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but he had apprehensions that the Germans would learn of the meeting and therefore asked Bánffyto get in touch with Maniu. As mentioned, Bánffytraveled legally to Bucharest to discuss specific problems of the Hungarian minority in Rumania and those of the Rumanian minority in Hungary. He arrived on June 18 , 1943 , and met a few days later with the Rumanian negotiator, G. Mironescu a former prime minister and foreign minister. Bánffywas unable to discuss problems designated in the memoranda of the two governments because Mihai Antonescu instructed Mironescuto discuss only territorial questions, while he was authorized to negotiate solely measures for improvement of the minorities situation in the two countries. Mironescuinformed Bánffythat the Rumanian government had denounced in Berlin and Rome the Vienna Award31 and was unwilling to negotiate on the basis of the status quo. The Hungarian and Rumanian positions were irreconcilable and there was no reason to continue the meetings.

The indomitable Bánffygot in touch with opponents of the Antonescu regime, and his most important conversation was with Maniu who came to Bucharest to meet him. Since a police car watched Maniu's residence until 11:00 P.M., Banffy visited him during the darkness of night. The two Transylvanians agreed that military cooperation between Hungary and Rumania would be desirable against the Germans, but Maniu wanted to include the Yugoslavs and emphasized that Rumania would never recognize the Vienna Award While Bánffyproposed the maintenance of the status quo until the peace conference, Maniu demanded immediate recognition of the Rumanian territorial claims and suggested that with the expected coming into being of large economic units the frontiers should lose importance. Failure of Bánffys mission on both official and opposition levels demonstrated the intractable nature of the conflict between the two countries. The policy of rapprochement came to an inglorious end. 32 Mihai Antonescu changed his mind and the Germans continued their squeeze play, using to advantage the conflicting territorial aspirations of Hungary and Rumania.

In Transylvania the Italo-German conciliatory efforts proved to be palliatives, and the Germans supported the Rumanians almost cDpenly. This policy was reinforced in Hungarian-Rumanian relations m that Rumania had a key role in the war against Soviet Russia; it had carried out full mobilization and contributed to the German war efforts incomparably more than had Hungary. Hitlers dislike of Hungary was well known and has been verified by many documents. 33 He had a great liking for the Rumanian dictator, Ion Antonescu.

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As Hitlers interpreter Paul Schmidt later put it, Antonescu was ''one of Hitlers closest intimates and was even kept more closely in the picture than Mussolini. He was the only foreigner from whom Hitlerever asked for military advice when he was in difficulties. . . . He made long speeches just like Hitler usually starting off at the creation of Rumania, and somehow relating everything he said to the hated Hungarians, and the recovery of Transylvania. This hatred of Hungary, too, made him congenial to Hitler for the Fuehrer despised the Magyars.''34 Antonescu indicated his determination to recover northern Transylvania by force of arms, and ''Hitlertook a secret pleasure in Antonescu's outbursts against the Hungarians, and even went so far as to hint that he might perhaps give him a free hand later in his plans of conquest."35

Surrounded again by a sort of revived Little Entente, protected this time by Germany, the Hungarian government tried to rely on Italy. The policy was bound to fail because Italy gradually declined to the status of Hitlers vasal, and Mussolini decided to fight along with Hitleruntil the very last. Despite disappointments, the Hungarians tried to win Italy's support because they saw no other alternative.

The Hungarian government sought to explore the possibilities of electing an Italian king. The advanced age of the regent was reason for such soundings. The duke of Aosta, cousin of Victor Emmanuel III a possible candidate for the throne of St. Stephen died in March 1942. The Hungarians then sought to strengthen Hungary's independence by a personal union with Italy under King Victor Emmanuel. The Duce reacted adversely to this plan, saying he had entertained a similar proposition in regard to the Duke of\s+Aosta, ''but with him dead, nothing else will be done."36

Prime Minister Kállay was anxious to clarify the delicate political problems in Rome and arranged for a visit to Italy in November of 1942, but the trip was postponed by Mussolini because of the collapse of the Libyan front. ''In fact, this is not the moment to welcome any guests,,, remarked Ciano 37 Eventually Kállay visited Rome in early April 1943, to gain Italian support for resistance to Germany. When Kállay referred to the fact that the Axis was retreating on every front Mussolini interrupted him saying that ''Hitlerhad assured him that in the summer he would settle with the Russians once and for all.,' Kállay replied that he could only discuss the present situation and pointed out that ''Hungary could not give a single soldier for this offensive."38 He avoided the question of a separate peace but brought up the possibility of a separate common policy within the Axis of Italy, Hungary, and possibly Finland and extolled the benefits of a

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common Italo-Hungarian policy on the Balkans. He explained to the Duce that he wanted to extricate Hungary from the war and lead it back into nonbelligerency. Mussolini assured Kállay of friendship, tried to justify Italy's foreign policy in a historical context, and warned Kállay that ''We cannot even think of a separate peace."39

During this period there was some similarity between the foreign policies of Hungary and Rumania. Both countries overestimated Italy's capability to resist Germany and Mussolini's willingness to change his pro-Axis policy. Rumania's deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Mihai Antonescu, followed a strong pro-Italian policy, for he had hoped that Italy would establish contacts and conclude an armistice with the Western powers. He had maintained close relations with Bova Scoppa, the Italian minister to Rumania since July 1941, and had hoped that under Italy's leadership Rumania, and possibly Hungary, Finland and other small states, could cooperate and conclude an armistice and change sides during the war. In his memoirs 40 Bova Scoppa described Antonescu's ideas and endeavors in this respect. While visiting Rome in early June 1943, Scoppa submitted a Promemoria to Giuseppe Bastianini, Cianos successor as foreign minister since February 1943' reflecting the Rumanian evaluation of the military and political situation and Antonescu's ideas as to the steps to be taken. 41 Scoppa met Cianowho told him frankly: ''Con Mussolini non c'e niente da fare. E'un muro chiuso.'' (Nothing can be done with Mussolini. He has a closed mind.)42

Finally Bastianini informed Scoppa on June 15 that the Duce agreed with Mihai Antonescu on many points but would like to wait two months with the suggested diplomatic initiative when the military situation would be better. He invited Antonescu for an exchange of views' and a visit took place at the end of June with Antonescu warmly received and Mussolini emphasizing again that negotiations should start in two months, when the belligerent and neutral states would be brought to a conference--by Hitleror without Hitler-to decide Europe's future. Antonescu finally realized that Mussolini had replaced policy by pipe dreams.43 Events in Italy soon took a different turn; the English and the Americans landed in Sicily in July 1943, Mussolini was forced to resign, and Marshal Badolgio's government signed an armistice on September 3, made public five days later.

Another common error of this period was the belief in Budapest and Bucharest the British and American troops would occupy the Danubian countries in the last stage of the war. Hungarian and Rumanian politicians assumed that the United States at the peak of its

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power would not tolerate Soviet hegemony in Danubian Europe. Hungary had established contacts in 1942 and 1943 with British and United States representatives, and Hungarian and Rumanian diplomats and special emissaries in neutral countries put forth peace feelers in 1943 and 1944. Appraisal of these moves are outside the scope of this book, but one should note that the British and the Americans faithfully informed the Soviet government of the Hungarian and Rumanian approaches.

Armistice in Russia's Europe

The parallelism between Hungarian and Rumanian politics changed drastically in 1944 when Hungary was occupied by German troops on March 19, according to a carefully prepared plan, Marghareta I. The looming shadow of the Nazi dictator became a cruel reality. Hitlers promise to Horthyconcerning the exclusively military character of the occupation proved worthless. The Gestapo started its usual work. Prominent Hungarian patriots were jailed, deported, or forced underground. Persecution and mass deportation of Jews began. Prime Minister Kállay never resigned formally and found asylum in the Turkish legation. The new head of the government, Dome Sztójay, a former general and Hungarian minister to Germany, had always advocated a policy of submission to Nazi Germany, and in close collaboration with the Germans carried out the Nazification of Hungary. Horthyassumed an ostensibly passive attitude in the first months later resisting more or less openly the occupying Nazi forces and their Hungarian accomplices. Since the Germans did not take over direct control of major government agencies some possibilities for the future were left open. The attempt to kill Hitleron July 20, 1944, created confusion among German authorities in Hungary, momentarily increasing Horthys freedom of action. He dismissed the pro-Nazi Prime Minister, Sztójay, and replaced him with General Géza Lakatos General Gusztáv Hennyey another faithful servant of Horthy became foreign minister.44

But then Rumanian politics suddenly took an unexpected turn. On August 23, King Michaeldismissed and arrested Marshal Antonescu and Mihai Antonescu, proclaimed Rumania's surrender, and appointed a government of national unity with the nonpolitical General Constantin Sanatescu as premier. Rumania declared war on Germany and the Rumanian army changed sides with lightning speed

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and fought against the Germans. The quick action of the Rumanian army was an immense benefit to the Russians. The German plan for occupation of Rumania, could not be carried out and the German army, in disorderly retreat, did not even defend the passes in the Carpathian mountains.

The movement of the Soviet army and the regular Rumanian divisions into northern Transylvania was followed by the ''Voluntary Guards" of Maniu who introduced a regime of terror in regions inhabited by Hungarians. In view of large-scale atrocities and lootings the Soviet High Command in some instances intervened to protect the Hungarian population, and the Allied Control Commission in Bucharest on November 14 ordered the returned Rumanian functionaries and the ''Maniu Guards,, to evacuate northern Transylvania. From this time on the autochthon population, Hungarians and Rumanians together, organized an autonomous administration with the approval of the Soviet High Command, and for a few months northern Transylvania enjoyed an exemplary public order with constructive cooperation of the native population. The Soviet army needed orderly conditions behind the front.

The Italian and Rumanian cases were warnings to Hitler who decided to prevent similar events in Hungary and concentrated German armored divisions on the outskirts of Budapest. When Regent Horthys armistice proclamation was read on the Budapest radio on October 1S , these divisions moved into the capital. The Germans arrested pro-Horthymilitary commanders, deposed the Lakatosgovernment, and installed an Arrow Cross government under Ferenc Szálasi. Horthywas taken prisoner and deported with his family to Germany. A chapter of Hungarian history came to an end. Battles were fought all over Hungary for several months and the siege of Buda lasted over seven weeks. Gradually, however, German resistance collapsed, and the last German troops were driven out from western Hungary on April 4, 1945.

A new order began in Russia's Europe with the ensuing armistice period. The rules of international and domestic politics were fundamentally changed in countries occupied by the Soviet army. An armistice was signed with Rumania on September 12, 1944 and its Article 18 stated:

An Allied Control Commission will be established which will under take until the conclusion of peace the regulation of and control over the execution of the present terms under the general direction and orders of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, acting on behalf of the Allied Powers.

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The Bulgarian armistice agreement was signed on October 28, 1944 and its Article 18 (identical with Article 18 of the Hungarian armistice agreement of January 20, 1945) set forth:

For the whole period of the armistice there will be established in Bulgaria an Allied Control Commission which will regulate and supervise the execution of the armistice terms under the chairmanship of the representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command and with the participation of representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States.

During the period between coming into force of the armistice and the conclusion of hostilities against Germany, the Allied Control Commission will be under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

There are two major differences between the two texts. The Rumanian armistice simply stated that the ACC would be under direction and control of the Soviet High Command, acting in behalf of the Allied powers during the whole armistice period. The Bulgarian and the identical Hungarian texts provided that the ACC would ''regulate and supervise the execution of the armistice terms under the chairmanship of the representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command and with the participation of representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States.'' (Emphasis added) A second paragraph of Article 18 in these two armistice agreements restricted the general direction of the Soviet High Command to the period between coming into force of the armistice and the conclusion of hostilities against Germany. The United States proposed that in the post-hostilities period tripartite control should replace Soviet dominance, but this proposal was not accepted by the European Advisory Commission in London because of Soviet opposition. These changes were supposed to secure greater British and United States influence in the Bulgarian and Hungarian ACC. This formula was worked out by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Molotovon October 1 1, 1944, when the definitive percentage figures for influence in the Balkan countries and Hungary were established.

These were some of the diplomatic agreements and military developments which determined Hungary's and Rumania's international situation at the close of hostilities.

The ink had hardly dried on the Yalta agreements when Soviet Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs Andrei Y. Vyshinsky went to Bucharest and compelled King Michaelto dismiss General Nicholas Radescu's coalition government and appoint Petru Groza as premier. When Groza presented a solid National Democratic Front (FND)

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government--the FND was a Communist sponsored organization-- the king refused to appoint the designated cabinet members. Vyshinsky reportedly stated that this was an unfriendly act to the USSR and Rumania might cease to exist as a sovereign state. The king had no choice and the FND came to power. Within three days the Russians restored northern Transylvania to Rumanian administration so as to demonstrate Soviet support of Groza's government. Although Groza trled to introduce a conciliatory policy toward the Hungarian minority, his success was limited, abuses continued, and all benefits of the autonomous position of northern Transylvania came to an end.

The Role of Transylvania in Soviet Policy

As the armistice agreement declared the Vienna Awardof August 30, 1940, to be null and void, the Hungarian government looked for a solution of the Transylvanian problem along new lines. The revival of the ethnographic arguments, which were the basis of the Vienna Award was considered unwise and was rejected at the outset. Although a variety of projects were prepared for solution, I would have preferred a general rather than specific demand until we ascertained what support Hungary could get from the Great Powers. I was overruled, and the foreign minister decided to accept a plan worked out by Imre Jakabffy, a member of the Pál TelekiInstitute for Political Science. This plan envisaged the return of 22,000 square kilometers to Hungary with roughly 1,600,000 inhabitants. According to the 1950 Rumanian census, this territory was inhabited by 86S,620 Rumanians and 49S,106 Hungarians. In the 1941 census the proportion of Hungarians was higher, but this difference did not change the basic disproportion. Meanwhile, over a million Hungarians would have remained under Rumanian sovereignty. The idea was to balance the Hungarian and Rumanian minorities in Hungary and Rumania. It was assumed that these conditions would result in better treatment for minorities in both countries.

In early April the Soviet government invited leading members of the Hungarian government to Moscow, and this was considered a good occasion to raise the question of Transylvania. A meeting held under chairmanship of the president of the republic on the eve of the departure for Moscow endorsed the Jakabffy plan, but at the same time also decided that the delegation should have an alternative solution in reserve that included only the border districts with a clear Hungarian majority. After the meeting, I was ordered to prepare the

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alternative plan that night. Although presentation of two proposals to the Russians--without knowing their intentions--did not strike me as a good idea, I discussed the matter with Transylvanian experts in the TelekiInstitute and they worked out another plan proposing to return to Hungary 11 ,800 square kilometers and 967,000 people. According to the Rumanian figures of 1930 the Hungarians had a slight majority in this territory, 442,000 compared to 421,000 Rumanians. The delegation presented both proposals to the Russians.

The delegation returned from Moscow full of optimism, for it had been well received. Soviet hospitality knew no bounds and the Hungarian delegation had been lavishly entertained. Stalin seemed benevolent and made concessions in several areas. Gyöngyösithen explained to the leading officials of the Foreign Ministry how the discussion developed concerning Transylvania. According to him Stalin listened to the Hungarian arguments and requests, turned to Molotovand asked if there was a basis for territorial claims, and Molotovcorrectly replied that Article 19 of the Rumanian armistice agreement opened the way for Hungary's territorial aspirations regarding Transylvania. Next day Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir G. Dekanozov advised the Hungarian foreign minister that before raising territorial claims' direct negotiations should be attempted with the Rumanian government. Molotovlater repeated this advice. The atmosphere of the conversations seemed so friendly and Stalin's attitude so benevolent that the delegation took Soviet support for granted. Stalin's toast delivered at a dinner for the Hungarian delegation on April 16 inspired understanding and good will. The following excerpts are characteristic:

At present it seems that many medium and small countries are afraid of the Soviets. This fear is unjustified. Leninstated that all nations, large or small, have their particular value and importance from the point of view of humanity. This principle still rules in Soviet policy. More than half of the Soviet population is non-Russian, and consists of many nationalities. These nationalities enjoy complete autonomy and freedom.

The Soviets have always had sympathy for Hungary and always wanted to be on friendly terms with her. This was true even when the Hungarian regime was not democratic. [Stalin then spoke about the Hungarian flags of 1849 which had been returned to Hungary by the Soviets in 1941.] At that time declarations made by Hungarians induced the Soviets to believe that Hungary was a real friend. In their simplicity the Soviet leaders did not know that this was only a fake. A few months after the flags had been returned, Hungary declared war

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on Russia. The fight was long and bloody, Horthylater was prepared to make an Armistice, but he had no character and energy. Szálasi continued the fight. Under such circumstances the Red Army could do nothing else than to fight too.

The Russian people have a debt towards Hungary. The Armies of the Czar helped the Austrians in 1849 to defeat the revolutionary Hungarian army. However, the Soviet Union, who executed the last Czar, Nicholas 11, is not responsible for the sins of the Czarist regime.

[He is now glad to know that the leaders of the Hungarian nation are democrats and that they have come to Moscow. He emphasized the fact that the Soviet Union always wanted friendship with Hungary, regardless of the latter's government.]

[He then emptied his glass to the health of the friendly relations between Russia and Hungary.]45

Besides the friendly atmosphere there was another reason why Moscow's apparent good will toward Hungarian claims appeared credible. As mentioned' Voroshilovand Pushkin had encouraged Gyöngyösiand Tildythat Hungary should raise territorial claims against Rumania' another former German satellite. In reality, both before and after the Moscow visit of the Hungarian delegation, in the Council of Foreign Ministers Molotovhad resolutely opposed an American proposal looking to slight modification in the Hungarian-Rumanian boundary. Although nothing was promised to the Hungarians in the Transylvanian question, the Soviet suggestion for bilateral negotiations with the Rumanians seemed encouraging to the delegation as a f~rst step in the resolution of the boundary dispute. Not a hint was made about the real Soviet policy that opposed even the study of boundary revision between Hungary and Rumania in the CFM. The camouflage in Moscow was complete. By handing over all of Transylvania to the Groza government in March 1945, the Kremlin politicians played their trump card, consolidating that puppet regime and refusing to discuss boundary modification. To them the important consideration was control over Rumania. Article 19 of the Rumanian armistice agreement set forth that:

The Allied Governments regard the decision of the Vienna Awardregarding Transylvania as null and void and are agreed that Transylvania (or the greater part thereof) should be returned to Rumania subject to confirmation at the peace settlement, and the Soviet Government agrees that Soviet forces shall take part for this purpose in joint military operations with Rumania against Germany and Hungary.

The parenthetical phrase was used by the Russians as a club held over the Rumanians and as encouragement to the Hungarians in

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Budapest. The British and Americans proposed the expression, ''subject to the confirmation at the peace settlement," thinking this insertion would keep the whole question open for reconsideration at the peace conference. But the Soviets refused to discuss at inter-Allied meetings the meaning of the parenthetical phrase. And ''subject to confirmation at the peace settlement" meant to the Soviets automatic confirmation of what they had done.46

After the Moscow visit the Communist party in Hungary made a turnabout and began to support Hungarian territorial claims; one of the leading Hungarian Communist authorities in foreign affairs József Révai, delivered an irredentist speech on April 26, demanding that all territory along the Rumanian borders inhabited by Hungarians be returned to Hungary, together with such cities as Arad, Szatmárnémeti, Nagybánya, and Nagyvárad. He asserted that the Communists in the emigration between the two World Wars were true representatives of Hungary's national aspirations but that their efforts were annihilated by the suicidal pro-Nazi and anti-Soviet policy of the Horthyregime. A few weeks before this speech Revai had wanted every ''reactionary'' who dared ask for territory from Groza's Rumania to be brought before the People's Court. ''We cannot weaken Groza,s democracy," he had said at that time.

This reversal of Communist policy concerning Hungary's territorial claims gave a basis for optimistic speculation, but later it became evident that the motive behind the change in Communist tactics was hope of winning the support of Hungarian public opinion. The Communists apparently did not want to burden the Party by opposing national aspirations; they preferred to ride a popular bandwagon. The leaders of the Hungarian Communist party might have believed that after the Moscow visit the Soviet government would support some Hungarian territorial aspirations. According to my observations, Soviet authorities gave orders and instructions to the Muscovite Communists in Budapest but did not inform them of the real objectives and tactics of Soviet foreign policy.

On May 5, at Székesfehérvár, the prime minister, and at Szolnok the foreign minister, delivered addresses outlining in vigorous terms the peace aims of Hungary. Public opinion was optimistic for a short time although the first disappointment occurred a few days before the delivery of these addresses. In accord with Moscow's advice, a high official of the Foreign Ministry, Paul Sebestyén, went to Bucharest to initiate negotiations. Prime Minister Petru Groza and Foreign Minister Gheorghe Tatarescu gave him courteous reception but refused to discuss Hungarian territorial claims; Sebestyen immediately

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returned and on April 27 a note was dispatched to representatives of the major victorious powers in Budapest.47 This note was based on the above-described proposal prepared in the Pal TelekiInstitute, which had been presented in Moscow by the Hungarian delegation. The Hungarian government requested return of 22,000 square kilometers to Hungary, that is, 20 percent of the total area of 104,000 square kilometers transferred to Rumania by the Treaty of Trianon.

The optimism that followed the Moscow visit soon vanished, if only because of the negative response of Rumanian statesmen to Hungarian overtures. The shrewd Tatarescu would not have refused negotiations with Sebestyén had the Rumanian government lacked assurance of Soviet support. Groza and Tatarescu hinted as much to the Hungarian envoy. The coalition parties and the Hungarian people became disappointed when it appeared that members of the delegation to Moscow could not support with facts the optimism they had expressed in speeches. A last effort in the Transylvanian dispute was made at the Paris Conference.

Notes

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West