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From "Eastern Switzerland" to Ethnic Cleansing

Is the Dream Still Relevant?*

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Ten years ago, in the bliss of annus mirabilis, the term "ethnic cleansing" was unknown. Today we devote a conference to that subject only to discover how many criminal events in history may fall under that hideous category.

While the organizers of the conference were wise in pointing out the difference between forced migration, population exchange and mass extermination aiming at genocide, and we havenít yet adopted a definition of the term "ethnic cleansing," Iíd like to point out, however, that in my opinion the term is worse than euphemistic, it is misleading. It has nothing to do with cleanliness, purity, on the contrary, it is a code name for killing and/or expelling people who are undesirable because of their national and/or religious identity, on account of the language they speak. The term really means "ethnic killing," ethnocide, which is indeed different from genocide, but it is related to it in being totally unacceptable, something to be prosecuted by the international community.

On one of my first trips to Western Europe I came across a book entitled Katyn¹. A Crime without Parallel. Since then I learned that, sadly, the brutal murder of tens of thousands of Polish POWs by the Soviet NKVD was not without parallel, it was surpassed only too often. Before the Balkan horrors of the 1990s I shared the belief of so many people that after the crimes of Hitler's Nazism and Stalin's Communism similar actions could not happen again. We were mistaken, and that is how the title of the present conference was born.
In the course of our proceedings we heard scholarly accounts of little-known forced re-settlements, mass murders and war crimes: the fate of the Greeks of Asia Minor, that of the Crimea Tatars and many other smaller peoples in the Soviet Union, and the largely untold suffering and eventual elimination of the Germans who used to live in Bohemia, in Transylvania, in the Banat and the Vojvodina. Another hardly known story, described in four papers, is the massive reduction in the size and proportion of the Hungarians in Slovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia.

My message tonight is not simply to highlight another sad story of abuse. My aim is more positive, an effort to show that the horrors of Bosnia and Kosovo were not inevitable, that the co-existence and peaceful cooperation of peoples who live side-by-side, often intermingled, is possible, that there are promising models for that both in the past and in the present. In my view the most viable way for that is the Swiss model of arranging the various ethnic groups of a country into separate Kantons.

The Confederatio Helvetica as model

Louis Kossuth, the leader of the War for Hungarian Independence, writing in exile in 1862, proposed a Confederation of the Danubian Nations, as the best guarantee against interference and domination by the nearby great powers and as a solution for handling the conflicting territorial claims of the many smaller peoples living in the Danube Basin. He ended his essay with a peroration: "Unity, agreement, fraternity among Hungarians, Slovaks and Romanians! Behold, my most ardent desire, my sincerest advice! Behold, a blithesome future for us all!" More than fifty years later, at the end of World War I, Oscar Jászi, a long-time advocate of the rights of the non-Hungarian nationalities of Hungary, soon an exile in Austria, and later a Professor at Oberlin College, Ohio, wrote a book which advocated the replacement of the dual Austro-Hungarian Monarchy by a federation of German Austria, Czech Bohemia, Hungary, Polish-Ukrainian Galicia and Croatia, making up "The United States of the Danube." He called for the adoption of the Swiss Kanton system, where the administrative units of a region would reflect the ethnic composition of the population. In this way the historic Kingdom of Hungary was to become "a kind of Eastern Switzerland," where the various nationalities would enjoy territorial and/or cultural autonomy. Jászi was not a lonely dreamer, from the 19th century Czech Frantisek Palacky to the Romanian Aurel Popovici and the Austrian Otto Bauer and Karl Renner in the 1900s many Central European political thinkers believed that the best way to assure the peaceful co-existence of the
eleven national groups living in the Habsburg Monarchy lay in national autonomies, a kind of compromise between total separation (i.e. independence) and enforced unity.4

A plan similar to Jászi's was submitted to the British Foreign Office in October, 1918 by Leo Amery, an adviser to the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George. Its conclusion was: "Permanent stability and prosperity could best be secured by a new Danubian Confederation comprising German Austria, Bohemia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania and probably also Bulgaria. [Ö] In any case the various nationalities of Central Europe are so interlocked, and their racial frontiers are so unsuitable as the frontiers of really independent sovereign states, that the only satisfactory and permanent working policy for them lies in their incorporation in a non-national superstate."5 Almost simultaneously the American team preparing peace, the Inquiry, when drawing up proposals for new states to emerge in Central Europe, proposed the transformation of Austria-Hungary into a federation.6 Even when the allies decided to work for the break-up of the Monarchy the final U.S. recommendation came to the conclusion that "the frontiers supposed [sic] are unsatisfactory as the international boundaries of sovereign states. It has been found impossible to discover such lines, which would be at the same time just and practical. [Ö] many of these difficulties would disappear if the boundaries were to be drawn with the purpose of separating not independent nations, but component portions of a federalized state."7

The idea of using the Swiss model for managing the ethnic mosaic characterizing a large part of Central and Eastern Europe was revived during the Second World War. One of the many plans for a fair post-war settlement and a solution of the problem of Transylvania, traditionally a bone of contention between Hungary and Rumania, was drawn up by a member of the Hungarian Parliament, Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, 8 In his book published in 1944 in English on the future of Transylvania9 he argued for the cantonal model in an independent state, having separate as well as mixed Hungarian and Romanian territorial units, thus preserving ethnic peace in that historic province, where religious tolerance was enacted already in the 16th century. A recent study by an Hungarian writer recalls the past plans for Transylvania to be reconstituted along the Swiss model and argues for a system of autonomous regions.10
The ethnic mosaic in Central Europe

About a thousand years ago Central Europe embraced Christianity and four kingdoms emerged: Poland, Bohemia (the land of the Czechs), Hungary and Croatia. Serbia and two Romanian principalities, Wallachia and Moldova, following the rite of the Eastern Orthodox Church, were established two or three centuries later. While in all these states one national group (and language) was dominant, they contained several ethnic minorities, and there was a constant influx of new settlers: mainly Germans and Turkic peoples, the Cumanians being the largest, also Romanians (then called Wallachs) and some Jews. In the first group Latin, in the second Old Church Slavic was the language of learning and administration. In everyday life each person was free to use whichever language he or she preferred, and many people spoke several languages. Loyalty to the state, however, was not based on language or ethnicity, rather on allegiance to the sovereign King, who reigned Dei gratia, by the grace of God. The settlers, hospes, whether importing skills and trades to the towns, or mining gold, silver, salt, or working in the fields, were granted royal privileges, including the free use of their language and running their own local affairs according. When two or more ethnic groups lived in the same town they usually inhabited separate quarters, and the mayor or judge as well as the councilors were selected on a rotational basis. Ethnic strife was rare, and the Kings were ready to protect the minorities, whose taxes were an important source of revenue. The various ethnic islands, primarily the German "Saxons" in Transylvania and the Zipser in North-Eastern Hungary, were able to preserve their linguistic identity until the 20th century.

Wars and epidemics naturally took a heavy toll of the population, but systematic killing based on language or ethnic identity was rare. When the multinational Ottoman Empire, dominated by Islamic Turks but often managed by Greeks and Albanians, conquered the Balkan Peninsula, the conflict undoubtedly had a religious connotation. The ensuing centuries of warfare had a most detrimental impact on the evolution of Southeastern Europe, including decimating the population. The armies of the Sultan (often Tartar, Slavic or Albanian auxiliary troops) killed, plundered and took people into slavery by the tens of thousands, but the mercenaries of the Habsburg kings were not much better in their treatment of the population of Hungary either. Contemporary travelers like Lady Mary Montague described the devastations in graphical terms. Following the expulsion of the Ottomans from Hungary in the 18th century big changes occurred in the ethnic composition of Central Europe. The devastated and depopulated
Southeastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain saw massive organized colonization mainly by Germans (called Swabians) arriving from the West, Slovaks from the North and Rusyns from the Northeastern Carpathians moving to the fertile and "free" land of today's Vojvodina and the Banat. Serbs and Romanians arrived also in great numbers, escaping poverty, mismanagement, and, occasionally, religious intolerance under Ottoman rule. The Habsburg Emperor-Kings established a military borderland to protect their possessions, the local Catholic Croats being joined by Orthodox Serbs thus inadvertently laying the foundation for the brutal conflicts of the 20th century. Both the older and the new ethnic islands had substantial territorial as well as religious autonomy. Croatia had its own Diet, the Sabor in Zagreb, the military border from the Austrian Alps to the eastern Carpathians had its own military administration, and the Orthodox Serb Patriarch of Karlowatz as well as the Romanians of Transylvania enjoyed religious freedom and autonomy.

The origins of ethnic conflicts

It was largely due to the Ottoman wars and subsequent colonization that by the late 18th century the Hungarians became a minority in the Kingdom of Hungary, but that became an issue only from the 1830s on, with the rise of nationalism, when language and its concomitant, ethnic identity, became the primary basis for group loyalty. "National awakening" was bound to lead to trouble everywhere where populations were ethnically mixed: in Hungary, in Poland-Lithuania, and all over the Balkans. The towns were often inhabited by one national group, while the villages nearby by another. The situation was complicated by the cleavage between landowning nobles, industrious burghers of towns and the poor serfs, who started to move to the urban and industrializing areas. The most typical case was in eastern Galicia, with a Polish-speaking gentry and a Ukrainian rural population, where the towns had also sizeable German and Yiddish-speaking Jewish population. A similar, but even more complicated pattern could be observed in Transylvania, where the nobility was Hungarian (absorbing also some Romanians), the urban element divided between Hungarians and Germans, while the peasants were both Hungarian (called Székely or Szekler in the southeastern corner of the principality), German or more properly Sächsisch in the Königsboden, and Romanian, the latter moving down from the pastures in the mountains to the destroyed Hungarian villages or arriving from Moldova and Wallachia over the Carpathians. Social tensions also grew with industrialization setting in.
Contrary to the commonly held belief that “ethnic cleansing,” or in a more general way, present-day ethnic conflicts go back to centuries of animosities and hostilities, there were far fewer wars between the peoples of the Danubian Basin than in Western or Northern Europe. The first serious nationalist clashes between them occurred only in 1848, during "the springtime of nations," when the common desire for liberty, equality and national freedom floundered on the territorial issue, on the conflicting claims to the same territory, e.g. Transylvania. Particularly difficult was to separate peoples along national lines when they lived mixed, overlapping each other. The call was for "Home Rule," national independence, or at least for very substantial territorial autonomy. The new government of Hungary, in accordance with the principles of contemporary liberalism, believed that equality before the law and the new constitutional system would satisfy the non-Hungarian citizens of the country, and rejected demands for federalizing the country along national lines. The reactionary advisers of the Habsburg King sent in an army to suppress Hungary, and by skilfully manipulating the Croatian, Serbian and Romanian peasantry, led by loyal, "Habsburgtreu" priests and officers, they induced these "nationalities" to rebel against the government. The Hungarians were supported by the vast majority of the Slovak, German and Rusyn nationalities and by all the Jews of the kingdom, as well as by a large number of Polish, Austrian and Italian volunteers. The outcome was a long war, with brutal atrocities committed against Hungarian civilians (not returned in kind), and it ended only with the Russian Czar sending a 300,000 strong army to help his Imperial colleague, crushing not only the Hungarians, but also the aspirations of the Slavs and Romanians for self-government and the hopes of the Poles for restoring their independence.

The Hungarians learned the lesson, and when in 1867 they made peace with the Habsburgs and the laws of 1848 were restored, they made an honest effort to placate the non-Hungarian citizens by passing the first Law on National Minorities in the world. Despite its liberal principles it did not go far enough, particularly, it did not accept the demands for territorial and ethnic autonomy, except in the case of the historic province of Croatia. This liberal piece of legislation was also increasingly disregarded, especially from the 1890s on. The autonomy of the Romanian and Serbian Churches, however, was recognized, including their right to have an independent educational system, so the ethnic composition of Hungary did not change dramatically. "Magyarization," a policy to turn non-Hungarians into Hungarians through assimilation, may have been desired by many Hungarians, but a change in one's language and identity was observable
only in the towns and in the industrial zones, affecting only the urban 
German and Jewish population. Assimilation among them was voluntary 
and often enthusiastic, while the rural Slovak, Serb and Romanian 
communities were hardly affected.11

With verbal intolerance growing on both sides, at the end of World War I, 
encouraged by the Entente Powers and the United States, the non-
Hungarian population of Hungary opted for secession. The unity of the 
Romanians, as well as the unification of the Czechs and Slovaks and also of 
the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was thus accomplished. Sadly, the 
peacemakers were not content with realizing the principle of self-
determination, espoused and advocated by President Wilson. The new 
borders did not reflect ethnic lines, even where it would have been quite 
easy to do so. One third of all Hungarians, more than three million, were 
incorporated in Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia, against their 
will, denying the call for plebiscites. Czechoslovakia acquired three million 
Germans and one million Hungarians, Poland one million Germans and 
more than six million Ukrainians and Belorussians, Romania 4.5 million 
non-Romanians (Hungarians, Germans, Ukrainians, Russians, Bulgarians 
etc.). One third of the population of the new Central Europe did not belong 
to the majority nations, they were national minorities.

Radical efforts to change the ethnic map

The new or vastly enlarged states were aware of the precariousness of their 
new holdings. Rather than trying to win over their minorities with kindness, 
with autonomy (in many cases solemnly promised before the peace treaties 
were signed), they did not even bother to keep their international 
obligations, the Minority Treaties signed with the Great Powers in 1919, 
that were meant to protect the minorities. The aim of the new masters was to 
reduce the number and proportion of the national minorities by expulsion, 
harassment leading to "voluntary" emigration, assimilation, or just by 
statistical maneuvering. Of course there was considerable difference in 
methods between the various countries, but even the supposedly exemplary 
democracy of Masaryk's Czechoslovakia tried to dilute the compact bloc of 
Hungarians in Southern Slovakia by creating colony-like settlements, 
sending in Slovak and Czech army veterans and other carpetbaggers.

In Central and Eastern Europe in the inter-war period one cannot speak of 
"ethnic cleansing" in the horrible, post 1990 version of the term. But by 
looking at the figures, at the changes in the actual number of the minorities,
even more in their proportion on the national level and in the various localities, I cannot but speak of "creeping ethnic cleansing," a gradual but steady tendency of changing the ethnic composition of the regions inhabited by national minorities. This was by no means a natural process, simply the outcome of industrialization and its concomitant, urbanization, it was induced and maintained artificially, using the resources of the state.

The second World War brought sufferings and brutality unparalleled in modern history to most of the peoples and individuals living in Central and Eastern Europe. It is enough to mention the murder of six million Jews, the deportation and forced re-settlement of millions of non-Russians by Stalin, aptly called the nation-killer by Robert Conquest, or of the expulsion and elimination of most of the Germans from the Südostraum. The papers read at the present conference provide chilling pictures of inhuman behavior. Whereas some groups and individuals must bear a far heavier responsibility for those crimes than others, with the Nazis taking the lead, it must be a sad conclusion that there was no people in Europe which did not produce individuals who deserved a place in a court investigating war crimes. Brutality begots brutality, and the mass expulsions, forced population transfers and vengeance directed at the innocent, culminating in mass murders, did not come to an end until 1948, in the Soviet Union until the death of Stalin 1953. The imposition of Communism did stop open ethnic cleansings, but inaugurated decades of massive and large-scale changes in the ethnic composition of the territories previously disputed, especially in that of the towns.

The pattern was the same everywhere. The peasants were forced into the collective farms, after that it was easy to send the unhappy and redundant people to work in the newly created heavy industries and mines. Ugly urban settlements mushroomed everywhere, and the new arrivals often spoke a language different from that of the old inhabitants or of the surrounding area. That is how millions of Russians moved into the Baltic States, annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940, and, starting much earlier, into the Caucasian region or to Central Asia. The post-war communist governments, using the extensive powers of the state, launched new campaigns to send Serbs to Kosovo and the Vojvodina, Romanians to Transylvania, and Slovaks to the southern rim of Czechoslovakia, re-annexed from Hungary. At first glance that was the opposite of "ethnic cleansing," it was rather "ethnic mixing," but this rapid and centrally coordinated process created a lot of ill feeling and mutual distrust, especially since the newcomers, the colonists were given the top jobs, they made up the local police and the
secret police, and usually did not even try to learn the language of the minority, which often was the local majority.

It is not the task of the present essay to give an account how Hungarians became victims of such an undeniable, deliberate changing of the ethnic composition of the land of their birth. I can only present the various types of those detestable policies. The unilateral, unauthorized expulsion of tens of thousands of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia was followed by an organized "population exchange," involving about 150,000 people, agreed to by Hungary as a lesser evil than outright expulsion, which became the lot of the three million Germans. But at least those policies were carried out more or less in an organized way, and while quite a few people died during the process, outright murder was rare. In Transylvania Romanian irregular troops carried out a number of "executions" of innocent Hungarian peasants in several villages in late 1944, but the number of victims was much smaller than deaths caused by the inhuman conditions of the POW-camps or the forced labor camps in the Danube estuary, or delta. Tens of thousands of Germans (Saxons from Transylvania and Swabians from the Banat) were sent to the Soviet Union for labor, many did not return. In Subcarpathia, the province which Hungary was compelled to cede to Czechoslovakia only to be passed on to the Soviet Union in 1945, practically the whole male Hungarian population was rounded up and sent to forced labor inside the Soviet Union in late 1944, with extremely high rate of mortality. The clearest case of ethnic cleansing occurred in the Vojvodina, the province that was returned to Hungary in 1941. At the end of 1944 the Communist partisans of Tito tortured and murdered about forty thousand Hungarian civilians, including women, children and priests. From the late 1940s on the brutal methods gave way to gradual ethnic change described above. By 1990 the results were quite astounding, as shown in the tables and charts.

Ethnic map of Hungary in the late 15th century
Ethnic map of the Carpathian Basin (around 1980)
Change in the number of ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania, Slovakia, Vojvodina and Transcarpathia (1880-1990)
Change in the number and percentage of the Hungarian minorities in different regions of the Carpathian Basin (1880-1991)
Change in the ethnic structure of selected cities and towns of present-day Slovakia (1880-1991)
Change in the ethnic structure of population in selected municipalities of Transylvania (1880-1992)
Ethnic structure of the population of the present territory of Vojvodina
Ethnic structure of the population living in the regions of South Eastern Europe (1920, 1980)

Looking at the charts and figures helps to understand why the national minorities living in Central and Eastern Europe are so keen on the right to self-government and language rights. What they fear is nothing less than gradual elimination, creeping and silent ethnic cleansing. Comparing their number and proportion between 1920 and 1990 makes this fear well founded.

Please note:
These charts and maps are not jet available. Similar maps and data could be found on the pages of this Home Page:
Kocsis-Hodosi: Hungarian Minorities in the Carpathian Basin, and the Map section of the links

Is the dream relevant after the horrors?

In late 1991 the Yugoslav People's Army launched an attack on Croatia, and following heavy fighting overrun Eastern Slavonia and the Knin region in Central Croatia. The civilian population, Croats and Hungarians, who did not flee or hide, were killed in large numbers. The Serbs living in Western Slavonia became targets of retribution and escaped to Serbia. In 1992 the "ethnic cleansing" of the Muslims and Croats of Bosnia commenced. Those who were not killed or expelled were subject to systematic torture and rape. The horrors continued until in 1995 NATO finally stopped what became a war of mutual extermination. Following that the Croatian army occupied the "Serb Krajina" in the middle of Croatia, inducing its inhabitants to flee. The last chapter of mass expulsions and killings took place in Kosovo in 1999, and while it was stopped and reversed thanks to the bombing campaign of NATO, the conflict between the Serbs and the Kosovar Albanians, and the sporadic killings did not stop until today.

Winston Churchill proved more right than he ever imagined, independence brought terrible sufferings to the peoples of the one-time Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Bosnia included!)¹². Is there an end to all that, is there a way back, to ethnic peace and justice? Can the nightmare of "ethnic cleansing" be replaced by ethnic survival and revival? Since the international community seems to be committed to this goal, testified by the numerous recommendations and conventions of the U.N., the OSCE and the Council
of Europe, the answer must be in the affirmative. Since both NATO and the European Union made it clear that the observation of minority rights is one of the preconditions of admitting an applicant country into its ranks, one should be optimistic. But whereas there is a general commitment not to allow new ethnic cleansings, there is no similar commitment for preventing the slow, creeping version of ethnic change and all the concomitant suffering and conflicts. In my opinion the best guarantee for the survival of the remaining national minorities lies in re-discovering and adopting the cantonal model. This is not what the international community is striving for. There is much talk about the need for a multiethnic society in the former Yugoslavia and beyond that. Older history and the events of the last ten years show us that the way to achieve and preserve such a model lies not in mixing peoples artificially in a reckless way, neither in returning all the expelled, "cleansed" victims to the scene of the crime, expecting them to get along with their tormentors in good spirit, but in following the Swiss model of autonomous units bound together by geography, common traditions and economic interests. It has been found working not only in Switzerland, but also in South Tyrol, in Catalonia, and hopefully it will work in Corsica. That model should be introduced in Serbia, particularly in the Vojvodina and the Sanjak. That is what the millions of Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania are striving for. An Eastern Switzerland in the Danubian Basin was a dream once. It should be turned into a reality.

Conclusion

I'd like to submit four preliminary conclusions from the present study of the subject "ethnic cleansing."

1./ Historians should strive to present these facts to the political leaders, to the general public and particularly to their students. A healthy indignation about the horrors witnessed over Bosnia and Kosovo should direct attention to the earlier versions of those policies.

2./ It is worth noting that those crimes do not pay in any way. Apart from the signs that the indicted war criminals are sooner or later brought to court, the practice of getting rid of the "undesired" national groups has proved to be detrimental even to those who thought they would benefit from it. The expulsion and elimination (or in the case of Ceausescus's Romania occasionally the outright selling) of the Germans, Jews, Hungarians, Greeks, Muslims, who were all diligent, hard-working, often better-than-average educated people was a very serious loss to the country concerned.
Those majorities that remained found themselves poorer in so many ways.

3./ It is essential to come to terms with the past. The International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague has its important tasks, but the crimes must be faced also by the people in whose name they were committed. Responsibility, remorse and reparation, these three Rs are the precondition for the fourth, reconciliation. I am proud to say that my country, Hungary, has done all that over its painful 20th century and is willing to continue on that path.

4./ I recall the very first sentence of my Latin textbook, Historia est magistra vitae. In a sophisticated translation it says that history is a philosophy, which teaches through examples. That is even more ambitious than Henry Kissinger's aim of "shedding light on the likely consequences of comparable situations,\(^{13}\)" and I do hope that the terrible practice of "ethnic cleansing" offers us more than one lesson. It goes beyond the command "thou shalt not," it should also show that ethnic diversity is not bound to lead to violent clashes, and also to realize that the best way for creating or re-creating a multiethnic society might be found in the cantonal model.

**FOOTNOTES**

1 Louis Fitzgibbon, Katyn a Crime without Parallel. (Dublin, 1971, 1975)

2 Kossuth Lajos Iratai [The Papers of L. Kossuth], vol. VI. ed. by Ferencz Kossuth (Budapest, 1898)


4 Éva Ring, ed., Helyünk Európában [Hungary's Place in Europe] (Budapest, 1986).


8Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky (1886-1944), Hungarian author and politician. He was a courageous opponent of Nazi Germany, a leader of the Hungarian resistance, who was executed by the Hungarian hirelings of Hitler on Christmas Eve, 1944.


11 The "national question," inter-ethnic relations in Austria-Hungary, policies towards the national minorities, changes in the ethnic composition of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, has been treated by a large number of books and articles. C.A. Macartney, The Habsburg Monarchy (Oxford, 1968) offers probably the most comprehensive and balanced picture, while Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States (Boulder, Colo., 1977) deals specifically with the issue. For a recent summary, with statistical figures and maps Cf. The Hungarians. A Divided Nation. Ed. Stephen Borsody (New Haven, 1988).

12 "there is not one of the peoples or provinces that constituted the Empire of the Habsburgs to whom gaining their independence has not brought the tortures which ancient poets and theologians had reserved for the damned." Sir Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (London, 1948), 14.

13 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, 1994), 27.