COUNT JANOS ESTERHAZY

The rigid attitute of the Czechoslovak government in the Sudeten German question generated ever greater anxiety, especially in British political circles. In the course of the April 18 and 29 English-French discussions in London, Chamberlain and Halifax finally persuaded Daladier, the new French Prime Minister and Bonnet, the new Foreign Minister, that under the given circumstances it would be impossible to defend Czechoslovakia against a German military attack. They decided, therefore, to increase the pressure on the Czechoslovak government for an urgent solution to the Sudeten German question. *²⁶⁷

This alteration of political course had most far-reaching consequences on the politics of the entire European continent. This was manifested, among others, by a sudden burst of diplomatic activity. We will take a look at the most important moves, in chronological order, as much as possible.

On April 25, Henderson, the British Ambassador to Berlin, visited Budapest where he met Regent Horthy, Daranyi, Imredy and Prince Primate Seredy. Next, Henderson went to Prague and met with Benes and Hodza. He also saw, twice, Dr. Geza Szullo. *²⁶⁸

Osusky, the Czechoslovak Minister in Paris reported that in return for full support, Paris expected full readiness to compromise on the part of Prague. *²⁶⁹ 0n May 7, the British and French minister to Prague delivered seperate demarches to the Czechoslovak government. Henderson told Secratary of State Woerman that the demarches were intended to promote a general settlement of the question.

Meanwhile, between May 7 and 10, Hitler and Ribbentrop were in Rome where they met Mussolini and Ciano. Their meeting put the brakes on the efforts of the Italian and Hungarian politicians to establish a "horizontal axis" because from here on, the Italians

153

exercised the greatest caution in this matter. *²⁷⁰ This fact only served to confirm the long-standing Hungarian policy to seek the settlement of territorial questions by peaceful means and to stay away from European conflicts of any description.

The Prague government, however, apparently did not attach much urgency to the solution of the problem. That is clear from the May 10 report by the Hungarian charge d'affaires ad interim in Prague. The report concluded with a prophetic prediction for the future.

According to the Hungarian diplomat, the Czechs wanted the country and the world to believe that they are feverishly working on a new national minorities law. His understanding was that the Prague government was unable to reach agreement even about general principles. Foreign Minister Krofta himself had said that it is a very slow process but hopefully it would be ready for presentation to parliament during the current session. The Hungarian envoy was of the opinion that "the Czechs want to solve the question or postpone the solution, with long-range promises which the Sudeten Germans will never accept and suddenly we may face a situation which is dangerously reminiscent of the final days of independent Austria." *²⁷¹

The British government demonstrated the great importance it attached to the solution of the Sudeten German question by inviting Henlein to visit London in May.*²⁷² According to those present at the meeting, "Henlein made a generally good impression and behaved in a diplomatic manner." Churchill himself spoke with satisfaction about Henlein in an interview. Henlein was demanding autonomy but did not ask that Prague break up its alliance with Russia.*²⁷³

As noted earlier, Hungarian Prime Minister Daranyi, who had shifted too far to the right, was replaced on May 13 by Bela Imredy. Three days later, the Hungarian Minister in Rome called on Ciano and proposed, among others, a new, secret agreement to replace the Pact of Rome. *²⁷⁴ Both Mussolini and Ciano received the proposal with skepticism. This attitude, as we have noted, can be attributed to the talks between Hitler and Mussolini around May 10. Later, Ciano told the Hungarian Minister that the issue would be discussed with Imredy and Kanya during their visit to Rome. Ciano had repeatedly raised the question of Hungary leaving the League of Nations. Imredy kept postponing this move because he wanted to avoid a confrontation with the very powers with which he was anxious to improve relations.

On May 16, the L e Temp s newspaper called Henlein's demands just. Earlier, on May 2, the Times of London published a

154

report to the effect that Prague would be advised to accept the majority of Henlein's demands. Meanwhile, Dr. Szullo and Jaross received an invitation from the Hungarian committee of the English parliament. *²⁷⁵

According to a coded telegram from the Hungarian Minister to Berlin, dated May 19, "a German cabinet minister has voiced German concern over the fact that the Czechs are negotiating with each national minority separately and play them off againt one another. He thinks it would be necessary for the Hungarians to raise the same demands the Sudeten Germans do." *²⁷⁶

On May 20, Hodza declared in a statement to the press that the Pittsburg Agreement is morally binding. *²⁷⁷

Probably in order to counter German troop movements, on the night of May 20, Prague ordered a partial mobilization. This move stretched almost to the breaking point the already existing tensions. On May 20, Ribbentrop reported to Hitler that he was told by Henderson that England would not remain idle in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia. *²⁷⁸ On May 21, the Czech and British ministers to Budapest lodged a protest against the alleged mobilization of five Hungarian age groups.*²⁷⁹ Kanya reassured the British diplomat. Benes, in a speech to the military, declared: "We are not afraid of anything." *²⁸⁰

We have mentioned in Part One Father Tiso's negotiations in Budapest, at the end of May, when he attended the Eucharistic Congress.

Meanwhile, the advocates of autonomy won a great victory in the municipal elections. The Hungarians won with unprecedented margins in Nyitra, Vagsellye, Losonc and Galanta. In the meantime, Hodza received Henlein. *²⁸¹

Following the deep crisis of May, German Admiral Canaris sent General Staff Major Pruck to Budapest. Pruck emphasized that Germany wants to maintain peace under all circumstances. *²⁸² This more cautious was also reflected in statements by Goring and Weizsacker before Stojay, the Hungarian Minister to Berlin. They had called for caution in dealing with the Czechoslovak question because Hitler did not want to be swept into a European war. *²⁸³

On May 27, the British government sent William Strang as an observer to Prague. From Prague, he went to Berlin. *²⁸⁴

Osusky, the Czechoslovak Minister to Paris, briefed French Foreign Minister Bonnet about the new legislation dealing with national minorities. *²⁸⁵

155

In Part One, we have mentioned a visit by a Slovak American delegation to Rozsahegy. We might mention as a sidelight that there was a crowd at the station, as early as four in the morning, waiting for the train which was due at seven. Dr. Hletko was the first to step off the train as it arrived from Warsaw, with a case holding the Pittsburgh Agreement in his hand. Karl Sidor greeted the delegation on behaff of the Slovak Peoples Party. Father Hlinka received the delegation Saturday noon. For the first time, Dr. Hletko took the Agreement out of its case. There, for all to see, was the signature of Masaryk. It was a great moment in Slovak history. *²⁸⁶

The Russian central committee of subcarpathian Ruthenia met on May 30 to honor the delegation of American Ruthenians. Pop, a member of the delegation, pointed out that because his group had voted in America for attaching Subcarpathian Ruthenia to the Czechoslovak republic, they are morally bound to help the Ruthenian brethren to secure their autonomy. *²⁸⁷

156

Even though the policies of Benes never showed any serious intent beyond words to remedy the grievances of the Hungarians, Benes remained hopeful that the lmredy government would seek closer relations with Czechoslovakia. These hopes had been fanned by the Western powers, based largely in Imredy's British orientation. However, the Hungarian political leadership had always held the same views about the grievances of the Hungarians, regardless of who was at the head of the government.

This was clearly demonstrated in Kanya's address to parliament on June 1. He said, among others: "After the end of the world war, when with the assistance of its friends among the great powers, Czechoslovakia established a state where the so-called national minorities constitute a majority, it also acquired large Hungarian territories. Many had hoped that this circumstance would prompt the Crechoslovak government to do everything it can for a reconciliation with Hungary and establish at least the basis of a normal economic relationship with us. However, the official Czech policies had run on a totally different track and were probably based on the belief that it would be possible to maintain for a long time the Crechoslovak Republic's extremely advantageous postwar position which was resting exclusively on the power of bayonets." *²⁸⁸

Much earlier, on April 6, Bakach-Bessenyey, head of the political department in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, told Czechoslovak Minister Kobr quite frankly and without mincing any words that he regards the Little Entente responsible for its failure to reach out to Hungary before it was too late: "All opportunities have been buried by now and the Danubian nations face a unrelenting fate very soon. In one form of another, they will become satellites of Germany. It will happen to Czechoslovakia because of the Sudeten German problem. Hungary will become a satellite of Germany on account of their

157

comradeship in arms. Rumania and Yugoslavia will find themselves in the same situation because of economic pressure. *²⁸⁹

Nevertheless the secret negotiations with the Little Entente had continued and, as we will see, concluded with the Bled conference in August, unfortunately without any substantive result. Again, the main reason was the refusal of the Little Entente to recognize the realities and to work for a rational settlement. Even among the Little Entente member states themselves there was a lack of unanimity on many issues, often they fought each other, each pursuing its own interests. No wonder then that the alliance established in 1919 for the maintenance of the status quo was bound to collapse under such circumstances.

Hodza, in the meantime, kept promising a solution for the problem of national minorities. In a statement to the Pesti Hirlap newspaper, on June 2, he held out the promise of local autonomy as the solution. *²⁹⁰

At the Pozsony meeting of the United Hungarian Party, it was announced that the national minorities act was still under preparation. The party leaders reiterated that their position remains the same. They continue to demand Hungarian national self-government within the territorial autonomy to be granted for Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia. *²⁹¹

ln early June, both the Ruthenian National Council and the Sudeten German Party submitted their demands to Hodza. *²⁹²

A very large crowd attended the municipal elections rally of the United Hungarian Party. Esterhazy reiterated once again that "We Hungarians are law abiding citizens and for twenty years we have fulfilled our civic responsibilities to a degree beyond our strength. We did not preach revolution but we did not hesitate openly and bravely to step before domestic and foreign forums and with frank words and truthful propaganda inform the world of our situation. *²⁹³

The United Hungarian Party won a great victory and Hodza announced that within the next few days the government would introduce legislature on the status of the national minorities. *²⁹⁴

The Hodza government held two meetings with the Sudeten German representatives. Hodza and Krofta informed the cabinet about the negotiations with the Germans. *²⁹⁵

Jaross and Esterhazy sent a long telegram to Hodza, protesting a petition camgpaign and fund raising for national defense throughout Slovakia.

158

One June 27, the Hungarians of Subcarpathian Ruthenia demanded immediate autonomy. On this occasion, the United Hungarian Party held a congress in Subcarpathian Ruthenia.²⁹⁷

In the course of his meeting with representatives of the various national minorities, on June 29, Hodza received a Polish delegation. On the same day, he also received the Hungarian delegation. According to a press release about the hour-long meeting, Hodza was briefed about the contents of a memorandum which the party had submitted at an earlier date. The Hungarian delegates had an opportunity to inform Hodza in some detail about the conditions of the Hungarians in Slovakia. *²⁹⁸

Hodra, reportedly, did not mention the proposed legislation about the statutes of the national minorities, nor was anything said about revising the constitution, which would be unavoidable if equality before the law for the national minorities was to be secured. Consequently, the national minorities were anticipating the new legislature with some apprehension.

The first detail of the legislation, as disclosed to the Sudeten German Party, dealt with amending the law on language rights. *²⁹⁹

On July 4, Hodza informed representatives of the Slovak Peoples Party about the proposed legislation. *³⁰⁰

According to American press reports, Ruthenians in the United States had requested President Roosevelt to press for autonomy for Subcarphatian Ruthenia. *³⁰¹

On July 13, Slovak and Hungarian speakers at the national legislative assembly demanded autonomy for Slovakia. *³⁰² Foreign Minister Krofta, in a statement to the Petit Journal newspaper, declared that the national minorities would be given major concessions. *³⁰³

On July 20, Hodza met for an hour with the Hungarian leaders. He promised that the final draft of the legislature would be published to following week. *³⁰⁴

Kanya, in an interview with a Brussels newspaper, declared that the most important issue, as far as Hungary is concerned, is the condition of the Hungarian population in the Little Entente countries. *³⁰⁵

Kanya's statement was closely linked to the increased Hungarian diplomatic activity following Imredy's appointment to the office of Prime Minister. One of the main goals of Hungarian diplomacy was rapprochement and coming to terms with Yugoslavia. The importance of this goal was underscored by the appointment of Kanya's

159

close personal friend, Bakach-Bessenyey, as Hungarian Minister to Belgrade. Earlier, the Hungarian Minister to Rome reported to Kanya about his conversation with Kristic, the Yugoslav Minister to Rome. Kristic, who had accompanied Yugoslav Prime Minister Stojadinovic on his tour of Italy, told the Hungarian diplomat that Stojadinovic wants to reach an agreement with Budapest.

"Kristic has the poorest possible opinion of Benes and regards him the despoiler of Czechoslovakia," reported the Hungarian Minister. "His (Benes') worst mistake was the decisive influence he had exerted on the drafting of the peace treaties. He compounded this mistake with his subsequent policies which were based on the assumption that the postwar weakness of the German empire could be maintained indefinitely.

"Benes has managed to earn the hatred of all his neighbors. He had alienated his allies in the Little Entente by assuming a posture of supremacy and trying to act as "primus inter pares". A proud nation like the Serb, which resembles in many respects the Hungarian, could not welcome and permit such a behavior. Consequently, Belgrade has gradually developed a strong antipathy to Benes and his country which lacks all the natural requisites needed for its continued existence," said Yugoslav Minister Kristic, as quoted by his Hungarian counterpart in Rome. The Hungarian diplomat added that Kristic is a most thoughtful, serious man with great political savvy, who used to be chief of staff to Yugoslav Prime Minister Pasic.*³⁰⁶

On July 12, Bakach-Bessenyey reported to Kanya that he had met Stojadinovic in his villa at Bled and briefed him about the Bucharest discussions regarding the Little Entente. The Rumanian treatment of the Hungarian minority raises great obstacles to any rapprochement, even though the Rumanians ought to know that the Hungarian government and public opinion attach the greatest importance to this question. With regard to Czechoslovakia, it is the position of the Hungarian government that no agreement is possible until the Prague government reaches a settlement with the leaders of the Hungarians in the Highlands. Following a discussion of the condition of the Hungarian minority of Yugoslavia, Stojadinovic spoke. "He considered our conception correct," Bakach-Bessenyey reported, adding that for the time being, the Yugoslav Prime Minister did not want to make a political committment regarding the nations of the Little Entente. *³⁰⁷

On July 15, Istvan Csaky, chief of staff of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, received Kean, foreign affairs editor of the Sunday Times.

160

He told Csaky that it is his understanding that Hitler and the German general staff do not want war under the present circumstances, while Goring and lower-ranking leaders of the National Socialist Party would not mind going to war. This state of mind is all the more dangerous because, according to Kean, Csaky was absolutely right that "certain Czech circles have assumed a provocative posture because they regard the current circumstances favorable to take care of an armed conflict which seems to be inevitable." Kean also said that he had heard of a memorandum by Colonel General Brauchitsch, requested by Hitler, laying out order of battle plans for an attack on Czechoslovakia. He had also heard that these plans made no mention of Hungary, either as an ally or as an opponent. *³⁰⁸

On July 18, Imredy and Kanya met Mussolini and Ciano in Rome. According to notes prepared for the meeting -- presumably by Kanya -- the Czechoslovak situation was to be the first item on the agenda. The notes make it clear that "Hungary has never considered an offensive move against Czechoslovakia on its own. However, in the event of an armed conflict between Germany and Czechoslovakia, Hungary could not remain a bystander. But Hungary would participate in the military solution of the Czechoslovak question only if it could remain 100 percent certain that Yugoslavia would remain neutral and would not attack Hungary in the rear.

The notes express doubt that about such neutrality at the moment, regardless of what Stojadinovic may have told Ciano. This remark was a hint at Stojadinovic's two-faced politics. The Bucharest negotiations between Hungary and the Little Entente and between Hungary and Rumania are making very little progress, largely because of the attitude of the Rumanian government. They would consider any settlement only on the basis of our (Hungary') legal equality and reconfirmation of the Kellog Pact, while a general statement about the national minorities would have to be negotiatied separately with each member of the Little Entente.

On the question of Hungary quitting the League of Nations -- something about which the Italians are very insistent -- the notes point out that the League of Nations is the only forum where "we have been able to bring before the public opinion of the entire world the pathetic fate of the Hungarian minorities, torn from us by the peace treaty. On the other hand, Geneva is the place where we can have, at least once a year, direct contact with the great Western powers. By that, I have mostly England in mind because it has always shown some interest in the Hungarian problems."

161

With reference to the "horizontal axis," the notes observe that "from our point of view, there are two further preconditions (in addition to keeping an eye on Germany) to its establishment. One is the absolute necessity of a common border between Hungary and Poland; the other, a satisfactory settlement of the relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia, without which we could not join the axis.

The notes also mention the German invitation to Regent Horthy, which he was pleased to accept, having already visited two other friendly powers, namely Italy and Poland.*³⁰⁹

162

Janos Esterhazy took an active role in the diplomatic efforts when he visited Warsaw for talks with Foreign Minister Beck. Beck emphasized the true friendship between Poland and Hungary. He predicted that in the event of Czechoslovakia's disintegration, Slovakia in its entirety would be returned to Hungary.

The Polish Foreign Minister recalled his conversation with Sidor, a leader of the Slovak Peoples Party, whom he had received some time earlier. Beck told Sidor that Poland has no territorial claims against Slovakia, therefore it should go in its entirety to Hungary. He reassured Sidor that he was familiar with the intentions of the Hungarian government about the Slovak question. Hungary, he said, was planning to grant Slovakia far-reaching autonomy.

Beck's statement reassured Sidor who said that the Slovaks are not afraid of the Hungarians of the Highlands because they understand each other, but are somewhat apprehensive about the attitude of the Hungarians in Hungary itself. *³¹⁰

A report from the Hungarian Minister in Warsaw to Foreign Minister Kanya reviewed the Polish views about the general international political situation: "The farther away we get from the critical days in May, the more the bellicosity of the great Western powers decreases. As far as France is concerned, the dominant factor is to save the appearance of loyalty to the allies. They do not want to have this loyalty tested, therefore the French no longer rule out the establishment of a federated state in Czechoslovakia, which would lead ultimately to the separation of the various alien nationality groups. *³¹¹

Early July, the Hungarian Minister in Bucharest reported to Kanya that "the Rumanian government is delaying the settlement of the nationalities' question for fear that following publication of the new Czech law on the minorities, the minorities in Rumania would raise new demands, invalidating all previous measures.

163

In facing Rumanian public opinion, Foreign Minister Comnen became a prisoner of the carelessly posited thesis that the question of the minorities is strictly a domestic affair and none of the Hungarian government's business. At the same time, he wants to create the impression abroad, especially among the great powers which have shown interest in the nationalities' question, that Rumania is solving the problem of its national minorities with the tacit agreement, or consent, of the Hungarian government. Creating that impression would greatly strengthen the position of the Rumanian governmment against demands that the securing the rights of the minorities should go beyond the minimal program envisioned by the Rumanian government. *³¹² This delaying tactic had greatly impeded negotiations with the Little Entente.

A highlight of the intense diplomatic activity among the great powers was the proposal by the German Minister to London to call an international conference for the solution of the Czechoslovak problem. The conference would be attended by England, France, Germany and Italy, and it would mediate between the Prague government and the Sudeten Germans. France supported this move at first, but then turned against it. *³¹³ The plan found warm reception in the British press. *³¹⁴ The great interest shown by the British government was reflected in the fact that Basil Newton, the British Minister to Prague, had two meetings with Hodza on July 23. *³¹⁵

On July 26, in an interview with The Daily Telegraph, Henlein declared that defense and foreign affairs should be the responsibility of the central government, while all the other matters belong to an autonomous popular assembly. *³¹⁶

164

The nationalities act was completed by the end of July but it was published in a piecemeal fashion. Essentially, it provided a skeleton which was to be fleshed out through further negotiations. Much of it was drawn from measures which were said to have been based on providing equal rights.*³¹⁷ Apparently, the intent had been to complete and publish the hastily prepared legislation before the arrival of the Runciman Mission. It was reported in The Daily Telegraph newspaper on July 26, and subsequently announced by Chamberlain in the House of Commons that the Prague government and Sudeten German Party have agreed to the appointment of Lord Runciman to mediate the disputed questions. *³¹⁸

The roots of this British diplomatic initiave go back to a period prior to the news report in The Daily Telegraph. They can be traced back to the infinite stubbornness of Benes' politics. Prague's attitude toward the Sudeten Germans, as well as toward all the other national minorities, had been more provocative than conciliatory and showed little inclination for a rational settlement. The British government was deeply disturbed by this attitude because it knew that Prague's stubbornness would push the national minorities, like it or not, into Hitler's arms.

The Sudeten German issue was the most explosive of them all because it involved the mighty German Empire. The earliest solution of this problem had top priority. Dealing with the grievances of the other minority groups was relegated to the background. A question directed at the Prime Minister in the House of Commons by Captain Plugge, made the point. The question was whether the Prime Minister was willing to convene a conference to review the grievances Hungary had suffered for a long time at the hands of its neighbors and as a result of the Treaty of Trianon, and to seek a remedy for those grievances. The question was prompted by the fact the Britain had been

165

one of the signatories of the Treaty of Trianon. Even though there were no plans for such a conference, the question reflected the view that neither the Hungarian minority groups, nor the Hungarian government were interested in a solution by armed force. What they wanted was a negotiated solution.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Anschluss had given Germany a disproportionate impact on Hungary's economy, Hungary's sympathies were with England. Hungary had made every effort for a sincere rapprochement with the West, only to be abandoned by the West and, contrary to its interests, forced into the German sphere of political influence. The Hungarian national minorities have been forced to endure historically unprecedented injustices and the time has come to find a legal and peaceful remedy for those injustices. *³¹⁹

166

As noted earlier in Part One, on August 3, 1938, Lord Runciman arrived with his wife and entourage in Prague. The United Hungarian Party's welcoming message, in English and Hungarian, appeared on the front page of the party's newspaper.

The message reminded him that twenty years earlier, "the peace treaties took into account only the two polarities of battles lost and battles won, and forgot the fact that only states can be defeated for a while, but nations can not. The Czechoslovak Republic came into being through recognition of victory by the Czech, Slovak and Ruthenian, while the German, Hungarian and Polish nations living in the same territory were made to bear the entire moral and material burden of a lost war. Twenty years' efforts at nation building had but one goal: to employ the strength of the majority in the establishment and broadening the Lebensraum of the Czechoslovak nation at the expense of the Germans, Hungarians and Poles.

"Such a development was unhealthy and contrary to nature and was bound to result in conflicts. All that has been needed was a shift of balance among the great powers which are shaping the history of Europe.

"There is more than a German-Czechoslovak, Polish-Czechoslovak, Slovak-Czechoslovak or Ruthenian-Czechoslovak problem. There is also Hungarian-Czechoslovak problem. We feel that 20 years ago we were deprived of the right proclaimed with prophetic inspiration by President Wilson, the right of self-determination. Only securing that right can restore an equitable state which guarantees equal development under equal conditions for all nationalities." *³²⁰

In Part One, we have touched upon Lord Runciman's negotiations. Here is now a somewhat more detailed look at their Hungarian aspects. As noted earlier, Lord Runciman's main mission was to mediate in the Sudeten German problem. Nevertheless, leaders of the

167

other national minorities, including the Hungarians, also tried to bring their grievances to his attention.

Leaders of the United Hungarian Party spared no effort to secure an appointment with Lord Runciman. They saw him on August 12, and Lord Runciman's office issued a brief official communique about the meeting. It stated that Lord Runciman received the delegation of the United Hungarian Party at 12 noon. The delegation was composed of Dr. Geza Szullo, Andor Jaross and Janos Esterhazy, who briefed him about certain points in a memorandum which was submitted earlier.

Because of the confidential nature of the talks, the Hungarian side also refrained from giving a more detailed account. It was understood, however, that the one-and-a-half hour meeting took place in the Hotel Acron in Prague and the Hungarian leaders had an opportunity to brief Lord Runciman and his experts on all questions involving the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. It was thought likely that further negotiations might follow. *³²¹ According to other sources, Lord Runciman had said that whatever rights the Sudeten Germans may be granted, such rights would be automatically extended to the Hungarian population of Czechoslovakia. *³²²

The grievances presented by the Hungarian delegation included the following: excessive number of Czechoslovak civil servants in Hungarian districts; a shortage of Hungarian civil servants; excessive taxation; restrictions imposed on the use of the Hungarian language in the courts and before administrative agencies; often insurmountable obstacles put in the path of those who want to obtain proof of citizenship; severe damage to industry and agriculture; serious shortcomings in education, and reparation for the damages inflicted since the end of the war.

Even though coexistence for the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia is not at all assured under the present conditions, the United Hungarian Party would be willing to accept a modus vivendi, Lord Runciman was told. *³²³

It should be noted that several members of the party had urged to emulate the Sudeten German Party as the only way to succeed with Lord Runciman. Democratic methods, they said, bring no results. Esterhazy's response was, "Never! The violent methods employed by the Sudeten Germans are contrary to our democratic convictions," he said.

168

The delegation of the United Hungarian Party had a second meeting with Lord Runciman on August 25. This encounter took place after the Bled conference between Hungary and the Little Entente and the Kiel meeting of Hitler and Horthy. The agenda of the second meeting with Lord Runciman included once again the small number of Hungarian civil servants in the Hungarian districts; the way Prague was taking advantage of the so-called activists, or collaborators; educational matters, including the appointment of teachers by the Czechoslovak authorities; the absence of a Hungarian university, and the appointment of non-Hungarians to Hungarian chairs. *³²⁴

169

The scheduled visit by Hungarian leaders to Germany had a major impact on preparations for the Bled conference. Hitler's invitation to Regent Horthy, delivered in May by General Raeder, soon became common knowlegde and raised deep concern among the Little Entente governments. They began speeding up the diplomatic negotiations with Hungary so that an agreement might be reached before Horthy and Hitler meet. The Czechoslovak government became more conciliatory and was ready to accept the first part of the formula proposed by Kanya but continued to reject the second part, insisting that it would be another interference in Prague's domestic affairs.

The Hungarian government, too, eased its position and was willing to come to terms with all three Little Entente states regarding parity in armaments and the question of a non-aggression treaty. The change in the Hungarian attitude was due to diplomatic intervention by the British government on August 16 and 19. *³²⁵

A joint communique was issued on August 23 simultaneously in Budapest and Bled. According to the communique, the Little Entente accepted parity in armaments for Hungary and all four states had come to an agreement about non-aggression in accord with the Kellog-Briand Pact.

Hungary had also reached secret agreements with Yugoslavia and Rumania regarding their Hungarian minorities. Czechoslovakia, however, refused to accept a similar draft statement. Some light had been shed on this during a meeting between Kanya and the British charge d'affaires ad interim. Kanya told the British diplomat that "Bossy, the Rumanian Minister to Budapest, had shown great understanding regarding our demand to Prague for a more far-reaching statement on national minorities than the one isstied by the other two Little Entente states -- demand which even Prague had recognized

170

as justified. We could not accept the statement proposed by Prague, first because of Czechoslovakia's internationally known record in the treatment of its minorities, and, second, because Benes is held in an extraordinary distrust here by eveyone without exception, because of all his unkept promises." *³²⁶

Thus, Kanya himself regarded the Bled agreement a temporary measure which "will be considered final with the signing of a Hungarian-Czechoslovak minorities agreement." The Little Entente powers were unable to bring themselves, even at the twelfth hour, to find a realistic compromise which would solve the problem once and for all. The Bled agreement never came into force. The Little Entente, doomed to failure from the beginning, demonstrated that the prophecy of so many observers has been fulfilled. It could not pass the test of history. As a result, each of its members ended up on Hitler leash, as predicted by the Millerand government as far back as 1929.

The Bled agreements, limited as they may have been, stirred quite a dust in the European diplomatic arena. It goes without saying that each state judged their significance according to its own interests. The Western powers wanted to see an anti-German victory in the agreements, coming at the time when it appeared that Hungary might be swept by Germany into a coming war against Czechoslovakia. This is demonstratred by the tone of the British press. Such as an August 24 editorial in the Daily Herald, paying tribute to the extraordinary flexibility of Hungarian diplomacy. *³²⁷ The British charge d'affaires ad interim in Budapest told Kanya of Foreign Secretary Halifax's satisfaction on August 30. *³²⁸ The Little Entente was raving about the unity among the three member states and hailed the agreement as their great success, even though Prague knew all too well what the facts were.

Berlin, on the other hand, was dismayed by the news from Bled. It showed that the Hungarian diplomacy was trying to secure itself a back door, a kind of emergency exit, toward the Western powers and, at the same time, attempting to increase Hungary's influence. Thus, Hungarian diplomacy held two cards simultaneously, hoping to play them as the occasion arose. Toward Germany, it could raise the prospect, or at least the appearance of an agreement with the Little Entente. That card could have been played, for example, if Germany were unwilling to guarantee Yugoslavia's neutrality. *³²⁹ The same card could have been played if Germany had assumed a threatening posture against Hungary, as it had done with Austria. *³³⁰

171

The Hungarian diplomacy had to brace itself against potentially strong pressure to join immediately a military campaign against Czechoslovakia, which could easily drag the entire continent into war.

The Bled agreements obviously ran counter to Hitler's plans and the German leaders made no bones about that during the Kiel talks with the Hungarian leaders, which had just begun. On August 23, Ribbentrop and Kanya met aboard the Patria where a self-assured Kanya kept fending off Ribbentrop's queries about the Bled agreements. But the German foreign minister kept remonstrating. The agreements, he said, made it appear as if Hungarian wanted to keep itself apart from the German-Czechoslovak conflict and had given up its territorial demands.

While in Kiel, the Hungarian leaders were told by the Hungarian Chief of General Staff that the Germans had scheduled their attack on Czechoslovakia for late September or early October. They were also told that Hitler had refused to listen to the advice of his own generals who were opposed to the early date because they needed more time to make preparations. *³³¹

Ribbentrop easily dismissed Kanya's concern over the neutrality of Yugoslavia by saying that "he who wants revision (of the borders) must be an opportunist." In the course of the meeting, Kanya made several sarcastic remarks which Ribbentrop could never forget. *³³² Hitler who met Imredy the same afternoon had an angry outburst, saying that he "wanted nothing from Hungary." That put Imredy, reportedly, at ease but soon thereafter Hitler told him that "he who wants to participate in the feast cannot stay away from the kitchen." *³³³

In the evening of August 23, there was probably another meeting where the Hungarians proposed a compromise solution, namely that Hungary would join 14 days after the German intervention. *³³⁴ Kanya must have thought that after 14 days, it would become obvious what the attitude of Britain and France were and Hungary could act accordingly.

The impact of the Bled agreements on the Western powers became fully clear only on August 24. By then, the Western capitals, as well as those of the Little Entente, were hailing the agreements as an anti-German victory. To a certain degree, even Budapest contributed to this. Kanya had not anticipated such a tremendous press reaction and it made the continued negotiations awkward. It took the greatest effort on the part of the Hungarian statesmen to refloat the negotiations which had run aground. On August 25, Imredy and

172

Kanya held a press conference where they declared that the Bled agreement will not enter into force before an agreement is reached with Czechoslovakia about the national minorities. *³³⁵

For some time by now, Kanya had lost the Germans' sympathy. There have been stories leaked to the effect that the Germans were eavesdropping on his telephone conversations with Kiel and Budapest. *³³⁶ Ribbentrop made no bones about this during the August 25 session. Kanya had no choice but to tell frankly all about the background of the Bled agreements, their motives and their temporary and preliminary nature. Ribbentrop, however, retained his rigid posture and Kanya had to alter his position regarding the timing of the intervention. He was in a difficult situation and, probably as a tactical move to gain time, gave October 1 as the earliest date. Ribbentrop did not even answer him. *³³⁷

On August 25, in a discussion between Horthy and General Brauchitsch, the general remarked that he had shared Horthy's apprehensions about the outbreak of war. This had come to Hitler's attention and he reproached Horthy during their afternoon session, provoking an irritated response. *³³⁸

Next, Hitler tried to pressure the Hungarian leaders through General Ratz, the Hungarian Minister of Defense. He also brought up the Polish threat, saying that should Poland intervene, Slovakia would fall into its lap and Hungary would be left with nothing. But the Hungarian Defense Minister did not yield to these arguments and noted that the Hungarian army was undergoing a reorganization. He also referred to the uncertainty of Yugoslavia's neutrality. So, this meeting, too, remained fruitless, except perhaps for Hitler agreement to continued discussions between the Hungarian and German general staffs. *³³⁹ The Potsdam talks of August 26 between Ribbentrop and lmredy remained similarly unsuccessful. *³⁴⁰ The same day in the afternoon, Horthy met Goring in the latter's hunting lodge at Karinhall, again without any substantive agreement. The entire visit to Kiel was best characterized by Kanya's outburst a few days later to a Hungarian diplomat: "That madman wants to trigger a war at all costs. *³⁴¹

Among the events with a direct bearing in that period on the fate of the Hungarians in Slovakia, we must mention that in its response to the Prague governments draft reform of the administrative machinery, the United Hungarian Party demanded legislative authority for the provincial assemblies. *³⁴²

In a speech at the Stockholm Congress of European National Minorities, Dr. Geza Szullo painted a shocking picture of the lot of

173

the minorities. Even though they are protected by international treaties and the individual states have assumed obligations toward their minorities, their grievances would fill volumes, said Dr. Szullo. He spoke of the various methods of robbing the minorities of their national identity, such as language tests, the critical shortages and abuses in the educational system, discriminatory practices in the hiring of teachers, dilution of legislative bodies with political appointees alongside the elected members and the overall state of corruption in public life. Dr. Szullo concluded his address by saying: "It is a fact that the problem of European national minorities demands an urgent solution." *³⁴³

We have noted in Part One that in the talks with Lord Runciman, Prague was employing delaying tactics, presenting a second and then a third plan to divide the German-inhabited areas into four administrative districts. *³⁴⁴ Hodza discussed this plan with Jaross and Esterhazy also. *³⁴⁵

The Daily Telegraph reported that lmredy was asking that the Hungarian minority be given equal treatment with the Sudeten Germans. *³⁴⁶

174

The Sudeten German Party did not accept the third plan, based on a cantonal system, because it failed to recognize the national minorities as legal entities and did not grant them the right of self-determination. In the meantime, Henlein met Hitler and Ribbentrop and delivered a message from Lord Runciman. *³⁴⁸

On his return to Prague, Henlein handed to Lord Runciman the so-called Hitler Plan. *³⁴⁹ The plan stirred intense diplomatic activity because, reportedly, Hitler had demanded further concessions which would have been tantamount to granting the Sudeten Germans autonomy. *³⁵⁰ Meanwhile, very important negotiations were being conducted in Prague between Aston-Gwatkin of Lord Runciman's staff and Henlein and Hodza, and between Lord Runciman and President Benes. Hodza also saw the leaders of the Slovak Peoples Party *³⁵¹

Up to the middle of September, the Hungarian press exercised great moderation in presenting the events, compared, for example, with the Volkischer Beobachter, It had still maintained its British orientation and employed a calm but determined tone in bringing attention to the pitiful lot of more than one-million Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. lmredy's speech in Kaposvar, on September 6, was an exception, with a sharp attack on the nationalities policies of the Prague government. *³⁵²

We have noted in Part One that the political parties of the four national minorities held a joint meeting in Prague to form a Hungarian-German-Slovak-Polish Unity Front.

On September 7, in Ostrava, there was a clash between Sudeten Germans and the Czechoslovak police. As a result of the incident, the nationalities talks were interrupted. On September 8, Lord Runciman asked Janos Esterhazy to warn Frank, the deputy leader of the Sudeten German Party, not to use the incident as a pretext to

175

undermine the negotiations because that could lead to war. Frank promised Esterhazy that the negotiations would be continued. Then he went to see Lord Runciman and the two men kept talking untilalmost two in the morning. *³⁵³

176

Even in this politically charged atmosphere, Janos Esterhazy found time to bring the grievances of the Hungarian schools to the attention of the Prague government authorities. He called on the Minister of Finance, urging prompt payment of the funds needed for the furnishings of Hungarian State Gymnasium (senior high school) in Pozsony.

Esterhazy visited the Minister of Education to discuss the construction of numerous Hungarian schools. The talks included enlarging the elementary school of Pozsonyret and the establishment of Hungarian elementary schools in Nyitra, Nemetgurab, Makranc and Csecs. The last two villages have been struggling for a Hungarian school for 15 years, even though the Hungarian population constituted an absolute majority in both villages and the Czechoslovak minority had its own schools.

Esterhazy also brought up the demand of the Hungarian population of Ligetfalu for the establishment of parallel Hungarian classrooms. Ninety Hungarian children had already applied for enrollment. Esterhazy put in a strong word also for the establishment of a Hungarian Gymnasium in Ungvar -- something the people had been demanding for nearly 20 years already.

Social support for Hungarian college students was another thing Esterhazy had been lobbying for. One of his requests was that applications of Hungarians for scholarships and other grants be screened by the organization of Hungarian college students, rather than the Czechoslovak student organization. *³⁵⁴

The Hungarians of Leva (Levice) turned directly to Lord Runciman regarding the reopening of the Hungarian gymnasium which was confiscated in 1918. *³⁵⁵

We have noted in Part One that in a September 10 radio address, President Benes called once again for moderation.

177

We have also noted the appeal of the Slovak Peoples Party, printed in the newspaper Slovak, entitled "Our Patience Has Also Reached Its End." The appeal's conclusion was that "Twenty years of patience have stretched human patience to its absolute limit."

In the meantime, Hodza briefed the Sudeten German leaders about his "fourth plan." As we have reported, the plan was rejected both by Sudeten Germans and the Slovak autonomists.

178

At a party rally in Nuremberg on September 12, Hitler delivered a sharp speech, demanding the right of self-determination for the Sudeten Germans. We have noted earlier that the Czechoslovak government had declared a national emergency, dissolved the Sudeten German Party (because of Henlein's demands to attach the Sudeten German territories to Germany). Lord Runciman's negotiations had broken off and he returned to London to prepare a final report for the British government. It is worth to describe a few sections of the report because they show us in what light the British statesman viewed the crisis in Czechoslovakia.

No matter how he condemned Henlein and Frank for breaking off the talks, Lord Runciman understood in many respects the feelings of the Sudeten Germans, their bitterness and their hopelessness.

"I sympathize with the cause of the Sudeten Germans," he wrote. "It is very difficult to live under alien rule. I am leaving with the impression that the rule over the Sudeten German territories in the last 20 years, even though it cannot be called actual tyranny and certainly not terror, could be characterized as insensitive, lacking any understanding, impatient and discriminating to the point where the anger of the German population was beginning to border on rebellion.

"The Sudeten Germans also felt that there have been too many promises in the past, followed by very little or no deeds, at all. This experience created an open lack of confidence in the leading Czech politicians. Local abuses only fueled the more serious grievances. Many Czech civil servants and gendarmes who spoke little or no German were sent to pure German districts. In the course of the land reform, Czech settlers were encouraged to settle in German areas; many schools were built for the children of the Czech intruders; Czech businesses were given preference over German ones...

179

"Even at the end of my mission, I saw no intention to remedy for these grievances. For any number of reasons, including the foregoing, three or four years ago the Sudeten Germans regarded their situation hopeless. The Nazi power has given them new hope. I consider it a natural development that they would turn to their ethnic kin and want to be transferred to the German empire.

"It goeswithout saying, in my opinion, that the region along the German-Czechoslovak border with its overwhelming Sudeten German majority should be entitled to full self-determination. Should certain transfer of land be unavoidable, and I think it is, it should be carried out at once. In territories where the German majority is not so overwhelming, I would propose local autonomy in accord with the 'fourth plan,"' wrote Lord Runciman. *³⁵⁶

But it is noteworthy how an impartial British diplomat regarded the Sudeten German griavances and the attitude of the Czechoslovak government regarding their remedy. The other national minorities had the same grievances and, again, the attitude of the Prague government was the same. Nevertheless, Prague expected loyalty from the minorities and when, naturally, such loyalty was not forthcoming to the degree it had been expected, the national minorities were accused of disintegrating the republic.

Hitler's sharp speech in Nuremberg, announcing that Germany would secure the right of seIf-determination for the German population of Czechoslovakia, generated considerable diplomatic activity throughout Europe. Hungarian diplomacy, too, swung into action.

The Hungarian government's goal was to see to it that every concession given the Sudeten Germans should be automatically extended to the Hungarians. It was working for the achievement of this goal in accord with the Western powers' conciliatory policies, through compromise rather than by force. Therefore, the first priority in Hungarian political circles was to secure the goodwill of the British and French governments. The main obstacle to that had been the fact that the Western powers were interested in little else beside a solution to the Sudeten German problem so that war with Hitler may be avoided. They were not concerned over the grievances of the other national minorities even if they had a stronger cause in demanding a remedy for those grievances. That is why Chamberlain extracted a promise from Hitler not to bring up the matter of the other nationalities -- a promise that Hitler failed to keep.

180

The Czechoslovak propaganda had also raised the argument that if the matter of the Hungarian and Polish minorities were to become subject of an international settlement parallel with the Sudeten Germans, it would lead to disturbances in Czechoslovakia and clashes with the neighboring countries would become inevitable. *³⁵⁷ This had greatly contributed to putting the Hungarian and Polish questions on the back burner and leaving the solution to bilateral negotiations.

The Hungarian government was negotiating with the Polish government, too. On September 13, immediately following Hitler's speech, the Hungarian Minister to Berlin met the Polish Ambassador who raised the possibility of a common border between the two countries. Regarding Slovakia, he said a plebiscite should be prepared as soon as possible. *³⁵⁸

The Hungarian charge d'affaires ad interim in London reported on September 13 that the British government was determined to push for a plebiscite in Czechoslovakia. But he did not think this would extend to the Hungarian question. Subsequently, the chief of staff of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry instructed the envoy to convey the message that "up to now, the Hungarian government has exercised the greatest patience and moderation over the events in Czechoslovakia. To a large degree, this can be attributed to the heretofore calm behavior of the Hungarians in Slovakia. However, should there be any discrimination regarding the legal status of the various national minorities in Slovakia, it could have unforeseeable consequences." *³⁵⁹

In a coded message to the Hungarian Minister in Warsaw, the Hungarian Foreign Minister expressed the opinion that either there will be war or, with British support, plebiscite will be held in the Sudeten German territories. "We must do everything in our power therefore to have the plebiscite extended to the territories with Hungarian inhabitants," he said. *³⁶⁰

On September 14, the Hungarian Minister in Warsaw reported to Foreign Minister Kanya that according to the Secretary of State of the Polish Foreign Ministry, "the present conditions may be just right to have at least some of the Hungarian demands fulfilled." *³⁶¹

On the same day the Hungarian charge d'affaires ad interim in London reported to Kanya that he had told most emphatically to Ingram, the head of the South European Division, of the most serious consequences if any concessions to the Sudeten Germans, including a plebiscite, would not be extended to the Hungarian minority. "Ingram

181

replied that for the time being, all attention is being concentrated on the Sudeten Germans, therefore he cannot say any more at the moment, except that he will take note of my communication and make it part of the official record." *³⁶²

Foreign Minister Kanya met the Polish Minister to Budapest on September 15. In his notes of the conversation, Kanya stated that the Gentlemen's Agreement between Hungary and Poland has come into force. The Polish Minister remarked that the Hungarians are too soft and in the event of a plebiscite in Czechoslovakia, will not be able to represent the interests of the territories with Hungarian inhabitants with sufficient force. Kanya denied this allegation. *³⁶³

On September 15, the Hungarian Minister in Warsaw reported to Kanya that he was told by the Polish Foreign Minister the following, among others: "I am entitled by our friendship to ask the Hungarian government in these fateful days to demand the most forcefully a plebiscite in the Hungarian Highlands. We can now really speak only in terms of moments because, as soon as England has come to terms with Germany, it will no longer pay attention to the others. If Hungary does not change its restrained attitude, it will miss a historic opportunity," said the Polish Foreign Minister. *³⁶⁴

182

COUNT JANOS ESTERHAZY