

## CONCLUSIONS

## § I. THE POSITION IN 1918

THE overwhelming majority of public opinion in Hungary remains profoundly convinced of the injustice of the Treaty of Trianon, and persistent in demanding revision of its terms. This demand is by no means confined, as is sometimes suggested, to a small band of 'feudal' magnates to whom the partition of Hungary and the measures introduced by the Successor States have meant the end of a position of almost regal wealth and power; nor even to the larger middle class whose careers as administrators and teachers in the non-Magyar districts are now closed to them. The voices of those who have suffered direct material losses are, perhaps, loudest in the chorus of complaint. The poor are less vocal; they have never been encouraged to talk much, anyway, and they may even regret the extreme vigor with which the revision campaign is prosecuted as exacerbating, on the one hand, relations between Hungary and her neighbors, and providing, on the other, too easy an opportunity for diverting attention from social problems within the country. But those Magyars who actually oppose the idea of treaty revision are few indeed: a mere handful of political extremists (many of them in exile to-day) who so hated the social structure of Hungary, despaired so utterly of reform, that to destroy it they were willing to see the country itself destroyed. The vast majority of their countrymen, of every political tendency, feel otherwise. The maintenance of Hungarian integrity was upheld with equal fervor, although by very different methods, by all four Governments—Conservative, Liberal-Socialist, Communist, and Conservative again—which ruled in Budapest in 1918—19; and by no one more pertinaciously than by Bela Kun, the little Jewish pseudo-journalist and Communist leader from Transylvania; and all four Governments, on this question if on no other, had behind them the vast majority of their country. To-day the demand for revision of the Treaty is voiced, and sincerely, by all classes of Hungarian society, from the big landowners through the officials and businessmen down to the workers and peasants. And the feeling in this respect shows small signs of diminishing. After the first few years had elapsed, when the gaping wounds made by the dismemberment had been bandaged—the refugees established in new houses, the businesses re-orientated, the first and most painful reforms (whether deserving that name or no) carried through in the Successor States—a certain appeasement or resignation was

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apparent, due in large measure to the economic prosperity brought about by a great influx of foreign loan capital; in part also to a feeling of sheer helplessness in the face of the overwhelming force represented by the upholders of the *status quo*. Then came the terrible economic depression which gripped Central Europe after 1929, the enfeeblement of the League of Nations, the rise of Germany, the encouragement given to Hungarian aspirations by Italy; and at once the smoldering embers burst into flame again.

Granted the premise that the Treaty was mistaken and unjust, then the demand for revision can hardly be dismissed, as it is by some of Hungary's neighbors, as mere war mongering. Even if the Millerand letter was only meant to refer to details of frontier rectification, yet the Treaty of Trianon itself provides for a possibility of its own revision on a wider scale in Article XIX of the League Covenant, which stands at its head.

And the relevancy of the idea of justice to the Treaty has never been denied. The Allies may have been under no technical obligation to apply the 'Fourteen Points' to Hungary, as they were to Germany, but their moral obligation has never been contested to apply these Points, and in general the principles enunciated by Wilson in his various speeches, most conveniently summed up in his phrase: 'the guiding principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities'. Indeed, what they maintained in their discussions with Hungary at Trianon was that although they might be dictating, they were dictating justice; it was precisely justice that required the dismemberment of Hungary and even the details of the frontier settlements.

And the beneficiaries of the treaty themselves adopt exactly the same attitude. Here and there a conscience may be queasy about some particularly generous local concession, but, as regards the broad lines of the Treaty and practically all its details, Hungary's neighbors are no less sincere, no less passionate in their belief in the justice of their acquisitions, than Hungary in the injustice. They would not thank the investigator who dismissed their right as merely one of might.

Between two such opposite views on the merits of what was done at Trianon, who shall be bold enough to judge? Particularly as no definition of justice in international affairs has ever been given, or is ever likely to be given. One may imagine it *in vacuo*; but take any question of practical politics, and a dozen considerations arise, each commanding respect, each in flat contradiction to some other which appears equally weighty.

It must, in the first instance, be emphasized that, except to some extent as regards the Austrian frontier, the Treaty was not a negotiated, but a dictated one. Hungary was not even invited to

Trianon until the Allies had made up their minds, and the mass of maps, historical essays, and statistics which her delegates brought with them represented, from the point of view of the Conference, so much waste labor. The single concession which they elicited was the 'Millerand Letter', which amounted to very little. It was, clearly meant to apply only to details of frontier adjustment; and although Hungary built great hopes on it, and tried to utilize it for much larger purposes, such expectations were clearly doomed from; the outset to disappointment.<sup>1</sup>

The fact that the peace was imposed and not negotiated would; not necessarily make it unfair, since one can well suppose that a; wise and impartial outside authority might have reached a just settlement more easily than could be obtained by the wearisome argument of claim and counter-claim. But in truth, the circumstances in which the Treaty was drawn up were not conducive to; the application of ideal justice. Hungary had been maneuvered, and in part had maneuvered herself, into the most unfavorable, situation that can well be imagined. Although, as we have said, the territorial clauses of the Treaty were not confessedly punitive, there was yet undoubtedly a feeling at the Peace Conference that the ex-enemy States represented Powers of Evil, to restrain which; was a moral duty on humanity. Hungary had to bear her full share of this odium for her part responsibility in the original declaration of war and her subsequent unwavering conduct of it; the more so as Count Tisza never made public his original opposition to the ultimatum, and his later stipulations. Károlyi's efforts to reverse the position in October 1918, although sincere and well meant, were quite incredibly naïve; not only the Serbs and Romanians, but the Czechs also had long since got the ear of the Entente. It; was far too late. President Wilson preached the necessity of democracy, but when Károlyi tried to follow his advice he was insulted for his pains by the French general commanding in Belgrade. Indeed, Hungary could do nothing right now. Each step of hers led her deeper into the sloughs. The Liberal-Socialist experiments in disbanding the old army and organizing a new force on democratic lines only led to chaos and weakness, and allowed Hungary's neighbors to press forward into her territory. While she could never have organized a successful resistance to the whole treaty, as Turkey did, yet it is quite possible that had she been possessed of efficient and determined military forces at the end of:

1. It is even sometimes suggested that but for the hopes which Hungary reposed in this letter, she would have refused to sign the Treaty. I cannot, however, believe that at that stage in events she could have refused her signature. It may be regrettable that M. Millerand used such high-flown language, lending itself so easily to false interpretations, but I cannot believe that the course of history was influenced thereby.

1918, she might have made considerably better terms for herself. When at last she did undertake a more active resistance, it was highly unfortunate for her that this should have been done in the name of the Third International. The help which Moscow had promised never came, and the Western Powers were only frightened by the specter of Bolshevism and strengthened in their resolve to exorcise it. Finally, when the reaction came, it came again in such form as to give an easy handle to Hungary's enemies.

The net result of all her efforts was thus to leave her branded with the mark of war-guilt, doubly aggravated by the imputations of Bolshevism and reaction; whereas of her four neighbors and principal prospective beneficiaries, three were safely ensconced on the side of both victory and moral superiority.

True, it was not Hungary's neighbors, but the Western Powers which drafted the Peace terms. But they, too, had been fighting for years against Hungary, or against her allies, and their representatives, being human, were inevitably influenced by war psychology. Few of them could escape a natural presumption against Hungary which was enhanced by the fact that they had been for years, and were again during the decisive weeks of the Peace Conference, exclusively in touch with her enemies. They took their decisions alone, but first they asked Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia to state their cases. They had themselves to supply any counter-case required; and they would have been more than human indeed if, in the circumstances, they had proved themselves very efficient devil's advocates.

Nor were they even altogether free to exercise this function. Although the Treaty of Bucharest was put aside as invalid, the presumption remained and was never questioned that Transylvania, at least, belonged to Romania of prescriptive right. It was only frontier details that had to be settled, and the point of rejecting the treaty was only to rebut Romania's claims to Magyar territory beyond the ethnographic line, and in the Banat. Similarly, the great decision of principle as regards the Slovaks had been taken long before, and promises publicly held out to the Yugoslavs also. Wilson's answer to the Andrassy note that 'the Czechoslovaks and Yugoslavs must themselves be judges of what will satisfy them' constituted a very far-reaching commitment indeed. It was no less ~ important that France had already decided, in the main, her future ~ policy in South-Eastern Europe, which was the strengthening of the three States which subsequently formed the Little Entente; so that the French delegation—perhaps the most active and influential of all in these questions—hardly even pretended to be neutral.

And finally, there was the decisive consideration that in some cases before the negotiations began, in almost all by the time they

were complete, Hungary's neighbors were in *de facto* political and military control of the areas which they meant to appropriate. As a writer of great authority has frankly admitted, 'a *fait accompli* had thus been created which the Peace Conference could not undo if it would. The Successor States might be persuaded or pressed into withdrawing from a few frontier positions, but anything so far-reaching as a plebiscite, which Hungary demanded for the occupied areas, would have been worse than useless, because the beneficiaries would simply not have given up their spoils, and there was no one to force them to do so.

It can, then, hardly be denied that the scales were weighted against Hungary; and she can fairly complain that she was, at least, unlucky in the way the decisions went. As regards the main question, whether justice demanded that she, should be dismembered into a number of national States, one may in fairness recall that the Allies were setting aside, with hardly a thought, considerations of legitimacy and historic right by which an earlier generation than our own set great store. The idea that so-called 'national determination' should automatically override these other claims in the name of justice is, after all, a thoroughly revolutionary one, which had never before been applied so extensively. And although we are accustomed to believe that Europe was settled on this basis in 1919 and 1920, yet the Allies never even suggested that it should be applied to their own territory, and President Wilson himself, its great prophet, hesitated to recognize diplomatically the Baltic States which, in application of the principle, had separated themselves from Russia, on the ground that to do so could involve ingratitude to an ally. If Hungary had not been in the enemy camp, her historic claims would scarcely have been ignored so cavalierly as they were. Possibly, indeed, the partition of Hungary would never have taken place in such wholesale fashion had the Partition of Poland, a century earlier, not provided Germany and Austria with an Achilles' Heel apiece and had not the Russian revolution eased the consciences of the Allies in this respect.

In different circumstances, again, more weight might easily have been attached to one plea by Hungary: that many of the non Magyars were of recent origin, immigrants and 'guests', to whom she had given shelter, who could not fairly claim the same consideration for their national claims as an indigenous nationality. Hungary somewhat marred her own point by over-insisting on it and by exaggerating its applicability; but it has assuredly some substance.

Far more important, however, was the assumption of the Allies

1. Temperly, 'How the Hungarian Frontiers were Drawn' (in *Foreign Affairs*, April 1928), p.435.

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that so far as possible *all* non-Magyar peoples ought to be freed from the Magyar yoke. The suggestion that the majority of the Slovaks, for example, might not want to be delivered from Hungary at all was clearly never taken seriously. If the existence of a Magyarone party among them was admitted, their members were regarded as renegades. The nationalist point of view was felt to be the only natural and proper one.

Thus the doctrine of self-determination was used to detach not only the Romanians and Serbs from Hungary, but also the Slovaks and the Bunyevci. And more: although the position of the Ruthenes, who were not being given a national State of their own, was obviously different, they were yet attributed to Czechoslovakia as a more 'natural' connection for them than the Hungarian. But the assumption was carried farther still: it was supposed that the 'neutral' or 'third-party' minorities, such as the Germans in Northern, Eastern, and Southern Hungary ought also to be reckoned in the non-Magyar camp. Thus in the Voivodina, for example, the Germans were added to the Serbs, and it was found that the Magyars were in a minority; whereas if the Germans had been added to the Magyars, it would have been the Serbs whose claim might have appeared thin. There was obviously a general belief, quite sincerely held, that the Magyar rule was something quite particularly oppressive and, above all, unnatural. It was felt that the new national States were automatically justified, and that even where it was necessary to attribute minorities to them, this did little harm, because they were more democratic and socially more advanced than Hungary. Moreover, it was believed that the Minority Treaties which the Successor States were being required to sign would give adequate protection.

The way to test how feeling really stood among the peoples concerned would have been by plebiscites. Hungary demanded this at the time, and her grievance that the request was refused, already strong on the face of it, was made to look far stronger still when, in the one instance in which a plebiscite was allowed to her (in Sopron), it went in her favor. I personally should hesitate to use the analogy of the Sopron plebiscite, because I know that it was not fairly taken, and do not know whether the abuses determined the result. But the demand in general was a fair one. The popular 'declarations' in Turëiansky Svätý Martin, Prešov, and Not Sad were clearly not representative expressions of opinion by the whole of the populations concerned, even though they did represent the views of certain sections. The real reason why the Allies could not insist on plebiscites was, as we have seen, quite a different one.

The truth was that national feeling was not nearly so advanced among the 'nationalities' of Hungary as the Peace Conference was

made to believe. Besides the Magyars themselves, only the Croats and the Romanians had really strongly developed national consciousness. That of the Serbs, once active, was in decline; that of the Slovaks was confined to a handful of intellectuals, while a far larger number of educated Slovaks went into the other camp and became enthusiastic Hungarians. This was even more true of the Ruthenes and the minor Yugoslavs, and of all the Germans except the Transylvanian Saxons. And even among those who did not actively 'Magyarize', there were many who would have been fully content with the integral application of the Nationalities Law, if they could only have obtained it. The automatic identification of the point of view of the nationalist leaders with that of the whole nationality was probably the gravest injustice, and the most far-reaching in its effects, of all inflicted upon Hungary.

If, therefore, the principle of self-determination had been genuinely applied in 1919, it is most probable that Transylvania would have voted for union with Romania, but that a majority among the Slovaks and Ruthenes would have asked to remain within Hungary, with a measure of self-government on the lines of the Ruthene Statute. Croatia-Slovenia would, of course, have joined Yugoslavia, and the Serbs of the Voivodina would have wished to do so also; but, taking all the nationalities of the Voivodina together, Hungary would probably have got a clear majority. In the northern Burgenland the vote would most likely have gone to Hungary; in the south, to Austria.

But, once the main decision was taken, the determination of the frontier in detail was also done in a manner most unfavorable to Hungary. As we have said, there were very many cases in which economic, strategic, and ethnographic considerations conflicted. In practically every case (except that of Austria) the ethnographic claims of Hungary's neighbors were done the very fullest justice; only quite absurd demands, just as that for the Slav Corridor through West Hungary, were rejected. There was, as we said, a patent desire to leave as few non-Magyars as possible in Hungary. But where the Successor States (again excepting Austria) asked for territory not ethnographically theirs, on economic or strategic grounds, then the fact that Magyars had to be sacrificed to these necessities counted for little. Thus Czechoslovakia, to guard her communications and her economic interests, was given a wide strip of Magyar plain; Romania again had the benefit of the doubt, in the interests of her communications, Yugoslavia could hardly suggest that the Northern Baèka and the Baranya were necessary for her on economic grounds, but she asked for them as strategic necessities, and got away with it. Incidentally, it is clear that strategic considerations weighed more in the decision regarding

Ruthenia than ever appeared at the time. There is, on the other hand, practically no instance where Hungary received any important concession from Czechoslovakia, Romania, or Yugoslavia on any of these grounds. The cumulative effect of all these decisions was, again, to create a situation genuinely unjust to Hungary. The number of Magyar 'frontier minorities' left to the three main Successor States far exceeded that of their own nationals left just inside the frontiers of Hungary; their strategical positions were much the stronger; their economic interests far better safeguarded. The scales were weighed in matters of detail, as when the broader question was considered.

## § 2. THE POSITION IN 1937

Looking back to day it is easy to find fault with the work done at Paris and to sympathize with Hungary's contention that much grievous injustice was done to her. Yet it would be unprofitable to dwell only on the past. If we are to consider to-day the possibilities and the justification of revision, we must do so in the light of conditions as they are now, not as they were twenty years ago.

For much has changed since the treaty was concluded. It was, as we saw, probably true then that many of Hungary's nationalities were still in that passive attitude which she required of them and which France, for example, asks of her minorities to-day: reserving national feeling, as it were, for the home circle, but acquiescing in the supremacy of the dominant nation and ready, even anxious, to merge in it so soon as there was any question of public life, or, indeed, of any wider social activities. But to day this old-fashioned outlook has practically vanished. It survives among many of the Jews in all the Successor States; but among the other nationalities, only among certain rather backward peasant communities. It is most widespread among the minorities left in Hungary herself, where most of the Slovaks, nearly all the Southern Slavs, and a few of the Germans still hold to it. Outside Hungary, one finds it among the Croats of the Burgenland, and here and there elsewhere, as among the Ruthenes of the Voivodina. But in general it is rapidly giving way to a more modern outlook.

It has melted like summer snow among those nationalities who have tasted power, in the shape of the Romanians, the Serbs, and the Slovaks. All of these races are now strongly and aggressively nationalist, with a nationalism which is now inseparable from political ambitions. Nor can we deny a similar feeling to the Ruthenes, even though its exact future direction is still uncertain. Hardly less striking has been the growth of a new nationalism among the Germans, beginning with those of Hungary's neighbors but



including to day—a belated but most important phenomenon—the younger generation within her own frontiers.

Not every Slovak or German, much less every Ruthene, is, indeed, a nationalist to-day; but each of these nationalities has now developed its class of leaders, its official, commercial, and intellectual bourgeoisie, its administrators, teachers, bankers, industrialists, from whom the new ideas will spread downward and outward into the masses. Their nationalism is thus a 'fait acquis' which our generation will not see changed except to grow stronger still. Nothing could now eliminate it short of such wholesale measures as the Habsburgs carried out in Bohemia during the Counter-Reformation.

Thus if, by waving an enchanter's wand, we were to put back the frontiers of 1918, we should by no means be restoring the situation as it then existed within them. The Magyars would find a determined mass as large as their own, divided, indeed, geographically and belonging to many nationalities, but in almost every case determined to resist further assimilation, to develop their own national cultures, and to have and hold a large amount of political self-government.

And not only would the nationalities be in themselves far more exacting in their wishes and far better able to press for them, but they would also be in a much more powerful position internationally. No one can reasonably doubt that Yugoslavia and Romania have come to stay as fully sovereign states. Both of them are already very different from the Serbia and the Romania of the nineteenth and even the early twentieth centuries, when they were small and inexperienced States, Romania being, in addition, condemned to discretion by her Alliance with the Dual Monarchy. The support which they could give to the Serbs and Romanians within Hungary would be on a very different scale from what they could afford before the War, and the attraction which they would exercise would assuredly be steady and powerful.

We must ask, too, whether, in imagining a restoration of the frontiers of Hungary, we are supposing also the reconstitution of Austria. Such an event hardly seems probable; but, without it, Hungary would be deprived of a support which, as we have shown, was immensely valuable to her national policy during the half-century after 1868—without which, indeed, in the opinion of many of her own leaders, she could not even have attempted that policy. Further, failing the reconstruction of Austria, and unless, alternatively, Germany were to engulf the Historic Lands of Czechoslovakia, we must reckon with the Czechs exercising (on the Slovaks) an attraction comparable, if not quite equal, to that of Serbia and Romania on their own respective kinsmen.

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Obviously, the general development of national feeling and the changes which this has brought about outside Hungary's former frontiers, as well as inside them, have transformed the whole position fundamentally. The 'thirty million Magyar kingdom' has vanished forever into Cloud-Cuckoo-Land. Even if the old frontiers were restored, Hungary could never again hope to Magyarize the chief nationalities, nor is it at all likely that she could even content them with an integral application of the Nationalities Law.

It is true that Hungary herself does not imagine that she could revert to the conditions or to the policy of 1914. Besides renouncing Croatia-Slovenia altogether, she seems inclined to day to envisage leaving Transylvania in some sort of independent position; and for the other areas inhabited by non-Magyars she asks, not their unconditional return to herself, but only plebiscites among the peoples concerned. She has also stated, through Count Bethlen, that, if these areas were restored to her, she would grant their inhabitants 'national' autonomy, for which she would be prepared to accept an international guarantee.

While paying tribute to the fairness of this request (which is not the less reasonable in principle for the immense practical difficulties which it would entail), I yet feel bound to say that so long as the map of Europe remains otherwise unchanged in its essential outlines: so long, that is, as the independent national States of Romania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Austria exist (or, in default of Austria, any German State covering the present Austrian territory), I cannot easily conceive of the Slovaks, Romanians, Yugoslavs, and Burgenland Germans voting for a return to Hungary under any terms whatever. However wrong the Treaty of Trianon may have been, the developments of the past twenty years have now supplied a post-dated justification of its main principle of dismemberment of Hungary; and so long as the national States in question are able to maintain themselves, no conscientious man could possibly recommend the 'integral' restitution of Hungary.

It is another question whether the frontiers of the new States ought to be regarded as intangible. Hungarian opinion, as we saw, protested not only against the larger principle of the dismemberment of Hungary, but also against the way in which it was carried out in detail. It argues that if the principle of national determinism is to be adopted, it ought at least to be applied equally; and demands the unconditional return, without plebiscite, of that string of predominantly Magyar territory, contiguous to the frontier, which runs round a large part of her new boundaries: which would give her back, according to Hungary's own figures (based on the 1910 census) at any rate 800,000 odd Magyars from Slovakia, at the sacrifice of only 60,000 Slovaks, and over 400,000

Magyars from Romania, at the expense, again, of 60,000 Romanians.

As regards this claim, events have brought no such change as they have in the larger question. The figures given above of course flatter the position of the Magyars to-day, since emigration of their officials and other optants and immigration of new officials, business men, and colonists from other parts of the Successor States have brought about certain changes in the populations of the border areas; to which must be added, of course, the effects of 'de-Magyarization'—whether justified and natural or not, need not concern us here. This process has, however, chiefly affected 'third party' minorities, notably Jews and Suabians. It is only in Slovakia that it has had any important effect on the numerical relationship between the Magyars and the principal nationals. Where, therefore, an area, particularly a rural area, was genuinely Magyar in 1914 it is usually Magyar to day also. I cannot feel that excessive attention ought to be paid to the new colonists, in view of the difficulty which most of them have experienced in making good, and the artificial nature of the whole process. Their governments have usually paid out large sums to establish them; it would cost them little more to reverse the process.

Hungary's claim to the preponderantly Magyar areas contiguous to her frontiers is even stronger to-day than it was in 1919, in one important respect. She can no longer fairly be regarded as the sole villain of the nationality drama. This does not mean that all States treat their minorities equally badly. Czechoslovakia deserves credit for the comparative liberality of her policy. But experience has now shown us that when a state commits itself to a national policy, the position of the minorities is bound to become extremely difficult, at best. Good intentions will not suffice, for they may have to yield before the force of circumstance, as is shown, again, by the case of Czechoslovakia (with relation to her recent emergency legislation). We also see to day that the League Minority Treaties did not afford the protection and compensation that was hoped.

All the States concerned, and not only Hungary, have adopted national policies. In all, the minorities have suffered more or less severely, and, as I have indicated in the separate sections, I believe it true to say that in them all, even in Czechoslovakia, the majority of the local Magyars would wish to return to Hungary.

Social considerations are rather more complicated. Here, again, we have learned to our cost that Hungary is not the only sinner. She remains in some respect the most oligarchic of all the States with which we are concerned, as Czechoslovakia is undoubtedly the most democratic. The awful examples of Yugoslavia and Italy since the War should, however, warn us of the danger of giving

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nations differential treatment according to their alleged degree of civilization or even to their past records.

Given the form of the national State, which is of its very essence so deeply inimical to national minorities, and especially to those related to races living immediately across a frontier, peace and justice are probably best served by reducing the number at least of such frontier minorities as far as possible. This principle should, I believe, be applied wherever the question lies between Magyars on the one hand and Slovaks, Western Germans, Romanians, and Serbs on the other. Since practically all the doubtful points were given against Hungary in '919, an even-handed application of this principle would result in considerable modifications in her favor to day.

It remains, of course, impossible to draw the frontiers so as to coincide absolutely with the ethnographical line. In certain areas considerations of economic viability remain so strong that they are bound to be given first place. But even these can be often reduced more than might at first be suspected by special arrangements such as servitude over railway lines, free zones, &c. In certain districts these have been attempted and have worked reasonably well.

As for strategic frontiers, I think that they should be adopted only in quite special cases, and for preference only in order to defend a weak state against a strong one, not, as in the Voivodina, vice versa. As a rule they are the least defensible of all claims.

Where the ethnographical principle must be modified, it would seem fairer to try to balance out the numbers of the two minorities on each side of the frontier as evenly as possible.

In the various special sections of this book I have mentioned the places where such frontier rectification seems to me easiest and fairest. I can claim no infallibility for my own proposals. It was not possible for me to go all along the frontier, nor all along the ethnic line, nor to investigate the economic connections, much less the strategic importance of every border area. I can do no more here than suggest that in principle, if the system of the national State is to be preserved, the frontier ought to follow as nearly as possible the ethnic line between the Magyars and the Germans (in the west), Slovaks, Romanians, and Serbs; and that where this line cannot be followed, the advantages and the minorities ought to be balanced as equally as possible.

In any case, whether revision is effected in Hungary's favor, or whether the frontiers are left as they are to day, an attempt ought to be made to expand and reinforce the system of minority protection. Experience has shown that it is only in exceptional cases that a minority contiguous to its own National State will ever be truly content to live as a minority under alien rule. Nevertheless, good

minority legislation and administration, although: it cannot compensate for severance from the mother country, can at least do much to mitigate the distress of that position.

A different situation arises where large numbers of third-party minorities are involved. These are naturally far more dispassionate than the principal nationals or minorities; they are not moved by the feeling which makes a Magyar or Serb declare that he would rather be in Hungary, or in Serbia, even though he might there be materially, culturally, and administratively worse off than in his own national State. One finds, indeed, some relics of this feeling (in favor of Hungary) among certain of the Magyarized Jews of the Successor States; but it is dying out among the younger generation of Jews, and among the other large dispersed minority, the Germans, it has already vanished almost entirely. The Germans and many of the Jews are perfectly prepared to put themselves up to the highest bidder.

With minorities of this type, it is possible, and necessary, to differentiate between the policies adopted towards them by the different States: not in order to praise or blame motives, but simply to estimate results. As regards the Jews, the position, as we have shown, is various and obscure, with a general leaning (except perhaps in Czechoslovakia) in favor of Hungary. But as regards the Germans, who are more numerous still, one must say frankly that, of all the States concerned, Hungary has been the most unwise in her behavior. She has not been the most oppressive—on the contrary, in many respects she has been more liberal than any of her neighbors; but she has been the least ready to meet the present German point of view. She has many excuses, since the older generation of her own Germans have disavowed their children, but the fact remains that the present generation of Germans in the Danube valley insists above all things on the right to maintain, foster, and confess its 'Deutschtum'; and Hungary allows that right more grudgingly than any other Successor State.

On that ground, the Germans in the Successor States are, on the whole, opposed to a return to Hungary. If, therefore, one had to settle the fate of districts where they are strong, e.g. the Baèka and the Banat, on the basis of the supposed wishes of the population, without the help of a plebiscite, one would have to count them as being on the side of Yugoslavia and Romania respectively and leave the areas accordingly under their present dispensation.

The Germans are not in the slightest degree attached to either the Serbs or the Romanians (still less to the Czechs); if Hungary offered them more favorable terms, they would immediately accept them and change their allegiance once more with the utmost cheerfulness. They would, however, require to be assured that

Hungary's overtures were sincere and likely to prove permanent, and Hungary's past record and present policy have not encouraged that belief. Hungary is, of course, herself in a dilemma, because to increase her German population in the south-east and the east would mean to reinforce both the numbers and the national spirit of what she already possesses in the center and west; and she is not at all certain that this would not lead to an irredentist movement in her western Counties, and perhaps to the eventual loss of fresh territory to a *gleichgeschaltet* Austria. That, however, is, as we say, her lookout.

The fact remains that, in large parts of what used to be Southeastern Hungary, the Germans to-day hold the local balance between the Magyars and the Serbs and Romanians respectively. If Hungary chose to adopt such a policy as would tempt the Germans to wish to return to her, there would be a good case for restoring the areas in which Germans and Magyars together hold a clear majority over Serbs or Romanians.

Up to a few years ago the Šokci, Bunjevci, and 'Wends' of the Prekomurje might fairly have been counted as third-party minorities. To day they, with the Slovaks of the Voivodina, ought probably to be reckoned with the Yugoslavs. There remains, however, the case of the Ruthenes, who cannot at present be attached to any national State of their own. The true reasons for giving Ruthenia to Czechoslovakia were strategic, whereas the economic argument for restoring it to Hungary, in the interests of all parties, is exceedingly strong. While recognizing, therefore, the good work which Czechoslovakia has done in that country, contrasting as it does most favorably with what Hungary did and left undone before the War, and recognizing also that considerations of 'Weltpolitik' must be given exceptional weight in this area, I have yet written that in my opinion the interests of the local population would be better served if it were restored to Hungary. In order, however, to prevent national, social, and economic injustice, it would have to be given a very wide degree of autonomy, based; perhaps, on the draft worked out in 1918 but brought up to date in the light of later experience and placed, as Count Bethlen himself suggested, under an effective international guarantee. If this were not done, complaints would at once arise again, and those who recommended the change would regret their action.

The 'lesser revision' on lines something like these would, I believe, be only equitable. It accepts the principle of Hungary's dismemberment on national lines and seeks only to draw the consequences without favor to either party. I believe, too, that it would remove a considerable number of the acute causes of friction in the Danube valley to day. It would not seriously diminish either

Yugoslavia or Romania; and I think it possible that Hungary herself might in time come to accept it as a final solution as far as these two countries are concerned. Even to-day, as often in the past, the Magyars and Serbs have often inclined, as it were *malgré eux* and in the intervals of acute controversy, towards friendship; and it is not at all impossible that if Romania treated her Magyar population wisely she might make of it a bridge for establishing a similar friendly relationship with Hungary.

There remains, however, the case of Slovakia, which is far more difficult. One cannot fairly suggest that no local concessions should be given to Hungary at the expense of Slovakia. Czechoslovakia was treated fully as generously, in points of detail, as either of her two allies. Yet the concessions were in a way more necessary to her and even local readjustment might seriously endanger her.

The fact is, of course, that while Yugoslavia and Romania, in spite of their internal difficulties, are really solidly founded blocs which can stand a good deal of chipping, Czechoslovakia is a fine but delicate structure, which a little pressure here or there might shake very badly. It has too many danger-points, too many vital necessities. Since the Historic Lands contain one German for every two Czechs, the Slovaks are vital to enable the Czechs to preserve their dominant position; the strip of plain in the south is vital, for economic reasons and to make communications possible; Ruthenia is vital to enable the structure thus built up to keep in touch with its allies; and so on. And in the minds of many, Czechoslovakia herself is vital to the balance of European power.

So long as Czechoslovakia exists, and so long as we accept the system of the national State in the Danube valley, then we must say of the Slovaks what has been said of the Serbs and the Romanians: that it would be contrary to the principle of self-determination to hand them back to Hungary to-day. One can only propose local readjustments, leaving the main position as it stands now.

It is, however, much less easy to imagine Hungary resting permanently content with such minor changes in the north, than in the east or the south. For the historic, economic, and also the spiritual connections between Northern and Central Hungary were in the past always far closer than those between the center and the remote and exposed east and south. The severance of those connections has inflicted upon her a real blow from which it seems doubtful—on economic grounds, if none other—whether she can ever entirely recover.

We are thus faced with two requirements, which cannot possibly be reconciled on the basis of the National State; and although it may appear utopian and unpractical to suggest it, I am convinced

that the only true solution for the problem of Slovakia, as indeed for that of the Historic Lands of the Czechoslovak Republic, for Transylvania, and ultimately for the whole Middle Danube Basin, lies in the abandonment, by all concerned, of this unlucky attempt to make a single nation dominate an area inhabited by so many different nationalities.

It is an attempt that has never once proved successful. During the earlier period of Hungary's history, as we showed, conditions were widely different, and the ideas of modern nationalism were unknown. Then followed the age of the Habsburgs, when Hungary, although *de jure* independent, was *de facto* bound hand and foot. A hundred years ago began the movement which evolved into the attempt by the Magyars to create of Hungary a *Magyar* national State. Looking back we may, say that in this or that particular she was unlucky, that, given more time, she might have made more progress. But the conditions were actually more favorable than not, and the fact remains that she failed. The Treaty of Trianon is proof thereof.

Thus it is true to say that up to 1918 a national State in the modern sense of the word never existed in the Danube basin; the attempt to create one only led to disrapture of the old political unity. The natural deduction would be that this form of State is unfitted to local conditions, and therefore not destined to endure. The history of events since 1919 seems to me only to have confirmed that lesson. The Successor States have the advantage over Hungary of blocs of their majority peoples (or peoples able to fulfil that role) outside the areas which they have received at Hungary's expense; but within those areas only Austria among them has very many fewer minorities, relatively to the total population, than Hungary had herself. Practically all these minorities are discontented with their position, and must always remain so, so long as they are treated as minorities in both the numerical and the moral sense. A solution which is repudiated by so large a proportion of the peoples concerned has few of the marks of permanency.

Those who believe in the principle of the present order, without being blind to its defects, yet hope that by extending and improving the system of minority protection, and by removing tariff barriers and similar obstacles to free intercourse, the frontiers could be so 'spiritualized' as to become invisible. I should be the last to deny the advisability of better minority protection, which is one o. the most urgent needs of to day, and ought to be a first object of consideration, whether the frontiers are modified or left intact. But it is useless blinking the fact that no minority protection yet devised has prevented any State from doing with its minorities precisely as it wished. The only real check hitherto has



been such intrinsic strength as some individual minority may have possessed.

The most elaborate improvement of the League machinery will hardly alter this position very greatly. As for economic co-operation, this, if it ever comes, will be a consequence and not a cause of political appeasement. Political considerations have hitherto invariably outweighed economic. Hitherto, far from becoming invisible, the frontiers have grown more and more formidable during the past twenty years.

The only permanent solution of the problem of the Danube basin lies in the adoption of complete national equality among its inhabitants—the transformation of the area into a true ‘Eastern Switzerland’ in which every nationality alike can find national liberty and a national home. If this principle once prevails, it may truly be argued that it does not particularly matter where the frontiers are drawn. If, in spite of this, I still hanker after seeing a unified territory re-established corresponding more closely to that of the old Hungary, this is because of geographical and economic considerations. Some parts of the old Hungary have fared better than others since 1919; a few corners may actually have gained by their altered position. But, broadly speaking, the old Hungary did form a natural unit which seemed to possess an inherent strength lacking in some of its successors, and a State established within those boundaries, but on a better political basis, should be able to secure for its inhabitants a higher standard of living than the new formations based on ethnographical considerations.

The old Hungary certainly commanded very strong centripetal forces, of one kind or another. It has shown in the past a very remarkable coherence which cannot be altogether fortuitous. There were centrifugal forces too, notably that of nationality, which became so strong that in 1919 all else had to give way before it. Yet I cannot but regard the present solution as one of despair. I believe that the forces making for unity will ultimately prove so strong that a way will be found to adjust the relationships between the different nationalities in such manner that they will find it not merely possible to live together, but impossible to do otherwise. I think that it can fairly be said of Hungary what Palácky said of Austria in 1848: that if she did not exist it would be necessary to invent her.