COUNT JANOS ESTERHAZY

Meanwhile, the Prague parliament enacted a law to devalue thb currency. Janos Esterhazy sharply criticized this move. He said, "Before attempting to devalue the crown we should have assured that it is not followed by a general price increase." *²²³ On October 16, he lodged a protest against forcing the Hungarian students of Bajanhaza to attend a Slovak school. *²²⁴

In a committee hearing on the budget, on November 4, 1936, Esterhazy declared, "Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia, along with the Hungarian question, are the most burning problems of the state, in need of the most urgent solution." *²²⁵ Addressing the same committee, on November 11, he sharply criticized the Prime Minister's plans for minority reforms. On November 14, he criticized the educational budget, noting that since its establishment, the Czechoslovak state had spent 24,000 million on education but only a tiny fraction of that sum went to the Hungarians. *²²⁶

On December 2, 1936, Esterhazy delivered a major, comprehensive speach in the house budget debate. "It is said," he began, "that we are not satisfied. Well, let us look and see objectively, who is satisfied in this republic. The Czechs are not satisfied because they are afraid of bankruptcy. The Slovaks are not satisfied because they have not been granted autonomy, the same as the Ruthenians, even though it has been guaranteed by international treaty. Neither are the Germans satisfied, nor can the Hungarians be satisfied because their minority rights, guaranteed by the peace treaty and the constitution have not been granted.

"We have thousands of grievances. In villages with all-Hungarian population we do not have elementary schools. in the two-room school of the pure Hungarian Macsola, a Czech school was set up to accomodate the children of a handful law enforcement officers. As a result, there is one Czech teacher with 35 students in one room, while in the other room, two Hungarian teachers are taking turns

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teaching 124 Hungarian students. The Hungarian school of Ipolyker was closed in 1935. The village of Machaza has repeatedly petitioned for a school for its 42 children, to no avail. In the village of Sirak, 58 parents requested the introduction of Hungarian teaching, to no avail.

"In Aknaszlatina, a two-room auxiliary building serves as the schoolhouse. One room is occupied by a handful of Czech children, while 470 Hungarian children take turns with Ruthenian children in the other. In Palyi, some 100 Hungarian families have requested the non-compulsory teaching of the Hungarian language. The school principal did not even bother to forward the request to higher authorities.

And so continued Esterhazy's litany of grievances. He pointed to a similar situation with the secondary schools also. "These, gentlemen, are crimes crying to high heavens," he said. 'And legislators from the governing party calmly ignore our grievances, saying that the Hungarians have all the rights they are entitled to; that there is nothing amiss here; that the republic is threatened by the murderous Hungarian revisionism and the murderous German Hitlerism, therefore they are rushing into an alliance with Stalin.

"Eighteen years ago, the responsible leaders of the republic promised autonomy to Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia. Let the government, at last, grant those two provinces autonomy so that we and our Slovak brethren may determine the destiny of Slovakia.'

Esterhazy's speech was repeatedly interrupted by hecklers but he just brushed them aside. *²²⁷

On December 14, 1936, the first flag of the United Hungarian Party was dedicated by the Hungarian farmers of Abauj county. The lar~e, festive celebration was marked by a rousing speech by Esterhazy. *²²⁸ On December 19, in Zsolna, he addressed the United Hungarian Party's executive committee. *²²⁹

Those "crimes crying to high heavens," that is to say, the various measures depriving the Hungarians of their treaty rights, which Esterhazy had frequently complained about in the Prague parliament, did not cease. They were becoming increasingly grievous as time went by. Eventually, as we shall see, the Hungarian government joined the leaders of the Hungarian minority in addressing these problems. The tactical moves of Hodza, such as his November 10, 1936 statement about the solution of the problems of the minorities, as described in Part One, or his February 18, 1936 meeting with the Sudeten German activists, which has been so much ballyhooed by the Czechs, did not bring any change in the lot of the minorities.

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The increased participation of the Hungarian government in the attempts to solve the problem of the national minorities was actually promoted by the Little Entente powers through their approach to Hungary in early February, 1937. On January 19, Kobr, the Czechoslovak Minister to Budapest, spoke to Foreign Minister Kanya about the moderation of the sharp war of words between the Hungarian and Czechoslovak news media. He also brought an offer of a non-aggression treaty between Hungary and Czechoslovakia in return for recognition of Hungary's right to military parity.

Kanya referred to the April, 1935, talks in Venice where, he recalled, he had set conditions regarding full military parity and the condition of the Hungarian national minorities. On the same occasion many others, including British Foreign Secretary Eden, acknowledged that Hungary was pursuing peaceful policies.

'It is a well-known fact," said Kanya, "that all the international problems experienced by Czechoslovakia can be traced back primarily to the Prague government's treatment of its national minorities... Several European powers, including Italy and Austria, share our position regarding military parity, therefore any concession on our part is out of question.

"In my opinion, a rapprochement between Czechoslovakia and Hungary will be possible only if the Crechoslovak government recognizes our right to military parity and, with a noble gesture, remedies at least the most basic grievances of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia," Foreign Minister Kanya concluded. *²³⁰

On June 10, 1937, the Hungarian Minister in Prague reiterated to Foreign Minister Krofta that a declaration on mutual non-aggression would be conditioned on a concurrent, far-reaching gesture by the Little Entente powers toward their Hungarian minorities. Krofta's response was that under no circumstances would the Czechoslovak

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government allow it policies toward the minorities become the subject of an international agreement. *²³¹

Meanwhile, Hodza, too, discussed resumption of relations with Hungary in a conference of the three Little Entente prime ministers. *²³² That resulted in August 30, 1937, meeting in Sinaia where Hungary was represented by Laszlo Bardossy, the Hungarian Minister in Bucharest.

Bardossy presented a four-point proposal which included:

1. recognition of the right to military parity;

2. declaration that a state may order certain administrative measures on its own accord. Following a previous agreement, these are listed in an attached confidential annex;

3. Hungary's declaration of non-aggression, reciprocated by her neighboring states;

4. the responsible authorities of the Little Entente states establish contact with leaders of their Hungarian minorities to negotiate a far-reaching settlement of the conditions of those minorities. *²³³

In his talks with Krofta, Minister Bardossy remarked that the annex about the administrative measures would contain the memorandum submitted in December, 1935, by Esterhazy to Benes, following his election to the presidency. Benes had promised to comply with the requests in the memorandum in return for Hungarian support in his election campaign, but subsequently he failed to do so. Krofta replied that this question can be settled only on the basis of mutuality, securing the rights of Hungary's Slovak minority as well. Bardossy rejected this condition, saying that the situation of the Slovaksin Hungary is not comparable to the situation of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. Krofta, however, insisted on his condition. *²³⁴ With Kanya's agreement, the negotiations continued and it was decided that they would be resume in Geneva. *²³⁵ On September 13, the Little Entente states met in Geneva, but nothing was accomplished.

The Hungarian view at the time was that even though the Little Entente states had agreed to bring up their national minority policies in international negotiations, "in their narrow-mindedness they failed to do the very thing they should have done, they failed to meet numerous just demands of their Hungarian minorities." *²³⁶

While this was going on, Janos Esterhazy was unceasingly lobbying the Prague government, demanding that the endless grievances of the Hungarian minority be remedied. On January 30, 1937, he submitted a question to Minister Derer compelling him to act on a question submitted earlier, in 1936, regarding the use of the Hungarian language in the court at Ersekujvar. On February 18, Esterhazy

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demanded government assistance to Hungarian college students. On February 18th, in the house agriculture committee, he demanded revision of the agricultural reform. On June 4, in a speech in parliament, he demanded establishment of a Hungarian university.

On June 15, Esterhazy was the first speaker in the debate of the government's bill about the authority of the governor of Subcarpathian Ruthenia. On June 19, he and Holota requested that the grievances of the small paprika growers be remedied. On June 21, at a demonstration by 8,000 United Hungarian Party supporters in Nyitra, he demanded autonomy for Slovakia. On October 6, Esterhazy declared, "the fulfillment of our rights can be achieved only through autonomy." On October 10, he submitted a question in parliament regarding the naming of a chief judge in the Rimaszombat district and demanded to know why are there no Hungarians appointed to leading positions in the judiciary. On November 10, Esterhazy questioned the Minister of Interior about the violation of Hungarian language rights in the Feled, Galanta and Ersekuivar districts. *²³⁷

It became clear by November, 1937, that in order to steer the German expansionist efforts towards the East, the Western powers became willing to accept Hitler's plans for the reorganization of Central Europe. This fact left its imprint on the whole continent. It affected every foreign policy move.

The Hungarian political leadership, too, was guided by this recognition in its negotiations. It was aware of the fact that the moderate policies it had pursued for a long time, especially with regard to territorial demands, particularly the efforts to have these demands satisfied in a peaceful and mutually acceptable fashion, would no longer satisfy the aggressive German policies, sanctioned by the Western powers. And that is what came to pass.

The Czechoslovak-Hungarian diplomatic negotiations from October through December, 1937, also demonstrated the same narrow-minded attitude of the Little Entente states, which we have noted before, in sharp contrast with the great patience that Foreign Minister Kanya had displayed in the matter of the Hungarian national minorities. That was conceded by not less a person than Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Krofta on October 17, 1937, to the Hungarian Minister in Prague. The Minister reported that Krofta "spoke with admiration about the great patience" displayed by Foreign Minister Kanya in this matter. *²³⁸ But this did not prevent two days later Kobr, the Czechoslovak Minister to Budapest, from telling Kanya that Czechoslovakia cannot accede to the demand of the Bardossy memorandum that the

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Prague government keep the promises it had made to Szullo and Esterhazy. Kobr used the occasion to attack Szullo and Esterhazy. *²³⁹

Two months later, on December 21, in a conversation with Gabor Apor, permanent deputy to the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Kobr asked Apor about his talks with French Foreign Minister Delbos who had stopped in Budapest on his tour of Central Europe. Delbos's moderating influence of the Little Entente states and his efforts at compromise were reflected in his own attitude. He stated his own view that "the question of the minorities must be solved, it is a matter of life or death for Czechoslovakia."

Delbos was certain about a Czech-German compromise and said that this would be automatically beneficial for the Hungarians, too. "If the Rumanians are not willing to go along," he said, "a bilateral solution may be possible, without their participation or, perhaps, together with the Yugoslavs." He always stressed, however, that these were his personal opinions. *²⁴⁰

This possibility was underscored by a report from the Hungarian charge d 'affaires ad interim in Prague. He reported that President Benes had briefed Austrian Minister Marek about his talks with Delbos and stated, among others, that "The national minorities may not be a subject of international negotiations, however Czechoslovakia may be willing to discuss the question with its friends (sic!): *²⁴¹

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It was against this background that leading Hungarian politicians traveled to Germany. Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, had just visited Hitler and Hitler, satisfied that England would not interfere with the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia, invited Prime Minister Kalman Daranyi and Foreign Minister Kalman Kanya to see how Hungary would react to such a move. It soon became apparent that Hitler had in mind a very active role for Hungary.

Daranyi and Kanya met with Goring first, on November 21. Goring criticized Hungary, for not taking a sufficiently decisive stand against a proposed vienna-Prague-Budapest bloc, or the rumored Hungarian offer of armed help to Austria in the event of a conflict between Austria and Germany.

Goring tried to intimidate the Hungarian statesmen to line them up behind the German plans. He said: "It is Hitler's opinion that the present generation of Hungarians must be content with taking an aggressive attitude in one direction (Czechoslovakia) and thus regain its lost territories." Rapport with Yugoslavia should be restored, even at cost of recognizing the present boundaries. There should be some modus vivendi found between Hungary and Rumania because, even though Hitler is not opposed to the Hungarian revisionist efforts, he thinks such moves should be postponed. Goring was a past master of playing off neighboring states against each other and manipulating them in the furtherance of German political goals.

Daranyi and Kanya met Hitler on November 25. Like Goring before him, Hitler, too, was pressing for action against Czechoslovakia. *²⁴² Even though the Hungarian delegation was emphasizing the identity of the German and Hungarian goals, the possibility of an Anschluss gave rise to deep concern among the Hungarians.

Meanwhile, the debate on the budget was continuing in the Prague parliament. The general debate was concluded on November 16,

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followed the next day by the debate of specific items. The Sudeten German politicians were to first to attack Hodza's address. Dr. Rosche, a Sudeten German Deputy, pointed out that "even though the Germans of Czechoslovakia were given the concept of the state they do not see the concept of the Fatherland. Relations with states which have national minorities living in Czechoslovakia, such as the Germans, Hungarians and Poles can be improved only after the Czechoslovak government umproves its relations with those nationalities," Rosche added.

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Janos Esterhazy also delivered a speech in response to the address by Hodza. "I have never heard such an empty, meaningless statement by a Prime Minister," he said. Regarding the condition of the national minorities, Esterhazy quoted from a speech the late President Masaryk had delivered on July 6, 1892, in Vienna: "Those of us in Bohemia will not rest as long as we must feel that we are only tolerated. The more educated our people becomes, the more it will be aware of the foreign rule and I must say that a government which fails to understand the spirit of a people represents a foreign rule."

Esterhazy then added, "We, Hungarians, who live here today, find ourselves in the same situation where the Czechs were at the time President Masaryk delivered that speech. Two full years have gone by since Prime Minister Hodza became head of the government. We have heard him say repeatedly that the condition of the minorities will be improved but, the truth be told, unfortunately there has been no tangible measure taken toward that end.

'There will be no domestic tranquility in this republic until a complete and radical solution is found for the problem of the minorities. It is in the interest of the state to find that solution as soon as possible. The solution to the problem of the minorities, in my opinion, depends primarily on the chauvinism of the present regime," said Esterhazy. Then he quoted a December 9, 1908, statement by Masaryk:

"Chauvinism is basically devoid of character. The chauvinist is willing to use any scoundrel who is willing to betray his people. The chauvinist keeps insisting on the purity of the race, the righteousness of thinking, but embraces even the most unprincipled individuals if they betray their race."

Esterhazy called on the government and the majority party to pay heed to Masaryk's words. And with reference to the so-called Hodza Plan, he called its promotion an exaggeration when the author

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of the plan cannot restore order even among the national minorities of the country entrusted to his care, while, at the same time, proposing a solution to the problems of the Danubian Basin.

Next, Esterhazy raised questions relating to Hungarian teacher training, the University of Pozsony, the issue of citizenship and the settling of disputes about language rights. 'If the Czechoslovak government truly wanted to create a peaceful atmosphere with Hungary, the Prime Minister should have paid more attention to our condition and many of the oft-stated promised should have been fulfilled. We have had more than enough statements and promises," said Janos Esterhazy. *²⁴³

In Part One, we mentioned Benes's broadcast at Christmas, 1937, when he promised once again a remedy for the grievances. We also noted that Derer, a Slovak cabinet minister with Czech sentiments, called Father Hlinka and his colleagues, rascals. We reviewed Beran's sensational proposal in the New Year's issue of the newspaper Venkop, suggesting that both the Sudeten German Party and the Slovak Peoples Party should be given a seat in the Prague government. And we quoted Henlein who had surveyed the previous 20 years and found that there are many dissatisfied Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians and Poles living in Czechoslovakia, and yet the government lacks any understanding.

The Prague government's response, as we know, was an even more vehement attack against the national minorities. At this stage, the Sudeten German Party sent emissaries to Father Hlinka in Rozsahegy (Ruzemborok) to discuss cooperation between the two parties. From there, the delegation went to Budapest. Before discussing that visit to Budapest, first a look at the overall situation in Central Europe and the conditions in Hungary.

The possibility of an impending Anschluss raised understandable concern in Hungarian government circles. The appearance of Hitler's might in the vicinity of the Hungarian border placed a severe restriction on the government's freedom of action. Therefore, in search for the best solution in a difficult situation, Kanya began looking once again at the concept of the "horizontal axis." Because even though the revision or the peace treaties it has deemed unjust remained one of the most important goals of the Hungarian government, it wanted to accomplish that by peaceful means, through mutual agreement, and never under conditions dictated by Germany. Nevertheless, it was already known that Hitler had assigned Hungary an active role in the summary solution of the Czechoslovak question.

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It was under these circumstances that in February, 1938, Regent Horthy paid a state visit to Warsaw. At a February 10 press conference in Warsaw, Foreign Minister Kanya declared: "The discussions were characterized on both sides by the bond of ancient friendship between the two nations. I consider that friendship of special value because of its significant contribution to the improvement of the atmosphere in the Danubian Basin, which is equally in the interest of both Hungary and Poland."

During the discussions of the "horizontal axis," Polish Prime Minister Beck made repeated references to the German threat, but Kanya emphasized that "in the event plans for a polish-Hungarian and Yugoslav-Italian combination were to come into being in order to establish a balance, it would pursue friendly policies toward Germany." *²⁴⁴ In connection with this plan, there began an active diplomatic effort to transfer Subcarpathian Ruthenia to Hungary and thus establish a common border between Hungary and Poland. This plan had the support of Italy, too.

In the course of discussions between the Hungarian Minister to Warsaw and French Minister Leon Noel, the French diplomat spoke in the most complimentary manner about "the moderate and intelligent conduct of Hungarian foreign policy." According to Kobylanski, chief of the political division in the Polish Foreign Ministry, "the Czechs, too, are recognizing the errors of their previous policies. Sooner or later, Prague will be compelled to make very far-reaching concessions to the Sudeten Germans and this will be accompanied by a solution of the Hungarian and Slovak questions, too. Whether Prague wants to or not, it will have to enter this path." *²⁴⁵

According to confidential information reaching Petrovich, the Hungarian consul in Pozsony, Sudeten German Deputy Frank had promised Father Hlinka that if the Slovak Peoples Party is willing occasionally, in certain matters, to cooperate with the Henlein Party and the United Hungarian Party against the government and thus form a joint opposion front of the national minorities against Prague, the Sudeten German Party would support the Hlinka group's demands for autonomy. The February 27 edition of the Slovak newspaper published statements by Henlein, Esterhazy and Pjescak, a Ruthenian deputy from Slovakia, about the questions of autonomy and communism, a statement which could be regarded as a manifestation of a united opposition front of the national minorities. *²⁴⁶

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On March 13, 1938, as it had been expected for quite some time, Hitler occupied Austria and annexed it to Germany. This move created a totally new situation for Hungary. Not only did the mighty German empire become a next-door neighbor across the country's western border, it also became a determining factor in the entire Danubian Basin. It became a factor which the peoples of the region had to deal with, whether they liked it or not. *²⁴⁷

Foreign Minister Kanya told the foreign affairs committee of the Hungarian parliament that "blood and territory" were the only things Hitler was interested in. The threat that Germany might draw much of Europe under its rule became increasingly apparent.*²⁴⁸

The Hungarian political leadership was trying to maintain a free hand as much as possible under those difficult circumstances. It tried to postpone any major decision to the time when it would be clear what commitments would serve its best interests. Hungary had hoped that London would play a greater role in European politics. That is why Hungary wanted to have diplomatic relations both with the Western powers and with Moscow, while maintaining its membership in the League of Nations. *²⁴⁹

Around May 20, Czechoslovakia ordered a partial mobilization along its borders with Germany and Hungary. Certain German troop movements were given as the reason. The mobilization created a tension between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. On May 30, Hitler approved the plans, code-named Fall Grun for a possible attack on Czechoslovakia. *²⁵⁰

It should be noted here that Hitler plans anticipated a very active role for Hungary and during their meeting in November, 1937, Hitler had promised Daranyi and Kanya that Slovakia would be turned over to Hungary. Kanya, however, had already stated that Hungary does not want to use force in support of its revisionist claims

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and does not want to trigger a war. At the same time, Kanya raised the possibility of a settlement with Yugoslavia. *²⁵¹

In pursuit of the political goals outlined earlier, the Hungarian government launched an intense diplomatic activity, partly to promote a rapprochement with the Little Entente, and toward Poland, Italy and Germany. Kanya and Polish Foreign Minister Beck had agreed that they would demand the same rights for their national minorities in Czechoslovakia as Germany was demanding for the Sudeten Germans.

While these diplomatic efforts were going on, Daranyi, who had been moving to the extreme right, was defeated as Prime Minister. He was succeeded by Bela Imredy. The negotiations with the Little Entente took place during his administration.

Getting back now to the situation in Slovakia, on a tour of Eastern Slovakia, Janos Esterhazy addressed the Hungarians of Saros and Zemplen counties, who gave him an enthusiastic reception. In a speech on February 22, he stressed that "autonomy is the joint demand of all the original inhabitants of Slovakia." In Szepsi, he pointed to "several recent statements on the part of the governing majority, expressing the desire for reconciliation with the national minorities. He noted that "the government has not yet carried out the February 18 agreement with the Germans, even less so with the Hungarians. There has been no trace yet of the promised reforms 'with the stroke of a pen.'" Esterhazy added that "the nationalities living in this land must join forces to secure their rights." *²⁵²

In an interview with the editor of the newspaper Slovak, Esterhazy was asked if he saw any parallels between the Hungarian and Slovak nationality policies. He replied: "Those who have been paying attention to the policies of the local Hungarian parties since the new state came into being, may see that their main goal has been to maintain the Hungarian nation in Slovakia, to nurture its national consciousness and to work for the full recognition and securing of their rights as guaranteed by international agreements. That is the basis of the parallel between the Slovak Peoples Party and our political movement," he added. *²⁵³

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We have noted in Part One that a delegation from the Sudeten German Party called on Father Hlinka in Rozsahegy (Ruzomberek) to discuss cooperation and to name liaison persons. From there, the delegation went to Budapest to explore the possibility of cooperation with the United Hungarian Party. Sudeten German deputies Kunzel and Frank held unofficial discussions with Tibor Pataky, Secretary of State in the Hungarian Prime Minister's office. They briefed Pataky of their negotiations with the Slovaks and told him of plans for a joint Slovak-Hungarian-German demonstration in Pozsony to mark the 20th anniversary of the Pittsburgh Agreement. The Sudeten German emissaries were also received by Daranyi and Kanya. At the request of Esterhazy, they also met former Prime Minister Istvan Bethlen.

As we have noted earlier, Janos Esterhazy also met with the leaders of the Slovak Peoples Party. On May 10, Szullo, Jaross and Esterhazy had an hour-long meeting with Prime Minister Hodza. On May 11, in a speech in parliament, Esterhazy demanded that the government honor the status quo of the national minorities. *²⁵⁵

The March 22 edition of the proceedings of the house of deputies included a question submitted by Esterhazy back in February, complaining of the lawless behavior of local government officials and gendarmerie in Kiralyhelmec. According to the question, similar acts of lawlessness had occurred, among others, in Czernochova, Boly, Ladmoc and Kaponya. *²⁵⁶

On March 29, Hodza announced in a broadcast speech that he will submit a proposal for a comprehensive law embracing all the rights of all the national minorities.

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On March 30, the United Hungarian Party issued an Appeal to the Hungarians of Slovakia, calling on "all Hungarians, regardless of social class or religion... We consider all Hungarians our brethren... The national minorities of the republic are uniting before our very eyes. The minority Germans have formed one camp, so have the minority Slovaks and Poles. Let us, minority Hungarians, join in our united camp!" The Appeal was signed by Dr. Geza Szullo, Dr. Janos Holota, Jozsef Szent-lvany, Dr. Mikios Pajor, Andor Jaross, Dr. Endre Korlath, Kalman Fussy, Dr. Bela Szilassy, Janos Esterhazy, Geza Porubszky, Karoly Hokky and Lajos Turcsanyi. *²⁵⁸

On April 1, 1938, in a dictatorial manner, the Minister of Interior banned all public assembly, with the obvious intent of preventing the opposition parties from informing the public of their program for the upcoming municipal elections. *²⁵⁹

On April 6, 1938, in an address to the house of deputies, Janos Esterhazy called parliamentary, provincial and municipal elections. *²⁶⁰

On Aprfl 8, the Hungarian charge d'affaires ad interim in London reported to Foreign Minister Kanya that statements made by Chamberlain in his March 24 speech are still regarded an expression of government policy. That means that England would not necessarily join France in an armed conflict in Czechoslovakia. *²⁶¹

On April 11, 1938, the permanent deputy to the Hungarian Foreign Minister instructed the Hungarian Minister in Berlin to inform the German Foreign Minister of "the firm intent of the Hungarian government to grant the widest autonomy to the Slovak and Ruthenian residents of the Highland in the event it were to be returned to Hungary." *²⁶²

In an effort to promote more moderate and conciliatory policies, on April 18, 1938, Kanya informed the Hungarian Minister to Bucharest that the situation has substantially changed since the

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September, 1937, meeting in Geneva with representatives of the Little Entente. The Czechs have drawn the appropriate conclusions from the altered situation and are preparing new legislature on the national minorities. The minorities are looking forward with great anticipation to the concessions to be granted by the Prague government. "We have to wait and see what the new legislature contains," Kanya said. *²⁶³

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On April 24, 1938, at a Sudeten German Party rally in Karlsbad, Henlein pointed out that in 1918, the Sudeten Germans had believed in President Wilson's principles of self-determination. That is why they have turned so many times to the League of Nations to complain over the violation of those principles, but to no avail. They have repeatedly tried to negotiate with the Prague government, also. Henlein summed up the Sudeten German demands in eight points:

1. The same legal rights and equal status for members of the German minority and the Czechs.

2. In securing of such equal status, recognition of the Sudeten German minority as a legal entity.

3. Designation and recognition of the territories inhabited by Germans.

4. Introduction of autonomous German administration in all spheres of life whenever the interests of the German minority are involved.

5. Introduction of legally valid measures to protect citizens who live outside their designated national minority territories.

6. Putting an end to the wrongs inflicted on the Sudeten Germans since 1918 and redress for the damages they have suffered.

7. Recognition and application of the principle that territories inhabited by Germans should be served by German officials.

8. Full freedom to declare adherence to the German nationality and German political philosophy. *²⁶⁴

The Sudeten German demands were rejected by the Czech news media. *²⁶⁵

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We have noted in Part One that the Pragai Magyar Hirlap, the official newspaper of the opposition, summed up the Hungarian demands. Following a sloppy and often erroneous publication in Narodny Listy, on May 11, the Hungarian newspaper reprinted the memorandum which had been submitted one month earlier to the Prime Minister's office by Andor Jaross and Janos Esterhazy.

It was emphasized in the memorandum that "these demands are not complete. They pertain to legal, cultural and economic matters and do not include the party's political program which embraces full equality and self-government for every nation in the republic, as well as territorial autonomy for Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia.

"Revision of the constitution, or drafting of a new constitution, is required to carry out this program, and that must be done with the participation of representatives of every nationality in the republic. We are convinced that only a complete and organic refurbishment of the state can secure a harmonious coexistence for the nations which make up Czechoslovakia; protecting the ethnic identity of each nationality, based on political, economic, cultural and social equality, free development and equal opportunity that will form the fundations for peaceful relations among Czechoslovakia's nationalities.

"This great, comprehensive, truly historic effort must be preceded by an internal national reconciliation to restore the fully Hungarian character of the Hungarian minority."

The demands contained in this memorandum outline this preliminary task in full detail in 81 points. The parliamentary forum had summed these up in general terms in 12 points.

The article emphasized that the present program and political goals of the United Hungarian Party are identical with the program established by the party's predecessors nearly 20 years earlier. if the government were to agree to the 81 points, it would restore the national

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status quo without which any solution to the Hungarian question would be nothing but a worthless document written in a vacuum. *²⁶⁶

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