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DIPLOMACY IN A WHIRLPOOL |
IV-THE SECOND WORLD WAR
1 Ciano's notes in his diaries describe the situation in some detail. "The
Hungarians do not wish to yield to the demand. They are aware that this is a
prelude to an actual occupation of the country. And they are right. On my
return from Salzburg I indicated to the Duce that the Germans were using the
same language to the Hungarians that they used six months previously to Poland:
querelles D'Allemands. I accompanied Villani [Baron Frederick Villani, Minister
of Hungary to Italy] to the Duce. Villani is extremely anti-German. He talked
clearly. He spoke of the menace that would weigh upon the world, including
Italy, if Germany won the war. In Vienna they are already singing a song which
says, 'What we have we shall hold onto tightly, and tomorrow we shall go to
Trieste'. Hatred against Italy is always alive in the German mind, even though
the Axis had for a time lulled this hatred to sleep. The Duce was shaken. He
advised the Hungarians to turn down the German demand as courteously as they
can." The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943, September 9, 1939.
2 When Villani reported to Ciano that the Hungarian Government had denied the
right of passage to German forces, Ciano noted: "I believe that this refusal
will not be forgotten by the Germans and that at some time or other the
Hungarians will have to pay for it." Ibid., September 11, 1939. Later in the
month he summarized his information about Hungary: "In spite of the state of
alarm there is a good deal of calm and as much decision to fight in case the
Germans should want to invade the country. Teleki calls Hitler a gangster . . .
" Ibid., September 25, 1939.
206
Horthy shared Teleki's views. Ulrich von Hassel noted in his diaries that
Horthy most openly expressed his absolute rejection of Hitler and his methods
and that Hitler had tried to treat Horthy A la Schuschnigg and Hacha, but that
his attempt had misfired. The Von Hassel Diaries (New York, 1947), p. 86.
"Bekanntlich zeigte Hitler nie besondere Vorliebe fur Ungarn. Er hatte Ungarn
seine "schlappe Haltung" 1938 und die Verweigerung des Durchtransportes von
Truppen wahrend des polnischen Feldzuges schwer verubelt". Erich Kordt, op.
cit., p. 308.
3 One of the leading Hungarian pro-Nazi newspapers announced in huge headlines
that "Stalin is divorcing his Jewish wife".
4 The Ciano Diaries, December 23, 1939.
5 Ibid., January 6-7, 1940.
6 Csaky requested Ciano to inform the Rumanians of the following: "If Russia
attacks Rumania and Rumania resists sword in hand, Hungary will adopt an
attitude of benevolent neutrality towards Rumania. On the other hand, Hungary
would immediately intervene should one of the three following cases arise: (1)
the massacre of the minorities; (2) Bolshevik revolution in Rumania; (3)
Cession by Rumania of national territory to Russia and Bulgaria without
fighting. Csaky added that even in that case nothing will be done without
previous consultation and agreement with Italy." Ciano's Diplomatic Pepers, p.
331.
7 The Ciano Diaries, March 25, 1940.
8 Ibid., March 28, 1940.
3 Ibid., April 8, 1940.
10 Ibid., April 9, 1940.
11 Before the occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, Molotov assured
the German Government that the Soviet Union "simply wished to pursue its own
interests and had no intention of encouraging other states (Hungary, Bulgaria)
to make demands on Rumania". Nazi-Soviet Relations (Washington 1948), p. 160.
12 According to Hungarian documents, Hitler made statements in this regard to
Sztojay on February 1, 1941, and to Bardossy on March 21, 1941. Hitler told
Bardossy that the Rumanians asked for a quick German intervention because of
the preparations of the Red Army to cross the Danube. Cf. P. Groza, In
Umbra Celulei (Bucuresti, 1945), p. 276.
13 The Ciano Diaries, August 28, 1940.
14 Ibid., August 29, 1940.
15 An area of 43,492 square kilometers with a population of 2,600,000 was
reattached to Hungary. According to the Hungarian censuses of 1910 and 1941,
the number of Hungarians exceeded the Rumanians in this territory, while the
Rumanian census of 1930 indicated a slight Rumanian majority.
Following the delivery of the award, Csaky and Ribbentrop signed a treaty
assuring special rights to the German minority in Hungary. With the conclusion
of this treaty the problem of the German citizens of Hungary ceased to be
exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the Hungarian state. For the
text of the treaty see, Matthias Annabring "Das ungarlandische Deutschtum",
SudostStimmen, II (March, 1952), 13-14. For Teleki's attitude in the crisis see
Richard V. Burks, "Two Teleki Letters", Journal of Central European Affairs, 7
(1947), pp. 68-70. It should be noted, however, that Burks' evaluation of
Teleki's motives is not quite correct.
16 Molotov considered the Italo-German guarantee to Rumania, with respect to
her national territory, as a justification for the supposition that this action
was directed against the U.S.S.R. For the pertinent exchange of notes see,
NaziSoviet Relations 1939-1941 (Washington, 1948), pp. 178-194.
207
DIPLOMACY IN A WHIRLPOOOL
17 It should be noted that at the present time, Soviet Russia keeps an army in
Hungary to assure the lines of communications vith Russian troops stationed in
Austria. This, however, was authorized by Article 22 of the peace treaty of
February 10, 1947.
18 The Government was violently attacked by the opposition in both houses of
parliament because of this step. Count Stephen Bethlen and Tibor Eckhardt
strongly criticized this move. The Hungarian Minister to Washington, John
Pelenyi, resigned in protest.
19 Cf. A. Ullein-Reviczky, Guerre Allemande Paix Russe: le drame Hongrois,
(Neuchatel, 1947), pp. 71-73.
20 Hitler had summoned the Hungarian Minister to Germany on the day following
the night of the putsch and had offered Hungary "the most enticing pieces of
Yugoslav territory". He even dangled Fiume - which incidentally was Italian
territory before the Hungarians. The Von Hassel Diaries, p. 183.
21 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military
Tribunal, Vol. VII (Nuremberg, 1947), p. 257.
22 Ibid., p. 331.
23 Ibid., pp. 331-333.
24 One of the best English experts on Danubian Europe summed up Teleki's
activities in the following way: "Teleki had the terrible task of steering
Hungary through the first two years of the Second World War. Although Central
Europe was now completely dominated by Germany, and although Hungary had
received two pieces of territory from her neighbors as a German present, Teleki
fought stubbornly to retain some measure of independence for his country. His
efforts compare favourably with those of Roumania in the same period. When
resistance was no longer possible and his own Regent and General Staff betrayed
him, Teleki took the classical way out". Hugh Seton-Watson, Eestern Europe
Between the Wars 1918-1941 (Cambridge, 1945). p. 196. It is necessary to note
that Horthy did not betray Teleki but that he himself was betrayed by the Chief
of the Hungarian General Staff. It is another question that, under the
circumstances, Horthy tolerated such betrayals.
25 Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston, 1950), p. 168. Cf.
Richard V. Burks, loc. cit., pp. 71-73.
26 After the war the American authorities extradited Bardossy to the new
Hungarian regime. He was sentenced to death by the people's court in Budapest
and was executed.
27 Hungarian troops occupied the Bacska, the triangle of Baranya and two small
territories along the river Mura. The size of these areas was 11,475 square
kilometers, with a mixed population of about one million. More than one third,
the largest segment of the population, was Hungarian, and the rest Serbs,
Germans, Croats, Rumanians, and other nationalities.
28 For details see, A. Ullein-Reviczky, op. cit., pp. 101-107. Kassa actually
was bombed by German planes. Cf. Erich Kordt, Wahn und Wirklichkeit (Stuttgart,
1948), p. 308. An officer of the Hungarian Air Force, Adam Krudy, stated in a
report to the prime minister that German planes bombed Kassa, but he was
silenced by Bardossy. Cf. Horthy, op. cit., pp. 235-237.
29 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military
Tribunal, Vol. VII (Nuremberg, 1947), p. 335.
30 The British note was handed to Bardossy on November 29, 1941, by the
American Minister to Hungary. It read as follows "The Hungarian Government has
for many months been pursuing aggressive military operations on the territory
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, ally of Great Britain, in closest
collaboration with Germany, thus participating in the general European war and
making substantial contribution to the German war effort. In these
circumstances His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom finds it neces
208
IVTHE SECOND WORLD WAR
sary to inform the Hungarian Government that unless by December five the
Hungarian Government has ceased military operations and has withdrawn from all
active participation in hostilities, His Majesty s Government will have no
choice but to declare the existence of a state of war between the two
countries".
31 Bardossy's record of his conversation with Pell and Travers is among the
unpublished files of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry.
The British ultimatum was delivered to Finland, Hungary and Rumania as a
result of Stalin's repeated and pressing appeal. Prime Minister Churchill tried
in vain to convince Stalin that the declaration of war against these countries
would not be beneficial to the Allied cause. Churchill explained to Stalin in
his telegram of November 4, 1941, that these countries "have been overpowered
by Hitler and used as a cat's-paw, but if fortune turns against that ruffian
they might easily come back to our side. A British declaration of war would
only freeze them all and make it look as if Hitler were the head of a grand
European alliance solid against us. Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance
(Boston, 1950), pp. 528, 533.
32 Bardossy's instructions sent to the Hungarian Ministers in Berlin and Rome
on December 11 and 12, show how he tried to avoid an involvement in war with
the United States. See Appendix, Documents 4 and 5.
33 Cordell Hull, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1114, 1175-1176. Cf. Documents on
American Foreign Relations, Vol. IV (1942), pp. 123-124.
34 Filippo Anfuso, Du Palais de Venise au Lac de Garde (Paris, 1949), p.
221.
35 For Hungary's military participation in the second world war, see Jeno
Czebe and Tibor Petho Magyarorszag a masodik vilaghaboruban (Budapest, 1946).
36 This was the figure established by the investigating inter-ministerial
committee appointed by the Kallay government in 1943. Serbian sources greatly
exaggerated the number of the victims. Although the local population had
nothing to do with the massacres, Tito's partisans in 1944-45, tortured,
murdered and deported innocent Hungarians by thousands. In some villages the
Hungarian population was completely wiped out and the victims greatly
outnumbered those of Ujvidek and Zsablya.
37 The most important of these were Andor Szentmiklossy and Aladar
Szegedy-Maszak. The former took Ghyczy's old place as secretary general of the
Foreign Office, while Szegedy-Maszak had charge of the political division.
Under the German occupation both of them were imprisoned by the Gestapo.
Szentmiklossy met a cruel death at Dachau in February, 1945. Szegedy-Maszak was
liberated there by American troops. He became Hungarian Minister to the United
States in January, 1946, and resigned in June, 1947.
38 The present writer was in charge of this work in this division. The
framework of the peace preparations was outlined in a memorandum drafted by
Szegedy-Maszak in the spring of 1943 and approved by a small committee
appointed by Prime Minister Kallay. The most prominent members of this body
were Count Stephen Bethlen and the Minister of Interior, Ferenc Keresztes
Fischer.
39 Vilmos Nagy was minister of national defense from September, 1942 until
June, 1943. He became the target of extreme rightist attacks and his liberal
attitude was strongly objected to by Germany. Kallay probably wanted to appease
Hitler in dismissing Nagy, while continuing his orientation toward the Western
powers. In an interesting volume, published under the title Fatal Years in
Hungarian, Nagy recorded his experiences displaying some bitterness toward
209
Horthy and Kallay. Vegzetes Esztendok 1938-1945 (Budapest, 1947). Mussolini's
envoy to Hungary, in his memoirs, described how the Axis Powers obtained Nagy's
dismissal from Kallay. F. Anfuso, op. cit., pp. 241-242.
40 Eugene Levai, Black Book on the Martyrdom of Hungarian Jewry (Zurich and
Vienna, 1948), p. 73.
41 The leader of the Small-Landholder Party, Tibor Eckhardt, left Hungary in
1941 for the United States. He was deprived of his citizenship by the Bardossy
government. The Smallholders Party submitted a memorandum to Prime Minister,
Kallay, in July, 1943, which violently attacked cooperation with Germany,
demanded the withdrawal of all Hungarian troops from Russia and the
reestablishment of Hungary's neutral and independent status, if necessary by
fighting against the German army. The author of this memorandum, Endre
Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, later organized a plot against the Szalasi regime and was
executed in December, 1944. See pp. 84, 91. On the other hand, the right wing
of the government party demanded of Kallay the liquidation of the left wing
opposition parties and newspapers and pursuance of an absolutely pro-German
policy. They suggested that a German defeat would be followed by Bolshevization
of Central Europe and did not think that the Western powers could or would
hinder such developments. For the text of the rightist memorandum, see,
Ullein-Reviczky, op. cit., pp. 157-164.
42 "It is a strange fact that Hungary, where Reaction and Terror were
introduced earlier, and where the people had fewer rights and liberties,
retained longer than any other Eastern European State remnants of Liberalism.
Even after the outbreak of war with Russia, newspapers such as the Liberal
Magyar Nemzet published articles criticizing the New Order; the Liberal leader
Rassay and the Social Democrats attacked the government in Parliament, and
members of the former "March Front" openly discussed the formation of a Popular
Front. One of these intellectuals even wrote an article declaring that Hungary
in 1941 needed political liberty and national independence, and that these
could be obtained only by a revolution of peasants and workers.... All of this
is of little importance to the war effort of the United Nations, but it shows
that the rulers of Hungary, who have reduced to the minimum their contribution
to the Axis, are not 'Quislings' in the same sense as Antonescu, Pavelic or
even Boris.', Hugh Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 197. Cf. J. F. Montgomery,
Hungary the Unwilling Satellite (New York, 1947).
43 He was murdered by Soviet soldiers in March, 1945, while defending women
who sought refuge from the Red Army in the episcopal residence.
44 One of the leaders of the pro-Polish organization was Monsignor Bela Varga,
chairman of the National Assembly in 1946-1947, now in exile in the United
States and President of the Hungarian National Council. Cf. Les Refugies
Polonais en Hongrie pendant la Guerre (Budapest, 1946). Cf. Ecclesia (Roma),
September 1, 1943.
45 Cf. Refuge en Hongrie 1941-1945 (Paris, 1946), published by the escaped
French war prisoners
46 Cf. Hungarian Economic Resistance Against German Penetration (Budapest,
1946). This booklet describes the principal means and results of economic
resistance.
47 For the postwar fate of this hoard, see pp. 132-133.
48 German economic envoy for southeastern Europe.
49 The Goebbels Diaries 1942-1943 (Washington, 1948), Louis P. Lochner ed. and
trans., entry of March 5, 1942.
50 Memorandum of the conversation between the Fuehrer and the Duce, with
Ribbentrop and Ciano also present, at Klessheim near Salzburg, April 29 1942.
Bulletin, XV (1946), 59.
210
IV THE SECOND WORLD WAR
51 See p. 39.
52 Paul Schmidt, Hitler's Interpreter (New York, 1951), pp. 205-206. Cf. note
71 , on p. 203.
53 Ibid., p. 244. As to Hitler's encouragements given to Antonescu concerning
the ultimate fate of Transylvania, see Trial of the Major War Criminals Vol.
VII (Nuremberg, 1947), p. 322.
54 Cf. p. 47.
55 Ciano Diaries, August 25, 26, 27, 29, 1942. Mussolini considered the plan
as part of an anti-German conspiracy which would have caused a crisis in
Italo-German relations. For the details of the affair see, F. Anfuso, op. cit.,
pp. 230-231.
56 Ciano Diaries, November 5, 1942.
57 The article of the New York Times, September 30, 1943 is not accurate in
this respect.
68 The Von Hassel Diaries, p. 346.
59 The account of these negotiations, published in the city edition of the New
York Times on February 5, 1945, by C. L. Sulzberger, is erroneous in some of
its points. Mr. Sulzberger states that: "An Armistice between the Hungarian
Government's envoys and the United Nations was secretly signed on a motor-boat
in the Bosporus at midnight of September 9, 1943. The British Ambassador to
Turkey, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, acted as the Allied Plenipotentiary and
an official of the Budapest Foreign Office was sent especially on a clandestine
mission to conclude this armistice". The truth is that in this period of the
war the military situation did not make possible the conclusion of an armistice
treaty with Hungary.
60 For Hitler's reaction, see p. 76.
61 The negotiations conducted at Stockholm are described by the former
Hungarian Minister to Sweden, A. Ullein-Reviczky, op. cit.
62 For the Hungarian reaction to it, see pp.66-67.
63 F. Anfuso, op. cit., p. 240.
64 For the Rumanian armistice negotiations, see, Alexander Cretzianu "Rumanian
Armistice Negotiations: Cairo, 1944", Journal of Central European Affairs, 11
(1951), 243-258. F. C. Nano, "The First Soviet Double Cross", Ibid., 12 (1952),
236-258.
65 The passage of the note relevant here ran as follows:
"Die koniglich ungarische Regierung wird zweck baldiger und vollstandiger
Losung der Judenfrage in Europa gebeten auch ihrerseits in Ungarn entsprechende
Massnahmen baldmoglichst in die Wege zu leiten. Die bisherigen Ansatze in
dieser Richtung werden deutscherseits begrusst. Sie sind allerdings noch weit
davon entfernt, mit der Entwicklung in Deutschland und anderen Staaten Euro pas
Schritt zu halten. Alle Umstande sprechen dafur diese Frage noch wahrend des
Krieges zu einem endgultigen Abschluss zu bringen. Es handelt sich dabei nicht
um ein deutsches, sondern um ein gesamteuropaisches Interesse...."
"Nach deutscher Auffassung waren daher folgende Massnahmen in Ungarn
zweckmassigerweise zu ergreifen:
1) Die Juden auf dem Wege fortschreitender Gesetzgebung unterschiedslos aus
dem kulturellen und wirschaftlichen Leben auszuschalten.
2) Durch sofortige Kennzeichnung aller Juden die entsprechenden
Regierungsmassnahmen zu erleichtern und dem Volk die Moglichkeit zu klarer
Distanzierung zu verschaffen.
3) Die Aussiedlung und den Abtransport nach dem Osten vorzubereiten".
211
66 According to Sztojay's report, Luther added details about the settling of
the Jews in other countries. He warmly praised Slovakia, where the ]ast of the
Jews were being deported. He referred to the considerable number of Jews
deported from Rumania. He extolled the severe measures taken by Bulgaria, as,
for instance, the compulsory wearing of the yellow star badge. Almost no Jews
were left in Yugoslavia. Only difficulties in transportation prevented Croatia
from completely executing their deportation laws. The Laval government of
unoccupied France was anxious to secure German help for the deportation of the
Jews. According to Luther, they were just being extradited across the
demarcation line.
67 Trial of the Major War Criminals, Vol. X (Nuremberg. 1947), p. 135. For the
details of Hitler's and Ribbentrop's threats in the Jewish question, see Levai,
op. cit., pp. 31-36. He published the full report of the Hungarian Minister to
Germany on the discussions with Ribbentrop.
68 The April 18, 1943, entry in the Goebbels Diaries summarized Horthy's visit
in the following way: "Horthy's visit on the Obersalzberg has come to an end.
On the first day it was conducted in a very heated atmosphere. The Fuehrer
minced no words and especially pointed out to Horthy how wrong were his
policies both in general and especially with reference to the conduct of the
war and the question of the Jews. The Fuehrer was very outspoken. He charged
the Hungarians with having tried to contact the enemy via Spain and Portugal.
Horthy denied this but that did not help him very much.
"On the second day the conversations were more normal. A communique was
drafted similar to the one on Antonescu's visit. On the insistence of the
Hungarians, however, the passage about our fight against the western
plutocracies was eliminated. I suppose the Hungarians believe that in the house
of a man who has been hanged one should not talk about rope!" (p. 335.)
In the following period the Goebbels Diaries reflect the growing German anger
against Hungary: "Horthy heard very little in the way of pleasant things from
the Fuehrer. But he does not seem to have taken this very much to heart for he
has so far fulfilled none of the promises he made on the Obersalzberg". (May 7,
1943, p. 352.)
69 Goebbels noted in his diaries that: "The Jewish question is being solved
least satisfactorily by the Hungarians. The Hungarian state is permeated with
Jews, and the Fuehrer did not succeed during his talk with Horthy in convincing
the latter of the necessity of more stringent measures. Horthy himself, of
course, is badly tangled up with the Jews through his family, and will continue
to resist every effort to tackle the Jewish problem aggressively. He gave a
number of humanitarian counterarguments which of course don't apply at all to
this situation. You just cannot talk humanitarianism when dealing with Jews.
Jews must be defeated. The Fuehrer made every effort to win Horthy over to his
standpoint but succeeded only partially." (May 8, 1943, p. 357.)
70 Cf. p. 69.
71 A few days before Horthy's visit, Nazi experts prepared a memorandum
containing alternatives for absorption of Hungary. See Appendix, Document 6.
72 Paul Schmidt, op. cit., p. 271. For a description of these events, see
Horthy, op. cit., pp. 262-268.
73 Hitler mentioned this possibility to Prime Minister Teleki in July, 1940,
and intended to apply such harsh measures against Hungary in 1944. C.f. Walter
Hagen, Die Geheime Front (Linz-Wien, 1950), pp. 344-348. Hagen's book contains
a comprehensive, but in many ways inaccurate chapter on the anti-German
Hungarian actions and the German counter-measures. The author himself was a
member of the German secret service.
212
IVTHE SECOND WORLD WAR
74 For the extermination of Hungarian Jewry by the Nazis and for the various
rescue actions, see Levai, op. cit., pp. 77-475. Levai collected and published
in four volumes material concerning the fate of Hungarian Jewry. These volumes
were published in Hungarian (Budapest, 1946): Black Book on the Sufferings of
Hungarian jews; Grey Book on the Rescue Actions for Hungarian Jews; White Book
on the International Rescue Actions; History of the Ghetto of Budapest. Two
publications in Hungarian review the activities of the Catholic and Protestant
churches. In the matter see, Albert Bereczky, A magyar protestantizmus a
zsidouldozes ellen: Hungarian Protestantism against the Persecution of Jews
(Budapest, 1945); Antal Meszlenyi, A magyar katolikus egyhaz es az emberi jogok
vedelme: The Hungarian Catholic Church and the Protection of Human Rights
(Budapest, 1947). For the underground activities of former Opposition
politicians under the German occupation, see, Imre Kovacs, D'une occupation
Ö l'autre (Paris, 1949), pp. 1-83.
75 The rank of the secretary of state in the Hungarian state organization
corresponded to the British under-secretary of state.
76 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Tribunal, Vol. IV
(Nuremberg, 1947), p. 367.
77 Levai, op. cit., pp. 235-240.
78 More than 3000 gendarmes were brought to Budapest to deport the Jews. The
Regent however, secretly concentrated reliable troops around Budapest, and, on
July 8, the gendarmes were ordered to leave the capital.
79 For details, see, Levai, op. cit., pp. 197-246.
80 This tireless and courageous diplomat mysteriously disappeared a few months
later during Russian occupation while attempting to return to Sweden. Cf. Jeno
Levai, Raoul Wallenberg, hjalten i Budapest; autentisk skildring av Kungl.
Svenska beskickningens i Budapest raddningsaktion 1944-1945 (Stockholm, 1948).
In November, 1952, King Gustav Adolf awarded Wallenberg a high decoration for
his humanitarian work in Budapest. Allegedly he is still alive in a Russian
labor camp. Cf. Judith Listowel, "Diplomats Behind Bars" East Europe and Soviet
Russia, VIII (November 20, 1952), pp. 7-10.
81 In reality: "During July, 1944, Hungarian Jews were being liquidated at the
rate of 12,000 daily; and as the crematoria could not deal with such numbers,
many bodies were thrown into large pits and covered with quicklime." Trial of
the Major War Criminals, Vol. III (Nuremberg, 1947), p. 567.
82 Ibid.. pp. 502-503.
83 Cf. Imre Kov_cs, op. cit., pp. 38-52.
84 Cf. Hagen, op. cit., p. 370.
85 After the occupation of Hungary the Germans demanded that the entire
Hungarian Army should attack the Red Army under German leadership. The
commander-in-chief of the first Hungarian Army, General Stephen Naday, objected
to this plan and proposed that the Hungarian Army should establish a firm line
of defense in the eastern Carpathians. Naday was removed and the Hungarian Army
was ordered to attack the Red Army beyond the Carpathians south of the Dneister
river. Cf. Czebe and Petho, op. cit., pp. 44-45 Erich Kordt noted: "Man hatte
es deutscherseits versaumt, rechtzeitig die Karpatenpasse zu besetzen, was
selbst nach dem Abfall Rumaniens noch moglich gewesen ware." Op. cit., p.
387.
For the operations of the Red Army, see W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff The
Russian Campaigns of 1944-45 (London, 1946). John A. Lukacs, "Political
Expediency and Soviet Russian Military Operations", Journal of Central European
Affairs, VIII (1949), 390-411.
213
86 Cf. Hagen, op. cit., p. 368.
87 The members of the delegation were General Gabor Faragho, supervisor of the
Hungarian gendarmery; Count Geza Teleki, professor of geography and son of the
late Count Paul Teleki, and Domokos Szentivanyi, a high official of the Foreign
Ministry. The delegation crossed the Hungarian frontiers to Slovakia on
September 28, 1944.
88 Otto Skorzeny, Secret Missions (New York, 1951), p. 193.
89 Hagen, op. cit., pp. 372-373.
90 The text of the proclamation has been published by J. F. Montgomery, op.
cit., pp. 236-238.
91 Skorzeny in his book described the occupation of the Royal Castle Hill and
his other activities in these days. Op. cit., pp. 193-218. His story is
inaccurate in some of its major points. Cf. Regent Horthy's statement in the
Figaro, June 13, 1950. For another German version of these events, see Rudolf
Rahn, Ruheloses Leben (Dusseldorf, 1949), pp. 262-273.
92 A poster announced to the Hungarian army: "Miklos Horthy hireling of the
Jews, traitor and former Regent of Hungary, has broken the oath he has taken to
the nation and you. From the moment of his treachery he is no longer your
Commander-in-Chief. As he broke his oath, he must be arrested. . . . As from
today Ferenc Szalasi is the responsible leader of Hungary. From this moment on
your oath is binding to him as the saviour of the nation. . ."
93 Important Declarations of Dr. Justinian Cardinal Seredi (Budapest, 1946),
pp. 5-11.
94 For some details, see Wisliceny's deposition at Nuremberg. Trials of the
Major War Criminals, Vol. IV (Nuremberg, 1947), pp. 369-370. Cf. Levai, op.
cit., pp. 371-379.
95 Leai published the texts of the notes of the neutral powers and described
the various actions and their results. Op. cit., pp. 354-361. According to his
calculations 124,000 Jews survived the ordeal in Budapest and 105,453 perished.
From the provinces all the Jews were deported and thus the total loss of Jewish
lives in Hungary reached the figure of 618,000. Op. cit., pp. 469-474.
96 Cf. Imre Kovacs, op. cit., pp. 68-83.
97 Hagen, op. cit., p. 380.
98 Cf. Antal Meszlenyi, op. cit., p. 30.
V-CHAOS: AN INTERLUDE
1 This conversation between Eden and Roosevelt took place in Washington on
March 14, 1943. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York, 1948), p.
711.
2 For the evaluations of war damages see, Economic Rehabilitation in Hungary,
Operational Analysis Papers, No. 47. UNRRA European Regional Office (London,
1947), pp. 8, 37-46. For the losses of agricultural machinery and livestock,
see Agriculture and Food in Hungary. Operational Analysis Paper, No. 33.
(London, 1947), pp. 11-12.
3 See p. 79 and note 37 on p. 209.
4 Cf. pp. 118-119.
5 See chapter X.
214
NOTES TO PART TWO
VI-SOVIET AND WESTERN POLITICS
1 As related above, the provisional armistice agreement signed by the
representatives of Regent Horthy in Moscow on October 11, 1944, was invalidated
by the subsequent Nazi putsch, and seizure of power. Thus a second Hungarian
armistice delegation appointed by the provisional National Assembly, made the
trip to Moscow and signed the definitive armistice agreement on January 20
1945. See p. 129. For the list of the provisional Hungarian Government, see
Appendix, Document 7, and for the text of the armistice agreement, Appendix,
Document 8.
2 See below, Chapter IX.
3 In reference to the negotiations concerning the nature and functions of the
Allied Control Commissions for the Axis satellites, Cordell Hull explained: "We
felt that the Control Councils should act under instructions of the Soviet High
Command only during the military period, which would come to an end with the
termination of hostilities against Germany. Between that time and the
conclusion of peace with the satellites, we felt that the three Allied
Governments should have equal participation in the work of the commissions, and
that their representatives should be able to report directly to their
respective Governments." The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. II (New York, 1949),
p. 1461. Cf. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians (New York,
1949), pp. 43, 65, 87.
4 H. F. A. Schoenfeld, "Soviet Imperialism in Hungary," Foreign Affairs 26
(1948), 555.
5 Article 18 is identical in the Bulgarian and Hungarian armistice agreements.
The corresponding article of the earlier concluded Rumanian armistice agreement
revealed Soviet intentions more clearly, for it simply stated that an Allied
Control Commission "will undertake until the conclusion of peace the regulation
of and control over the execution of the present terms under the general
direction and orders of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, acting on behalf of
the Allied Powers". As a result of American diplomatic efforts in Moscow
paragraph 2 was added to article 18 in the Bulgarian and Hungarian armistice
agreements and it restricted Soviet chairmanship to the period of hostilities
against Germany.
6 There then followed a reference to "Annex I", the rather vague text of a
letter transmitted on July 12, 1945, to the representatives of the U.S. and
U.K. Governments on the ACC in Hungary. For its text, see Appendix, Document
9.
7 New York Times, August 10, l945.
8 Art. 6. c. Bulletinn XVI (1947), 1161.
9 For material concerning some aspects of the relations between the American
and Russian members of the ACC in Hungary, see Hal Lehrman, Russia's Europe
(New York. 1947), pp. 192-195.
10 For details, see Ferenc Nagy, The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain (New
York, 1948), pp. 240-244.
11 See p. 157. Cf. Background Information on the Soviet Union in International
Relations. Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs pursuant to H. Res. 206,
81st Congress, 2d Session (Washington, 1950).
12 I complained once to a Soviet diplomat about the vague terms of the
215
armistice agreement. During the ensuing conversation he explained to me that
the first Russian draft was about 60 pages long and a very precise document.
The competent section of the Soviet foreign office was instructed to reduce the
text several times until it reached its present size, but the short version
still had to include the content of the first draft. Thus the ambiguous text of
the armistice agreement might not have been an accidental circumstance, but
part of a premeditated plan.
13 The ACC for Italy was established in November, 1943, and was abolished on
January 31, 1947. Bulletin, XI (1944), 137-138 and Bulletin, XVI, (1947),
1258.
14 Molotov, for example, complained about this situation at Potsdam. See James
F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York, 1947), p. 74.
15 John C. Campbell, The United States in World Affairs 1945-1947 (New York,
1947, 1947), pp. 52-54. For further details, see United States and Italy
1936-1946, Documentary Record (Washington, 1946).
16 William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York, 1950), pp. 369-370.
17 Ibid, pp. 378-379.
18 Ibid., p. 380. Cf. William Hillman, Mr. President (New York, 1952), pp.
114-116.
19 Philip E. Mosely "The Occupation of Germany New Light on How the Zones
Were Drawn", Foreign Affairs, 28 (1950), 604.