STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West

2. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 70-72.

3. Journal of Central European Affairs 8 (1948): 317-19.

2. John Pelenyi, ''The Secret Plan for a Hungarian Government in the West at the Outbreak of World War II," Journal of Modern History' 36 (1964): 170-77.

2. Ferenc Nagy, The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 154.

3. Cf. Oscar Jaszi, ''The Choices in Hungary," Foreign Affairs 24 (1946): 462. Jaszi points out the ''that Small Landholders, Party is not reactionary, not even conservative; it is a progressive party in favor of social and cultural reforms.,'

4. H.F.A. Schoenfeld, ''Soviet Imperialism in Hungary," Foreign Affairs 26 (1947-48): 560

5. Nagy, Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain, p. 72.

6. Jaszi, ''Choices in Hungary," p. 454.

7. Ibid., pp. 457-58.

8. Joseph Révai, ''On the Character of Our People's Democracy.,' The original article appeared in the Társadalmi Szemle (Budapest, March-April 1949). An English translation of the article was published in Foreign Affairs 28 (1949): 143-52.

9. The ACC for Italy was established in November 1943 and abolished on January 31, 1947. See The Department of State Bulletin (hereafter Bulletin) 11 (1944): 137-38, and 16 (1947): 12S8.

10. For the debate on the Hungarian reparation at the peace negotiations, see Foreign Relations of the United State (hereafter FRUS), 1946, 3: 236-37, 626-27, 636-38. FRUS 1946, 2: 1294. Cf. Bulletin, 15 (1946): 746-48.

11. Bulletin 1S (1946): 394-95.

12. For the Soviet-American exchange of notes, see ibid., pp. 229-32, 263-6S, 638-39.

13. After consolidation of Communist power these facades were no longer needed. In 1952 Moscow sold sixty-nine Soviet enterprises to Hungary, and in November 1954 even the Soviet Commercial and Industrial Bank and the Soviet share in the joint companies.

14. Bulletin 15 (1946): 638, and 16 (1947): 341. Of the total credit authorized for Hungary by the Surplus Property Administration, over 1S million dollars had not been utilized when the U.S. government suspended the execution of the surplus property credit agreement on June 2, 1947, after the Communist coup in Hungary. Bulletin 16 (1947): 1166.

15 . Speaking Frankly , p . 255 .

16. FRUS 194S, 3: 798-952; 1946, 6: 250-373; 1947: 260-401. Additional material is available in the National Archives. Cf. Louis Mark, Jr. "The View From Hungary," Witnesses to the Origins of the Cold War, ed., Thomas T. Hammond (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982), pp. 186-209; Hugh De Santis, The Diplomacy of Silence (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 141-45, 158-60, 184-85, 194, 208.

17. For the text of the memorandum, see Stephen D. Kertész, Diplomacy in a Whirlpool: Hungary between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953), pp. 252-59.

18. As the American minister Schoenfeld noted: ''Orders had been given by the Soviet Chairman of the Allied Control Commission that communication between the representatives of the Western allies and the Hungarian authorities must be channeled through himself.,, Schoenfeld, ''Soviet Imperialism," 555.

19. FRUS 1946, 6: 267-69.

20. Ibid., pp. 289-90.

21. FRUS 1946, 6: 297-98, 315-17.

22. See below, p. 201.

23. For Harriman's report See Box 96, R.G. 43, National Archives.

24. I visited Mindszentyat his headquarters in Buda a few times, and in November 1946 his secretary came to my office with the message that the cardinal wanted to see me urgently in the sacristy of the Basilica. I went immediately, and he showed me the rough draft of a telegram to be sent to Cardinal Spellman in New York and Cardinal Griffin in London. The telegram described the plight of Hungarians who had been deported from Slovakia to districts of Sudeten Germans who had been transferred. Mindszentyasked the cardinals to inform their foreign offices of the deportations and do everything in their power to stop these inhuman actions. We discussed the matter, and I took the text with me and gave it to our English translators. Then I made a confidential file of the case and dispatched the cables to the American and English cardinals. Mindszentygave the text to a news agency. I circulated the file in the Foreign Ministry and criticism was expressed because of my action. I replied that the government must be satisfied this time; it was one of the rare occasions when Mindszentysupported the official policy. See below, pp. 156 ff.

25. FRUS 1946, 6: 361.

2. Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New York: Henry Holt, 1951), p. S36.

3. Karl von Clausewitz, War, Politics and Power (Chicago: Gateway Edition, 1962), pp. 261-62.

4. Charles E. Bohlen, Wetness to History 1929-1969 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), p. 175.

5. Correspondence between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt, Orville H. Bullett, ed. Intro. George F. Kennan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), p. 599. For Bullitt's several memoranda to Roosevelt see ibid., pp. 571-600.

6. Harley A. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939-1945 (Washington: Department of State, 1949).

7. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Charles E. Bohlen to be United States Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 83d Cong., 1^st sess., 1953, pp. 2, 7. Later he stated: ''We in the State Department felt very strongly about the fact that during the war what I would say the political arm of the United States was not involved to the extent it should be." Ibid., p. 50

8. Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), pp. 644-98. See also Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins pp. 439-78.

9. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp. 628-51. Cf. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1948), pp. 1165-74.

10. Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), pp. 32G-27.

11. Ibid., pp. 446-48. See also Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1957), pp. 339-47; Dwight D. Eisenhower, |Crusade in Europe (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948), pp. 65-73.

12. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp. 659-61 and The Hinge of Fate' pp. 600ff. Cf. Louis Broad' The War that Churchill Waged (London: Hutchinson, 1960); Trumbull Higgins, Winston Churchill and the Second Front (New York: Oxford Press, 1957). For a comprehensive analysis of Churchill's wartime policy' see Kenneth W. Thompson, Winston Churchill's Worldview (Baton Rouge' La.: Louisiana University Press, 1983).

13. Philip E. Mosely, The Kremlin in World Politics (New York- Vintage Books, 1960), p. 205.

14. Roberc Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964), p. 187. Cf. Norman Kogan, Italy and the Allies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956); H. Stuart Hughes, The United States and Italy, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).

15. Lack of political preparations, confusion, and antagonism that on some important occasions dominated inter-Allied relations during the Mediterranean campaign are well characterized in the memoirs of General Eisenhower's American and British political advisors' Macmillan and Murphy, who coordinated diplomacy with Allied military operations under most difficult conditions. Harold Macmillan, The Blast of War' 1939-1945 (New York: Harper and Row, 1968); Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors.

16. Stalin's Correspondence with Roosevelt and Truman 1941-194S (New York: Capricorn Books, 1965), pp. 84-86.

17. Robert V. Gannon, The Cardinal Spellman Story (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962). See Spellman's memorandum of his conversation with Roosevelt on September 2 and 3, 1943, pp. 222-2S.

18. In a Russian village, Katyn, in the Smolensk region, the corpses of about 4,400 Polish oilcers were discovered by German authorities who alleged that the officers were executed by the Soviets in 1940. Without admitting the German accusation, the Polish government asked for an investigation by the Red Cross. Moscow used the Polish request as a pretext to break off diplomatic relations with the Polish government in London. The Soviet guilt in this mass murder was proven without any doubt. See J.K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest--The Story of the Katyn Forest Massacre (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962). Cf. Joseph Mackiewics' the Katyn Wood Murders (London: Hollis & Carter, 1951); Louis Fitz Gibbon, Katyn (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971); Hearings before the Select Committee to conduct an Investigation of the Facts' Evidence and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, 82^nd Cong. , 1952.

19. For the papers, reports of meetings, protocols, and documents of the Tripartite Conference in Moscow, see FRUS 1943, 1: 513-781.

20. Ibid., pp. 638-39, 679-80, 701, 736-37, 762-63.

21. Vojtech Mastny, ''The Benes-Stalin-MolotovConversations in December 1943: New Documents, ''Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas (1972): 371. Cf. Stephen Borsody, The Tragedy of Central Europe (New York: Colliers Books, 1962), pp. 230-41.

22. Joseph C. Grew, acting secretary of state pointed out in his letter to the secretary of war, Henry L. Stimson, on February 28, 1945, that the EAC had recommended to their governments only three documents: texts of Unconditional Surrender of Germany; protocol between the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union on the zones of Occupation in Germany and the Administration of "Greater Berlin"; agreement between the three governments on Control Machinery in Germany. On July 4, 1945, the EAC approved an agreement between the three governments and the Provisional Government of the French Republic on Control Machinery in Austria. France had been admitted to membership in the EAC in November 1944. See for EAC material, Box 10, SWNCC, National Archives. For EAC activities see Lord Strang, Home and Abroad (London: Andre Deutsch, 1956), pp. 199-225; George F. Kennan, ''The European Advisory Commission," Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston: Little. Brown, 1967), pp. 164-87; A. Roshchin, ''Postwar Settlement in Europe," International Affairs (1978): 102-14. For the organization and scope of activities of the EAC in 1944, see FRUS 1944, 1: 1-483. The conclusive negotiations of surrender terms for Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland were held outside the EAC. It was the position of the United States government that the armistice terms for these countries were proper subjects for consideration by the EAC. But because of Soviet opposition, the EAC. discussed only the Bulgarian surrender terms in September and October 1944. Ibid., pp. 39-40. For the work of the EAC in 194S, its final report and dissolution by the Potsdam Conference, see FRUS 1945, 3: 1-558.

23. Isaac Deutscher, Stalin' A Political Biography, 2d, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 512.

24. John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance (New York: Viking Press, 1947), p. 89.

25. For details see From Mayor Jordan's Diaries (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1952).

26. Vojtech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 73-85; idem, ''Stalin and the Prospects of a Separate Peace in World War II," The American Historical Review 77 (1972): 136S-88; AlexanderFischer, Sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1975); William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid (New York, 1976), p. 381. According to B.A. Liddell Hart, "Ribbentrop proposed as a condition of peace that Russia's frontier should run along the Dnieper, while Molotovwould not consider anything less than the restoration of her original frontier." History of the Second World War (New York, 1971), p. 488.

27. Bohlen, Wetness to History, pp. 140-41. Roosevelt explained later that he succeeded to establish personal relations with Stalin by teasing Churchill "about his Britishness, about John Bull, about his cigars, about his habits." Francis Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York: Viking, 1946), pp. 83-8S.

28. Bohlen, Witness to History, pp. 136, 138-39.

29. Tehran' Yalta;' Potsdam--The Soviet Protocols, ed., Robert Beitzell (Academic International, 1970); Teheran, Jalta, Potsdam--Die sowjetischen Protocol von den Knigskonferenzen der "Grossen Drei," ed., AlexanderFischer (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1968).

30. Hopkinsscribbled a note to Admiral King: ''Who is promoting that Adriatic business that the President continually returns to?" To which King replied, ''As far as I know it is his own idea. Certainly nothing could be farther from the United States Chiefs of Staff." Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins p. 780.

31. Bohlen, witness to History, pp. 151-S2.

32. FRUS 1943 ''Conferences at Cairo and Tehran,': G00-3. For discussion on dismemberment of Germany at Allied negotiations from Yalta to Potsdam, see Mosely, The Kremlin in World Politics, pp. 131-54.

33. Correspondence between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William c. Bullit, Bullitt, ed., p. 604.

34. Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), p. 59.

35. Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill and Attlee 1941-1945 (New York: Capricorn Books, 196S), p. 256.

36. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 226-27.

37. Albert Resis wrote a comprehensive article on this subject, "The Churchill-Stalin Percentage Agreement on the Balkans,', American Historical Review (April 1978): 368-87. Cf. Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, vol. 5 (London, 1971), pp. 149-53; Daniel Yergen, Shattered Peace (Boston, 1977, pp. 58-61; Geir Lundestad, The American Non-Policy Towards Eastern E7grope 1943-1947 (New York: Humanities, 1975), pp. 89-92, Joseph M. Siracusa, ''The Night Stalin and Churchill Divided Europe, " The Review of Politics 43 Uuly 1981): 381-409.

38. The Reckoning' the Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 196S), p. 560. Cf. Elisabeth Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1976), pp. 140-47, 220-22.

39. For correspondence on the attempts of the United States and British governments to furnish assistance to the Polish forces, and their unsuccessful attempts to secure the helpful participation of the Soviet government, see FRUS 1944, 3: 1372-98. Cf. Stefan Korbonski, Fighting Warsaw (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956); J. K. Zawodny. Nothing but Honor-- The Story of the Warsaw Rising of 1944 (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978);Jan M. Ciechanowski, The Warsaw Rising of 1944 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

40. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 278-80.

41. FRUS 1945 "Conferences at Malta and Yalta." The decision-making process of the Yalta Conference was scrutinized by Diane S. Clemens, Yalta (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

42. For reasons of Roosevelt's rejection of the Emergency High Commission, see Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, p. 394.

43. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 507-9. Cf. Mosely, The Kremlin in World Politics, 1SS-88.

44. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 510.

45. Eden, The Reckoning. p. 59S.

46. Roosevelt and Churchill--Their Secret Wartime Correspondence, ed. Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and ManfredJonas (New York: Saturday Review Press, E.P. Dutton, 1975);Joseph P. Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill 1939-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1976).

47. Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New Yorkk: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), p. 186.

48. Off the Record--The Private Papers; of Harry S. Truman, ed. Robert H. Ferrell (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), p. 16.

49. Bohlen, Witness to History, p. 222.

50. Marquis Childs, Witness to Power (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), p. 54.

51. Robert H. Ferrell, George C. Marshallas Secretary of State, 1947-1949 (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1960), pp. 72-73.

52. Raymond J. Sontag, ''The Democracies and the Dictators since 1938," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 98, no. 5 (October 1954): 313.

53. See for details Jim Bishop, FDR's Last Year (New York: William Morrow, 1974); Churchill Taken from the Diaries of Lord Moran (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966).

54. According to American military estimates the grand design against Japzn would involve about 5,000,000 men, the operations might cost over a million casualties, and fighting would not end until the latter part of 194G, at the earliest. It was thought that battles in Manchuria between the Soviet and Japanese armies would save many American lives. Cf. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 619. Admiral Zacharias commented: "It was an unfortunate and altogether wrong estimate, its authors being deceived by a purely military and quantitative evaluation of the enemy, a treacherous trap into which even the greatest military leaders are likely to fall occasionally." Ellis M. Zacharias, Behind Closed Doors (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1950), p. 56.

55 . John J. McCloy, The Challenge to Americat7 Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 44.

5. See excerpts of this memorandum in Kertész, Diplomacy in a Whirlpool, pp. 266-69.

6. For a short version of these data and argumentation see La Hongrie et la Conférence de Paris, vol. 1 (Budapest: Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1947), pp. 63-107.

7. FRUS 1946, 6: 27S. For a detailed account of United States foreign policy at the time, see Lundestad, The American Non-Policy Toward Eastern Europe.

8. FRUS 1943, 3: 23. Cf. Mastny, "The Benes-Stalin-MolotovConversations in December 1943: New Documents, " pp. 372-73, 382, 401.

9. For its text see, La Hongrie et la Conference de Paris, vol. 1, pp. 1-6.

10. Article 53 of the Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land provided that, ''An army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds, and realizable securities which are strictly the property of the State, depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, and, generally all movable property belonging to the state which may be used for the operation of the war."

11. The armistice division of the Foreign Ministry in May, June, and July, 194S, repeatedly sent notes with similar contents to the ACC. The note of May 25 enumerated 28 factories which were dismantled and removed but were not included in the reparations deliveries. Other notes completed the list and described in detail the various confiscatory actions and other abuses of the Soviet army and asked for restitution and remedies. The ACC refused to negotiate on such matters and Hungary was even made responsible to foreign countries for confiscation and damages caused by the Soviet army. For example, a British note of November 19, 1945, in reply to a memorandum of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, stated that ''all loss or damage to British rights, interests and property in Hungary, regardless of cause, is to be reinstated under the terms of Article 13 of the Armistice."

12. La Hongrie et la Conference de Pans, vol. 1, pp. 7-14. For the English text see Kertesz, Diplomacy in a Whirlpool, pp. 262-66.

13. Similar commissions were established later between France and the Federal Republic of Germany, and between Poland and the FRG; both commissions produced exemplary results.

14. La Hongrie et la Conference de Paris, vol. 1, pp. 15-20.

15. Ibid., pp. 21-36.

16. The Hungarian representative, foreign minister of the, by then, completely Communist-dominated Hungarian government, did not reply other than by his hundred percent support of the Soviet position, which in fact denied that freedom of navigation for which the Hungarian government had dared to raisc its voice three years before. This American statement was made on August 13, 1948. Bulletin (1948): 283.

17. For the complete text of the memorandum, see Kertesz, Diplomacy in a Whirlpool, pp. 266-69.

18. Cf. Ferenc Nagy, Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain, pp. 238-39.

19. La Hongrie et la Conference de Paris, vol. l, pp. 40-50.

20. Ibid., pp. S1-55.

21. Ibid., pp. 72-107.

22. See, Nepszava, February 24, March 3, 10, and 17, 1946.

23. The economic adviser was Eugene Rácz who at that time was a nonparty man. Later when he was appointed minister of finance, he entered the Smallholder party.

24. For description of the delegation's Moscow trip and its aftermath, see Nagy, Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain, pp. 204-19.

25. Actually Hungarian manpower and Hungarian experts were used for this work performed under the direction of the Red Army. Some of the railroad lines for which Hungary was required to pay were situated in the neighboring countries. Cf. Nagy, |Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain, p. 208.

26. For details see below, pp. 129-33.

2. Ibid., pp. 214-1S.

3. Ibid., p. 21S.

4 FRUS 1945 ''The Conference at Malta and Yalta," p. 243.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p. 244.

7. Ibid., p. 245.

8. Ibid., p. 246.

9. Ibid., p. 248.

10. See for details, Hungary and the Conference of Paris (Budapest, 1947), vol. 4, p. vii, n. 2.

11. ''Policy Toward Liberated States: Czechoslovakia," Notter File Box 143, National Archives, p.7.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 8.

14. According to the American proposal compact masses of Magyar populations and towns of Szabadka, Zenta, Topolya, and Magyarkanizsa would have remained in Hungary. Cf. Francis Deak, Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942), pp. 28-29 and Map 2 at the end of the volume.

15. Hitlerhad summoned the Hungarian minister to Germany on the day following the night of the putsch and had offered Hungary ''the most enticing pieces of Yugoslav territory.'' He even dangled Fiume--which incidentally was Italian territory--before the Hungarians. The Von Hassell Diaries (Garden City' N.Y.: Doubleday, 1947), p. 183.

16. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, vol. 7 (Nuremberg, 1947), p. 257.

17. Ibid., p. 331.

18. Ibid., pp. 331-33.

19. One of the best English experts on Danubian Europe summed up Telekis activities in the following way: ''Telekihad the terrible task of steering Hungary through the first two years of the Second World War. Although Central Europe was now completely dominated by Germany, and although Hungary had received two pieces of territory from her neighbors as a German present, Telekifought stubbornly to retain some measure of independence for his country. His efforts compare favorably with those of Romania in the same period. When resistance was no longer possible and his own Regent and General Staff betrayed him, Telekitook the classical way out.,, Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars 1918-1941 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1945), p. 196.

20. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 168. For Telekis way of thinking during the critical events in 1940 and 1941, see Richard V. Burks, ''Two TelekiLetters',, Journal of Central European Affairs, 7 (1947), 68-73. Cf. Lorant Tilkovszky, TelekiPal' Legenda és Valóság (Legend and Reality) (Budapest, 1969).

21. After the war the American authorities extradited Bardossyto the new Hungarian regime. He was sentenced to death by the People's Court in Budapest and was executed.

22. Hungarian troops occupied the Bacska, the triangle of Baranya and two small territories along the river Mura. The size of these areas was 11,475 square kilometers' with a mixed population of about one million. More than one third, the largest segment of the population' was Hungarian, and the rest Serbs, Germans, Croats, Rumanians, and other nationalities

23. See below, pp. 219-20.

2. Documents on German Foreign Policy' July 1940, No. 69, p. 76. For a digest of reports of Hungarian envoys from Moscow see Andor Gellert, ''Magyar diplomatak Moszkvaban, 1934-1941" (Hungarian Diplomats in Moscow, 1934-1941) Uj látóhtár, 26 (February, 197S): 17-37.

3. The CianoDiaries 1939-1943, ed. Hugh Gibson (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday' 1946), December 23, 1939.

4. Ibid., January 6-7 , 1940.

5. Csákyrequested Cianoto inform the Rumanians of the following: ''If Russia attacks Rumania and Rumania resists sword in hand, Hungary will adopt an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards Rumania. On the other hand, Hungary would immediately intervene should one of the three following cases arise: (1) the massacre of the minorities; (2) Bolshevik revolution in Rumania; (3) Cession by Rumania of national territory to Russia and Bulgaria without fighting." Csákyadded that even in that case "nothing will be done without previous consultation and agreement with Italy." Cianos Diplomatic Papers, ed. Malcom Muggeridge (London: Odharn Press, 1948), p. 331.

6. The CianoDiaries, March 25, 1940.

7. Ibid., March 28, 1940.

8. Ibid., April 8, 1940.

9. Ibid., April 9, 1940.

10. For details see Hory Andras, Még Egy Barazdát Sem, published by the author. (Vienna, 1967). Hóry was the Hungarian negotiator in Turnu-Severin.

11. Before the occupation of Bessarabia and northern Bucovina, Molotovassured the German government that the Soviet Union ''simply wished to pursue its own interests and had no intention of encouraging other states [Hungary, Bulgaria] to make demands on Rumania." Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941 , Raymond Jarnes Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1948), p. 160.

12. According to Hungarian documents, Hitlermade statements in this regard to Sztoiay on February l, 1941, and to Bardossyon March 21, 1941. Hitlertold Bardossythat the Rumanians asked for a quick German interven tion because of the preparations of the Red Army to cross the Danube. Cf. Petru Groza, In Umbra Celulei (Bucuresti: Editura Cartea Rusa, 1945), p. 276.

13. The CianoDiaries, August 28, 1940.

14. Ibid., August 29, 1940.

15. An area of 43,492 square kilometers with a population of 2,6oo,ooo was reattached to Hungary. According to the Hungarian censuses of 1910 and 1941, the number of Hungarians exceeded the Rumanians in this territory, while the Rumanian census of 1930 indicated a slight Rumanian majority. Following the delivery of the award, Csaky and Ribbentrop signed a treaty assuring special rights to the German minority in Hungary. With the conclusion of this treaty the problem of the German citizens of Hungary ceased to be exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the Hungarian state. For the text of the treaty, see, Matthias Annabring, ''Das ungarlandische Deutschtum," Südost-Stimmen 2 (March 19S2), 13-14. For detailed discussion and bibliography, see B. Vago, ''Le Second Diktat de Vienne: Les Preliminaires," East European Quarterly no. 4 (1969): 415-37 and ''Le Second Diktat de Vienne: Le Partage de la Transylvania," Ibid., 5, no. 1 (1971): 47 73

16. Molotovconsidered the Italo-German guarantee to Rumania, with respect to her national territory, as a justification for the supposition that this action was directed against the USSR. For the pertinent exchange of notes, see Sontag and Beddie, Nazi-Sovjet Relations 1939-1941, pp. 178-94.

17. It is a curious historical parallel that Article 22 of the peace treaty of February 10, 1947, authorized the Soviet Union ''to keep on Hungarian territory such armed forces as it may need for the maintenance of the lines of communication of the Soviet Army with the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria." However, the difference was that the German military personal was restricted to a few railroad stations, while the peace treaty permitted keeping an unlimited number of Soviet troops in Hungary.

18. The government was violently attacked by the opposition in both houses of parliament because of this step. Count Istvan Bethlen and Tibor Eckhart, leader of the Smallholder party, strongly criticized this move. The Hungarian minister to Washington, John Pelenyi, resigned in protest.

19. Cf. Ullein-Reviczky, Guerre Allemande Paix Rusle: le Drame Hongrois, pp. 71-73.

20. According to a German diplomat, Erich Kordt, the German General Staff arranged the bombing. See Wahn und Wirklichkeit (Stuttgart, 1948), p. 308. At the Nuremberg trials General Istvan Ujszaszy, that time in Russian custody, stated that he was convinced ''that the bombarding was carried out by German planes with Russian markings.'' The Kassa incident is still a much debated question. See for the intricacies involved: N.f. Dreisziger, ''New Twist to an Old Riddle: The Bombing of Kassa (KoRice), June 26, 194l,lwJournalofModern Histo7y 44 (1972): 232-42; idem, ''Contradictory Evidence Concerning Hungary's Declaration of War on the USSR in June 1941," Canadian Slavonic Papers 19, no. 4 (December 1977): 81-88. Regarding the political influence of military leaders in these crucial years, see Dreisziger, ''The Hungarian General Staff and Diplomacy, 1939-1941,'' Canadian-American Review of Hungarian Studies 7, no. 1 (Spring 1980): 5-26.

21. Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. 7, p. 33S.

22. The British note was handed to Bárdossy on November 29, 1941, by the American minister to Hungary. It read as follows: ''The Hungarian Government has for many months been pursuing aggressive military operations on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, ally of Great Britain, in closest collaboration with Germany, thus participating in the general European war and making substantial contribution to the German war effort. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom finds it necessary to inform the Hungarian Government that unless by December 5 the Hungarian Government has ceased military operations and has withdrawn from all active participation in hostilities, His Majesty's Government will have no choice but to declare the existence of a state of war between the two countries."

23. The British ultimatum was delivered to Finland, Hungary, and Rumania as a result of Stalin's repeated and pressing appeal. Prime Minister Churchill tried in vain to convince Stalin that the declaration of war against these countries would not be beneficial to the Allied cause. Churchill explained to Stalin in his telegram of November 4, 1941, that these countries ''have been overpowered by Hitlerand used as a cat's-paw, but if fortune turns against that ruffian they might easily come back to our side. A British declaration of war would only freeze them all and make it look as if Hitlerwere the head of a grand European alliance solid against us.,' Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 528. Bardossys record of his conversation will Pell and Travers is in the files of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry.

24. Bardossys instructions sent to the Hungarian ministers in Berlin and Rome on December 11 and 12, show how he tried to avoid involvement in war with the United States. For the text of the instructions see, Diplomacy In a Whirlpool, pp. 234-36.

25. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan, 1948), vol. 2, pp. 1114, 117S-76. Cf. Documents on American Foreign Relations, vol. 4 (1942), pp. 123-24. Senator Vandenberg suggested that the declaration of war on Hitlers Danubian satellites was done in response to Russian demand. See also The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), pp. 31-33.

26. Filippo Anfuso, Du Palais de Veni5e av Lac de Garde (Paris, 1949), p. 221.

27. Hungary's military participation on the war against the Soviet Union was limited. The number of combatant Hungarian divisions in Russia was five in 1941, ten in 1942, none in 1943, and fourteen in 1944. During the same period, the number of divisions for occupation duties varied between two and six divisions. The number of combatant Rumanian divisions was twelve in 1941, thirty-one in 1942, twenty-five in 1943 and 1944. There were only three Rumanian divisions for occupation duties in 1942 and 1943. For details see Le Hongrie et la Conférence de Paris, vol. 1, pp. 86-90. It should be noted that during this period, the population of both Hungary and Rumania was around fourteen million.

28. About my assignment, see Csatari Daniel, Forgoszélben: Magyar-román viszony 1940-1945 (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1968), p. 123.

29. Memorandum of the conversation between the Fuehrer and the Duce, with Ribbentrop and Cianoalso present, at Klessheim near Salzburg, April 29, 1942. Bulletin 1S (1946): 59.

30. For the activities and report of this commission, see Csatari, Forgoszélben, pp. 124-32. This book with some abbreviations was published in French under the title: Dans la Tourmante: Les relations Hungaro Roumaines de 1940 a 1945 (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1974). For the Italo-German Commission see pp. 111-18.

31. The Hungarian government inquired and found out that the German and Italian governments did not know of this Rumanian allegation.

32. For details see Csatari, Forgoszélben, pp. 229-51 and Dans la Tourmante, pp. 209-24. Cf. Elemer Illyes, Erdély Változása (Change in Transylvania) (Munchen: Aurora Konyvek, 1976).

33. He indicated his feelings frankly to the Rumanian foreign minister, Gafencu, on April 19, 1939. ''They say that I want to restore the grandeur of Hungary. Why should I be so ill advised? A greater Hungary might be embarrassing for the Reich. Besides, the Hungarians have always shown us utter ingratitude. They have no regard or sympathy for the German minorities. As for me, I am only interested in my Germans. I said so frankly to Count Csaky. . . And I have said so without equivocation to the Regent Horthyand to Imredy the German minorities in Rumania and Yugoslavia do not want to return to Hungary; they are better treated in their new fatherland. And what the German minorities do not want, the Reich does not want either. "Grigore Gafencu, Igst Days of Europe, A Diplomatic Jogrney in 1939 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 68-69.

34. Paul Schmidt, Hitlers Interpreter (New York: Macmillan, 1951), pp. 205-6.

35. Ibid., p. 244. As to Hitlers encouragements given to Antonescu concerning the ultimate fate of Transylvania, see Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. 7, p. 322. Hitlerand his underlings juggled with promises and threats to keep Hungary and Rumania in line. This was especially the case when political leaders of these countries visited Hitler Ibid., pp. 320-23.

36. The CianoDiaries, August 25-27, 29, 1942. Mussolini considered the Hungarian plan as part of an anti-German conspiracy which would have caused a crisis in Italo-German relations. For the details of the affair, see Anfuso, De Palais de Venise, pp. 230-31.

37. The CianoDiart'es, November S. 1942.

38. Kallay Hunganan Premier1 p. 147.

39. For the entire exchange of views, see ibid., pp. 145-61.

40. Bova Scoppa, Coloqui con Due Dittatori (Roma: Ruffolo Editore, 1949).

41. Ibid., pp. 102-8.

42. Ibid., p. 109.

43. Ibid., pp. 112-14.

44. See for details, Gustav Hennyey Ungarns Scbicksal zwischen 0st und West (Mainz: Von Hase und Koehler Verlag, 1975), pp. 59-61.

45. These excerpts are parts of the notes Foreign Minister Gyöngyösitook at the Moscow negotiations. Box 100, R.G. 43, National Archives

46. Stalin was not secretive about his aims during the war. When the British foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, visited him in Decernber 1941, Stalin explained his ideas concerning the postwar territorial and political settlement. He stated that "Rumania should give special facilities for bases, etc. to the Soviet Union, receiving compensation from territory now occupied by Hungary." Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 629.

47. La Horgrie et la Conférenae de Paris, vol. 1, pp. 108-11.

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West