crowning example; while Széchenyi, the second great figure of the age, although of good Magyar stock, hardly spoke the national language. Moreover, the Magyars were joined in their struggle very enthusiastically by some of the non-Magyar nationalities, notably by the great majority of the Germans (the Saxons of Transylvania excepted) and the Jews, with a goodly proportion of the Slovaks and Ruthenes: these being in the main the nationalities who enjoyed no special status in Hungary, but lived as an integral part of the nation; so that their social and constitutional status vis-à-vis Austria was exactly the same as that of the Magyars themselves.

There was, however, another side to the question. The privileged nationalities of the Military Frontier and the Banat felt no loyalty to a Hungarian State which they had never known -- for if the later Habsburgs had paid lip-service to the Hungarian Constitution they had put it aside in dealing with the nationalities. They were the Emperor's men, his faithful servants and his protégés. The Transylvanian Saxons, although they remembered Hungary, preferred a Transylvania which should belong directly to Austria, partly because this offered a better guarantee of their special position, partly for national reasons. The Romanians hoped to find in Vienna a protection which Kolozsvár had never given them and which they could not hope to find in Pest. Much more the Croats, whose historical rights were well established, and were now endangered by the movement in Hungary.

It is easy, in these circumstances, to see how the question took on, by indefinable but quite inevitable stages, the forms of modern nationalism. Among the Magyars themselves there were two motives. The first regarded their own position. The assault on their constitutional life had taken, in part, the form of an assault on their nationality, as when the attempt was made to Germanize the administration. But this last and supreme effort of autocracy coincided with the spread from Western Europe of that mysterious romantic movement which found expression almost everywhere in Europe in a series of national rebirths. The Magyars, always impetuous and swift to move, felt this strange stirring as strongly as any people in Europe. A great national revival took place. The jejune, almost moribund language was revived, fed, and fattened. Everything that was national in speech, costume, and habit became the mode.

The movement could not confine itself to private life. No less

than Joseph II, the Magyars felt the dog-Latin of their Parliament and administration to be a charnel relic; but where the Roman Emperor and German King wished to replace it by living German, they, naturally, desired that their own language should succeed it.

Then came the position of the nationalities. The centrifugal ambitions of some of them were an obvious source of danger. In the past the separate privileges had been resented chiefly by the landowners and Estates, who found their power hampered. But now it was a larger question: a question of uniting Hungary against the foreigner. The separate status of the privileged nationalities was an obstacle which clearly needed to be broken down. But even apart from this consideration, it was natural that the Magyars, identifying their own national movement with the constitutional struggle against Austria, should have quickly and easily persuaded themselves that the salvation of the whole country lay chiefly in the Magyar national language and spirit. Without and against the nationalities, it was quite impossible to defy Austria or, for that matter, to administer an independent Hungary; but either of these things could be done if the nationalities could be brought to reinforce the Magyar national stock. As early as 1781 the Magyar statesman Bessenyei had formulated the 'fundamental idea of the cultural policy of the Magyar national state of the nineteenth century, that the foreign nationalities inhabiting the Danube Valley must be Magyarized linguistically. *12-1) Others of his contemporaries preached the same gospel. *12-2) True, the Magyars had regarded themselves hitherto as a race superior to the Slovaks or the Vlachs, and from that point of view, the natural policy would rather have been one of exclusiveness. But circumstances alter cases; and, as one writer put it, 'if we take an inferior drink to add to a noble wine, we do not destroy the qualities of the latter, but it mixes with the other'. *12-3)

And it must not be forgotten that those who preached these doctrines were genuinely convinced that they were not in any way oppressing the nationalities, but, on the contrary, conferring upon them great benefits. Thus Count Zay, Inspector-General of the Lutheran Church (himself of Slovak origin), told an audience of Slovaks that to impede the Magyarization of our country even indirectly, and to strive for the development of any other language. than the Magyar, is equivalent to sapping the vital forces of constitutionalism and even of Protestantism itself, and hence that the Magyar language is the truest

1) G. Kornis, *A Magyar mûvelõdes eszményei* ('The Ideals of Hungarian Civilization') (Budapest, 1927), vol. i, p. 107.

2) Ibid., pp. 107, 112, 121-2.

3) Cit. R. W. Seton-Watson, Racial Problems in Hungary (London, 1908), p. 60.

guardian and protector of the liberty of our country, of Europe and of the Protestant cause. Let them therefore convince themselves that the triumph of Magyarization is the victory of reason, liberty and intelligence. *13-1)

It was not all Magyars who approved of, or believed in, this policy. Count Stephen Széchenyi, known to his own and subsequent generations as 'the greatest Hungarian', held strongly that the policy of Magyarization was mistaken. A speech which he delivered in 1842 as President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences was devoted almost entirely to this theme, and contained a solemn warning to the nation of the dangers of overstraining the bow. But the general feeling was on the other side; according to a modern Magyar historian, this speech 'finally estranged the opinion of the day' from Széchenyi. The Hungarian Diet pressed on its plans for strengthening and unifying the country. Laws were passed introducing Magyar into the administration and schools, with an almost sublime disregard of the susceptibilities, or the difficulties, of the nationalities. This, at least, ran contrary to no established right; but the laws were extended, although not in quite their full force, to Croatia-Slovenia as well, whose constitutional position was attacked in other ways also. Then the conflict broke out.

§ 3. THE FIRST CRISIS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

We have now reached the beginning of the last stage of Hungary's history -- the last, that is, of which a writer can speak in 1937. We are full in the midst of the central question of Magyarization. We have seen how and why it began. To-day, more than a hundred years later, it is extraordinarily difficult to pass judgement on the rights and wrongs of it. For the sense of nationality is of all the great political feelings the most subjective and the most variable. Where an individual is possessed of an active national consciousness, which he is determined to preserve, then any force or pressure exerted to deprive him of it is assuredly dishonoring to those who apply it, as it is also (as experience has proved) futile. On the other hand, not all nationalities possess such a consciousness, and even when it is generally awake in some nation, there will always be individuals and sometimes whole social classes whom it leaves untouched. This was even more widely true a hundred years ago than it is to-day. Europe is full, not only of individuals, but of whole nations which have become assimilated completely and of their own free will. Moreover, some nations -- at least at certain periods in their

1) Cit. R. W. Seton-Watson, Racial Problems in Hungary (London, 1908), p. 67.

histories, for the quality does not seem to be constant -- do possess an active power of attraction which enables them easily to absorb alien elements, while others are passive, yielding readily to assimilation. The 'Auslandsdeutsche' were until recently conspicuous examples of the latter type. It is extremely hard to say wherein this active or passive quality resides. It may be only in the advantage of social status or superior economic strength; but certain nations seem also to possess a mysterious inherent attraction which is independent of material considerations. And I think it right to state here, as my personal opinion, that few, if any, nations in Europe possess this attraction in so large a measure as the Magyars. When all their predecessors from the East failed and disappeared, they alone made good their foothold and survived. Mixed as is the blood of every nation in Europe, few are of such diverse origin as they. The tiny original stock of invaders has absorbed many times its own numbers of foreign elements, and this process has gone on both in medieval times, when it was unconscious, and in modern days, when it was done of set purpose. It has been not only extensive, but intensive also. No other European nation contains so many recruits who are not at all unwilling prisoners but, on the contrary; heart and soul for their adopted cause -- indeed, its most intolerant champions. To deny that the 'Magyarization', whether in older or in more recent times, often met with the full approval of the persons assimilated would, I believe, be to misunderstand the position very seriously.

But it is also true that the Magyar is excessively impetuous and impatient of opposition. Everything with him runs to extremes. To-day we are more accustomed than our fathers were to violence of speech and action, and nothing surprises us. But in pre-War Europe probably few, if any, nations allowed themselves to indulge in so many intemperate and entirely reprehensible outbursts against those who thwarted them as these same Magyars. Failure to accept in entirety their dogmas -- general or partial agreement is not enough -- seems to arouse in them a sort of fury. Therefore those who did not succumb to their attraction were often roused to a bitter hatred against them.

And finally the Magyars are too headstrong, too instantaneously convinced of the rightness of their own cause, and too optimistic, to be good judges of political forces. They invariably underestimate their enemies. So it was in the first half of the nineteenth century. Absorbed in the wonders of their own national renaissance, they hardly noticed the similar movements which had begun among non-Magyar 'nationalities' ; certainly did not regard them of equal importance with their own, still less even dream of making political concessions to them. On the contrary, the hint of opposition

(which they seldom admitted to represent the real opinion of the people) only incited them to hurry on with their own program, with disastrous results.

1848 is commonly regarded as the prototype of 1918, and in fact the events of the two years are closely analogous. In both cases the Hungarian Government found itself in conflict with the outer world; in both, a part of the nationalities stood by Hungary while a part allied themselves with the enemy. In both cases the issue, which would almost certainly have been favorable to the Magyars had the lists been clear, was decided against them by an outside force. If the dismemberment of Hungary dates from 1918 and not from 1848, it is because the impact of that force was different. In 1898 the nationalities enjoyed little help from their kinsmen beyond the frontiers. Certain encouragement and even help came to the Serbs and Romanians, causing the more far-sighted observers to prophesy difficult times ahead. Then, however, no practical irredentism was possible. Serbia was small, weak, and still semi-dependent; Romania had not yet even achieved her own independence, the Czechs were still fighting for their own national rights in Bohemia. The forces against Hungary were the Russian Tsar and the Austrian Emperor, the role of the former being purely military, while the Emperor, of course, did not desire such a situation as has arisen to-day, being as much preoccupied as the Magyars themselves to keep the frontiers of Hungary intact against Serbia or Romania.

The event proved the centripetal forces in Hungary to be far from negligible. There was little division in the ranks of the Magyars themselves, once the peasants had been satisfied by some hurried reforms. Most of the Suabians and Jews supported the Magyars, as did a large part of the Ruthenes and the Slovaks. Some of the latter, however, demanded recognition of themselves (as of the other Hungarian nationalities) as a 'nation' with a separate Diet, national guard, and flag, and various linguistic concessions. The Serbs, after making somewhat similar demands and meeting with a blunt refusal, took up arms against Hungary, allying themselves with the Croats who led the campaign in the Emperor's name. In Transylvania, where the Union with Hungary was proclaimed, most of the Saxons and the Romanians were undoubtedly against it, preferring the position of Transylvania within a great Austrian state. Although Romanians took part on both sides in the fighting, the majority were certainly against Hungary.

The alacrity with which so large a fraction of the nationalities had turned against them came, by their own confession, as a complete surprise to the Magyar leaders. When the struggle first began, they had been prepared not only to maintain the political unity

of Hungary but even to attack the separate and time-hallowed privileges of Croatia. Only in July 1849, in the last days of its existence, did the Diet make a belated attempt to conciliate the nationalities. It still retained the political unity of the country, rejecting the principle of national autonomy for the different nationalities, and Magyar was still (as it had been proclaimed a few months previously) to be the official language of administration, justice, and the army. Considerable individual concessions were, however, made. Every citizen was allowed the right to use his own language in the Communal and County Assemblies. The language of instruction in the schools was to be that of the locality, and parish registers were also to be drawn up in that language. Petitions might be presented in any language, and appointments to all offices were to be made without distinction of language or religion.

But these concessions, which were adopted in the face of considerable opposition from the die-hard minority, came much too late to fulfil their object -- if, indeed, they could ever have done so. In any case, the law remained a dead letter, since only a few weeks after its enactment the Russian armies completed the subjugation of Hungary.

The period which followed was a very interesting one. Those of the nationalities who had turned against Hungary had done so in the hope of securing better terms from Austria. Francis Joseph duly reduced the relative advantage formerly enjoyed by the Magyars. Croatia received back Slovenia (which Hungary had proposed to take from her) and the Muraköz (Medjemurje); the union of Transylvania with Hungary was annulled; the Backa and the Banat were formed into an 'autonomous Serbian Voivodina', and the rest of the country divided on very rough ethnographical lines into five districts, two of which were mainly Slav, two mixed and one purely Magyar. The bias in favor of the Slavs was unmistakable; besides the Voivodina, Bach, Francis Joseph's Minister of the Interior, seems at one time to have entertained the idea of giving the Slovaks a similar 'national home'. The educational and cultural life of the nationalities made a certain progress. But the object, as soon became clear, was not to encourage Slav national feeling, but to repress every national movement alike. The administration was centralist, Its language German, and gradually, but with growing speed, German was made the language of education also. Moreover, the entire system, although in technical efficiency probably superior to anything which Hungary had ever known, was informed by a spirit of reaction and repression.

A very few years of this régime sufficed to bring about a strong reaction among the nationalities in favor of an understanding

with Hungary. It became clear that a considerable proportion of them -- and not only those who had taken their side in 1848 -- were now anxious to remain in Hungary, if only they could reach a reasonable settlement of the national question. The Magyars, on their side, had been frightened by 1849; their former leaders, where they had not been executed, were in exile or discredited; and their political thought was at that time strongly influenced by two unusually safe statesmen, Deák and Eötvös, both of whom had constantly opposed intolerance towards the minorities, and Magyarization, as being both inhumane and politically unwise, insisting that such methods would not achieve their object, but would merely drive the nationalities into the enemy camp. Wisdom, toleration, and liberty, on the other hand, would attach them firmly to the Hungarian cause.

Consideration of the national question was resumed in 1861, after the 'October Diploma' of 1860 had again recognized Hungary's historic individuality and restored in part her ancient constitution. On Eötvös' motion, the whole question was referred to a Parliamentary Committee, which on August 1st, 1861, produced a very remarkable report. *17-1) It began by pointing out the difficulties in the way of territorial autonomy, occasioned by the admixture of races. The old communal, denominational, and municipal autonomy traditional in Hungary offered a better means of protecting 'the just demands of the individual citizen... in such manner as to guarantee in free union the possible development of the individual nationalities as corporations'.
Two guiding principles were laid down:

(a) that the citizens of Hungary of every tongue form politically only one nation -- the unitary and indivisible Hungarian nation, corresponding to the historic conception of the Hungarian state.

(b) that all peoples dwelling in this country -- Magyars, Slovaks, Romanians, Germans, Serbs, Ruthenes, &c: are to be regarded as nationalities possessing equal rights, who are free to make valid their special national claims within the limits of the political unity of the country, on a basis of freedom of the person and of association, without and further restriction.

An outline follows of the measures recommended by the Committee. These may be summarized as follows:

Every citizen may employ his mother tongue in addressing the authorities. The Church Communes may choose their own language of instruction in their primary schools. Every denomination and nationality is free to erect secondary and higher schools, the choice of system and language of instruction resting with the bodies founding them, subject to the Government's right of supervision.

1) Text in Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 421-33.

In State schools the Government decides on the language of instruction, but must take into account the languages spoken in the district of the school concerned. The language of the State is Magyar, but its offices and dignities are to be filled in virtue of capacity and merit, without regard to nationality. The language of Parliament is Magyar. In local government local languages are used, provision being made for translations, &c., to ensure the rights of minorities and mutual comprehension between the local and central authorities.

The provisions do not apply to Croatia or Transylvania. One peculiar phrase will be noted in this draft: the reference to the 'development of the individual nationalities as corporations'. The subsequent proposals make no provision for implementing the national corporate life suggested by these words -- for the references to 'nationalities' in the clauses relating to education are quite vague and ambiguous. It is hard not to suppose that we have here what is a common thing in committees composed of persons of divergent views: a phrase inserted to placate one party, while the majority is willing to accept the general phrase but not to admit its implications. In fact the Magyars and the nationalities had failed to agree on this point of 'national corporations'. The Serbs, at a meeting held at Karlovci in the April preceding, had asked for the revival 'within Hungary, viz. within the Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slovenia, and Dalmatia' of the 'Serb Voivodina' with its own Diet and 'collective representation' at Budapest. The Slovaks in June, had also asked for 'national recognition and an autonomous territory'. Even the Ruthenes desired separate territorial autonomy. Only the Germans had put in no demands.

The Magyars, however, were not prepared to go so far as this; they stood rigidly by the 'political unity' of Hungary. *18-1) Thus, on this one point, there was a complete divergence of mews. Parliament was dissolved before any action could be taken on it, and the next action of the Magyars was to drive the Slovaks back to Vienna by threatening their small educational freedom. If the situation did not change greatly during the next five years or so, this was because Hungary was again subject de facto to Austrian absolutism, while it was universally recognized that the position was provisional and must be succeeded by a more comprehensive solution.

When the Compromise of 1867 was concluded, the Magyars were already in a stronger position. The Crown had decided to

1) This was the attitude not merely of the Magyar chauvinists, but of men like Eötvös, who was prepared to surrender entirely the predominance of the Magyar nationality and language in favor of complete equality, only retaining Magyar as the language of Parliament and the central administration, as a matter of convenience.

make its peace with Hungary on the basis of the historic rights claimed by the national leaders. This meant that it would at least not actively support the nationalities, who had to make what terms they could with the Magyars. These terms were embodied in three main instruments: the Compromise with Croatia, the Union with Transylvania, and the Nationalities Law.

The details of the Compromise need not concern us here. granted Croatia a status which in the main did full justice to historic rights, and if a Croatian question still remained, there was henceforward no question of equating this with the ordinary nationalities question in Hungary. Not so Transylvania, which was united with Hungary by a law which also abolished the special privileges of the various nationalities and proclaimed the equality of all citizens, irrespective of race or religion. A promise was given that the rights and privileges of the Saxon University (except its judicial functions) should be maintained. Many of these were, however, subsequently abolished; and, except for this qualification, Transylvania became legislatively and administratively integral part of Hungary.

For the remaining nationalities, the governing provisions were those of the Nationalities Law of 1868. Consideration of this question had been resumed by a Parliamentary Commission in 1866. The debates had been very prolonged and even embittered. *19-1) The representatives of the nationalities who spoke *19-2) (with the exception of the Bunyevci and some of the Slovaks, who took point of view of the majority) insisted very strongly on the principle of complete equality for all the nationalities of Hungary, with grouping of the Counties, &c., as nearly as possible on ethnographical lines, and far-reaching autonomy within these for e; nationality. The demand was not always expressed in identical terms, for the nationalities failed signally to adopt a common front and each had a particular interest which it was anxious to press even at the sacrifice of the desires of the others: the Serbs the revival of their old privileges, the Saxons the maintenance of their 'University', the Romanians the abolition of all discrimination again them. The general sense of their claims was, however, identical in each case. The Magyars, on the other hand, insisted absolutely on the maintenance of the political unity of Hungary and its predominating Magyar character. Only within these limits were they prepared to grant religious liberty and individual linguistic rights to the members of the various nationalities.

In this event the Parliament adopted the point of view of the

1) For an interesting account of the debates see I. de Nagy, *A nemzeti törvény a Magyar Parlament elõtt 1861-1868* (Budapest, 1930).

2) No representative of the Suabians or of the Jews appears to have spoken.

majority, in the form of an amendment to the original majority draft put forward by Deák, the chief difference of which, as compared with the majority draft, lay in the addition of a preamble, setting forth what Deák held to be the fundamental principles of Hungarian national policy. The text of this preamble ran as follows:

Since all citizens of Hungary, both in virtue of the principles of the Constitution and from a political point of view, form a single nation -- the indivisible unitary Hungarian nation -- to which all citizens of the country belong, irrespective of their nationality, and enjoy equal rights: since, moreover, this equality of rights cannot be submitted to differential regulation except regarding the official use of the various languages of the country, and that only in so far as is necessitated by the unity of the country, the demands of administration and the prompt execution of justice: the equality of rights of all citizens of the country remains absolute in all other respects, while the following rules will serve as a basis regarding the official use of the various languages.

The law goes on to lay down provisions which do not differ very widely from those of the 1861 draft, excluding the ambiguous mention of 'nationalities' contained in the earlier documents, The language of State is 'in virtue of the political unity of the nation' Magyar, which is the language of Parliament, of the University, and the official language of the administration. In the County Assemblies the minutes are to be kept in Magyar, but can also be kept in another tongue if one-fifth of those present desire it; arid any one may speak in those Assemblies either in Magyar or in his own mother tongue, if that is not Magyar. The communes choose their own language of business, and in dealing with persons belonging to the commune, must use the language of those persons. The Counties are to correspond with communes and individuals as far as possible in the language of the latter. The language of the higher Courts is Magyar, but reasonable provision is made for parties of different mother tongue. Individuals, communes, churches, &c., enjoyed a free right to found, and to collect and administer funds for, elementary, secondary, and higher schools, prescribing themselves the language of instruction therein. The State prescribed the language of instruction in State schools, but wherever citizens of any nationality were living together in 'considerable numbers' they must be given an opportunity to receive instruction in their mother tongue 'up to the point where higher education begins'.

§ 4. HUNGARIAN NATIONAL POLICY, 1867-1918

Every writer, from either camp, who discusses this law gives it fullest praise. It is certainly one of the best nationality laws that

have ever been drafted; the League of Nations Minority Treaties; which have drawn very largely upon it for inspiration, fall far short of it in generosity. In the opinion of many writers, it could have solved the national question in Hungary. It is interesting and melancholy to consider why it failed to do so.

The first and most obvious reason is that, after the first few years at least, it was never applied by the Magyars themselves. Magyar patriotic writers to-day usually deny with characteristic vehemence this, the reiterated complaint made by the leaders of the nationalities and their friends, and in doing so, render their country a singular disservice; for the inescapable conclusion, if they are right, is that the wisest of laws, scrupulously applied, could not reconcile the nationalities to life within the Hungarian State. If this were true, then Hungary was doomed indeed. But it is not true. The fact is that the school of Deák and Eötvös exhausted its strength in a few years after the passage of the great law. There existed, indeed, to the last among the Magyars a small group who believed that the application of the law could solve the national question; and some, too, who questioned the policy of Magyarization on moral grounds. But in public life, at least, their voices were completely drowned by the clamor of that rival school of thought which had already made itself heard when the law was being drafted, and within a few years had become the almost unchallenged master of Hungarian national policy.

The central tenet of this school was still really political; it was the maintenance of the old unitary nature of the Hungarian State, of the old doctrine in modernized form, of 'omnis nobilitas Hungarica'. But this doctrine now involved far more Magyarization than in the old days, when all the peoples of Hungary had enjoyed a certain equality through their common use of dog-Latin. Now, when Magyar, not Latin, was made the language of public life, it followed that the whole upper structure of the State must be Magyar. This ideal soon came to be applied not merely to Parliament or to the officials but to all the moneyed classes and the national intellectual life. For a member of the bourgeoisie to insist on his non-Magyar speech or origin was to render him suspect, at least, of non-acceptance of the unitary Hungarian State; of treason, stratagems, and spoils.

Hungary maintained to the last that she sought no more than political unity; and in fact the peasants were, at least during the first decades, left pretty well to their own devices. But this was due to two causes: firstly, the sheer impossibility of making any great impression on the peasant masses which Hungary had at her disposal until she had trained up a sufficient number of

teachers and leaders; and secondly, the traditional mentality of the Hungarian

State, which has always been oligarchic and has never regarded the peasants as a serious political factor. But the feeling was certainly widespread that Hungary would not be really safe until every man, woman, and child within her frontiers had been Magyarized: until she had become, as some enthusiasts dreamed, a 'thirty-million Magyar kingdom'.

Thus the turn of the disregarded social classes came late -- in some cases had hardly been reached when the debacle arrived. But more and more the ideal of complete Magyarization was gaining ground. And successive generations of Hungarian statesmen, strong in their sublime confidence alike in the rightness of their cause and in their ability to achieve their aims, held to this ideal until the very last. Even the obvious disaffection of the Serbs and Romanians during the War did not lead them to think of concessions, but rather to redouble their efforts. With the world cracking round them they stood unchanged, like the missionary in Stevenson's fable, and hardly to-day will their successors admit ruefully that 'it seems that there was something in it after all'. As late as mid-October 1918, when the King-Emperor issued his famous manifesto promising the transformation of Austria into a federation of national States, the Hungarian Government threatened to cut off food-supplies unless a clause were inserted that 'the integrity of the Lands of the Holy Hungarian Crown is in no way affected by this reorganization'; and on the day when the manifesto appeared, Dr. Wekerle, the Hungarian Minister President, repeated in the Parliament at Budapest, in words which any of his predecessors might have used, that Hungary would at all costs maintain unimpaired her national integrity and unity. 'Within this framework we are willing to give the nationalities, whom we have always treated humanely... individual rights.'

The opposition to this policy was practically confined to a few stalwarts of the 1848 party, who had been so embittered by the conduct of the King-Emperor in 1848 and 1849 that they were ready to make far-reaching concessions to the nationalities in order to buy their support against the Crown. *22-1) But the representatives of this school of thought never came into power until the very end. It was only on October 31st, 1918, that Michael Károlyi took office. Then, indeed, there was a hurried attempt to change the long-set course -- an attempt initiated by Károlyi and put into partial practice by the man whom he made his Minister for Nationalities, Oskar Jászi. Jászi, indeed, went so far as to repudiate the idea of Magyar supremacy altogether and to advise equal rights for all

1) The few concessions made to the nationalities (especially the Romanians) by Count Stephen Tisza were purely tactical moves to weaken the Hungarian nationalists, against whom he was ruling for the Crown.

nationalities and the development of national autonomy on the Swiss model. *23-1) The activities of this Ministry form an interesting and little-known chapter of Hungarian history. As told elsewhere, *23-2) it was able to agree on and actually to put into operation a statute for the Ruthenes which probably satisfied the majority of opinion among that people, in so far as an articulate opinion existed. It also produced a statute for the Germans, which was put into force in West Hungary, *23-3) and even a Slovak Statute, which might have satisfied the Slovaks if Hungary had had to deal with the Slovaks alone. *23-4)

But by this time the situation was quite out of the hands of any Hungarian Government, or of the Hungarian nationalities. Jászi himself saw this clearly, and writes himself that he had no hope of saving Hungary's old political integrity; all that he could aim at was saving the plebiscite principle, so as to secure as favorable frontiers as possible for Hungary, preserving the old connections of economics and communications, and preparing for a future federative rapprochement of all the States in the Danube Basin. *23-5) And in the event even this, as will be seen, proved impossible.

Hungary's real nationality policy was contained, not in Jászi's belated attempts, not in the Nationalities Law of 1868, but in the measures which were taken by successive Hungarian Governments between 1868 and 1918. These are described at length by a writer much better acquainted with the subject than myself, and able to deal with them more fully (although every smallest fact is really relevant to the present theme). Here I can mention only the main features, referring the reader for details to Professor Seton-Watson's numerous and authoritative works. 6

1) O. Jászi *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary* (London, 1924), p 57, n. a. See also his views expressed at length in his later work, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago,1929

2) See below, p. 213 f. 3) See below, pp, 49ff. 4) The Slovak Statute was issued on March 12th, 1919, as People's Law No. XXX of 1919 (text in A. Szana *Die Geschichte der Slowakei* (Bratislava, 1930), pp. 282-4). It follows closely the lines of and religion, proportionate representation for the Slovaks in the Hungarian Parliament for common the Ruthene and German Statutes, creating an autonomous 'Slovenska Krajina' (divided into three Governments) with a National Assembly autonomous for internal administration, justice education, affairs, a Slovak Minister responsible to both the Slovak National Assembly and the Hungarian Parliament, and protection for the nations minorities. 5)Jászi, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary* p. 57. 6) *Racial Problems in Hungary* (1908) (general and the Slovak problem in particular); *Corruption and Reform in Hungary* (1911); *The Southern Slav Question* (1911), *A History of the Romanians* (1934). To Magyar writers Professor Seton-Watson is anathema. They cannot deny the accuracy of his facts, but they hold his outlook to be biased and the picture which he presents to be distorted. It is true that he concentrates chiefly on the conflicts between the Magyars and the active nationalists among the nationalities, and may perhaps under-estimate both the extent and the sincerity of the voluntary assimilation which took place, I can, however, find

The Electoral Law of 1874 kept the nationalities politically impotent. The provisions of this law look paradoxical at first sight, since the constituencies of the nationalities were usually far smaller than those of the true Magyar areas, and in fact the Liberal Party ruled mainly through a majority returned from Transylvania, the Slovak Counties, &c. The explanation is that the Hungarian Governments which stood by the Compromise were opposed also by the partisans of Magyar independence, who were in reality their most dangerous enemies. These were checked by making the constituencies large; while in the periphery, the extremely restricted franchise and open voting left the power in the hands of the Government. Every sort of intimidation was practiced on the voters, so that it was the rarest thing, costing the greatest courage and sacrifice, for such a constituency to elect a representative of the nationalities. The nationalist point of view was thus almost unrepresented in Parliament up to 1918.

Justice and administration, down to the Commune, were almost exclusively Magyarized, the reorganization of the judicial system in 1869 failing to renew the rights guaranteed to the nationalities in the old County Courts they abolished, while hardly a pretence was made to observe the linguistic provisions regarding administration. But the most systematic assault was made against the separate educational and other cultural life of the nationalities. In 1874 the three Slovak gymnasium were suddenly closed, and in the following year the Slovak cultural society, the Slovenska Matica, was closed down and its property confiscated -- a foretaste of what was to come. In 1879 a new Law on primary education made a knowledge of the language of State compulsory for every teacher, imposed State control on the training colleges in this sense, and gave the Ministry of Education power to decide the number of hours to be devoted to the teaching of Magyar, and to close any institutions which failed to conform with instructions. The nationalities still, it is true, enjoyed a certain protection in the autonomy of their churches, who controlled the denominational schools. They were, however, handicapped by their poverty, and when they were forced or induced to accept a subsidy the price was always a diminution of their freedom. If, moreover, a denominational school failed to come up to the educational requirements laid down by the State (and many of them were primitive indeed) it could be closed and a new State school erected. Great numbers of these new schools no work from the other side to set against his; since his opponents either ignore or deny the problems of which he treats, instead of explaining them. The reasoned Magyar view has yet to be expounded in any West European language, Meanwhile, Professor Seton-Watson's works remain unsurpassed in any language as collections of the facts and of the utterances of Magyar statesmen and Parliamentarians on the National question.

were built, and mainly in the non-Magyar districts, the Alföld suffering badly by comparison. In these the language of instruction was always exclusively Magyar: in 1906 only a single exception to this rule could be found in all the 2,046 State elementary schools then existing. (It is, of course, true that no compulsion rested on parents to send their children to State schools where denominational schools existed, and this system of analysis of names was unknown in the old Hungary.) In 1883 came a Secondary Education Act. The 14 non-Magyar secondary schools still existing (6 Romanian, 1 Serb, 7 Transylvanian Saxon) were placed under strict official control and Magyar language and literature made compulsory subjects in them. The language in all State gymnasium now became exclusively Magyar. All secondary schools founded thereafter were purely Magyar, requests by the Slovaks and Romanians for permission to found further institutions meeting with such official obstruction as to be tantamount to flat rejection. In 1891 came a Kindergarten Law, which also aimed undisguisedly at promoting Magyarization. In 1902 the Minister of Education ruled that from 18 to 24 hours a week should be devoted to Magyar instruction in the primary schools (in which the total number of hours of instruction never exceeded 26). Then in 1907 came the Education Acts associated with the name of Count Apponyi -- laws which in practice were never fully applied, but rank in theory with the least liberal of their day. The liberty of teachers in State elementary schools was further restricted. Similar control was applied to the teachers in the denominational schools, who became henceforward State officials. New standards of equipment and salaries were laid down for the denominational schools which made it practically impossible for them to carry on without State grants. These were coupled with conditions: the teacher must be able to read, write, and speak Magyar correctly and must give instruction in the manner and to the extent laid down by the Ministry, which in certain cases acquired a veto on appointments and even a right to make appointments without consulting the school authorities. A special oath of loyalty was exacted from all teachers, and disciplinary inquiries might be instituted against any of them for neglect of Magyar instruction, for a tendency hostile to the State, and for other political offences; they were liable to dismissal unless they could ensure that their pupils of non-Magyar tongue could 'express their thoughts intelligibly in the Magyar language, orally or in writing', by the end of the fourth school year. About eighteen hours weekly of the total twenty-three of instruction had to be devoted to the sole purpose of instruction in Magyar.

Incidentally, the use of non-Magyar languages was widely prohibited in every sphere of public life, and there are many

authenticated cases of even little children being severely punished by their teachers for speaking their own language in play. The place-names of Hungary were officially Magyarized, and strong inducements were held out to officials -- and indeed, to others -- to Magyarize their names -- an operation which they could perform for a few pence. Thus an outward appearance, at least, was achieved of a purely Magyar country. But above all, any public manifestation of any national sentiment other than the Magyar, any protest against the non-fulfillment of the Nationalities Law, met with the most intemperate and insulting reception from the Magyar and Magyar-Jewish press and Parliament. The peoples' representatives vied with each other in finding abusive and even filthy terms to apply to those of their fellow citizens who were unwilling to accept the ideals thrust on them in so uncompromising a fashion.

§ 5. THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF HUNGARY UP TO 1918

The story is not, however, exhausted by the purely linguistic or educational, nor even by the purely political measures. Reference must also be made to the very important changes arising out of Hungary's economic development. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Hungary's economic situation had been deplorable. The Turkish invasion had destroyed her old prosperity, and even after the Turks retreated, plague and disorder practically closed the southern and eastern frontiers, while Austria, after acquiring Galicia, surrounded Hungary on all remaining sides and had her in a strangle-hold. Maria Theresa and Joseph II frankly exploited this position for the benefit of the Austrian Crown lands. Hungary was to be a 'colony', to supply Austrian industry with cheap raw materials and the Austrian consumer with cheap food-stuffs. A tariff barrier was maintained between Austria and Hungary. At first Hungarian agricultural produce was taxed on entering Austria, and Austrian industrial products on entering Hungary. Under Joseph II the latter duties were abolished, so that Austrian industry had free access to the Hungarian market, Hungary being prevented from competing by the heavy dues levied on foreign raw materials, and by the refusal of the State to grant her industries subsidies such as were lavished on Austrian entrepreneurs (a refusal justified by the attitude of the nobility on the tax issue). *26-1) But even Hungary's main exports, such as wine and even wheat, were allowed into

1) For a description of the position see especially H. Marczali, *Hungary in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1910), Chapter I.

Austria only in so far as the importation did not conflict with the interests of Austrian producers.

The Diets of the early nineteenth century regularly demanded the abolition or at least the reduction of the Austrian tariff; at this time the land-owning agrarians were all-powerful, the movement for complete independence was weak, and the formation of a free trade area with Austria seemed to offer the best chances for Hungary's economic progress. After the publication in 1840 of Liszt's great work, *Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie,* ideas suddenly changed. Kossuth and his friends conceived the idea of an autarkic Hungary, with high tariff protection against all the world, Austria included, which should allow the development of an independent Hungarian industry. In 1844 Kossuth founded a society for the development of Hungarian industry; its members had to swear to buy no foreign-made article which was also manufactured in Hungary, for seven years. The demand was strengthened by the consistently deplorable condition of Austrian finances, which involved those of Hungary.

After 1849 the absolutist Government, of course, adopted the very opposite course. The tariff barrier between Austria and Hungary was abolished on October 1st, 1850, the whole system of taxation made as nearly uniform as possible, the tobacco-monopoly introduced, the economical and financial life of the country modernized. Incidentally, the tariffs of the whole Monarchy were lowered very considerably. These reforms were carried through by the Austrian absolutism; but it is proof of their soundness that they were left almost unaltered in the Compromise of 1867. Hungary recovered, however, the forms and much of the substance of her economic independence, such as the right to pay only an agreed and limited quota to the common expenses of the monarchy, and to refuse her consent to the raising of any future common loan. The great question of the tariff was settled by a characteristic compromise. Hungary maintained her constitutional right to enact her own legislation and establish her own customs barriers. In view, however, of the 'many and important contacts' between the interests of Hungary and the rest of the Monarchy, Hungary was prepared to conclude periodically a commercial and customs alliance, which should cover the whole conduct of trade questions. This was to be worked out in connection with the establishment of the quota, and of common principles to be adopted in connection both with indirect taxation and with railway policy.

When this arrangement was reached, the idea of Hungarian autarky had fallen again into disrepute. Deák and his colleagues, the authors of the Compromise, believed that Hungary's interests

would best be served by the closest possible relations with Austria: the more so as Hungary possessed only one harbor (her right to which was disputed by Croatia), while Austria straddled across all her lines of communication to the west. It was thus possible without great difficulty to conclude an alliance in 1867 which laid down that for the following ten years the territory of the whole monarchy should form a single customs unit surrounded by a common customs frontier.

For some years this school of thought prevailed. Harvests were good and there were large export surpluses, which were easily placed in Western Europe, and particularly in Germany. There was thus no justification or indeed desire for industrialization, and the few enterprises which had been founded for political reasons soon disappeared. Only the milling industry of the plains developed. Hungary's ambition to modernize herself found its outlet in the expansion and adornment of Budapest, and above all in the construction of her railway system, which was carried through at high speed. First Budapest was linked by rail to all parts of the country, then a beginning was made with certain provincial centers, of which Pozsóny (Pressburg, now Bratislava) and Temesvár (Timisoara) were the first, while large sums were spent on developing Hungary's single port of Fiume.

At the end of the decade the Customs Alliance with Austria was renewed, but each partner now reserved the right to denounce it. The tariff was, incidentally, now autonomous. In 1879, after the imposition by Germany of her high protective tariff, which largely crippled Hungary's export to her of wheat and cattle, thoughts turned back to the possibilities of industrialization; particularly as the railway network, without which an active policy was impossible, was now complete. 1881 saw the first Hungarian law for the furtherance of home industry by various subsidies, loans on easy terms, freight reductions, grants of machinery, exemption from taxation, &c. In the following ten years the population employed in industry increased by 125 per cent. The tariff policy of the next decade again rather favored the agrarians, who used their strength, incidentally, to crush their competitors in Romania and Serbia -- a policy which inflicted severe losses, in particular, on Transylvanian industry. Further Acts granting even more extensive advantages to Hungarian industries were, however, passed in 1890 and 1899, while Hungary's legal independence from Austria was made even more apparent. In 1899, the Delegations of the two Parliaments having failed to agree on certain disputed questions, Hungary assumed the 'legal position of an independent tariff area'. After long negotiations the common tariff area was made secure in 1906, de facto, for a further

period. The Tariff Alliance was replaced by a customs treaty valid for a further ten years. At the same time the negotiations for a separate National Bank -- a demand loudly voiced by the nationalists -- were carried a step farther.

In the following years the autarkization of Hungary made exceedingly rapid progress. Yet another Law (1907) gave even greater advantages to native industries, with the avowed intention of developing the manufacture of articles hitherto not produced in Hungary, or produced only on a small scale. Almost every party in Hungary was agreed on the final aim of preparing the ground for economic separation from Austria; the only difference between them being that the industrialists wanted to hurry on the process, while the agrarians wished to wait until they could be secure of marketing all their surplus in the country. No government, however, could now return to the old policy of a balanced Austro-Hungarian economy, and the furtherance of industry was pursued by all alike. In particular the textile, iron and steel, and machinery industries received very extensive help and grew with mushroom speed. The number of persons employed in industry in Hungary rose from 818,000 in 1890 to 1,038,00o in 1900 and 1,397,000 in 1910. By 1914 it was certainly already considerably larger. During the World War it was possible for Hungary, if under the most unfavorable conditions imaginable, yet to realize at last her long-cherished dream and to achieve economic separation from Austria.

This story was worth recounting in so much detail, because it is extremely important to understand both what influences were at work, in what direction they were tending, and how recently they had begun to operate. Hungary's motives were undisguisedly political. She wished to turn herself into a compact economic unit, self-reliant if not entirely self-contained, and for this she employed both positive and negative methods. Thus, while cheap and quick connections were formed between Budapest -- the political as well as the natural center -- and the most distant corners of the country, communications between the peripheral districts and the outer world, which might strengthen centrifugal tendencies, were ingeniously thwarted. *29-1) The industrial policy was similarly designed to strengthen the interdependence of the various parts of Hungary and loosen their ties with the rest of the world.

1) Cf. Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy* (London, 1911), pp. 324-34, for particularly glaring instances of how Croatia's communications with Vienna, and more crassly still, with Dalmatia and Bosnia, were hampered, either by simple neglect to build railways at all, or by the manipulation of freight tariffs which forced Croat produce to pass through Budapest (under the Hungarian-Croatian Compromise of 1868, Croatian autonomy did not apply to the railways). The connections between Western Slovakia and Moravia, West Hungary and Styria, Transylvania and Romania were little better,

This economic policy was in many respects Hungarian rather than Magyar. There was no question of impoverishing the nationalities, or of placing them at an economic disadvantage compared with the Magyars. Budapest was, indeed, embellished very splendidly and at great cost; but in general, in economic as in educational questions (where far more money was spent on teaching little Slovaks Magyar than on teaching little Magyars arithmetic), the tendency was rather to neglect the purely Magyar districts at the expense of the non-Magyar. As a rule, the development seems to have followed the lines dictated by straightforward economic interests, raw materials and sources of power being utilized where they were found, and factories placed where most suitable. In part, too, efforts were made to give employment to the inhabitants of the most poverty-stricken districts, and thus to guard them against the threat of famine.

The chief industrial development (outside Budapest) was thus precisely in the non-Magyar districts. Hungarian statistics on the support given to industries in money and machinery between 1881 and 1914 show that, reckoning by area, the north-west easily leads the way. All the Counties receiving more than 600 crowns per square kilometer lie in this part of Hungary and more than half in the present Slovakia, about the same proportion being purely Slovak. The Counties receiving 300-600 crowns lie chiefly in Western Slovakia and German West Hungary, with one purely Magyar County in the plain, and one German County in Transylvania. The 100-300 Counties are in Slovakia, a part of Western Hungary, and along the strip which borders on the Transylvanian mountains, while below that mark come the Magyar plain, the Ruthene and Romanian mountains, the remainder of South-West Hungary, and the Southern Slav districts. Statistics on subsidies received per head of population show even more clearly the absence of national discrimination.

It is, however, quite true that subsidies and even ordinary facilities, such as licenses, were refused to the distinctively national enterprises which the leaders of certain of the nationalities attempted to establish with the purpose of keeping alive national sentiment or providing funds for political parties. In such cases the authorities employed every resource to frustrate the plan. So, too, with the choice of workers. The single case in which national discrimination was sometimes practiced was that of the Romanians. Some factory owners did try to 'keep the Vlachs out' just as the colonists centuries before had banned them from their land, *30-1) Any discrimination between the other nationalities was

1) Some of my critics have queried this statement, and I wish to repeat that I am quite satisfied of its accuracy.

based on quite different considerations. If the Ruthenes were unpopular in factories on account of their alleged roughness, German workers were often preferred to Magyars for their greater skill and Slovaks for their lack of pretensions.

At the same time the Magyars certainly saw in the industrialization a welcome aid to their policy of Magyarization. To Magyarize the peasants must clearly take many decades; it was, indeed, hardly possible even to begin seriously with the task with the means at Hungary's disposal in the nineteenth century. It did, however, seem possible to make of the towns centers and foci of Magyar life and culture, whose influence would gradually irradiate the country-side; and this policy was deliberately pursued. Special attention was paid to the towns in districts of mixed population, where conditions were favorable for quick results; thus such cities as Sopron (Oedenburg), Kassa (Kosice, Kaschau), Temesvár, or Ujvidék (Novi Sad) grew into important administrative, industrial, and cultural centers, contrasting advantageously alike with the few impregnable fortresses of the nationalities and with the safe Magyar strongholds of the Alföld.

These developments went a very long way indeed towards giving Hungary the economic unity which her champions claim for her. A hundred years earlier the different Counties could without gross exaggeration have been described as so many mutually independent agrarian republics; while town and country were at perpetual loggerheads. By 1914 the foundations of a real unity had been laid; and with the development of the economic life, and the differentiation of production and labor, the different parts of Hungary had become mutually interdependent to a degree never previously achieved in her history.

Moreover, the development was proceeding apace. Hungary was still in many respects a backward country, and this was due in no small degree to the faults of her own ruling classes. The social system was exceedingly reactionary, the facades hurriedly erected in the chief centers screened appalling poverty and ignorance, fostered by a most rigid political class-rule. It is, however, unfair to lay all Hungary's shortcomings to the account of her ruling classes. Many of them were due to her tumultuous past history. She had, after all, only enjoyed some half-century of real de facto independence. Given another equally long period of peace, she might have developed into a strongly consolidated, and, in view of her great natural resources, a highly prosperous, modern state. This, however, depended ultimately -- as the example of Austria before the War and Czechoslovakia since it show -- on her ability to solve, in one way or another, her national problem.

§ 6. THE NATIONAL BALANCE-SHEET

It is extremely difficult to assess what progress Hungary was making towards her avowed goal. To the casual traveler, Hungary would have appeared by 1914 as an almost completely Magyar country. On the railway he would have passed only towns and villages bearing Magyar names (since the earlier local appellations had been officially changed), seen only Magyar inscriptions, heard Magyar orders shouted. If he had had any dealings with officialdom, he would have found the Magyar language reigning unchallenged; and, alike in polite society and on business, he would have been given to understand that the use of any language other than Magyar was only a concession to a foreigner.

Some of this was, of course, only what is popularly known as eye-wash. In many villages, for example, the new Magyar name was exclusively official, while the inhabitants never dreamed of using it -- perhaps, indeed, did not know it. But it was not all show. Hungary really had, in that short space of time, made Magyar not only the facade of her house, but many of its more important structural elements. It was not merely that the so-called upper classes were Magyar; that administration, justice, and higher education were the same. This would have been important enough, seeing what a large proportion of the country's activities were comprised therein but further, the great majority of the middle classes commercial, industrial and 'intellectual', as well as official, now spoke and felt Magyar. And by 'middle-class' we mean here a large section of society, including even most of the artisans and skilled workmen. Hungarian figures of the joint-stock companies in 1915, based on the language used by the boards or the names of the leading men', showed that 97.4 per cent. of these companies with 99.3 per cent. of the share capital, 99.4 per cent. of the preference shares, and 99.5 per cent. of the total assets were in the hands of Magyar-speaking persons (largely, of course, Magyarized Jews). 1.1 per cent. of the companies belonged to Romanians, 0.9 per cent. to Slovaks, 0.5 per cent. to Transylvanian Saxons, and 0.1 per cent. to Serbs, these representing the few specifically 'national' enterprises of the non-Magyars. *32-1) The industrially employed population was divided, according to the 1910 figures, into 65.1 per cent. Magyars, 15.2 per cent. Germans, 8.1 per cent. Slovaks, 5.3 per cent. Romanians, 1.8 per cent. Serbs, 1.0 per cent. Croats, 0.5 per cent. Ruthenes, and 5.0 per cent. others. *32-2)

1) Vol iii A, pp 410-11, of The Hungarian Peace Negotiations: an Account of the Work of the Hungarian Peace Delegation at Neuilly s/S. from January to March 1920. Published by the Royal Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 vols. in 4, Budapest, 1920-22. Subsequently referred to as Hungarian Peace Negotiations.

2) ibid p. 353

The nationalization of the towns -- the first object which the Magyars had set themselves -- had made astonishing progress. Thus Budapest, which was three-quarters German in 1848, had become 68 per cent. Magyar by 1890. Arad, which had been half Romanian and one-third German, had become 65 per cent. Magyar; Pécs (Fünfkirchen) had changed from almost purely German to three-quarters Magyar. The same story could be told of Pozsóny, Sopron, Ujvidék (Neusatz, Novi Sad), Szabadka (Subotica, Maria Theresiopol). Between 1880 and 1890 alone, the Magyar population increased in Nagyvárád (Grosswardein, Oradea Mare) by 26 per cent., in Kassa by 99 per cent., in Szabadka by 24 per cent., in Ujvidék by 37 per cent,, in Sopron by 66 per cent., in Pancsova (Pancevo) by 76 per cent., in Temesvár by 42 per cent., in Versécz (Werchetz, Vrsac) by 25 per cent. In all these towns the population of other languages registered either small increases, or decreases, amounting in the case of Subotica to 15 per cent. In the 25 largest towns of Hungary the Magyar-speaking population grew in this period by 688,000, or 29 per cent., and in the 101 smaller towns by 16 per cent., while the German-speaking population remained almost exactly stationary, with a slight decrease. The two decades after 1890 saw a still further, rapid increase in Magyar-speaking population. Thus everything that represented the new advanced, growing Hungary seemed to be safely Magyar, while the other languages were confined to the backward peasant communities of the periphery, were becoming more and more subordinate, second-rate, losing their vitality and their power of development. Counting in these peasant masses, the progress was, of course, far less rapid. The census figures shown below indicate that

	1880		1890		1900		1910	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Magyars	6,403,687	46.65	7,356,874	48.61	8,651,520	51.4	9,944,627	54.5
Germans	1,869,877	13.62	1,988,589	13.14	1,999,060	11.9	1,903,357	10.4
Slovaks	1,845,442	13.52	1,896,641	12.53	2,002,165	11.9	1,946,357	10.7
Romanians	2,463,035	17.50	2,589,066	17.11	2,798,559	16.6	2,948,186	16.1
Serbs,Croats	631,995	4.60	678,747	4.48	629,169	3.7	656,324	3.6
Ruthenes	353,226	2.57	379,782	2.51	424,774	2.5	464,270	2.5
Others	211,366	1.54	243,795	1.62	333,008	2.2	401,412	2.2

the increase in the Magyar-speaking population was not at all large in the country districts. To take, for example, the decade 1880-90, the growth outside the towns amounted only to some 200,000, showing a rate of increase lower than that of

several other nationalities; and that in spite of the fact that both the system and the methods by which the census was taken favored the appearance of an increase in the Magyar element. It appears, in fact, that while the scattered groups of non-Magyars living in the plain, and surrounded by Magyars, such as the Slovaks and the Ruthenes out in the open plains, the Germans of the Bakony district, the Bunyevci round Szabadka, were Magyarizing fairly rapidly, under what were probably for the most part natural influences, yet the nationalities living m compact masses round the periphery had hardly been touched by Magyarization. A good example is the German linguistic frontier in the west, which has hardly shifted a kilometer for centuries. In this connection it is most interesting to read the verdict of M. P. Balogh, an ethnologist who investigated the situation for the Government in 1902 and reached the conclusion -- which seems at first sight curiously at variance with the census figures -- that in the period of Liberal rule (since 1875-1900) the Magyars had lost 465 communes to the nationalities, while gaming only 261 from them. Their chief gains had been at the expense of the Slovaks, their chief losses to the Romanians and Germans. Of all the nationalities of Hungary the Ruthenes had been the largest losers, then the Magyars, then the Serbs. The Romanians had gained most on balance; after them the Slovaks, then the Germans.

The great question for Hungary was, then, whether by virtue of what she had already achieved, by the influence of the foci which she had established, and by the intensified Magyarization of elementary education she could make the same impression on these peasant masses as she had on the urban population. She did not despair, and, indeed, her previous record entitled her to hope. On the other hand, there was always the possibility that the resistance would stiffen in the future. She owed something of her progress to her own long start, and as wealth and education spread through the country, reaching one backwater after another, the same causes which had made possible the great development of the Magyars might also operate, in turn, in favor of the nationalities. We shall see, in the subsequent sections, how the situation developed with regard to each nationality. It is hardly possible ever to give a conclusive answer, for in nearly all cases two rival forces were at work: the attraction of Magyarization, and the national resistance. The former seemed much the stronger in the case of the Slovaks, the Ruthenes, the Germans; the latter, in that of the Romanians. But the force which each possessed depended largely on incalculable factors, and the answer to what would have happened if the War had not intervened can never be given with any assurance to-day. We can only say that by 1918 the whole upper structure of the State was Magyar, while the peasants were still much as they had been half a century earlier.

§ 7. THE CROWN AND THE FORCES OUTSIDE HUNGARY

It is, however, necessary to call attention to certain factors outside Hungary itself which assumed a large, perhaps a dominating role in the situation. Magyar historians are fond of emphasizing the part played by the Crown in favor of the nationalities and against the Magyars. This, as we have seen, is true and most important up to 1867. If Hungary had been ruled by national kings in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, she might well have solved her national problem as completely as France did. On the other hand, without foreign help, often forcibly administered, she would not have been rid of the Turks when she was; so that the Crown cannot be counted only as an enemy. In any case, after 1867 it became quite definitely a friend. Having once concluded the Compromise, Francis Joseph left the nationalities to make their own terms with the Hungarian Government. He never again intervened in their favor. None of them even dared to approach him until the Romanians did so, nearly a generation later; and then they were stonily rebuffed.

In appearance the position of the Crown was one of neutrality; in reality it proved a strong support for the Magyars. The whole conservative power of one of Europe's most conservative states stood behind Hungary's own system, which itself depended so largely for its efficiency on its oligarchic character. More important still, through her partnership in the Dual Monarchy, Hungary belonged to one of the Great Powers of Europe whose might constantly overawed the little Romanian and Serbian states which were now coming to constitute the real threat to Hungarian integrity, while the position of the Czechs and the Ruthenes in the monarchy made it hardly possible for a Slovak or a Ruthene question in Hungary even to arise. It was largely for this reason that Count Stephen Tisza (and others with him) clung so tenaciously to the Austrian connection, believing that without it Hungary could not permanently resist the centrifugal pull of Romania and Serbia. Others believed that without the Crown, and with a thorough democratization of Hungary, the national question could be solved indeed, that the only solution lay that way. But the bulk of the governing class were certainly not prepared to pay in advance the price of the experiment.

It was their loss of the Crown's support that made the nationalities abate their claims after 1868. We have seen that in 1865 both the Slovaks and the Serbs had desired 'national' autonomy on a territorial basis. The wishes of the Romanians (not included in the 1865 negotiations) were certainly not less far-reaching. At the worst, all these three nationalities wished for complete equality

for all languages of Hungary; the minority draft of the Nationalities Law, signed by the sixteen non-Magyar deputies, contained proposals to this effect. Only when Francis Joseph finally abandoned them did they decide to make do with the Nationalities Law. Later, as Francis Joseph grew old, the situation changed once again. His heir apparent, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, notoriously believed the national policy of the Magyars -- towards whom he felt an almost passionate detestation -- to be a danger to the integrity of his future dominions, and he proposed, like Joseph II, to postpone his coronation and to force through some reorganization of Austria-Hungary based on a different system from the German-Magyar hegemony on which the Compromise rested. It was not known exactly what shape his plans would take -- indeed, they probably changed more than once. Undoubtedly, however, they involved some sort of support of the non-Magyar nationalities. For a time he appears to have been strongly impressed by a remarkable book, *Die vereinigten Staaten Gross-Oesterreichs*, published in 1900 by a Transylvanian Romanian, M. Aurel Popovici, who pleaded for a federalization of Austria-Hungary into fifteen states on a federal basis, with German as the lingua franca. Afterwards, it was suggested, Romania and Serbia would enter the federation under Habsburg overlordship. At another period Francis Ferdinand contemplated changing the Dualist form of the Monarchy into Trialism by uniting all the Southern Slav districts of both Austria and Hungary, with Bosnia and Herzegovina, into a third Habsburg State. Later, again, he seems to have entertained less far-reaching ideas. But at all times he kept in close touch with the leaders of the nationalities, particularly the Romanians (who hailed him almost openly as their destined savior), but also the Slovaks.

The fact that the dormant political ambitions of the leaders of the nationalities became active again only when they saw once more the prospect of finding a friend outside Hungary may seem to strengthen Hungary's case that, left to herself, she might have solved her problem. But we must remember that the Crown was still, in one respect, a tremendous conservative force. Francis Ferdinand was no less an enemy than Francis Joseph to Serbian and Romanian irredentism. He proposed to destroy Magyar supremacy, but not Hungary. Whether a truly independent Hungary, under a truly national Hungarian king, could have permanently defied at least the Romanian and Yugoslav irredentism is a doubtful question indeed. And that, if any, is the real hypothetical question when we review Hungary's last years and ask -- could it have been otherwise?

§ 8. THE BREAK-DOWN AND THE TREATY

At all events, the success or the failure of Hungary's experiment could not but depend very largely on factors outside her own frontiers. It is therefore relevant, and will, again, avoid a certain duplication, to record the precise circumstances in which her final tragedy came about. She entered the War, of course, as one of the Central Powers. Her Prime Minister, Count Tisza, had not at first been in favor of the monarchy's projected war against Serbia. He had even threatened to resign if the ultimatum were made impossible for Serbia to accept, as Berchthold planned. Later he withdrew his opposition, stipulating only that the monarchy should receive no acquisitions of territory. Hungary's enemies have attempted to fix the odium of 'war-guilt' on Hungary for his conduct; she has repudiated the charge with equal vigor. We need not here go into the details of this controversy, since the Treaty of Trianon was not avowedly punitive; but it is, of course, germane, although somewhat superfluous, to remark that from July 1914 onward Hungary was committed to the side of the Central Powers, which proved also to be the losing side.

Throughout the War she stood loyally by Austria and her allies, even although, towards the end, she exploited Austria's difficulties somewhat ruthlessly to strengthen her own position as partner in the Dual Monarchy. Her attitude changed only in the very last days. She was then still intact, and her troops stood everywhere on foreign soil, but Austria was disintegrating visibly, and in October 1918 her own integrity seemed once more threatened from Serbia and Romania. Her troops then began to clamor to be sent home to defend their own frontiers. Simultaneously social unrest was increasing, and a party was proclaiming that Hungary's whole policy had been mistaken; that by dissociating herself from the Central Powers she could make her own peace with the Entente. The leaders of this party believed that by concessions to the nationalities they could persuade all, or practically all, of them to remain within the rejuvenated and reformed Hungary. On October 31st the king appointed Count Michael Károlyi, the leader of this group, his Minister President, Károlyi formed a Ministry drawn from the Party of Independence and the Parties of the Left. His Minister for War, a Social Democrat, recalled the Magyar troops from the Front, but began to disband many of the units, fearing that they might be used for revolution, or for counter-revolution.

Meanwhile, on November 1st, the Austro-Hungarian Supreme Command concluded an armistice with the Italian Commander-in-Chief at Padua, fixing a line of occupation in the south-west only.

Elsewhere the line was to consist of the existing political frontier, but the Allies were entitled to occupy the interior of the Monarchy if they desired. Croatia-Slovenia had already, two days previously, proclaimed its independence of Hungary; and Fiume was necessarily lost to Hungary also.

The Allies now advanced in the Balkans and reached Belgrade. Károlyi went to meet the French Commander, General Franchet d'Espérey, who was chiefly preoccupied by his anxiety to cut off the retreat of General Mackensen's German Army, then in Romania. It never occurred to him to treat the new Hungary as a friend; on the contrary, he prescribed a line running across the whole of the south and east of Hungary from Besztercze (Bistrita, Bistritz) in Eastern Transylvania, southward to the Maros (Mures), west along the course of that river, and through Szabadka, Baja, and Pécs to the Mur. Allied troops were allowed to occupy the area east and south of this line, but the Hungarian civil administration was to continue functioning there, as elsewhere in Hungary. This agreement was concluded on November 6th and signed on November 13th. Thereupon Serb troops advanced up to the line in the south and Romanians in the east. The local populations then produced demonstrations, of varying degrees of spontaneity, in favor of the new States, which thereupon took over the civil administration also.

The Belgrade armistice did not touch Northern Hungary; but the Czechoslovaks had obtained from the Allies recognition as an Allied Army and State; a popular assembly of Slovaks had decided in favor of a Czechoslovak State, and Czech troops began early in November to cross the frontier. Subsequently they obtained permission to occupy a line corresponding roughly to their claims and Hungary was forced by the Allied representative in Budapest to withdraw her troops behind that line. Meanwhile the Serbs had advanced in some places beyond the line first laid down by General Franchet d'Espérey, and the Romanians had moved right out into the Hungarian plain. On March 20th, 1919, Hungary was forced further to withdraw her troops so as to leave a neutral zone between them and the Romanians.

In the meantime, the Peace Conference had already opened in Paris, The Serbs, Czechs, and Romanians were all represented there by delegations recognized as Allies. Each of them stated its case before the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Their statements of claims, together with the other documentary material which had been collected by the Allied experts (including the Hungarian national statistics), were then taken over by Commissions, comprised of American, British, French, and Italian experts. These Commissions worked out frontier lines and recommended them to their chiefs.

So far as Hungary was concerned, most of the work of these Commissions (except as regards a few points of detail) was completed for the northern, eastern, and southern frontiers as early as March or even February 1919. Only the west frontier was undecided; Austria, like Hungary, had not been invited to the Conference, and it was not yet certain whether she would claim any part of Hungary.

While the frontiers were being worked out, Károlyi had been succeeded as Minister President by a government of the extreme Left, whose spiritus rector was Béla Kun. Fearing to see Communism spread, the Allies allowed the Romanian troops to advance as far as the Theiss. Kun now undertook an offensive and drove the Czechs out of Eastern Slovakia, but this only hastened the decision of the Allies. They forced him to withdraw, and issued a declaration (June 13th) that a line closely corresponding with the demarcation lines in the north and east would constitute Hungary's political frontiers with Czechoslovakia and Romania respectively. The declaration did not apply to the south, where some controversy appears still to have been proceeding over the Yugoslav claims; but the broad decision had been taken there also, and the details were agreed soon after, when the draft Peace Terms were finally approved.

As regards all frontiers except the west, nothing mattered much after that. The Romanians actually advanced and occupied Budapest in August, but this act brought them no additional concessions. Conversely, when a Hungarian Conservative Government was re-established and was at last invited to send a delegation to Paris, where it arrived on January 7th, 1920, this was not in order to negotiate but simply to accept the decisions reached. No concession was made nor even any serious discussion entertained on the broad principle of Hungary's dismemberment; nor were the proposed frontiers even altered m detail in any important respect. In reply to Hungary's protests, M. Millerand, speaking for the Peace Conference, agreed that in certain cases where frontiers were found 'not to correspond precisely with ethnical or economic requirements', 'an inquiry held on the spot may perhaps, make apparent the necessity of a displacement of the limits laid down by the Treaty in certain parts'. No general inquiry was possible but if the Delimitation Commissions found that the Treaty anywhere 'created an injustice which it would be to the general interest to remove', they might report to the Council of the League, which would offer its services for an amicable rectification. 'The Allied and Associated Powers', said M. Millerand, 'are confident that this procedure will furnish a convenient method for correcting in the delimitation of the frontiers any injustice against which objections not unfounded can be raised.'

In the event, the Delimitation Commissions made only few and trivial alterations, not all of which were even in Hungary's favor. One frontier alone, that with Austria, was exempted from this summary procedure. Here the two countries were treated as equals, and Hungary obtained certain important concessions. Hungary signed the Treaty on June 4th, 1920, and ratified it on November 13th, 1920.