COUNT JANOS ESTERHAZY

We have given a brief review of the international developments between 1940 and 1945 to provide a perspective to the life and struggles of the Hungarians in Slovakia. Their conditions were gradually deteriorating. This was true not only of the economic conditions but particularly so because of the anti-Hungarian sentiments of the Slovaks, fanned from above.

Even though the anti-Hungarian sentiments became fully apparent only in 1945, their roots go back to the 1939 period. The majority of the Hungarian authors traces it to the Vienna Decision of 1938. According to one author, "In the fall of 1939, Hitler's resettlement of national minorities in order to 'purify' the ethnic composition of the various countries had raised great hopes in Pozsony.

In the spring of 1943, the Gardista, official organ of the Hlinka Garda already foretold of the coming deprivation of rights when it wrote: "We demand the expulsion of the Czechs, the deportation of the Jews, the roundup of the Gypsies and the stripping away of the Hungarians' rights." This demand was published on April 19, 1943.

In December 1943, Benes and Kiement Gottwald, secretary general of the Communist Party, reached an agreement establishing the principle of a Czechoslovak national state and its subsequent realization. Smutny, the secretary of Benes, reporting about a visit to Pozsony by Colonel Chapuisat, representative of the International Red Cross, quoted him as saying, "the Germans and Hungarians are hated here." *⁴⁷⁰

232-

Janos Esterhazy had to fight this anti-Hungarian discrimination all the time. Although he always emphasized in his speeches his sincere friendship and support for the newly independent Slovakia, he also raised the grievances against the Hungarians and demanded their rectification. Esterhazy sharply criticized Benes, who was in London at the time, for continuing to cling to his failed policies which had been based on the outcome of the treaty of Trianon.

In a major speech at the January 26, 1940, meeting of the United Hungarian Party, Esterhazy declared that those who want to create a new order in Europe after the end of the currently raging war will not be able to avoid the imperative of the conditions prevailing in the Carpathian Basin. "Only the small group of people with a shared interest, greatly blinded but of little moral value, who had gathered around Benes and Hodza, are unable to see and learn the lessons of the failure of the principles and methods imposed in Versailles and Trianon. It is clear to everyone else that one must refrain even from the slightest attempt to reorder Europe in that manner The Concept of St.Stephen recognizes only peoples or nations of equal rank -- ranked side-by-side and not above or below one another -- in the land of St.Stephen."

With regard to the so-called gentlemanly principle, Esterbazy explained that "the only valid and lasting principle is the one that would raise everyone, in the noblest sense of the word, to the ranks of gentlemen (middle class). An integral part of this is the securing of freedom and independence for ourselves, as well as granting it to others." *⁴⁷¹

On March 14, 1940, Janos Esterhazy marked the first anniversary of Slovak independence with an editorial in the Uj Hirek newspaper. "Independent Slovakia came into being one year ago," he wrote. "More has been gained than the late, great leader of the Slovak nation, Father Hlinka would have dared to dream. The Slovak people have accomplished more than they ever hoped in their long struggle to free themselves from the Czech yoke.

"We Hungarians can truly appreciate what it means for a people, a nation, to attain its freedom. We only wish the celebrants would understand that now, as they are receiving every blessing from their rich cornucopia, they should not disparage our comradely sentiments developed over the years toward all our struggling and suffering fellow men." *⁴⁷²

Speaking in the Slovak parliament on May 7, 1940, Esterhazy declared: "Openly and bravely I acknowledge that we Hungarians

233

and Slovaks must look for what brings us together and not what separates us from each other. I stand here, before the Slovak parliament with clean conscience because ever since the beginning of my political career I have proclaimed and served the cause of friendship with the Slovaks."

Among the grievances, Esterhazy brought up the sudden dismissal of two Hungarian teachers after 28 and 33 years of service, without any disciplinary action. He demanded immediate investigation of this matter. *⁴⁷³

Speaking at the June 21, 1940 meeting of the United Hungarian Party, Janos Esterhazy noted that "the 'peacemakers" at Trianon wanted to condemn Hungary and the Hungarian nation to death. It is thanks to the Hungarians' unwavering will to live that the death sentence could not be carried out".

"We want to believe," Esterhazy continued, "that the peace that will come will be true peace, sprung from from Christian brotherly love. The Hungarians in Slovakia had to live through many trials and tribulations during the last year-and-a-half. I beseech my Hungarian brethren who have been seasoned by all the suffering but their patience is understandably becoming short, I implore them not to falter for one minute." *⁴⁷⁴

On August 30, Esterhazy met Minister of Interior Mach. On September 5, he announced the reform of Hungarian political party activities. The same day, the leadership of the United Hungarian Party gave Esterhazy a unanimous vote of confidence. On September 13, he addressed the organizing meeting of the Slovak Journalists Federation. On October 10, he spoke in the parliamentary debate on the census. *⁴⁷⁵

On November 27, 1940, Esterhazy delivered an important speech in the Slovak parliament's debate of the new national security bill. Re reiterated that "now that their party is about to be registered, the Hungarians of Slovakia will continue to meet their obligations toward the state and its representatives. The Hungarians of Slovakia have always had a positive attitude toward the independent Slovak state and I am convinced," Esterhazy continued, "that with proper understanding. this constructive positivism can be developed to the fullest extent. A just nationalities policy provides greater security than any Maginot Line because nothing will strengthen a state more than the sense of feeling at home, by its citizens, whether they belong to the majority or minority." *⁴⁷⁶

234

On December 21, Esterhazy spoke in (he parliament's budget debate and asked for rectification of the Hungarians' grievances. *⁴⁷⁷

In his New Years Day article of January 1, 1941, Esterhazy declared that life is not easy for the Hungarians in Slovakia. "Still," he said, "on this day I wish to lay the veil of forgetting on everything that may provoke not only our just criticism but also our dissatisfaction because we have never deserved the harsh treatment we have received." And he quoted the wise aphorism of Ferenc Deak: "We must risk everything for the nation but we must not risk the nation for anything." *⁴⁷⁸

At the February 28 meeting of the United Hungarian Party, Janos Esterhazy emphasized: "We want peaceful accord with the Slovaks. We are guided by a single thought, one that does not know hatred, unequal treatment here in the Danubian Basin, among the sons of nations predestined to a common fate." *⁴⁷⁹

On the second anniversary of Slovakia's independence, Esterhazy wrote an editorial in the Uj Hirek newspaper. He raised the question, why did Czechoslovakia disintegrate after two decades? "The answer comes automatically," he wrote. "Because Czechoslovakia could never live up to its alleged 'historic destiny,' granted by the authors of the Paris peace treaties. Also, because Czechoslovakia had been forced on the stage of European history as an instrument of an imperial grouping whose political program consisted solely of vengeance, promotion of its own selfish interests, and the destruction and enslavement of the small nations. The larger half of the 14 million inhabitants of Czechoslovakia consisted of national minorities: Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Ruthenians and Poles. Yet, the Czech minority insisted on ruling over the non-Czech majority in such a drastic manner that it could not have any other fate than the one it had, along with the man who had personified it."

On the same occasion, the Uj Hirek greeted Esterhazy on his 40th birthday and paid tribute to his outstanding activities. The article mentioned that at an early age, in May 1931, at a meeting in the Szent-Ivany mansion, he had offered a 15,000 Crown prize for a popular work about the history of the Hungarian nation. *⁴⁸⁰

On May 24, Esterhazy offered editorial greetings to Slovenska Jednota, the paper of the Slovaks in Hungary, which on that day became a daily newspaper in service of the cause and interests of the Slovak people in Hungary. *⁴⁸¹

On August 28, Esterhazy eulogized Istvan Floch, Editor of the Uj Hirek, at his funeral service in Porsony's St.Andrew cemetery. *⁴⁸²

235

On August 14, 1941, Janos Esterhazy delivered two lectures at the Summer University of Debrecen about the impact of minority life on the Hungarians and the life of the approximately 100,000 Hungarians in Slovakia.

Among the 63 members of the Slovak House of Deputies, Janos Esterhazy is the sole representative of the interests of the Hungarian minority. In addition, there are 150,000 Germans and 60,000 Ruthenians. The bulk of the Hungarians live in three significant linguistic islands, in Porsony and vicinity, around Nyitra and near Nagymihaly. *⁴⁸³

On September 2, 1941, Esterhazy spoke at the opening of the Madach Book House in Pozsony. *⁴⁸⁴

236

In June 1942, the Hungarian Parliament of Slovakia, the first gathering of the leaders of the Hungarian intelligentsia, met at the invitation of Janos Esterhazy. In his opening remarks, Esterhazy noted that "a nation remains a nation only as long as it is guided, led and nourished by its own soul. And let us continue right away," said, "It is being nourished by a unique nourishment, its Hungarian consciousness. As long as this soul is free to develop, it may lead and guide. As long as this soul can consciously enlist the forces of the nation into its service, the nation will survive. The soul of a nation does not grow from one day to another. The soul of the nation is being cultivated through centuries and millennia, shaped like granite by the erosive forces of wind and rain.

"A nation can be killed only if they kill its soul. We must always watch the intellectual currents of Hungary because that is the trunk of the tree from which our branch has grown." He quoted Istvan Gyorffy who had said: "It is the popular tradition that keeps us Hungarian and it is the international culture that makes us European. But if all we want is to be European, no matter how large a nation we may be, we would soon cease being Hungarian. We would merge into the great Western nation whose cultural influence is the easiest to absorb. And if we were to withdraw completely from under the influence of Western culture, our cultured and stronger neighbors would trample us under their feet and, again, we would diseappear.". *⁴⁸⁵

Also in the summer of 1942, Hungarian writers in Slovakia participated in the annual Budapest Book Fair. Elek Kornyei wrote this report about the Budapest visit of the leaders of Hungarian intellectual life in Slovakia:

"Our House of Books, with its shingle roof and porch decorated with Slovakian Hungarian folk motives, has a ceiling reminiscent of an open book. It carries a message from the past in the words of Berzsenyi, 'It is not the multitude but the soul that brings miracles.'

237

On the other side, a message of the present by our leader, Janos Esterhazy, about our fate in Slovakia, to the Hungarian nation: 'A Hungarian word in our land rings a festive tone in our souls."'

On behalf of the writers, Anna Pozsonyi thanked Esterhazy for his services in the development of the Hungarian literary life in Slovakia: "Thank you for making it possible for us this year to introduce ourselves in Budapest under circumstances that became possible only through your generosity, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for helping call attention to the fact that in our land, too, the Hungarian words can be heard, the Hungarian rhymes resound and the flame of enthusiasm for Hungarian literature is burning in the hearts." *⁴⁸⁶

The tenth anniversary of Janos Esterhazy's entry into politics was celebrated by the Hungarians of Slovakia on December 12, 1942, in Otatrafured. The festivities began with Mass, attended by Janos Esterhazy, his sister, young daughter and son, along with several leaders of the United Hungarian Party.

The Mass was followed by greetings by well-wishers in the great hall of the Grand Hotel. Telegrams from Hungarian Prime Minister Miklos Kallay, lstvan Bethlen and other Hungarian dignitaries were read.

The most moving tribute came from the representative of the Family Division of Hungarian Party: "May you, Mr. Chairman, remain the hope and support of every Hungarian poor! May all your good deeds, healing touch, return manyfold on your dear family! May the caressing warmth of every Hungarian mother reach the one who first taught you, Mr. Chairman in resounding Hungarian to help our neighbors, the one who poured from her own noble soul into your heart the sensitivity for everything that is good, noble and beautiful."

Janos Esterhazy was deeply moved as he thanked for the warm greetings. *⁴⁸⁷

Earlier, the Slovak parliament was debating a bill calling for deportation of the Jews. Ivan Komanec reported about it as follows:

"The Slovak national assembly voted by acclamation, by raising of hands. The only deputy among the members present, of whom it was obvious that he did not raise his hand, was Janos Esterhazy the representative of the United Hungarian Party. He drew immediate attacks from the Grenzbote and the Gardista newspapers." *⁴⁸⁸

The Grenzbote article expressing its disapproval of Esterhazy's No vote was entitled 'Der Herr Graf stimmte nicht mit." *⁴⁸⁹

A report by the Slovak Communist Party, delivered to Moscow by Karol Smidke contained this characteristic description of the attitude

238

of the Hungarians in Slovakia: "One can say that in contrast with the Germans, the Hungarians have behaved very decently in Slovakia, the majority of them are democrats, many are leftist-oriented." *⁴⁹⁰

The Gestapo wanted to arrest Janos Esterhazy because of his anti-Fascist behavior, but the German government was reluctant to take the risk that would have entailed because Esterhazy was popular in Hungary and his arrest might have led to anti-German demonstrations. His arrest was ordered only in the fall of 1944, after the extreme right wing came to power in Hungary. *⁴⁹¹

On September 2, 1943, Esterhazy delivered a major speech in a meeting of the United Hungarian Party's central leadership. "Four years ago yesterday," he began, "war broke out between Germany and Poland. Soon, the whole world was engulfed in flames. We live in a time when mankind invests all its knowledge into the development of techniques for the more perfect destruction of man."

Esterhazy then spoke of the Hungarian grievances and stressed thai he would do everything to have them rectified. He added, however: "I will take no step which might endanger even for one moment the domestic peace, domestic order or the possibility of an honest rapprochement among nations. We regard to the Slovaks with the greatest goodwill and the most sincere sentiments. After the war, as peaceful reconstruction gets underway, those of us who have lived and will continue living here in the Danubian basin will depend on one another." *⁴⁹²

On January 19, 1944, Esterhazy delivered a lecture at the Hungarian Academy of Science on "The Fate of the Minorities among the Nationalities." He emphasized the Hungarians in Slovakia will always remain true Hungarians. *⁴⁹³

Esterhazy summed up the tasks of the new year in these words: "Mutual understanding, unity and absolute discipline across the board." *⁴⁹⁴

On January 29, 1944, Janos Esterhazy was invited by three large Hungarian organizations to address a joint session in Budapest. His topic was "National Life in Minority Status. *⁴⁹⁵

On March 25, 1944, Esterhazy eulogized Laszlo Aixinger, the long-time executive director of the United Hungarian Party. He spoke before a crowd of several thousand mourners in St.Andrew Cemetery in Pozsony.

These were his closing words: "On behalf of all the Hungarians in Slovakia, and at the same time in the name of the entire decent Hungarian nation, I express the deepest gratitude to Laszlo Aixinger

239

for his loyalty, for his unselfish work and his perseverance. With these words, I say Goodbye to you Lad, my dear colleague." *⁴⁹⁶

240

Letters reaching Benes's circle in London in March 1944 from Slovakia told of demands to remove the Hungarians. "Remove the minorities! We reject feelers to the Sudeten Germans living in England. There is no difference between them. They have betrayed us. It is true of the Hungarians also." The publication reproducing this letter contained several letters written in the same vein . *⁴⁹⁷

On August 4, 1944, Karol Smidke and M. Ferjencik traveled to Moscow and, on September 5, submitted the decisions reached by the Czechoslovak emigrants in Moscow and the Communist leadership to the Slovak National Council. The decisions called for a solution to the Hungarian problem by recommending expulsion of the Hungarians. That has been revealed by the minutes of the Moscow talks, as published in 1964: "In order to open the way, as agreed upon, for the Red Army when it enters Slovakia, a general national uprising must be arranged, the traitors' government in Pozsony must be driven out, a provisional governmental authority must be given to the Slovak National Council, and with the help of the Red Army, the Germans and Hungarians must be driven out of Slovakia's occupied territories." *⁴⁹⁸ It should be noted here that we have given a detailed account of the "National Uprising" in Part One.

With regard to the Hungarians, it is worth mentioning a memorandum that Slovak Minister of War Catlos sent to Moscow. He wrote: "As soon as the Soviet forces establish a foothold in the Krakow area, the moment will arrive for a successful surprise attack on Hungary, as well as the opportunity to conduct additional military action against the Germans. The Slovak military forces would prepare and facilitate the prompt and smooth movement of Soviet forces across Slovak territory and would join in an attack on Hungary. *⁴⁹⁹

The Czechoslovak government in London, headed by Benes, sent a message on September 8 to General Viest in Slovakia: "In the

241

event of Hungary's collapse or capitulation, the Slovak territories lost to Hungary must be occupied." *⁵⁰⁰

On September 5.1944, the Slovak National Council met to hear a report by Smidke and Ferjencik about their talks in Moscow. From then on, Slovakia's policies began to foreshadow the so-called Kassa Program, promulgated in April 1945, which deprived the Hungarians of their rights. The idea that the deprivation of rights was a consequence of the extreme right wing policies that prevailed at the end of 1944 in Hungary. has been sharply rejected by Hungarian historians because by the time of the pro-German coup d'etat in Hungary, in October 1944, Benes and the Slovak National Council have long agreed on the plan of deporting the Hungarians and confiscating their possessions. "The decree to confiscate German and Hungarian enemy property was prepared by the Slovak National Council at the time of the Slovak National Uprising.*⁵⁰¹

In October, 1944, the persecution of Hungarian peasants also began. "All the land of the Germans, Hungarians and all their traitor collaborators must be confiscated at once, without any compensation and given free of charge to Slovak farmers." *⁵⁰²

Thus the formerly anti-Semitic wave was suddenly replaced by an anti-Hungarian orientation. According to the Hungarian view, the emigrants who were directing the resistance in Slovakia were responsible for the fanning of the anti-Hungarian sentiments. "By the time of the visit by the delegation of the Slovak National Council to London, in November 1944, there was already a consensus both in London and Moscow that transfer of the Hungarian population must be taken into consideration. *⁵⁰³ By the time the war ended, the principie of a national state and the demand for the expulsion of the Hungarians became the established policy.

242

Janos Esterhazy learned in mid-October 1944, following the pro-German coup in Hungary that the Gestapo wanted to arrest him. He went into hiding for a while. Wearing a disguise, he visited his family. They almost did not recognize him, sporting a long beard and his furcoat turned inside out.

December 1944, after the advance of the Soviet army forced the Gestapo to flee Slovakia, Esterhazy came out of hiding and returned to his office in Pozsony to await the arrival of the Soviet forces. His friends begged him to flee and surrender to the Western Allies. But he decided to stay with his Hungarian brethren whose interests he has represented from his early youth on.

It was agreed that the Esterhazy family would remain in Nyitraujlak because the air raids made travel on the roads very dangerous. On March 29, his house took a hit from the Soviet artillery. On March 31, the Soviet forces arrived. The Esterhazy home was taken over by plundering Soviet soldiers who did not leave the region until the end of April.

The Soviet forces reached Pozsony in April 1945. A few days after the German surrender on May 8, 1945, word came from Pozsony that the Soviet army kept Janos Esterhazy in custody for one or two weeks before he was released. He prepared one more memorandum on behaff of the persecuted Hungarian minority, defending it against accusations of fascism.

Esterhazy asked Gustav Husak the new Czechoslovak Cornmissar of Internal Affairs, for an appointment to deliver the memorandum. Husak did receive Esterhazy and accepted the memorandum, but then he had Esterhazy immediately arrested and jailed. The new Czechoslovak state accused him, along with the entire Hungarian minority in Slovakia, of being fascist and revisionist.

Esterhazy was held in the Spitalska street police jail. His sister Louise was denied permission to visit him. All property of the

243

Hungarian institutions in Pozsony was confiscated, including all the contents of the United Hungarian Party's offices. These measures were carried out by the new political police, in accord with the provisions of the Kassa Program.

The situation became so tense that Esterhazy's wife and two children had to leave Nyitraujlak and move to Budapest. Meanwhile, Janos Esterhazy was kept in jail while waiting for his trial. On June 22, his sister Louise managed with great difficulty to visit her older brother in the jail.

Esterhazy was aware that he may face a death sentence but was prepared to defend himself against the unfounded accusations. Another meeting between Esterhazy and his sister was scheduled for July 6 but events took a dramatic turn. On June 25, 1945, officers of the Soviet NKVD came to the jail, demanding that Esterhazy be handed over. The Czechoslovak police complied. Janos Esterhazy and Mihaly Csaky, vice chairman of the United Hungarian Party, were taken to a secret NKVD headquarters. One month later, the two men, along with several other leaders of the United Hungarian Party, were taken by the NKVD to the Soviet Union.

Louise Esterhazy was locked up in detention camp at Petronka. Later, she was taken with 2,000 other Hungarians, all labeled as dangerous Fascists, to Prtrelzka.

Meanwhile, there were contradictory reports about Janos Esterhazy's whereabouts. Some said, he was detained in Transylvania, according to other reports, he had been taken to Moscow.

Louise Esterhazy learned one day that she has been invited by the Secours Carholique to Paris to work as a translator-interpreter in Central European languages and that a passport and visa had been sent to facilitate her passage. She arrived in Paris on June 7, 1946 and learned that the report on Janos Esterhazy being in Transylvania was in error, due to a mixup of names, and her brother and his colleagues had been taken to Moscow.

During the Paris peace conference, Louise Esterhazy worked indefatigably, lobbying the various governmental delegations against the planned expulsion of the Hungarian minority. When speaking with the Canadian and Indian delegates, for example, she pointed out her brother's anti-Fascist behavior. She had a difficult task because Benes was trying to persuade them that the Hungarians were fascists. Ultimately, on September 30, 1946, the peace conference rejected the Ciehoslovak proposal to deport the Hungarians.

244

In February 1947, Louise Esterhazy met in Paris V.Clementis the Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister and asked him where her brother was being kept. Clementis replied, "Somewhere in the Soviet Union. We don't know where because we have not been told." *⁵⁰⁴

Janos Esterhazy, emaciated by hunger and torture, was taken in 1946 to a concentration camp in the northern Soviet Union.

245

We have noted in Part One that with the help of the Soviet Union, Benes had returned from London to Czechoslovakia. On April 5, 1945, the infamous Kassa Program was proclaimed. It became the legal basis for the cruel deprivation of the Hungarians' rights between 1945 and 1948.

The Kassa (Kosice) Program provided for the systematic and violent transformation of Czechoslovakia from a state of nationalities into a national state, with all of its consequences. It would require many volumes just to sum up those measures of the program which have stricken the Hungarians with unparalleled cruelty. We wish to present here in a nutshell only the highlights of the Kassa Program. Several publications have dealt with it in great detail, among them Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, by Francis S. Wagner, et al., which was the first comprehensive treatise of the Kassa Program, as well as Kalman Janics' frequently cited book.

The Kassa Program and the numerous decrees it had spawned, declared every Hungarian an enemy of the state and took away their Czechoslovak citizenship. The number of the impacted Hungarians was estimated at 800,000.

Hungarian public employees were dismissed at once. They were denied any compensation, including their vested pension rights. Private employees of Hungarian nationality were fired in a similar manner. The Hungarian language schools were closed down. The Hungarian cultural and social organizations, even sports clubs, were disbanded. Their property was confiscated and turned over to the state. Between 1945 and 1949, at least 40,000 Hungarians were condemned as war criminals and deported. All Hungarian-owned real estate was seized. Hungarian news publications were banned. The use of the Hungarian language was forbidden.

246

The other great problem was the issue of the deportation of the Hungarian minority. A Czechoslovak memorandum submitted to the Pottsdam Conference about the question of "transfer" was accepted only in part because only the deportation of the Sudeten Germans was approved, but not of the Hungarians. Therefore, a Hungarian-Slovak population exchange was negotiated with the Hungarian government and the resulting agreement was signed on February 27, 1946.

Under the terms of the agreement, the number of Hungarians in Slovakia designated to be transferred to Hungary would match the number of Siovaks in Hungary who would volunteer to move to Czechoslovakia. As a result, 73,373 Slovaks transferred, while the number of Hungarians was 68,407. Six-thousand Hungarians left voluntarily.

Another cruel and inhumane technique employed was the so-called "re-Slovakization." Many Hungarians were forced to declare themselves Slovak so that they may be permitted to secure their livelihood. This process had substantially reduced the number of the Hungarians. By 1950, only 367,733 were left.

The most drastic move was still to come. The Czechoslovak government had to find a way to get rid of an additional 200,000 Hungarians. It turned to the Paris peace conference of 1946 for approval. The roots of this move go back to the Pottsdam Conference where the United States proposed the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers, composed of the foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The Council of Foreign Ministers was charged with preparing the peace treaties and making recommendations for the settlement of the remaining territorial questions. Decisions by the Council were final.

247

The Peace Preparatory Division of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, under Istvan Kertesz, called on several institutions and experts to help prepare a memorandum. Its premise was that in contrast to the Paris peace treaties of 1918-1919, the new peace treaties should serve as the basis for a general rearrangement of Europe, rather than as punishment for the vanquished.

On July 4, 1945, the Hungarian provisional government delivered a memorandum to G.M.Puskin, the representative of the Soviet Union. The memorandum called attention to the atrocities by which the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia were being deprived of their rights. It also suggested that the territorial arrangements be based on the principles of ethnicity. The memorandum was not answered.

In August 1945, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry turned to the Budapest representatives of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. It was stated that Hungary is rejecting the idea of a population exchange, it would be acceptable only if linked with territonal compensations. The representatives of the Western powers did not respond to the Hungarian note, the Soviet representative refused to accept it.

In January 1946, Hungary sent a new note to the Allied Powers, followed by another and yet another. Soon thereafter, the Foreign Ministry prepared a draft document which included the territorial questions, especially that of Transylvania. The draft drew sharp attacks from the leftwing parties because of its "revisionist" tone, and it has never been delivered.

The inability of the Hungarian political parties to bring their views into harmony led to all kinds of difficulties. They agreed only in March 1946 to send a delegation to Moscow. With regard to Transylvania, they agreed to request the return of territories along the border with a purely Hungarian population.

248

The delegation, led by Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy, arrived in Moscow in April 1946. In the question of territories they were unable to accomplish anything.

In anticipation of the June meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Hungarian political parties agreed to request the securmg of equal rights for the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia and the partial return of Transylvania. The Hungarian requests were rejected both in the June meeting and also at the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September 1945. The Soviet Union recommended that the Vienna Decisions be set aside and Transyviania in its entirety be given to Rumania. This Soviet position has never changed.

The United States position regarding the Vienna Decisions was identical with that of the Soviet Union. Only with reference to the territorial claims in Transylvania did the American position change repeatedly, always with less and less inclination to accept the Hungarian claims. The British were largely behind the American position but later they lined up with the Soviet Union.

At the May 7, 1946 meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, after much deliberation and many changes, the United States government accepted the Soviet position and withdrew its support for the possible revision of the borders of Transylvania. The Hungarian government was shocked by this decision but the Hungarian delegation in Washington and London was unable to do anything about it.

The Hungarian delegation to the Peace Conference, led by Foreign Minister Janos Gyongyosi, arrived in Paris in August 1946. As a consequence of the previous diplomatic negotiations, the delegation had no choice but to sharply reduce its claims. Essentially, the Hungarian goals were confined to securing citizenship rights to Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries, to halting the further deportation of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia, an easing of the reparation burdens, and minor adjustments along the Hungarian-Rumanian border.

At the joint session of the Hungarian-Rumanian Territorial and Political Committee on August 31, 1946, Paul Auer presented the Hungarian position. He asked for the return of 4,000 square kilometers, involving about 500,000 people, 67% of them Hungarian, and towns along the border. He also recommended that the Szekely *⁵⁰⁵ land be granted autonomy, guaranteed by the United Nations. On September 5, with 10 Yes votes and 2 abstentions, the Committee accepted the May 7 decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

249

Clementis of Czechoslovakia proposed on September 10 that in order to widen the Pozsony bridgehead. five Hungarian villages across the Danube be transferred to Czechoslovakia. This move was supported by the Soviet Union, the Ukraine and Yugoslavia, but not by the United States and Britain. A compromise was reached, with the resulting transfer of Horvatjarfalu, Oroszvar and Dunacsuny to Czechoslovakia.

These decisions were approved by the November 1946 meetmg of the Council of Foreign Ministers in New York, and were signed on February 10, 1947, in Paris. It has been demonstrated that once again. the guiding principle was not to create conditions which might lead to the development of a more favorable atmosphere for peaceful coexistence in the Danubian Basin. Once again, the principle of victor versus vanquished prevailed. Let the reader decide what the consequences were. *⁵⁰⁶

Chiefly because of opposition by the United States and Britain, the Paris Peace Conference did not consent to the deportation of 200,000 Hungarians, as planned by Czechoslovakia, yet it failed to resolve the question because the eventual peace treaty just left the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia to their fate.

The peace treaty did not contain any provision banning the forced dispersal of the Hungarians. Such an action was commenced as early as August 1946, at a joint meeting in Pozsony of central and Slovak national organizations. *⁵⁰⁷ The deportations, lasting for 99 days, were carried out according to precise plans: "One or two villages were surrounded by military units. There were lists of families to he deported and they were ordered to start packing. The deportees were told that they have to leave their homes; their real estate, animals and agricultural implements were confiscated. There was no legal recourse against the deportation decision, the members of the family had to go, regardless of age or sex. The designated families were moved by military trucks to the nearest railroad station and put on trains to travel under heavy guard to Bohemia. The action lasted 99 days. ending on February 25,1947. It was not halted even in the bitterest cold and the severe winter made everything much more difficult. *⁵⁰⁸

Several Hungarian writers in Slovakia, including Gyula Duba, Laszlo Dobos, Viktor Egri, as well as others, recorded many cruel details of the deportations. The Hungarian press also reported extensively about the issue and soon the deportations came into the focus of international attention.

250

After more than two years in Soviet prison, on September 17, 1947, Janos Esterhazy was sentenced to death by hanging, in absentia, by the Slovak National Court of Pozsony. Here is a contemporary account of the trial: "Acting under authority of the Czechoslovak law establishing the peoples courts, the Slovak National Court of Pozsony sentenced him, in his absence, to death by hanging. The trial was presided over by judge Karol Bedma and the lay judges included Andrej Bagar, member of the Slovak National Theater and Dr. Cerno, a ministerial counselor.

"Esterhazy was charged with undermining the Czechoslovak Republic and services to Fascism. Dr. Cikvanova the court appointed defense attorney, a Czech women lawyer from Pozsony, announced at the beginning of the trial that she had received the charges only five days earlier and did not have enough time to prepare for the trial. She asked for a postponement. The court rejected the request.

"Next, the defense requested that witnesses be called because the court had not summoned a single witness. Specifically, the Czech defense lawyer wanted to have testimony from witnesses who could prove Esterhazy's anti-fascist behavior throughout the entire war and even before the war, when he rescued any number of Czechoslovak patriots from the Gestapo and helped them to go through Budapest to Belgrade and then to London. One person Esterhazy had helped to go to London was General Viest, the well-known Minister of War of the Czechoslovak government in exile, who became the military leader of the Slovak uprising in 1944. The court rejected this request, too.

"The judge gave a quick and superficial overview of the evidence against Esterhazy, such as the journals of the Slovak parliament which contained his speeches. It was characteristic of the court's attitude that for lack of any serious evidence, the judge brought up the fact, instead of saying Bratislava, Esterhazy had been using the city's Hungarian name, Pozsony.

251

"Another charge was that in August 1943, in Poprad, Esterhazy had called Tiso's Slovak republic a swindle and said the entire state had been built on a confidence game. Thus, even the most daring, almost foolhardy criticism of Fascism was presented by the judge as evidence against the accused.

"The defense attorney said in her summation that the court has failed to prove a single charge because Janos Esterhazy did not undermine the republic. There is incontrovertible proof of that in the fact that Esterhazy was not present at the time of the Zsolna decision, on October 6, 1938, declaring Slovakia's autonomy. nor was he present on March 14, 1939, in Pozsony, when the national assembly seceded from Czechoslovakia and declared Slovakia's independence.

"This contrasts with the statement Esterhazy gave during the 1938 Czechoslovak crisis to the Slovak, the organ of the Hlinka Party, clearly and decisively declaring that he was working for the securing of the minority rights of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia within the framework of the Czechoslovak republic.

"The defense attorney also pointed out that Esterhazy's statements in the parliament during the war were no proof at all of a fascist behavior because he spoke during the budget debate and his speeches did not hide any fascist ideology. On the contrary, everything he said was a declaration of democratic principles and Christian humanity. He demonstrated this the most eloquently when alone in the Slovak parliament he voted against the anti-Jewish laws, provoking sharp attacks from the Volkischer Beobachter, the Grenzbote of Pozsony and other newspapers.

"The defense attorney further noted that Esterhazy had been selflessly helping Crechoslovak patriots on their way to London through Budapest and Belgrade. She pointed out that there was no real collaboration between Esterhazy and Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten German Party, nor between Esterhazy and Jozef Tito. The United Hungarian Party under Esterhazy's leadership was nothing but an organization for the defense of the interests of Hungarians in Slovakia.

"In view of the foregoing, the defense attorney asked the court to take into account mitigating circumstances and judge Esterhazy by the same standards that have been employed with regard to all other members of the Slovak parliament. With a few exceptions, they have been all acquitted.

"Following the defense summation, the court retired. It came back 15 minutes later and announced the death sentence, based on

252

Title Three. The entire trial lasted three hours. After the death sentence was announced on September 17, 1947, an old leader of the Slovak communists, a man of high moral standards, declared: "This is sheer murder."' (The rest of the report has been censored.) *⁵⁰⁹

This so-called trial and death sentence enraged not only the Hungarians living in Czechoslovakia but also numerous Czech and Slovak patriots. Professor Charles Koch, a leading opposition figure from the Nazi period, called the sentence a judicial murder. *⁵¹⁰

Janos Esterhazy's sister, Louise learned of the death sentence by reading about it in The New York Herald-Tribune. On September 17 she sent a telegram to President Benes, protesting her brother's trial and condemnation in his absence. She asked the president to have her brother brought back to Czechoslovakia so that he may be tried again in a free, democratically conducted trial. She asked that the power which had taken her brother from Slovakia exercise the same generosity it had extended to other important Slovak personalities, such Catlos, Spisiak or Sokol, who had been allowed to go home.

Benes promised Louise Esterhazy that Janos Esterhazy would be given an opportunity freely to defend himself in a new trial against the charges against him. Louise Esterhazy received Benes's response in November 1947 through the Czechoslovak embassy and she thanked the president through embassy Counselor M.Klvana.

In January 1948, Louise Esterhazy was invited to the Czechoslovak embassy where the Counselor informed her that President Benes and his wife had received her letter of thanks. However, in February 1948, she was told that Benes, claiming poor health, tendered his resignation. A paralysis was preventing him from performing his duties, so there was nothing more he could do in the matter of Janos Esterhazy. On September 4, 1948, Benes died.

Janos Esterhazy's younger sister, Mariska, had remained in Nyitraujlak with her husband Ferenc who was of Polish origin, and their children. On May 10, 1949, she sent a telegram, then a letter, to her sister Louise, telling her that Janos Esterhazy has been brought back to Pozsony and is being kept in the courthouse lockup. Ferenc, his Polish brother-in-law, was permitted to visit him. A well-intentioned court official informed him that the death sentence was still in force and could be carried out within 48 hours. Only an amnesty would help, he said.

Janos Esterhazy's first question was about his family. Ferenc told him that his son, Janos was in Switzerland, his daughter Alice was

253

in Budapest with her mother. His mother and his sister Louise were doing well in Montreser, France. Mariska, Ferenc and their children in Nyitraujlak were also all-right.

Janos Esterhazy was visibly relieved by the news. Since he had been taken away, this was his first contact with his family. He was obviously weak and had to sit down in his cell. He said he has just learned that he had been sentenced to death in his absence. Ferene assured him that they will immediately submit a petition for clemency to the president.

Esterhazy told his brother-in-law that he had contracted tuberculosis in the Soviet Union and he would have died before long if he had stayed in the concentration camp. Ferenc comforted him, saying he was sure amnesty would be granted. The two men were both laughing and crying as they parted.

That same afternoon, Mariska came by taxi to Pozsony so that as Janos Esterhazy's younger sister she could too sign the petition for amnesty. In the evening, she traveled to Prague to see two friends, one of whom was of Jewish origin. Next day, he delivered the petition to the president.

Another friend of Mariska was received by Srobar, a Slovak who had participated in the resistance. He remembered Janos Esterhazy's anti-Hitler behavior. He took a copy of the petition and brought it to the council of ministers which happened to be in session. Srobar declared, it would be an assassination to execute Esterhazy. He recalled that in 1941 Esterhazy had voted against the deportation of the Jews and rescued many people by securing asylum for them.

The family was waiting in a hotel where Srobar called and told them that at the order of President Clement Gottwald, the execution would not be carried out and a decision will be made later about what to do with Esterhazy. That saved his life. Soon, he was transferred to the Red Cross Hospital and placed under medical supervision. Mariska went to Pozsony at once to visit her brother. On June 21, 1949, Louise received her first long letter and out of it learned what has happened to her brother since June 22, 1945.

The day after, on June 23, 1945, the NKVD took him and Mihaly Csaky from the Czechoslovak jail to its secret jail in Kempelen Street. He was repeatedly beaten while there and was afraid that members of his family might also be mistreated. Toward the end of 1945, he learned that he was to be taken to Hungary. Two days later, he was put on a train bound for Budapest, along with Mihaly Csaky, Tibor Neumann, Janos Jabloniciky, Lajos Parkanyi and other leaders

254

of the United Hungarian Party. From Hungary, after a long, tiring journey, they arrived in Moscow where they were taken to the Lubyanka Prison. There, Esterhazy was locked into a solitary cell, tortured and interrogated day and night. After a while, he was taken to a camp where, in 1947 he became extremely ill in the severe cold. The camp hospital diagnosed his illness as tuberculosis.

In 1948, orders came from Moscow that Janos Esterhazy be given good nourishment and built up because he would go on a lengthy journey. By 1949 he recuperated sufficiently to be declared ready to travel. On February 12, 1949, he was put on a train but it was only in April that he arrived at the Czechoslovak border where he was taken into police custody and brought to Kassa, then to a hospital in Pozsony. His condition gradually improved in the hospital.

In June 1949, his sister Louise and their mother sent a petition for amnesty to the president and to Foreign Minister Clementis. At the end of July, Mariska wrote to Louise that their brother has been returned to the prison hospital for treatment. Mariska sent her brother a small parcel every day to supplement the hospital food. Meanwhile, word came that the president had rejected the petition for full amnesty but commuted the sentence to life in prison.

In November 1949, Janos Esterhazy was transferred to Leopoldov prison where he was kept until March 5, 1950. On March 6, he was taken to Mirov prison in Moravia, then on August 23, to Ilava prison in Slovakia. On March 4, 1954, Esterhazy was transferred again, this time to the Rocov u Louny prison in the Czech region. On April 11, 1955, he was taken to Bory (Trestnica na Borech) near Plzno, on June 2 to Leopoldov, on May 4, 1956, to Mirov in Moravia. Despite the frequent transfers, miraculously the parcels had reached him and so did the letters once every three months. Later on, the letters became more scarce. Occasionally, Mariska was able to talk with his brother across an iron grill.

In July 1951, Louise Esterhazy was named Secretary of the Hungarian Refugee Committe which had been founded by Father Imre Gaeser.

In the summer of 1951, Alice and Louise's mother were deported, alongh with countless other Hungarians, from Budapest to the Great Hungarian Plain where they were to suffer a great deal from hunger and cold. In 1952, Alice was arrested by the AVO secret police. For a while she was imprisoned in Budapest, later she was taken to a concentration camp in Melykut.

255

Meanwhile Mariska kept besieging the authorities to have her brother transferred to a general hospital. Her husband, Ferenc, went to South Africa in order to earn money and support his family. Whatever had been left of the family home in Nyitraujiak was taken away from Mariska and she moved into a tiny apartment in the village.

In 1954, Janos Esterhazy learned from Mariska that his daughter, Alice managed to leave Hungary and was staying in Vienna with her uncle, Laszlo Esterhazy and his family.

In january 1956, Mihaly Csaky was freed. Louise met him in Paris and he told her that Tibor Neumann and Janos Jabloniczky had died in the Soviet prison camp.

On February 24, 1956, Louise's mother suffered a cerebral hemorrhage and on February 27, she died. Mariska traveled to the Leopoldov prison to tell her brother Janos of the death of their mother. They cried over their loss together.

Janos Esterhazy was still hoping that one day he may yet see his family. Unfortunately, however, the stormy times had spread them all over the globe. His son, Janos was working in New Zealand and his daughter, Alice was in Manhattanville College in the United States.

Nothing was more characteristic of Janos Esterhazy's deep religious faith and noble spirit than that on every day of the week he prayed for a different member of his family and on Sundays he prayed for his enemies.

In that period, between 1950 and 1955, Janos Esterhazy put up a heroic struggle to restore his health to live to see the day when he regains his freedom. The poor nourishment and the bitter cold did not help. And in the fall of 1956, the warden of Mirov prison took away the privilege of receiving an occasional food parcel from his family.

His fellow prisoners, both in the Soviet Union and in the Czechoslovak prisons, reported that Janos Esterhazy bore the sufferings of imprisonment and all the physical pain with superior courage and spiritual serenity. He drew this strength from his deep faith and was able to radiate it to his fellow prisoners. They said he was always ready to comfort them and ease their misery with his gentle humor and sympathy.

The 12 years of imprisonment have finally broken his health. In February 1957 his condition turned critical and he sent word to his family about the impending end. Mariska asked for permission immediately to go to Mirov and see her brother. On February 24, 1957, she was escorted to him by four Czech physicians who were also

256

prisoners. Discreetly, they left brother and sister alone. He told her that the doctors, who had been condemned also, were like best friends to him. They had been looking after him day and night. He appeared to be calm, serious, even though occasionally he would crack a joke. He wished he would be taken to the Nyitra hospital. But the warden persisted in refusing every request by the family. "I will not give you my prisoner, dead or alive," was his answer. The family tried once more in Prague to have him transferred to a general hospital. All in vain. And the end was inexorably approaching.

On March 8, 1957, the prison warden sent a terse telegram to the family, informing them that "Janos Esterhazy has died on March 8. His remains will be cremated and will not be released to his family."

Mariska went to Mirov at once to prevent the cremation and to try to have her brother's body released to her. The warden told her that the body had been taken already to Olomonc to be cremated. She asked the warden at least for the urn so that she might take it to Nyitraujiak to be interred in their father's grave, which had been the wish of her brother. Once more, the warden refused: "I told you once before that I will not release him, dead or alive."

A Requiem was celebrated in Paris by Father Roman Rezek, director of the Hungarian Catholic Mission, assisted by Father Michel Riquet. But the great son of our land was mourned by thousands of Hungarians all over the world.

The Requiem Mass in Paris was attended by many Hungarians emigres and French dignitaries and representatives of various institutions. The French Foreign Ministry, the Assembly of Captive European Nations, the International Rescue Committee, the National Catholic Welfare Conference, as well as fellow emigre groups were also represented. The family was represented by Louise Esterhazy, a member of the executive committee of the Cultural Association of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia.

The Hungarians of New York celebrated a Requiem Mass in St.Stephen church on March 30. It was attended by representatives of emigre organizations of Hungarian minority groups, such as the National Committee of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, the Scientific Society of the Highlands, the Society of Hungarians from Subcarpathian Ruthenia, the American Transylvania Federation, Council for the Liberation of Southern Hungary. Of the other Hungarian emigre groups, there were representatives from the American Hungarian Federation, the Hungarian National Council, the Hungarian Veterans Organization, the Hungarian Branch of the American Friends of the

257

Federation of Anti-BoIshevist Nations, leaders of the American Hungarian Catholic League. Following the Mass, condolences were received by Alice Esterhazy, daughter of Janos Esterhazy and recording secretary of the Cultural Association of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia.

The Cleveland branch of the National Committee of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia also celebrated a Requiem Mass on March 30 for the soul of Janos Esterhazy. *⁵¹¹

We might note that a few months after the death of Janos Esterhazy, his sister Mariska and her daughter Erzsebet went to Olomonc to view his urn. They were shown in the crematory a niche holding 18 urns, including that of Janos Esterhazy. These urns contained the ashes of his fellow prisoners -- Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians -- who had to walk the same way of the cross and whose familes were also denied that most elementary of rights, giving a decent funeral to their loved ones.

258

"Janos Esterhazy died on March 8, 1957 in Mirov prison in Czechoslovakia. It would be more accurate to say that he died a hero's death, falling in the struggle to which he had dedicated his life. His grave is surrounded not only by the Hungarian minority of the Highlands, but the entire Hungarian nation, extending to him the respect and affection due to national heroes and mourning him in their hearts. He was given a tragic destiny by the Ailmighty, the same tragic destiny with which He punishes, or perhaps rewards those who have been predestined to greatness.

"The era in which he lived was characterized by ideological chaos, hypocrisy and decadence. It was in the year of Trianon that he turned from youth to manhood, that was the time when the soul is the most impressionable, when impressions leave the most lasting mark. He grew up during a period of world war which was fought in the name of democracy and self-determination -- principles in whose name one out of four Hungarians were forced to live under a foreign state. That event and the subsequent sense of just rebellion against the injustice of Trianon may have been the most determining factor in shaping his entire life.

"His public life began in the early 1920s when Geza Szullo, the leader of the Hungarians in the Highlands chose him as his political heir. Geza Szullo's recommendation was received with universal approval on the part of the Hungarians in the Highlands and, before long, Esterhazy was named chairman of the Christian Socialist Party. His parliamentary career coincided with the period when there became increasingly apparent in Prague the signs of disintegration which was a natural consequence of the chauvinistic Czech national policies.

"He demonstrated his political maturity by sparing no energy in fighting for the right of self-determination of the Hungarians, while

259

taking the greatest care to remain on the high ground of public morality even amidst the most severe struggle.

"In choosing his political allies, Esterhazy was looking at the historical perspective, rather than momentary gain. He never forgot that the many small nations of the Danubian Basin will either stand together or fall together -- as demonstrated by events -- therefore even the deepest conflicts must be eliminated without violating national sensibilities, so that that the atmosphere of cooperation based on understanding may be brought about. He paid particular attention to that in the relationship of the Hungarians and Slovaks, knowing very well that because of their geographic location, these two nations occupy a key position in any Danubian cooperation.

"The ferment of the 1930s did not bring the desired results, it was drowned out by the roar of the cannons of the second World War.

"The Hungarian minority remaining in the independent Slovakia was relatively small in numbers. Janos Esterhazy chose to stay with them. In the turmoil of the second World War, his position outgrew its original Hungarian dimensions. His struggles shifted from politics to ideology. It was not Esterhazy, the politician, but Esterhazy, the man clinging to his Christian ideology, who was able to and dared to take a stand against the Satanic forces arising in the guise of Naziism and Communism.

"Esterhazy knew from the very beginning that cooperation with Naziism would be morally impossible and would lead to political disaster. But he also knew that cooperation with Communism, while resisting Naziism, would be likewise morally impossible and would also lead to political disaster. He saw this clearly at the time when many in the Western world, political readers included, deceived themselves by believing that some sort of ideological compromise with Communism is possible and when these Westerners were urging all resistance fighters to cooperate with the communists.

"It was not easy in those times to hew to the straight path. History provided a tragic justification of the rightness of his cause and his own passing was no less tragic.

"In 1945, he was taken away by the Russians. He spent three long years in Soviet forced labor camps. He came home broken in body but unshaken in spirit only to face a death sentence by the infamous Czechoslovak peoples court. The judge refused to weigh his behavior during the war. He was not interested in what defense witnesses had to say, he just pronounced the sentence which was

260

probably dictated from the Hradcany palace in Prague. The amnesty changed it to life in prison.

"He was condemned first of all because he was Hungarian, a fearless and uncompromising representative of his people, and because he was a true Christian. The lords of the Kremlin and the Hradcany palace knew that the man who dared openly to proclaim during the terror of the Swastika (cross) that "we Hungarians know only one cross, the Cross of Jesus Christ," that man would never surrender either to the hammer and sickle, or to the Crechoslovak peoples democracy. They knew that men like him must be liquidated by any means possible. There is just one thing they failed to take into account, that the children of martyrs are counted by the hundreds of thousands. And in 1956, the children of the Hungarian martyrs passed their first trial on the world stage." *⁵¹²

As we look back at the great Hungarian martyrs of the years of 1930-1950, three men come to mind immediately: Count Pal Teleki, former Prime Minister of Hungary; Baron Vilmos Apor, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Gyor, and Count Janos Esterhazy, leader of the Hungarian Party of the Highlands.

Pal Teleki became a victim of the imperialistic policies of Hitler's Germany. Vilmos Apor sacrificed his life in the defense of nuns who were seeking refuge in his Bishop's Palace from Stalin's hordes. Janos Esterhazy became a martyr at the hands of Hitler's Nazis, Stalin's Bolsheviks and the self-centered, chauvinistic system of Benes.

Their martyrdom was not in vain because "the children of martyrs are counted by the hundreds of thousands."

261

In Part Two, we have attempted to sketch in their broad outlines the struggles of the Hungarian inhabitants of the Highlands. later of the independent Slovakia, for the right of self-determination solemnly proclaimed by President Wilson, for their minority rights. for the peaceful revision on the basis of mutual agreement of the injustices imposed by the peace treaties of Paris and Trianon.

At the end of Part One, in the discussion of the Slovak efforts for autonomy and independence. we touched upon the conclusions that could be drawn from the stormy events of the post-1918 period. We emphasized that those conclusions could be, in general, equally applied not only to the Slovaks but to the other inhabitants of the Danubian Basin -- Hungarians, Germans, Poles, Ruthenians -- as well. To underscore that statement, we cited a Slovak publication, issued in the West, which called the rate of Slovakia a typical example of the problem of small nations. According to the article, the more than sixty-year coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks has been a deception and just as harmful under the rule of Masaryk and Benes, as under the Communists.

We have noted in that respect that how well a state takes care of its minorities is one measure of how far democracy has come in that state. We have also emphasized that according to the Hungarian view, the political leadership of Benes has miserably failed before the court of history. This has been clearly demonstrated by the fact that over a period of twenty years he was unable to secure the loyalty of his national minorities, not even that of the Slovaks, even though he kept calling them a "sister nation." Is it any wonder then that for twenty years it took the greatest difficulties and violent measures to keep this jerrybuilt artificial state alive, and even with that, it barely missed setting of a continent-wide conflagration?

Gigantic errors were made at the very birth of the Benes system. At the very beginning, its planners turned against the ideas of

262

President Wilson, who had a great foresight. For a detailed discussion of that, please refer to Note #22 at the end of Part One. President Wilson, as we have seen, was inclined toward the plan to establish an Austro-Hungarian federation, as recommended by his Commission of Inquiry. Then British Prime Minister Lloyd George, one of the architects of the Paris peace treaties and one of the best qualified witnesses in this question, spoke in a similar vein.

In his Memoirs, published by The Daily Telegraph in 1938, Lloyd George stated that originally, the allied powers had no intention of breaking up the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. On the contrary, he wrote, "Their only intention was to adjust the borders of the Monarchy in favor of Italy, Serbia and Rumania, and to establish a federated state in the rest of its territory, with the fullest autonomy for all nationalities." According to Lloyd George the people interested in the fate of the Monarchy, presented the great powers with a fait accomph and that is why the original plan could not be realized.

We have discussed in some detail the identity of those responsible for the fait accompli. It was made possible largely with the the massive propaganda, based on empty promises and untruths, the illness of the well-intentioned President Wilson, and the activities of Secretary of State Lansing and French Foreign Minister Pichon, both of whom had been strongly opposed to the Monarchy.

On February 5, 1919, Benes did not hesitate to make a solemn promise that Czechoslovakia will not oppress the national minorities which will come under its rule. On the contrary, he said, it is their intention to grant full rights to the minorities. Accordingly, on May 20, Benes submitted a memorandum to the Peace Conference, listing point-by-point the high-sounding promises which were never kept.

We have seen in both Parts what became of those promises. Of course, Benes and his friends and Western well-wishers denied that the grievances were valid and tried to portrait them as empty excuses and means for the undermining of the republic. That became the basis for the condemnation of large numbers of people, including Janos Esterhazy. It is sufficient at this point to refer to the final report of Lord Runciman, the impartial British diplomat who stated, among others: "Even at the end of my mission, I saw no intention to remedy these grievances... The Nazi power has given them new hope. I consider it a natural development that they would turn to their ethnic kin and want to be transferred to the German empire... Should certain transfer of land be unavoidable, and I think it is, it should be carried out at once."

263

Benes would not hear of such moves until he was confronted by the German arms. The same happened with regard to the Slovaks and the Hungarians. Benes would listen to the Hungarian grievances only when he was already under pressure. This was demonstrated, for example by the totally candid statement by Bakach-Bessenyei before Kobr, the Czechoslovak Minister in Budapest, on April 6, 1938, when he blamed the Little Entente for failing to reach out a hand to Hungary before it was too late: "All opportunities have been buried by now and the Danubian nations face an unrelenting fate very soon. In one form or another. they will become satellites of Germany. It will happen to Czechoslovakia because of the Sudeten German problem. Hungary will become a satellite of Germany on account of their comradeship in arms. Rumania and Yugoslavia will find themselves in the same situation because of economic pressure."

The greatest responsibility rests on the Benes system, but it must be shared also by the great powers, which they will have to recognize sooner or later, just as Lloyd George became aware of and tried to explain the failures. They are responsible because, contrary to Wilson's concepts which were guided by foresight and the interests of the future, rather than vengeance, they lent a helping hand to the creation of a nonviable system and its maintenance to the very end, to the point where their own interests became endangered by a European war.

Thirdly, the nationalities living in the Danubian Basin are also responsible because, instead of showing more patience, more goodwill, mutual understanding and, if necessary, willingness to compromise in the solution of their mutual problems, they believed the empty promises of the great powers which were playing them off one against another, and were competing for the favors of the great powers.

Let us now take a closer look at those whom we have just pronounced responsible for the fate that befell the peoples of the Danubian Basin.

The Benes system must respond to the judgment of history and one needs not be a prophet to tell that it is only a matter of time. That procedure has begun a long time ago, primarily among his compatriots and colleagues, greatly supported by the Slovak patriots also. The small nations concerned over the future of the Danubian Basin must do everything in their power to banish that spirit forever from their joint homeland.

264

Who could take the great powers to task for their responsibility? A great power is always looking for its interests and acts accordingly. All that can happen that after a while the great power becomes aware of the fact that, for example, its policies toward the peoples of the Danubian Basin have been in error and, on the long run, contrary to its own interests. When that happens, the great power has the option of reviewing and revising its policies. The peoples of the Danubian Basin can very effectively contribute to this with their informational activities. It is, after all, in their interest to help revise a faulty policy which has reached a dead end.

Naturally, the third group we mentioned, the peoples of the Danubian Basin can do the most because they would be serving, above all, their own interests. But by no means should they attempt to blame each other because that would just take them back into the old, worn rut.

We have repeatedly stated in this work that, in our opinion, the destiny of the peoples of the Danubian Basin must be held jointly in their hands because, as we have clearly seen, that is how they stand or fall. That is why Janos Esterhazy said on September 2, 1943, "We maintain the best intentions and most sincere sentiments toward the Slovaks. After the end of the war when the time comes for peaceful construction, those of us who have lived and continued to live in the Danubian Basin, will have to depend on each other."

Esterhazy also said, on October 28, 1939: Every person, even the most virtuous among us, is too weak to struggle successfully with the weight of his conditions. If at no other time, this is the time when we have to build muscles on the solidarity derived from the mutual interdependence of small nations, otherwise we might lose a valuable facet of our national identity. It is in our common interest with the Slovaks to create harmonic cooperation within the borders of the state, as well as among all the peoples of the Danubian Basin, to secure peaceful existence and pursuit of happiness even for the smallest ones among us.'

There is evidence that some Slovaks also share these views. Stefan B. Roman the late chairman of the Slovak World Congress, who died in 1988, said: "It is clear for us that the foundations of a free Europe can be established only through the cooperation of the oppressed nations of Central and Eastern Europe. Recrimination and chauvinism will not lead to a better future for the nations of Central Europe. That is why we deem it necessary to seek cooperation with

265

every neighbor of Slovakia, as well as their representatives in the free worid." *⁵¹³

We have noted in the Introduction that it is of paramount importance to become reconciled in spirit. We must be aware and we need to be thoroughly educated to the fact that this serves not only Hungarian or Slovak interests of which one or the other may take advantage. We must understand and we have to use every means to bring it into public consciousness that this is in the interest of both nations -- we are dealing here with a common Hungarian-Slovak destiny -- which is to serve the survival of both of them.

Representatives of the Central and Eastern European nations who live in the West have a significant historic mission to fulfill. They are not bound by the system ruling the mother country, which can preclude any dialog not in the interest of the regime, even if it were to serve the real future interests of the nation. Such dialogs can have but one prevailing theme: acceptance and further development of the common destiny with the neighboring peoples, which must serve the ultimate survival of their people. If representatives of these nations, living in the West, are willing to undertake and carry out this mission without any reservation, then the dream of Janos Esterhazy may be fulfilled. The dream which has been his intellectual heritage, expressed so clearly in his address already cited:

"Let us develop a peaceful and constructive cooperation, based on equal rights, among the peoples and nations which mutually depend on each other. This is equally in the interest of the Hungarians, Germans, Slovaks and Ruthenians who have lived here for centuries."

266

COUNT JANOS ESTERHAZY