Janics: Czechoslovak Policy and the Hungarian Minority

THE DEPORTATIONS

The hard line advocates of the ethnically homogeneous Czechoslovak nation-state were encouraged by the lack of interest the Great Powers had shown at the Paris Peace Conference in international minority protection. Unlike the peace treaties after the First World War, the new treaties did not obligate multiethnic states to respect the rights of ethnic minorities. This was hailed by the victorious nations of Central and Eastern Europe as a triumph of the homogeneous nation-state. The free hand granted to the victors against the vanquished tempted the Slovak nationalists to use force against the Hungarian minority. They decided to solve the Hungarian problem by internal dispersion under the guise of so-called "domestic measures."

At the beginning of November 1946, an ominous tone spread all over the Slovak nationalist press: "In case we cannot reach agreement with Hungary, our government and the parliament will find the means with which to solve once and for all the problem of the Hungarian minority, if necessary by merely domestic means. In any case Slovakia and its southern borderlands can only be Slovak and nothing else."¹

For some time after the Paris Peace Conference, neither the Czechoslovak nor the Hungarian side showed eagerness to open direct negotiations as envisaged by the treaty of peace between the two countries. Most likely, the motivation for hesitation on the Czechoslovak side was the conviction that internal dispersion under "domestic measures" offered better chances for a radical solution than international negotiations of any sort. The Hungarians, on the other hand, regarded delay in opening direct negotiations as salutary from their point of view. Their hope was that delay may cool down the hot temper of Czechoslovak nationalism. Evidently, neither the Hungarian government nor the Hungarian minority had been aware of the behind-the-scene Czechoslovak preparations for internal dispersion.

As we now know, tentative plans for the tragic 99 day episode of the winter deportations in 1946-47 had actually been laid already in the summer of 1946. According to the Slovak historian Samuel Cambel:

In Bratislava on August 6-7, 1946, at a joint meeting of the central authorities and the local Slovak national organizations it was decided that, in order to ensure the necessary manpower [for economic reconstruction] force would be used against the Hungarian population of South Slovakia pursuant to the provisions of Presidential decree 88/1945 [on universal labor service]. It was on this basis that the compulsory labor service of the Hungarian population of South Slovakia was decreed [in November 1946], the intention being that by the same token the [ethnic] structure of South Slovakia's population would be altered. The recruitment campaign did not apply to Hungarians under investigation for treason or cooperation with the Germans . . ., nor to those who had been selected for expulsion within the framework of the population exchange agreement . . . ²

Historian Cambel thus frankly revealed the early plans for internal -dispersion. The exemptions from deportation also revealed the social thrust of the intended measures. As it is well known, the Hungarians selected as "war criminals" (in excess of 100,000) were mostly intellectuals and well-to-do peasants, while the Hungarians selected for exchange (another 100,000) were also well-off farmers. The strategy of the final solution was clear. Expulsion would take care of the intelligentsia and of the kulaks, whose land would be made available for Slovak colonization, while the deportation would disperse the "remaining" Hungarians, belonging mostly to the agrarian proletariat.

Indoctrination of the Czechoslovak public opinion for supporting the new wave of anti-Hungarian measures began in late October. Dr. J. Lettrich, chairman of the Slovak National Council, declared before departing for a good-will tour of the United States: "The brotherly Czech nation and the government devote much greater attention to the German problem. Two and a half million Germans are already across the border, while so far, not even five percent of the Hungarians have been expelled from Slovakia. The problem of replacing the missing workers and employees in the Czech borderlands and in Czech industry arises following the departure of the Germans, and the situation is also serious in agriculture. The matter concerns us [Slovaks] insofar as they expect us to fill the gap caused by the departure of German manpower in the Sudeten area. We must deal with this because it is primarily a Slovak national concern . . ."³

It should be noted that Czech willingness to cooperate with the Slovaks in the matter of the Hungarians' deportation to the Czech lands was not always unanimous. President Benes himself counseled caution as this press release by ÈTK, the official Czechoslovak new agency indicates: "The delegation of the Slovak Resettlement Bureau calls on President Benes. The President of the Republic received the delegation of the Slovak Resettlement Bureau and of the National Reconstruction Foundation, which briefed the President regarding the possibilities for the solution of the Hungarian problem of Slovakia. In the course of the conversation they discussed the question of resettlement of the Hungarians. The President emphasized that the Hungarian issue was not merely an internal Slovak matter, but a concern of the State as a whole and it even has international implications, which have to be clarified."⁴

Benes's counsel of caution evidently referred to the fact that dispersion would bypass international agreements and the deportation project would imply that Czechoslovakia no longer wished to avail itself of direct negotiations envisaged by the peace treaty, nor believed that the population exchange was urgent. Apart from that, Benes, did nothing to stop the Slovak plans against the Hungarian minority. Moreover, Czech scruples whether motivated by international concern, class or humanistic considerations-conveniently disappeared once deportations began. The fact that the Minister of Agriculture in the central government was the strongly nationalist Slovak Julius Ïuris contributed to a speedy decision on the deportations. In Bratislava, the Slovak National Council, and the Board of Representatives (the highest government authority in Slovakia) unanimously approved the measure.

As the deportations began, Minister Ïuris declared: "We will . . . employ Hungarians on Bohemian lands. We will bring about order by our-selves since it cannot be done on the basis of mutual accord between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, because Hungary is sabotaging the population exchange; and we will carry all this out even if international forums do not approve."⁵

When Minister Ïuris spoke, the sate of siege already had been lasting for four days in the solidly Hungarian populated Western Csallóköz (an island between the two branches of the Danube). The 99 days drama began in the early hours of November 19, 1946, and it lasted until February 25, 194? It surprised both the affected population and government circles in Hungary, for after Paris, Hungarian public opinion expected relaxation of tensions and a return to reason.

The deportation operations were carried out according to detailed plans. Military units closed in on one or two villages at a time and then ordered the selected families to get ready for evacuation with their be-longings. Those to be deported were informed that they must leave their homes for good. Their real estate, their domestic animals, their agricultural equipment would be confiscated. There was not right of appeal. Family members had to leave regardless of age or sex. The designated families were transported by military trucks to the nearest railroad station whence they were dispatched to Bohemia under close guard. There was no relief even on the coldest days, although the winter that year was particularly severe. There was a cold wave all over Europe.⁶

The family sentenced to deportation was handed a flyer in Hungarian titled 'Instructions." Its standard text read as follows:

Each family will unconditionally and immediately receive adequate housing at its new place of work. A job assignment, food tickets and other coupons covering daily needs, also a remuneration commensurate with the category of work.

Since these persons will receive all the necessities of life at their new place of work, they may not take with them large quantities of cereal and flour. They are, however, authorized to take along the following articles and food items: 10 kgs. of cooking and bread flour per person, 3 kgs. of beans or peas, 1/4 kg. of poppy seeds, 20 kgs. of potatoes, 5 kgs. of vegetables; furthermore, any amount of home-made jams, preserves and homegrown fruits. For seed a maximum of 15 kgs. of corn, rye or oats per fowl. Lard and smoked meat to the extent of one slaughter. If this unit is not at the person's disposal, 1 kg. of lard, and 2 kgs. of meat per person. Furthermore, a family may take along any quantity of poultry, but no more than its stock as of December 31, 1946. No one may bring along or alienate (sell) horses, cattle of any kind (bulls, cows, calves), or pigs. Furthermore, every family may take along a complete set of furniture, all their clothing, and all those effects which are not part of the equipment inventory: agricultural machines, fireplaces, ovens, etc.

The families thus recruited into the work program will receive all the necessities of life at their new places of designation just like any other Czechoslovak citizen. The right of citizenship will be settled and the immovable property left behind will be duly compensated for on location and will not be confiscated.

The not particularly humane details of the deportations have been related by several Hungarian writers living in Slovakia (László Dobos, Viktor Egri, József Mács, Gyula Duba). We know from their reports that those condemned to deportations received "Instructions" which varied according to time and place. Gyula Duba, in his book on these events, had mentioned "Instructions" which did not include compensation for the confiscated property, but limited labor service to only one year.?

Gyula Duba, living as he still does in Slovakia, could only intimate what has to be pointed out here more clearly: the role of Hungarian collaborators. Hand-picked officials of Hungarian nationality assisting at the deportations cannot be excused even if we assume that they allowed Some persons to get away. They should not have accepted the assignment in the preparation and execution of the deportations. From reading the decree on universal labor service 88/1945, they should have realized that deportation was an abuse of power; they had the opportunity to take a stand, even to protest. How can one blame Slovaks for having done nothing, when persons of Hungarian nationality collaborated in these nationalist abuses of power?

After November 19 panic broke out in the entire Csallóköz. A mass of refugees attempted to cross the Danube into Hungary. On the Hungarian side, propaganda against the deportations began immediately. On the Czechoslovak side, the operations were kept as quiet as possible. Yet -it was not possible to keep the matter secret. The Hungarian press turned the affair into a European scandal.

Slovak historians (Zvara, Purgat, Cambel and Others) still refer to the Hungarians' deportations as "recruitment," the official term used at the time of the deportations. But this term is unacceptable. The "recruited" as well as their families were forced to leave their homes without any promise of an opportunity to return, and their wealth was confiscated. The terminology of the Presidential decree 88/1945 is not applicable. the case of the Hungarians, the decree merely was a legal pretext. The decree did declare universal draft for labor service. It did not, however, authorize confiscation of belongings nor the deportation of family members. The action against the Hungarian persons as well as the confiscation of their belongings was illegal. The action violated Czechoslovak laws in general, and it was in conflict with the Czechoslovak-Hungarian population exchange agreement as well. We must deal in greater detail with the story of the Presidential decree 88/1945, because the decree is still being cited in every historical work published in Czechoslovakia to cover up the illegal assault.

The Presidential decree 88/1945 empowered the government to draft men between the ages of 16 and 55 and women between the ages of 18 and 45 for labor service. The decree also lists the conditions for exemption.

The drafted person could serve a maximum of one year. In the case of the Hungarians, however, no heed was paid to age-limit or time limit. Moreover, every attempt was made to make the action against the Hungarians appear as legal is defeated by the practice of collective confiscation of belongings, which in the Presidential decree, is nowhere mentioned. Unfortunately, some Slovak historians are not bothered by these facts.

For instance, J. Purgat intentionally broadens the Presidential decree to include deportation and confiscation. He simply declares: "It followed from the universal labor service decree 88/1945 that the belongings of the Hungarians were confiscated, and they were deported to Bohemia and Moravia."⁸ The fact of the matter is that Presidential decree 88/1945, rather than authorizing confiscation of property and deportation of entire families explicitly called for special assistance to family members of those drafted for labor service.⁹ Other Slovak authors, J. Zvara and S. Cambel describe the events of those tragic 99 days as a rather pleasant labor service, not bothering even to mention confiscation of property and deportation of family members. It should be noted, however, that, in contrast to Slovak historiography, some Czech historians do call a spade a spade: They speak of "the Slovakization of the Hungarian minority," and denounce the actions by which Hungarians from South Slovakia had been incorrectly recruited and transported to Bohemia."¹⁰

No better than the accounts of the Slovak historians was the information dispensed by the Slovak press on the deportation of the Hungarians. For a while, the Czechoslovak press kept silent altogether. The deportations began on November 19, but the first report in the papers appeared only ten days later. The Bratislava Èas reported on November 19:

The expulsion of the Hungarians from Parkan [Pákány] and its vicinity began in the commune of Nana [Nána] on November 25. Seventy-five families were removed on this day from this relatively small commune. The deportation went smoothly, thirty families reported voluntarily. Thirty-five military trucks were provided for the transportation of the belongings to the railroad station and each of these was escorted by six soldiers and two security agents. Four trucks were made available to each of the families, and even more if need be according to the amount of belongings, while relatives and neighbors could share the transportation facilities. The deportations continued on November 26 and 27, this time from Parkan itself. The process went likewise smoothly. The Hungarians from the area of Parkan were resettled in Plzeò, Kladno, Pardubice, and the environs of other cities in northern Bohemia, where they will be assigned to work according to their experience and ability. The railroad cars are heated, and a military kitchen contingent accompany the deported to the point of their destination. The first transport left Parkan, Wednesday evening at 7:00pm, on November 17.¹¹

Among many other aspects, this news story failed to explain why thirty "volunteer" families from Nana needed the "escort" of eight armed men per truck to oversee their willingness to leave their homes.

With the first Slovak press reports on the deportations, also the press war between Hungary and Czechoslovakia had begun. Hungarian Foreign Minister, János Gyöngyösi, lodged vigorous protests against the "acts of inhumanity" taking place in Czechoslovakia. In turn, the Bratislava Èas on November 26 took issue with the Hungarian protest under the following front page headline: "The Hungarians do not cease to incite against Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak reply to Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyöngyösi. The propaganda of lies does not delude our Hungarians." An official report by the Slovak Press Agency that followed offered the Czechoslovak version of what was going on in the solidly Hungarian populated regions of Southern Slovakia:

As is known, on October 28, 1946, the National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic solemnly enacted the law [129(1946] regarding the two-year plan for the reconstruction of the Republic. From the beginning it seemed probable that, in order to carry out this plan of reconstruction, well organized and sizable labor forces would become necessary. The Presidential decree 88/1945 on universal labor service, approved by the National Assembly, intends to realize this objective. Article One of the decree states that every man and woman capable of work may be enlisted for performing urgent tasks of general interest. Since there is manpower shortage in the Czech provinces, it was necessary to apply the decree 88/1945 to the area of the entire Republic for the recruitment of labor, and to extend it to all strata of society, regardless of nationality. 180,000 Slovaks went to work in Bohemia within the framework of the recruitment of manpower. Of course, the citizens of Hungarian nationality cannot be exempted from the application of this law, and the Presidential decree regarding labor service applies to them as well. It should be noted that the recruitment for labor took place precisely according to the letters of the law, and in a humane and social manner. The citizens will be transported from the gathering points to their new workplaces in railroad coaches with their packages shipped in covered freight cars. They receive hot and cold meals during the journey. In some unavoidable cases, members of the family, first of all relatives and children living in a common household, accompany the workers. This takes place with the agreement of the family members; their wishes are taken into consideration, with the intention to ensure family togetherness and the care of family members. The children will be provided with milk along the way. The workers thus recruited will be working under favorable conditions; Hungarians will receive the same pay as the Slovaks. In addition to payment in kind the workers will receive monthly wages between 1800 and 2200 crowns, a sum which far surpasses the average monthly wage of the workers in Hungary. The decree regarding the recruitment of labor force is applied to the whole country, including the areas inhabited by Hungarians. It is carried out in an orderly manner and meets with understanding on the part of the Hungarian inhabitants of the country.

Janics: Czechoslovak Policy and the Hungarian Minority