STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West

In the course of the Second World War emigré Czechoslovak politicians on several occasions had praised the Hungarian population in Slovakia. The Slovak Communist leader, Vladimir Clementis, ex tolled the behavior of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia in the following manner:

Whoever experienced the period preceding Munich in the Magyar districts of Slovakia knows what a fundamental difference there was between them and the Sudeten regions.The majority of the Magyar workers and peasants not only appreciated the political and cultural progress which the Republic had brought them, but these classes also had an accurate view of Czechoslovakia's position in the European situation, and of her significance for the hopes of their comrades in Hungary, and thus for the whole Magyar nation.2

The Hungarians in Slovakia proved more anti-Nazi than the Slovaks. Benes pointed out in his memoirs that the attitude of the

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Slovak people was one of the factors in the destruction of Czechoslovakia.3 Many Slovaks had supported the pro-Nazi Tiso regime wholeheartedly. The Hungarian party was the only one that voted against the Hitlerte anti-Semitic laws in the Slovak parliament. It seemed incredible to the Hungarians that they might be punished on the basis of collective responsibility after reestablishment of Czechoslovakia.

During the war Nazi Germany placed Slovak behavior as an example before Hungary. Slovak newspapers accused Hungary of pro-Western sympathies and of promoting a double-dealing opportunistic policy. Some of Monsignor Tiso's supporters advocated expulsion of Hungarians. Czech agrarian and industrial production also was highly praised by the Germans. Czech farmers won highest prices in the German production race. As early as 1943 the powerful German minister of economics, Karl Clodius, hinted to the Hungarian prime minister, Kállay, that Hungary's economic sabotage might lead to military occupation since the Germans could get much more out of the occupied countries. As an example' Clodius mentioned the output of Czech industry and agriculture.

The Czechoslovak emigré government in London enjoyed a privileged position among the United Nations. The bad consciences of Western powers because of Munich was important, overshadowing objective facts. Hungarians were not responsible for the Runciman mission, and the Munich Agreement was accepted by Czechoslovakia, France, and Britain.4 The London Times wrote on September 28, l938: ''Self-determination, the professed principle of the Treaty of Versailles, has been invoked by Herr Hitleragainst its written text, and his appeal has been allowed." But in the growing anti-Munich political atmosphere in London, the Czechoslovak emigré government felt free to designate scapegoats for the disintegration of Czechoslovakia and decided that after the war they would get rid of non-Slav minorities. The radical transformation of Benes's policy during the war was aptly characterized by Wenzel Jaksch, the leader of Sudeten German Socialists in London.5 Slovak peasants who for centuries had worked peacefully as neighbors of Hungarian peasants, were incited by propaganda both from overseas and by Slovak-Nazi propagandists at home. A twofold propaganda machine stirred up the feelings of the Slovak people and explained to them that they could no longer live in the same state with the Hungarians.

The postwar coalition government of Hungary refused to believe that the Czechoslovak state would deviate from the principles of its founder, Thomas Masaryk indulging in persecution and racial hatred

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similar to that of Nazi Germany. In early 194S they were inclined to attribute anti-Hungarian atrocities to irresponsible elements. This wishful thinking was supported by news of a few manifestations of Hungarian-Slovakian friendship, but gradually it became clear that persecution of Hungarians in Slovakia was being planned and carried out systematically by the government.

In January 1945, the Czechoslovak ambassador to the Soviet Union suggested to the Soviet People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs the Inclusion of several points in the Hungarian armistice. It was proposed that ''Hungary take on certain obligations with respect to Magyars who possessed Czech citizenship but who will be transferred to Hungary."6 Although this proposal was not included in the armistice agreement, Prague apparently thought that the expulsion of Hungarians would be a simple affair. Under secretary of state in the Foreign Ministry, Vladimir Clementis, told the French chargé d'affaires Keller, on August 25, 1945, that the expulsion of the Hungarians differed from the expulsion of the Germans. It will be more of an exchange than transfer of population because the Slovaks from Hungary and the Hungarians expelled from Slovakia would be repatriated simultaneously, said Clementis. He explained to Keller that the transfer of Hungarians would not depend on the good will of the three Great Powers, but solely on approval of the Russian military authorities who alone were responsible for order in Hungary. The Czechoslovak government would send a mission to Budapest in the near future to work out with the Soviet commission the material conditions of transfer. As soon as agreement was reached with the Soviets Prague would deal directly with Budapest to determine the dates and places of transfer and the destination of each group. On this occasion Clementis himself intended to travel to Budapest to regulate the transfer within the general framework of an accord of good neighborhood Keller thought that he understood Clementis to say that he envisaged to raise the question of rectification of the Slovak frontier.7

Clementis,s explanations to the French chargé d'affaires revealed his determination to expedite the expulsion of Hungarians through an agreement with Soviet authorities in Budapest. Although Prague received Soviet diplomatic support, things did not work out entirely according to Clementis's expectations. The process of ridding Czechoslovakia of minorities began by a ''voluntary" cession of Sub-Carpathian Ukraine to the Soviet Union by the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of June 29, 1945. This was not an unexpected development. Benes indicated as early as 1939 that he would be willing to cede this territory to the USSR.8 During his visit in Moscow in December 1943, he told

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Molotovthat ''in regard to issues of major importance, [the Czechoslovak government] . . . would always speak and act in a fashion agreeable to the representatives of the Soviet government.,' And he pledged ''loyal collaboration and concerted action in all future negotiations.''9 It is not surprising that Moscow appreciated this policy of Vorleistung and the Soviet government gave support to the Czechoslovak policy of persecution and expulsion of Hungarians. Soviet officials pointed out on numerous occasions' particularly in connection with the Czechoslovak demand for transfer of the Hungarians' that the Czechoslovak government had earned support by its reliable attitude in the past.

The Potsdam Conference authorized Czechoslovakia to expel her citizens of German nationality, and the transfer took place rapidly. By the autumn of 1946, 2,165,000 Germans had been expelled. Having gotten rid of the Germans and most Ukrainians, Czechoslovakia probably would not have been endangered if the Hungarian minority had been treated in the spirit of Masaryks democracy. If Czechoslovakia preferred to become a purely national state, without a Hungarian minority, it would have been possible to solve this problem by rnoderate territorial cessions, for most of the Hungarians lived on territory contiguous with Hungary.

The ethnic boundary line had not undergone significant changes between Hungarians and Slovaks in centuries. That the southern part of Slovakia was not ''Magyarized'' territory was stated by one of the scholars on this subject, Alexej Petrov, of Russian descent, who made a detailed study of ethnic development of this region and whose works were published in Prague by the Czech Academy in 1928. Petrov reached the conclusion that ''The frontier of homogeneous Slovakia has, to all intents and purposes, remained constant for the past 100 and 150 years.,, This statement implied recognition that the territory below this line had been Hungarian. ''The picture of the Magyar-Slovak lingual frontier has, along a stretch of frontier about 400 km. in length and 10-25 km. in depth, scarcely been affected by the development of the two nations."10 As there was no massive ''Magyarization,' on these territories,''11 it was a perverted argument of postwar Slovak politics to speak about ''reslovakization" of the Hungarian population. In 1945 any reasonable settlement would have provided the basis for cooperation between the two countries. Instead Czechoslovakia started a bmtal persecution of Hungarians with expulsion as the ultimate goal.

A proclamation of April 2, 1945, in Kosice (Kassa) announced that Czechoslovakia was going to be a national state. President Benes

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emphasized in a speech of May 9, 1945, in Bratislava, that Czechs and Slovaks did not want to live in the same state with Germans and Hungarians. It became evident that the elimination of the Hungarian population constituted a major program of postwar Czechoslovakia. Hungarians were deprived of their citizenship, of all political and elementary human rights by a series of legal measures, administrative steps, and even by officially tolerated malicious actions of private groups and individuals. Hungarians were sent to concentration camps by the thousands. The state dismissed Hungarian officials, stopped payment of pensions to retired Hungarian civil servants, disabled men, war widows and sick people, and obliged private concerns to do likewise. Hungarian schools were closed and private education banned for Hungarian children. Ownership of radios or publishing and selling of Hungarian printed materials was banned. Use of the Hungarian language on the streets of some cities as well as use in postal communication and religious services was forbidden by law. For example, Decree no. 253 / 1945 of Sept. 10, l945 , stated in regard to the Evangelical church: ''German and Hungarian parishes and seniorates lose their independence; their assets are transferred to the Slovak churches. The clergy are to be dismissed and services held only in the language of the State." A Hungarian was not allowed to have employees or to be employed. Private property was confiscated in many cases and licenses withdrawn. Hungarian cultural and welfare institutions were dissolved and activities of this kind prohibited. Within a short time an entire legal system had been devised that discriminated against Hungarians in political, administrative, economic, cultural, religious, and other matters.12 Hungarians were placed almost entirely outside the law.

It is characteristic of this legislation that a constitution law, passed by the Provisional National Assembly on April 11 , 1946, declared the following:

Only Czechoslovak citizens of Czech, Slovak or other Slav race possess the suffrage. (Clause 3)

Only Czechoslovak citizens of Czech, Slovak or other Slav race may be elected. (Clause 4)

When these provisions were promulgated, the Hungarian authorities had proof of the purpose of Czechoslovak policies and changed their attitude. On April 5, 1945, the Hungarian government protested to the ACC against the anti-Hungarian discriminatory provisions of the decree concerning agrarian reform issued on February 27,

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1945, by the Slovak National Assembly.13 In a note dated July 4, 1945, to the Soviet government, the Hungarian government summarized anti-Hungarian decrees and atrocities and asked for intervention.14 Between April 1945 and July 1946 the Foreign Ministry sent 184 notes to the ACC protesting Czechoslovakian abuses against Hungarians. 15

Because the protests did not bring results, the Foreign Ministry sent memoranda to the three major victorious powers with detailed descriptions of anti-Hungarian measures. In a note of September 12, 1945, the Hungarian government asked to be heard by the Council of Foreign Ministers on the situation of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. This step was prompted by an action of the Czechoslovak prime minister, Zdenek Fierlinger, who had requested the Allied powers to agree to removal of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia. The Hungarian government proposed an international Commission of Inquiry, composed of delegates of Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and France, to investigate controversial issues between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, notably the following:

(a) To ascertain the accurate ethnic facts and economic conditions of the regions of Southern Slovakia inhabited by Hungarians.

(b) The record of the attachment of the Hungarian regions to Czechoslovakia at the Peace Conference after the First World War.

(c) The attitude adopted by Czechoslovak statesmen in the past regarding this territory. (d) The attitude adopted by the Czechoslovak government prior to the Vienna Awardof November 2, 1938.

(d) The Hungarian government's treatment of the Slovak and Czech settlers and of the indigenous population in the territories ceded to Hungary. (f) The position of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia since its liberation by the Russian army.16

In view of the fact that after the dispatch of this note the position of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia worsened, the Hungarian government reiterated its request on November 20, 1945. 17 This note argued that the Czechoslovak government would have been obliged to restore the legal position of the Hungarians as of December 31, 1937, including protection of minority rights, and requested that districts of Slovakia inhabited by Hungarians be placed under international control pending appointment of a Commission of Inquiry. A memorandum attached to the same note furnished information on the situation of the Hungarian minority.

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The Soviets did not reply to these notes. The British and American reactions were not favorable either, and eventually written refusals arrived in February and March 1946.

The American reply remarked that

In present circumstances the Gorvernment of the United States does not consider feasible the formation of an international commission to examine the Hungarian-Czechoslovak minority problem or to supervise any exchange of population. The Government of the United States cannot support a request for the establishment of international control of the districts inhabited by Hungarians in Slovakia. The Government of the United States will recognize and support a humane settlement freely agreed to between the Government of Hungary and the Czechoslovak Republic.18

The British reply informed the Hungarian government that

His Majesty's Government would be unwilling to participate in any international commission for the examination of the problem of Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia or for the supervision of any Czechoslovak-Hungarian exchange of population on the lines proposed by the Hungarian Government. His Majesty's Government are of the opinion that this question should be settled on a bilateral basis between the two Governments concerned. Further, they would not be prepared to try to persuade the Czechoslovakian Government to agree to any frontier rectification in favor of Hungary though they would not withhold recognition of any changes freely agreed to between the two countries concerned.19

The United States was the only power that gave indirect support to Hungary's protest against the application of the principle of collective responsibility. The American political Mission in Budapest handed the Hungarian government a memorandum on June 12, 1945, containing principles for a humanitarian transfer of population. 20 This memorandum took a stand against the principle of collective responsibility.

The United States Government would not consider it justified to deal with all members of an ethnic group who constitute a minority as criminals against the state and as subject to expulsion from its territory, only because of their ethnic origin.

The memorandum emphasized that removal of minorities could take place only in accord with international agreements and ''in an orderly way." It quoted the foreign minister of Czechoslovakia who had said on May 21, 1945, at San Francisco that

punishment would be imposed only upon Hungarians who had conspired against the Czechoslovak Republic and who had fought on the

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side of the Nazis, but that those Hungarians who had shown friendliness to the cause of Czechoslovakia might remain in that country with the full rights of citizens of that Republic.21

In reply to the American note the Hungarian government stated that, without wishing to oppose severe punishment for Magyar war criminals in Czechoslovakia, it was obliged to protest against collective persecution of the Hungarian minority, which recalled anti Jewish measures of the Nazis. It could not be said that all the Hungarians were to blame for disintegration of Czechoslovakia; after World War I nobody asked the opinion of Hungarians in territories attached to Czechoslovakia as to what state they wished to belong; the same thing had happened in 1938. On both occasions the Hungarian government proposed plebiscites. Hungarians in Slovakia surely could not be stamped as war criminals because they were satisfied to be reattached to Hungary in 1938. The note pointed out that

recent events in Slovakia demonstrate that the Government unfortunately is still pursuing the same Nazi principles which gave rise to the "Hlinka-Guard'' movement and to other similar organizations partly established to terrorize the Hungarian community. Those who are today persecuting the Hungarians in the name of democracy have done so for many years with the approval and at the instigation of the Third Reich under the pretext that in the "new order" for Europe the Hungarians could not be relied upon.

The fact that the Hungarian Party formed the only opposition in Tiso's Fascist Slovakia shows how little the Hungarian minority was in sympathy with the Nazi ideology. The leader of the Party, John Esterházy, was the only member of the Slovak Parliament who voted against the anti-semitic laws and strongly criticized them as not being in accordance with humanitarian principles.22

Negotiations in Prague

Dalibor Krno, representative of the Czechoslovak government with the ACC, proposed to the Hungarian government on October 9, 194S, that negotiations should begin in Prague on the exchange of population. Similar proposals were made in November 1945 to a delegation of the Hungarian Social Democratic party attending the Social Democratic Congress in Prague.23 Hungarian Socialists supported the suggestions and after return advocated in Budapest the idea of a population exchange as a step toward better relations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Under both internal and external

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political pressures, the Hungarian prime minister, Zoltán Tildy informed the Czechoslovak representative with the ACC that in the first days of December 1945 the Hungarian government would be prepared to open negotiations in Prague. At the same time he pointed out that the Czechoslovak government had taken new anti-Hungarian measures and that the Slovak press, with its magyaro-phobe propaganda, had created an atmosphere not likely to facilitate negotiation.24

At the invitation of the Czechoslovak government, a small Hungarian delegation negotiated in Prague, December 3-6, 1945. I accompanied the foreign minister with two specialists in Czechoslovak affairs, AlexanderVájlok and Lehel Farkas. In an address at the opening of the negotiations, Vladimir Clementis, under secretary of state in the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry and head of the Czechoslovak delegation (in view of Jan Masaryk's absence he was also acting foreign minister), insisted upon the responsibility of Hungary in the war and emphasized that Hungary had not complied with certain provisions of the armistice agreement. He put forward a proposal as a basis for negotiation25: in exchange for Slovaks from Hungary who spontaneously declared their wish to be transferred to Czechoslovakia, the government of Prague would have the right to select and transfer an equal number of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia to Hungary. The Hungarians not subject to exchange would be removed to Hungary and their goods confiscated. Hungarians to whom Czechoslovak citizenship would be granted could enjoy the rights of citizens but would not have any minority rights.

These proposals seemed preposterous, for it was well known that Czechoslovak authorities granted Czechoslovak citizenship only to Hungarians who declared themselves Slovak. Clementis stated on September 16, 1946, at the Paris Conference, that those ''who are shown in the Czechoslovak census return as Magyars, are not really of Magyar ethnic origin, but are partly of Slovak origin. Those of them who speak Slovak and have now declared their nationality to be Slovak have been granted the right to acquire Czechoslovak citizenship by a special law.''26

Hungarians in Slovakia outnumbered several times the Slovaks in Hungary. This latter group voluntarily moved from Upper Hungary to the Hungarian Lowland in the eighteenth century, after expulsion of the Turks, and had lived ever since among Hungarians and in considerable distance from the bulk of the Slovak people. Czechoslovak statisticians estimated in 1945 27 that 652,000 Hungarians remained in Czechoslovakia while Hungarian estimates ran between 700,000

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and 800,000. In Hungary the individuals who declared Slovak as their mother tongue were 104,819 in 1930 and 75,920 in 1941. Even if all Slovaks of Hungary would have declared their wish to be transferred it would have left unsolved the fate of more than half a million Hungarians in Slovakia. It is true that Clementis and other Slovak nationalists claimed there were 450,000 Slovaks in Hungary but such assertions were not supportable by facts--as pointed out by objective foreign experts 28--and proved in error by the result of the population exchange.

After two days of negotiations in Prague, the two delegations decided on December 4 to put into writing the views expressed and the solutions envisaged. Papers were exchanged the next day. Although the Czechoslovak aide-memoire 29 made minor concessions, it still reiterated the original proposal for negotiation.

The Hungarian protocol, which I drafted, was a condensation of views expressed by the Hungarian and Czechoslovak representatives.30 It stated that the Hungarian government found itself unable to approve the exchange of population because it was not in conformity with the principles of humanity and democracy. In view of an atmosphere more favorable to friendly relations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Hungary would agree to the exchange under certain conditions. The delegation proposed to count among Hungarians to be transferred those who were expelled from Czechoslovakia or unable to return as a result of Czechoslovakian measures--although they were Czechoslovak citizens on November 1, 1938. Outside those categories, the exchange would include persons whom judicial authorities qualified as hostile to the Czechoslovak state. When these categories had been exhausted the parties would agree on the choice of other Czechoslovak citizens of Hungarian ethnic origin, taking into consideration domicile, occupation, material situation, etc. The commissions supervising the exchange would have an international character; apart from representatives of interested states they would include representatives of the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States.

The Hungarian proposal provided for immediate abolition of all discriminating measures applied to Hungarians, plus integral restitution and compensation. As to the Czechoslovak proposal that after exchange the Hungarian population in Czechoslovakia should be expelled from that country, the Hungarian delegation was not even willing to enter into negotiation. Transfer of these Hungarians to Hungary could only be effected with simultaneous cession of territory in which they lived. The Hungarian delegation declared that the

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principle of exchange of populations appeared admissible only if the fate of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia would be regulated by appropriate measures.

After exchange of the Czechoslovak aide-memoire and the Hungarian draft protocol it became evident that no agreement was possible. The Czechoslovak delegation rejected all Hungarian proposals. Negotiations broke off on December 6 with a statement of the Hungarian foreign minister 31, who asked the Czechoslovak government in the name of democracy and the spirit of humanity not to apply new discriminatory measures to Hungarians in Slovakia, and above all to end persecution. The delegations could not agree even on the text of a communiqué, and the two governments published separate statements.

Two episodes pertaining to usual diplomatic contacts remain vivid in my memory because they characterize the atmosphere of Prague in December 1945.

The representative of Hungary in Czechoslovakia, Francis Rosthy-Forgách, arranged for me a private meeting with the head of the economic division of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, whom he considered a friend of Hungary. I told the Czech diplomat that we would like to establish close cooperation with other Danubian nations, especially Czechoslovakia, and explained our ideas. His reply was that as a first step we should accept the political demands of Prague concerning the settlement of the Hungarian question in Slovakia, then we should fulfill the financial obligations provided in the armistice agreement; and if all these and other pending problems were settled the Czechoslovak government might consider putting into operation the excellent commercial treaty concluded between Czechoslovakia and Hungary in 1938. After this reply not much remained for discussion.

A conversation of mine with Clementis was surprising in a different sense. At the farewell party given the Hungarian delegation he asked me for an eye-to-eye exchange of views, in the course of which he explained that it would serve the cause of Hungaro-Czechoslovak reconciliation if Hungary eliminated from its historical coat-of-arms the stripes and hills symbolizing rivers and mountains in Slovakia. I expressed surprise and told him that Hungary's coat-of-arms was not a negotiable question. It was grotesque to see that amidst cruel persecution of Hungarians, one of the promoters of the persecution--and a leading Communist--wanted to improve Hungaro-Slovak relations by such a queer proposal. He apparently thought it possible to wipe

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out the memory of ten centuries through heraldic changes in a historic emblem.

I left Prague with the conviction that between Slovak jingo-nationalism and helpless Czech bureaucracy not much space remained for statesmanship and common sense, necessary elements of lasting political settlements.

The much criticized nationality policy of Hungary had many defects but remained a far cry from, and could not even be compared with, systematic government-controlled persecutions in the new Czechoslovakia. Extravagant racial hatred became the central idea in post-World War II Czechoslovak politics, instead of the humanism of Masaryk It was obvious that Czech and Slovak political leaders were abusing their favorable power position and were destroying the possibility of cooperation with neighbors, especially Hungarians. In the course of negotiation I reminded Clementis that the wheel of history was turning rapidly, there had been ups and downs in the history of all Danubian nations and it was time now to look for a long-range settlement in Hungaro-Slovak relations. Clementis's answer was that Czechoslovakia, enjoying support of both the Soviet Union and the Western powers, would remove all Hungarians in one way or another. President Benes went even further and declared to Foreign Minister Gyöngyösithat the victorious powers had agreed in principle at Potsdam on removal of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia and seemed astonished to see our "stubbornness" in this matter, I expressed the opinion to Gyöngyösithat the Czechoslovaks would not negotiate with us if Benes's allegations were true.

After returning to Budapest, I went to see the American minister Schoenfeld, and asked him about the validity of Benes's statement. He categorically denied an agreement was reached at Potsdam on removal of Hungarians. Although such an agreement was not in the published text, the official denial was reassuring because tacit and unpublished understandings are not unknown in diplomacy.

Second Negotiations in Prague

In early January Dalibor Krno, the Czechoslovak representative accredited to the ACC, invited me for luncheon to discuss the possibilities of a population exchange agreement. Krno was an influential member of the Slovak Communist party and suggested with authority that instead of demanding withdrawal of anti Hungarian legislation,

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we should be satisfied with de facto improvement of living conditions of Hungarians and emphasized that the Czechoslovak government must have discretionary power for selection of Hungarians to be transferred from Slovakia. When I expressed disagreement, he argued that the population exchange was in Hungary's interest as well. In case of Hungarian unwillingness to cooperate, they would organize a worldwide diplomatic and propaganda campaign against Hungary and establish several hundred Slovak schools in Hungary, following the model of the Alliance Francaise possibly in cooperation with other Slavic people so that Hungary might have a Slavic population of a million in fifty years. 32

Like Clementis, Krno had personal grudges against the Hungarians that originated back in pre-1918 Hungary. I realized in the course of my contacts with both men that they lived under the impact of alleged persecutions suffered by them or their families and wanted to retaliate. This lust for revenge caused frustration and imbalance in their thinking and approach toward present-day problems connected with Hungary. Slovak leaders whom I met were either incapable or unwilling to envisage realistically Hungarian-Slovak relationships. All were convinced that they could obtain anything because they enjoyed support of the Soviet Union and the Western powers.

The Hungarian government informed the three major powers of the Prague negotiations on December 11. 33 The usual silence of Moscow and the negative replies of the Western Powers justified the boast of Clementis and other Slovak leaders concerning the sympathy enjoyed by Czechoslovakia. Hungary asked again for Western cooperation in settlement of our conflict with Prague. The Hungarian proposal concerning participation of Western representatives in the international commission to be established in connection with the population exchange was opposed by Czechoslovakia and rejected by the Western powers.

After failure of the Prague negotiations the Russians increased pressure on the Hungarian government for acceptance of the Czechoslovak proposals with respect to settlement of the Hungarian question in Slovakia. Pushkin complacently explained to Foreign Minister Gyöngyösithat the clumsy Czechoslovak politicians had committed a serious mistake in not removing the Hungarians from Slovakia at the close of hostilities. An accomplished fact would have been created that would have solved the chief difficulty between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and negotiations between the two countries would have been easier. Pushkin repeatedly made clear that Czechoslovakia enjoyed unqualified support of Moscow because in the past it had

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proved a reliable friend; Hungary should accept the Czechoslovak thesis and should look for compensation from Rumania, a country that had been in the same boat as Hungary.

Along with most Czechoslovak experts in the Foreign Ministry, I advised Gyöngyösithat Hungary should delay negotiation and submit the whole problem to the peace conference. But Gyöngyösifelt that this policy would run against Western advice and provoke Soviet retaliation. All the powers remained unresponsive to Hungarian proposals and complaints concerning persecution of Hungarians, and the Hungarian government had no way of defending its persecuted kinsmen or to hinder mass expulsions or internal removals to the Sudeten territories. Clementis made it clear that the persecution of the Hungarians would be continued on an increasing level until the conclusion of the population exchange agreement. In this situation the foreign minister saw no possibility for protecting the Hungarians in Slovakia. He was convinced the population exchange would prove that Czechoslovak allegations of the several hundred thousand Slovaks in Hungary were without foundation. He was afraid the Czechoslovak government with its great propaganda facilities might convince the peace conference of the validity of these allegations and hoped that results of the population exchange would show the situation realistically and strengthen Hungary's position at the peace table.

At the end of January 1946 the Hungarian government decided to accept with some modifications a Czechoslovak proposal presented to the Hungarian delegation in Prague on December 5, 1945, and rejected by the latter. I gave this compromise proposal to Krno on January 30, 1946, and stated that in event the Czechoslovak government accepted it as the basis for negotiation the Hungarian delegation was prepared to go to Prague. 34 The most important Hungarian modification stipulated that, concerning the criteria of Hungarians in Slovakla to be transferred in exchange, a decision would be taken by a special Hungaro-Czechoslovak commission, as soon as it was informed of the number of Slovaks in Hungary who presented themselves for transfer.

Three days later the Foreign Ministry received an invitation from Prague through Krno which implied the acceptance of our conditions The Czechoslovak government invited the Hungarian delegation which arrived in Prague on February 5, 1946. 35 The same delegation was led again by the foreign minister and included the secretary general of the Foreign Ministry, Paul Sebestyén, an experienced negotiator and legal expert.

Immediately upon arrival in Prague, Krno called on me at the

Notes

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West