STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West

The drawing up of the Charter of the United Nations and conclusion of the peace settlement with the five ex-enemy states turned out to be two separate processes. The victorious nations prepared the final draft and signed the Charter of the United Nations in June 1945. Peacemaking began at the Potsdam Conference of the Big Three July 16-August 2 , 1945).

The leaders of the American delegation to Potsdam, President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, had had little experience in international negotiation, although Byrnes had been a member of the Yalta delegation. They faced veterans of wartime conferences. The British were led by Churchill, ably supported by Foreign Secretary Eden, his close wartime collaborator. The Labor party leader Clement Attlee accompanied them, to ensure continuity of negotiation whatever the outcome of the parliamentary elections. In the midst of the conference, Churchill and Attlee flew back to London onJuly 25 to learn that the Conservative party had lost. Attlee returned to Potsdam as head of the British delegation, joined by the new foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin. But this change did not affect British policy; the secretary general of the British delegation, Sir Pierson Dixon, told me years later that Attlee and Bevin used the position papers prepared by the Foreign Office for Churchill. The Soviet delegation at Potsdam was dominated by Stalin and his henchman Molotov the foreign minister. The Russians were in a triumphant mood and advocated aggrandizement; they had the feeling that they were not getting recognition for their victory over the Germans and for the immensity of their wartime losses. Stalin impressed the leaders of the British and American delegations. One day Churchill kept repeating to Eden, ''I like that man.', Eden quickly wrote a memorandum in which he reminded Churchill that the Soviet goal was not only revision of the restrictive Montreux Convention and access to the Mediterranean but placing Constantinople under Russian control as a first step in the subjugation of Turkey. Soviet policy, he

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wrote, was becoming ''more brazen every day" and aspired to positions in Lebanon, Egypt, even Tangier.l

In the war against Napoleon, Russian troops had marched over Europe, and the Czar himself had arrived in Paris with his army. But at the subsequent Congress of Vienna, Russian ambition had received satisfaction with Polish territories, and the Russian army withdrew from other European countries. Although Western nations hoped in 194S that the Soviets would imitate this precedent, Stalin had no such intention. When Ambassador Averell Harriman met him at Potsdam, he said that it must be gratifying to be in Berlin after all the struggle and tragedy of the war. Stalin hesitated a moment and replied, "Czar Alexandergot to Paris."2 He possibly meant that Soviet troops in 1945 had not reached the Atlantic, despite the epic struggle and gigantic sacrifices of the Soviet people. Stalin's remark was characteristic of the Soviet way of thinking at the close of hostilities. Soviet leaders remembered the London treaty of 1915 that promised Constatinople and the Straits to the ramshackle Tsarist Empire and hoped to achieve something along such lines. Churchill had encouraged Stalin, saying at Teheran in 1943 that a large land power such as Russia deserved access to warm water ports, and he expressed hope that he would see Russian fleets, both naval and merchant, on all seas of the world.3

After the first conversation with Stalin, Truman noted in his diary: ''I can deal with Stalin. He is honest--but smart as hell."4 After his first meeting with Churchill and Stalin at Potsdam, Truman later wrote in his memoirs: ''I returned to my temporary home at Babelsberg with some confidence. I hoped that Stalin was a man who would keep his agreements.... Because the Russians had made immense sacrifices in men and materials. . . we hoped that Russia would join wholeheartedly in a plan for world peace."5

The secretary of the British delegation, Sir Pierson Dixon evaluating the balance of the Potsdam Conference 6 recognized that Stalin's great victory at Potsdam came over Poland--its frontiers and government. ''Not only did Poland acquire from Germany all the territories up to the Oder/ Western Neisse: Russia acquired Koenigsberg and a large slice of East Prussia. ''But in other respects the Soviets gained little at Potsdam, Dixon noted. Stalin received only token reparations from the Western zones of Germany, and they came to an end in May 1946. ''The Ruhr was kept firmly in Western hands: the Anglo-Americans held on to the Berlin enclave in Eastern Germany; they would not allow the Russians to acquire a similar enclave in western Germany."7 Italy and Austria were protected. Churchill in

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a series of sallies on July 23 and 24 ''put a stop to Russian penetration in six areas: Tangier, Libya, Turkey, Syria, Persia and Suez.,, A few days later Attlee and Bevin ''stopped all further discussion of Stalin's designs on Trieste and Greece.,'8

Dixon admitted that ''by being tougher the British could have extracted concessions from the Russians over eastern Germany and the Satellites. But to achieve this they would have had to make concessions in western Germany and the Middle East.,, Then Dixon asked two rhetorical questions: ''Was it worth pushing the German frontier well east of the Oder if that meant having the Russians on the Rhine? Was it worth having democracy in Eastern Europe if that meant having the Russians in the Mediterranean?''9

Meanwhile the victors at Potsdam planned for future cooperation. The conference established a Council of Foreign Ministers of the five principal victors: China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The CFM's purpose was to undertake the preparatory work for the peace settlement. The council was to draw up peace treaties primarily with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. In discharge of these tasks the council was to be composed of members representing states signatory to the surrender of enemy states. Although there was no French government recognized by the Allies at the time of Italy's surrender, France was recognized as one of the signatories of the armistice agreement with Italy. This meant that Britain and the Soviet Union prepared the treaty for Finland. For the three Danubian countries it was Britain the Soviet Union, and the United States. For Italy, France and the Big Three. Here was the origin of the 4-3-2 formula of peace making, but it was assumed that all five members of the council would participate in discussions. Western expectation was that the Council of Ministers at an initial meeting would agree on basic issues, and their deputies would cast the agreement into comprehensive form and draft the details and provisions of lesser importance. At a second meeting the council would consider these drafts and decide controversial questions. Texts prepared by the council would be submitted to ''the United Nations,'' and their recommendations would be considered by the council when approving the final version of the five treaties.

France and China did not participate in the Potsdam Conference and so the United States ambassador to France' Jefferson Caffery, addressed a series of notes to the French minister of foreign affairs, George Bidault, transmitting some agreements concluded at Potsdam before they were published. He also asked for French par

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ticipation in the Council of Foreign Ministers and agreement with the principles accepted by the Big Three concerning Germany and other matters.10 The French government accepted the invitation to participate in the CFM and emphasized that France was ''interested in all important questions concerning Europe in any region of Europe. This applies particularly to the settlements concerning Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland." China also accepted membership In the council.

The structure for peacemaking seemed clear and simple, and yet this process was soon blocked by surprising developments. The first session of the CFM met in London on September 11 , 1945 , to provide directives for deputies in the preparation of the five treaties. The first session accepted France and China as full participants in all discussions, and sessions were held for nine days with substantial progress made on the Italian, Finnish, and Bulgarian treaties. But on September 22, Molotovalleged that the procedure violated the Potsdam Agreement. It was illegal, he said, because it permitted the Chinese and French foreign ministers to participate in discussion of treaties on which they would not vote. He demanded exclusion of the Chinese foreign minister and partial exclusion of the French foreign minister.

Although the Western and Chinese foreign ministers were baffled by Molotovs interpretation of the Potsdam Agreement, in a spirit of compromise they showed willingness to accept Molotovs proposal. Byrnes suggested acceptance of the Soviet interpretation, provided that at the same time the council agreed that a truly representative peace conference should meet before the end of the year. This conference should include the five members of the council, all European members of the united Nations, and all non-European members that had supplied substantial military assistance in the war against European members of the Axis.

Instead of accepting the concession, Molotovput forward a more extreme demand: he proposed to change retroactively all records of the conference, eliminating any indication of Chinese and French presence in the sessions on the basis of the 4-3-2 formula. Molotovin effect demanded falsification of the record. The Soviet proposal was rejected, and on October 2 the council adjourned sine die without agreement.

With the procedural demand Molotovapparently wanted to retaliate because the council was unwilling to consider some far-reaching Soviet aspirations. He had proposed the transfer of Trieste to Yugoslavia and establishment of a Soviet base on the Mediterranean

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through Soviet trusteeship over Tripolitania and raised the issue of Soviet participation in the occupation of Japan. Rejection of such demands and Western unwillingness to recognize the unrepresentative governments of Rumania and Bulgaria challenged the Soviet position in the Balkans, and Molotovdecided to terminate the session through a procedural demand.12

At the London session of the CFM, Byrnes had proposed consideration of a modest boundary revision in favor of Hungary, to decrease the substantial Hungarian minority in Rumania. When Molotovheard this proposal he turned to one of his advisers and asked: ''Are there Hungarians in Transylvania?''13 The Soviet delegation opposed the American proposal, and the British delegation supported the Soviet position.

Another Hungary-related incident in London was Byrnes's declaration that the United States would not sign treaties with the unrepresentative governments of Rumania and Bulgaria, but was ready to recognize the broadly based coalition government of Hungary on receipt of a pledge of free elections. An American note to Budapest indicated readiness to establish diplomatic relations and negotiate a treaty with the provisional government, provided it would give a full assurance ''for free and untrammeled elections for representative government." As the Hungarian government offered the guarantee Molotovcountered the American move by an immediate and unconditional recognition of the provisional government.

In his report on the first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers (October 5, 1946), Byrnes emphasized that the American government ''shared the desire of the Soviet Union to have governments friendly to the Soviet Union in eastern and central Europe" and reaffirmed the pledges made in the Declaration on Liberated Europe. In a book published in 1947 Byrnes gave extensive explanation for failure of the London meetings. 14 He was aware that any failure of peacemaking would be attributed to him and so decided to make a gesture toward Moscow. In a speech before the Herald Tribune Forum in New York (October 31, 194S) he drew a parallel between the role of Soviet Russia in Eastern Europe and that of the United States in the Americas, pointing out that the United States could not and would not deny to other nations the right to develop a good neighbor policy.

Far from opposing, we have sympathized with, for example, the effort of the Soviet Union to draw into closer and more friendly association with her central and eastern European neighbors. We are fully aware of her special security interests in those countries, and we have

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recognized those interests in the arrangements made for the occupation and control of the former enemy states.15

One of the apparent reasons of the failure of the London Conference was United States reluctance to recognize the governments of Bulgaria and Rumania, and Byrnes decided to ask the publisher of the Louisville Courier-Journal, Mark Ethridge, to examine political conditions in those two countries. Molotovin London had alleged that the American government was misinformed about conditions in Bulgaria and Rumania, indirectly accusing American representatives in Sophia and Bucharest. An independent investigation by a non diplomat liberal Democrat seemed desirable. Ethridge knew little about the Balkans, but he was a perceptive journalist and, in company of a specialist in Balkan affairs, Cyril E. Black, visited Bulgaria, Moscow, and Rumania. In the two Balkan countries he interviewed members of government, opposition leaders, and public figures of various persuasions. In Bucharest the Moscow-trained Ana Pauker frankly told him that non-Communists were allowed to participate in the government only if they accepted Communist policies. Early in December, Ethridge submitted a ''Summary Report on Soviet Policy in Rumania and Bulgaria,'' together with a cover letter. His report was critical of conditions in Bulgaria and Rumania' and the secretary decided not to publish it.16

Byrnes meanwhile initiated a reconciliation with Moscow. Ambassador Harriman visited Stalin at Gagra in the Crimea on October 24 and transmitted a message from President Truman that reviewed disagreements of the London Conference, offered compromises, and assured Stalin that the president remained faithful to the Yalta accords and the policies of Roosevelt. Harriman was surprised that Stalin was less interested in the Balkans than in control of Japan. He realized that Byrnes's refusal to discuss Japanese affairs at London was the main reason for Molotovs behavior. In two long meetings Stalin agreed to reconvene to CFM to draft five treaties, with a peace conference to follow. The number of participating states in the conference remained open, and Stalin linked the control of Japan with the political future of the Balkan countries. Harriman then opened a series of talks with Molotov on the question of Russia's role in Japan.17 Amidst these negotiations Byrnes instructed Harriman to propose a mid-December meeting with Molotovand Bevin in Moscow on the basis of the Yalta Agreement that called for periodic consultation of foreign ministers of the Big Three. This he did without consulting the British foreign secretary, Bevin. Molotovwas delighted to accept, but Bevin was offended because of ex post facto notification.

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When he objected to the suddenly called meeting, Byrnes threatened to go to Moscow without him.

The tripartite Moscow Conference created ill-feeling in France. Byrnes explained to Ambassador Henri Bonnet that the tripartite conference would discuss primarily questions connected with the atomic bomb, Russian-American problems in the Far East, and the setting of the peace conference proposed by Byrnes in London, but not with questions touching French interests, notably affairs of Germany. Bonnet expressed dissatisfaction and asked Byrnes to arrange an invitation of the French government to Moscow.19 None was arranged.

The Moscow meeting of the foreign ministers (December 16-26) resolved that draft treaties prepared by the CFM on the basis of the 4-3-2 formula should be submitted to a conference, not of all the United Nations, as mentioned in the Potsdam Agreement, but of five members of the council and sixteen other Allied nations that had fought in Europe with substantial contingents. The conference, to meet in Paris before May 1, 1946, could discuss drafts of the peace treaties, express opinions and make recommendations. The Soviet government had opposeci a more substantial conference with wider jurisdiction and would have preferred a peace settlement exclusively by the Great Powers.

At the Moscow meeting Byrnes gave the Ethridge report to the Russians and by way of compromise showed willingness to recognize Soviet-installed governments in Bulgaria and Rumania, provided these governments took in two representatives of ''democratic parties not hitherto participating in them." The Big Three agreed on a commission to advise the Rumanian king on broadening the Groza government. Token representatives of the Liberal and National Peasant parties were duly admitted to the cabinet, but dropped after the Rumanian elections of January 1947. It was agreed that in Bulgaria the Soviet Union should advise the government to broaden its base but this scheme did not work because the Bulgarian government rejected conditions of the opposition.

Besides preparation of peace treaties and reorganization of governments in Bulgaria and Rumania, the Moscow Conference agreed on a Far Eastern Commission and an Allied Council for Japan, on some Korean and Chinese questions, and establishment by the United Nations of the Commission for the Control of Atomic Energy.20 Byrnes noted In his memoirs that in Moscow he still hoped that the Soviet Union and the United States had ''a common purpose.''

Former Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, out of office since

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August 1943, blamed Byrnes for failures at the Potsdam, London, and Moscow conferences and criticized his willingness to recognize the unrepresentative Rumanian and Bulgarian governments. He suggested that such ''a face-saving device" was counter to the Yalta agreement. Byrnes, he said, ''paved the way for the immediate consolidation of Soviet domination over eastern Europe and the Balkans.''22 There is truth in Welles's allegation, but he was not aware of such events as the Anglo-Russian percentage agreement of October 1944 in which Britain recognized Soviet predominance in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary.

Hungary was not involved in the distribution of power in the Black Sea countries. Its position seemed different to foreign observers because it was the only country under Soviet occupation where free national elections took place in November 1945, elections in which the Communist party obtained only 17% of the vote. For centuries Rumania and Bulgaria had been on the highway of Russian expansion, and installation of Communist-dominated governments in Bucharest and Sophia was an urgent matter for the Kremlin. Yet the absence of Western assertiveness over Bulgaria and Rumania showed a pattern that foreshadowed events in Hungary. In the Anglo-Soviet percentage agreement Hungary had the same position as Bulgaria, an 80-20 percentage division in favor of Russia, but this fact was not known until the opening of British Foreign Office records in 1973.

After the Moscow Conference of 1945 the head of the European division of the State Department, H. Freeman Matthews, visited the secretary--general of the French Foreign Ministry, Jean Chauvel, to transmit Byrnes's assurance that the American government considered very important France's adherence to the proposed plan for preparation of the five peace treaties. He informed Chauvel of questions discussed in Moscow and did not conceal that the Russians opposed a genuine peace conference and insisted that peace treaties should be prepared by the Big Three. Consequently, the Moscow formula for a conference was a compromise laboriously established. Matthews reassured Chauvel that the role of the CFM remained as established at Potsdam and that deputies of the foreign ministers should meet soon in London.23

French diplomats had a dim view of France's exclusion from peacemaking along the Danube, and Ambassador Maurice Dejean in a telegram from Prague reported a conversation with Masarykwho told him that elimination of France from the general peace settlement was ''un veritable disastre" for Czechoslovakia. Why did Byrnes not understand that in barring France he abandoned all Europe to a single

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power, Masarykasked? According to reports received in Prague, Molotovhad displayed the greatest cordiality toward Byrnes at Kremlin receptions, while ostensibly neglecting Bevin to show that the British foreign secretary was only tolerated in the company of the Big Three.24 Dejean noted that the Moscow Conference evoked more the meeting of Tilsit that gatherings of the Yalta style.25 Simultaneous with this telegram he dispatched a long report to Paris about the impressions the Moscow Conference had produced in Prague. He explained that for the Czechoslovaks, the exclusion of France from negotiations of the Hungarian and Balkan treaties meant that, except for the Italian treaty, Paris would have only a consultative voice in the peace settlement and that this had created a belief in Prague that France had become a second-class power.26

About this time Bonnet reported from Washington that a member of the American delegation in Moscow had told him that the Russians had accepted without objection the American proposal that the peace conference should be in Paris and that in Secretary Byrnes's opinion this meant recognition of the European role of France. The American delegate informed Bonnet of questions discussed in Moscow and called attention to the fact that France had not declared war on Bulgaria and Rumania, hence weakening its negotiating role.27

Ambassador Caffery transmitted Secretary Byrnes's message to the French foreign mmlster ad interim, Francisque Gay, whose answer reiterated that France was interested in all important questions concerning Europe and asked for clarification and assurance on several points decided at Moscow.

Secretary Byrnes, now representing the Big Three, gave the following explanations to the French government: The Moscow Agreement in no way altered the understanding in regard to preparation of the peace settlement with Germany; on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement the CFM retained authority to invite other states when matters concerning them were discussed; a broad and thorough discussion would take place at the forthcoming conference, and final drafts of the treaties would be made only after fullest consideration to recommendations of the conference; the draft treaties would take into account the views of enemy states, and adequate opportunity would be given to them to discuss the treaties and present their views.28

This statement assured the French government that the states participating in the conference could debate the treaties, that the council would consider recommendations of the conference, and that the defeated states would receive a hearing. France was apparently anxious to avoid even the appearance of dictation, in view of what had

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STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West