DIPLOMACY IN A WHIRLPOOL

X. THE PEACE PREPARATORY WORK (1945-1946)

Frustrated Beginnings.

Preparations of a defeated country for a peace treaty are never easy. But they were particularly difficult for those countries occupied successively by the German and the Soviet Army. The people of free nations understandably enough may be unable to appreciate the nature and intricacies of problems for which such countries had to find solutions. The Department of State, in a voluminous text, has published much of the data concerning the peace preparatory work in Washington during the Second World War.¹ Similar work, however, was of an entirely different character in the satellites.

In Hungary foreign politics were begun from scratch and the Foreign Ministry was organized anew. Foreign Minister Gyongyosi, an old member of the Smallholders Party, was previously editor of an opposition newspaper in the country. He signed the armistice agreement in Moscow and in the Debrecen period of the new regime thought that post-war Hungary first of all had to win the confidence of the Soviet Union and her Allies, and that then things might turn for the better. He particularly hoped that the Red Army would evacuate the country and that the Soviet Union would eventually become a huge market for Hungarian industrial products, thus making possible the much needed expansion of Hungarian industry and the opening of new opportunities for the surplus agrarian population.

At the outset Gyongyosi showed little interest in diplomacy in general or in preparation for the peace conference in particular.² Within a short time, however, he changed his views. As soon as the Foreign Ministry moved from Debrecen to Budapest, Gyongyosi gradually realized the utter impossibility of initiating any serious activity in foreign affairs without specialists. The newly appointed officials of the Foreign Ministry belonged to various political parties and had neither knowledge nor experience of foreign affairs. Thus the Foreign Minister had to rely increasingly on officials of the Horthy regime. His initial suspicion was somewhat mitigated, since most of these officials were active anti-Nazis and went through the screening procedure without much difficulty. Encouraged by this trend, some of the younger Hungarian diplomats became optimistic, and prepared sarious projects for the establishment of an up-to-date foreign service.

At the end of May, 1945, I was asked by the Foreign Minister to

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organize and supervise a division of the Ministry the function of which would be to prepare the Hungarian case for the peace conference. I undertook this work in a devastated and occupied country under the most difficult political and technical circumstances.

The Foreign Ministry began its work in one of the stripped tenement houses of Budapest. The peace treaty division occupied all of three rooms. Since the former building of the Ministry and all its contents had been destroyed during the siege, it was necessary to begin work without files and documents. Office equipment was not available at all for a while and even desks and chairs presented a problem, not to mention such technical items as typewriters. Furthermore, there was no transportation, and undernourished officials had to walk several miles from their homes. As late as autumn 1945, officials on their way home in the evening were occasionally robbed by Soviet soldiers. Fuel was scarce. For example, during the winter of 1945-46, many civil servants worked in offices without windows and without heat. To add to their hardships, their entirely insufficient salaries made it necessary to fight against inflation for their own physical survival.

However serious the technical difficulties were, they appeared unsubstantial in view of the general political conditions resulting from the Soviet occupation, the armistice agreement and domination by the Communist Party. Hungary was not a sovereign state. Foreign affairs were under the control of the Russian-dominated ACC. Civil administration was gradually reorganized by the political parties; however, this not only opened the way to many incompetent political appointees, but offered key positions to the Communists. Since the Foreign Ministry was headed by a Smallholder, the Communists secured important positions which they claimed under the system of the coalition government. In every division of the Foreign Ministry there was a Communist who reported to the party regularly. In addition, the chief of cabinet of the Minister, as well as the deputy head and later the head of the political division, were Communists. Through these key men the Communist Party knew everything that happened in the sphere of foreign affairs, and the Soviet authorities were consulted about all issues of importance. Thus they cou1d intervene at an appropriate time and exert decisive influence. The system of controls was even further developed. The NKVD and later, the Hungarian political police, summoned some non-Communist officials and forced them to report regularly on affairs and personnel.

As soon as Hungary renewed diplomatic relations with foreign countries, many officials who had served under the Horthy regime were sent abroad. This consequently opened new fields of opportunity for the Communists, and decreased the number of competent officials in Budapest.

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When I began the peace preparative work anew, my first question addressed to the Foreign Minister was: "What are the peace aims of the Government?" I asked this question repeatedly in the following months, but never received an explicit answer. Gyongyosi only explained those political difficulties of the coalition regime which hindered an agreement on our peace aims. Under such circumstances I concentrated on searching for and collecting the necessary material and data, and prepared a variety of alternative proposals. On the one hand, the wartime era of cautious double-talk ceased at least to the degree that we were able to obtain technical cooperation from all governmental agencies, without false excuses. But, on the other hand, we now had to face new difficulties of greater magnitude.

In June, 1945, I organized the peace treaty division in the Foreign Ministry and an interdepartmental committee which held weekly meetings in the Hungarian National Bank building. These meetings were held under my chairmanship until May, 1946, with the participation of the National Bank, the Ministries, certain scholarly agencies, and experts in various other fields. For important problems sub-committees were appointed, and they in turn reported to the general committee. The object of this work was a detailed investigation which embraced the economic, cultural, and financial development of Hungary from 1919 until the end of the Second World War. Then we examined the existing conditions and drew conclusions. The committee members included the country's foremost specialists in many fields. I openly stated that I would not want to have political appointees on the committee, and for a time it was possible to maintain this policy. I did not object to party membership as such, but I found it impossible to do constructive work with delegates whose only merit and qualification was membership in a party.³ Despite the non-political character of this committee, some experts, in view of the precarious conditions of the country, were not infrequently reluctant to express their opinions with frankness.

Besides the general inter-departmental committee, several specialized committees and coordinating agencies were set up. For example, one prepared nationality and territorial problems, and another supervised the financial and economic findings of the interdepartmental committee. This latter group consisted of the foremost economic experts in Hungary.⁴ Besides its supervisory work it considered several variations for the establishment of a Danubian Federation. I invited this committee for weekly meetings over a period of about three months, and found the lively debates therein about the possible impact of the various federative solutions on Hungary's industry and agriculture very useful. The final

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report of this committee proposed that the Government reveal Hungary's economic plight at the peace conference and ask for substantial reduction of our reparation payments and for the inclusion of properties confiscated and removed hy the Red Army in any such payments. But the foreign minister considered these and similar proposals so utterly futile that he did not even attempt to present them to the council of ministers. He thought that such a disclosure might even endanger the safety of the authors of the report. As to the various federative projects, we were never in a position to use the voluminous material collected on this subject.

Eventually the personnel associated with peace preparations consisted of several hundred government officials and experts, and therefore their efforts required a high degree of coordination. After nearly a year of work and mutual consultations, each ministry summed up its findings in a final report based on numerous preparatory memoranda. But, in early 1946, the Communist party discovered the potential importance of this work and delayed its conclusion in certain ministries. Thereafter, Communist delegates appeared in the general committee and consistently sabotaged its work.

In addition to the official interdepartmental committees, a special private group under the direction of Count Geza Teleki investigated certain fundamental aspects of the Hungarian case. This scholarly work was performed by a small group of reliable experts who labored in an atmosphere of comparative freedom. In early 1946, the results of their work were presented in several volumes to certain Western statesmen and experts. One copy of it was transmitted to President Truman.

The most difficult problem, the disagreement among the coalition parties concerning peace aims, remained throughout the peace preparatory period. The extreme differences made it impossible to find common principles acceptable to all parties. Although the Government avoided taking a stand in the matter, I had to look for some expedient in order somehow to proceed in the muddled political situation.

As soon as I began my work I attempted to get around the lack of governmental aims by asking for an advisory delegate for political problems from each coalition party. The delegates were duly appointed and we pledged our mutual good will and readiness for cooperation. I stated that I would always be glad to give any information to the political parties through them, but, for my own enlightenment, asked for concrete formulation of their political stand with regard to peace aims. Since I did not receive any specific proposal from the parties, I interpreted this passive attitude to mean that I could proceed with the peace preparatory work, and did not ask them any more questions. Consequently

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my position was made somewhat easier, though this situation did not change the basic political difficulties.

Besides the lack of positive peace aims, a further major obstacle arose from the fact that the coalition government considered the members of the war governments, including that of Kallay, as war criminals. Rakosi ironically remarked to me, "Mr. Envoy, you may soon greet your former boss, Kallay, here in Budapest when he stands before the people's court". The Foreign Minister warned me at the outset that the coalition parties would strongly protest against all arguments tending to exonerate the former governments and political leaders. This general punitive attitude toward the past was not however, entirely of Hungarian origin. In the postwar period the Horthy regime was unpopular in both East and West. In the eyes of the victorious powers Hungary was the junior member of the axis and, with her revisionist claims, one of the chief troublemakers in European politics. Nobody gave a second thought to the causes of Hungarian revisionism. Hungary's reluctant participation in the war and her endeavors toward an early armistice were not considered at all. Unlike the other Axis satellites, Hungary did not change sides effectively during the hostilities, and the fact that Hungarian troops fought with the Germans until the very last became an especial reproach to Hungary. Thus the new Hungarian regime only reflected the general opinion of the victorious nations in punishing some members of former governments. As things stood it would have been difficult to adopt a different attitude. These actions were not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Hungarian Government. The armistice agreement compelled Hungary to "cooperate in the apprehension and trial, . . . of persons accused of war crimes", and the Russians were greatly dissatisfied with the "lax" Hungarian attitude in the matter. The ACC gave the Russians the legal channel for intervention. The notion of "war criminals" was interpreted very broadly in Nuremberg and elsewhere. Legal and moral principles, let alone political wisdom, were not the most important considerations throughout Europe at the close of hostilities.

Even under such political conditions it was necessary to find ways to tell at least part of the truth. In view of the imposed limitations, the only alternative was to explain that a large majority of the Hungarian people actually resisted Nazism vigorously and that even the "reactionary pro-German" governments resisted under the pressure of popular feeling. On December 28, 1945, in a memorandum addressed to Prime Minister Tildy, I summarized my opinion concerning the extent of our war responsibility in the following manner:

My opinion concerning our responsibility for the war is that we have

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to present every possible argument which is apt to reduce such charges or at least explain reasons for our conduct during the war. Since the personality of the state remains the same in international relations, irrespective of a change of regimes, our international responsibility is not affected by internal changes. Therefore, we should not assume responsibility for the Hungarian nation above that which is absolutely necessary. To do so would be contrary to the best interests of the people.⁵

Even for the Communists it was difficult to reject openly this reasoning. Although the left-wing elements of the coalition disliked and criticized the use of such arguments, they did not veto them at the outset. Thus it was possible to develop these ideas in pamphlets and books. The aim of these publications was to emphasize that even during the period in which an alliance existed between the German and Hungarian Governments the great masses of Hungarian people were opposed to Nazi ideas and policies. The pamphlets and books moreover contained data concerning the fate of Allied war prisoners and political refugees in Hungary. They also dealt with information concerning the Jewish problem in Hungary, sabotage and resistance to Germany, economic help given to territories under German occupation, and explained some results of the democratization of the country.⁶

Besides the basic political difficulties, there were many other difficulties which constantly disturbed the peace preparatory work. A good illustration is the Soviet interpretation of the armistice agreement concerning the destruction of Fascist literature.

In fulfilling the terms of the armistice agreement, the Hungarian Government appointed a commission to establish a list of Fascist books. The commission was dominated by Communists and determined the Fascist character of the publications according to Communist wishes. All individuals, libraries, and public institutions were obliged to surrender the books on the list for destruction. Only two libraries were exempt, in order to preserve Fascist literature in closed rooms for the exclusive use of authorized persons. Since the Foreign Ministry and certain other government agencies did not receive such exemption, I attempted to persuade the Communists that it was practically impossible to explain Nazi expansionism or fifth column activity if the relevant Nazi literature was not available. My explanations were not accepted, and all alleged Fascist books in the Foreign Ministry or belonging to the scholarly institutions associated with us were destroyed.

Moreover, the Soviet commission controlling the destruction of Fascist books gave only a limited consideration to the list established by the

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Hungarian commission. For example, in some libraries they declared as Fascist, and thus to be destroyed, German economic and statistical periodicals dating from the last decades of the nineteenth century. In the catalogue of the Library of the National Museum the Soviet Commission was looking first of all for the word "Horthy" and asked for all the books catalogued under similar headings. Thus they destroyed all the books on "horticulture", some of them published in the seventeenth century, claiming that all such works spread propaganda for Horthy. In this case the Minister of Public Instruction, Teleki, personally intervened without result. Intervention in such cases was considered pro-Fascist action not only by Soviet authorities but even by Western-educated Hungarian Communist leaders.

Hungarian proposals for the peace settlement.

Some politicians, particularly in the right wing of the Smallholders Party, strongly emphasized the necessity of foreign propaganda in view of the coming peace conference. These politicians did not realize that as long as the coalition government did not have peace aims, there was not much to publicize. It was obvious that the Hungarian Government could not freely inform foreign countries about our fundamental troubles and especially of our difficulties with the Soviet authorities. In view of Hungary's diplomatic isolation and especially because of the meager finances at the disposal of the Foreign Ministry, any propaganda initiated by us could easily boomerang. The wartime solidarity behveen the Soviet Union and the Western powers still had its impact in Danubian Europe. The western Allies made it clearly understood that they were not disposed to antagonize the Soviet Union on Hungary's account.

Furthermore, Moscow could prevent all official Hungarian activities in foreign countries through the ACC.

In order to circumvent the difficulties and break down our isolated position, I began to draft peace preparatory notes. In the course of this procedure the most difficult questions were: To whom could the notes be addressed? What could be said? And how far could we go without arousing the Soviet and Communist wrath?

The first note was addressed to the Soviet Government on July 4, 1945. The Foreign Minister did not wish to assume full responsibility for the note and thus presented the draft to the cabinet. The council of ministers modified and considerably toned down the note, which was signed by the Prime Minister, who was in turn to present it to Marshal Voroshilov. Several days later the Foreign Minister discovered by chance that the Prime Minister had signed but had not delivered the note. In these times the presentation of complaints to the Russians was not an

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enviable task. It was apt to result in unpleasant repercussions. Finally the Foreign Minister took courage and handed the note to Pushkin.⁷ This note contained propositions dealing with the economic difficulties of the country, the persecution of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia and the new territorial settlement to be established by the peace treaty. Among other things, the note complained that the industry of the country was disrupted because the Red Army had confiscated raw materials, machines, tools, and manufactured products. The note requested that these materials either be restored or that they be regarded as reparation deliveries, because under international law they could not be considered war booty.⁸ Moreover, it was requested that confiscatory actions by the Red Army should be categorically forbidden in the future.⁹ The second part of the note described the anti-Hungarian measures in Czechoslovakia, comparing them with Nazi methods. The note asked for Soviet intervention to halt these discriminatory measures and persecutions. Concerning the new territorial settlement, the note proposed the adoption of the principle of nationality and plebiscites. Realizing the absolute ineffectiveness of our interventions with the ACC or the Soviet Government and the complications caused by discussions in the council of ministers, I proposed not to submit the peace preparatory notes to the council of ministers but to deliver them directly to the representatives of the three major powers, and afterwards to send a copy to the coalition parties. As a result of the lesson learned from the first peace preparatory note, the Foreign Minister accepted this plan. Hereafter all peace preparatory notes were sent directly to the American, British, and Soviet representatives in Budapest, and subsequently copies were forwarded to the coalition parties. Consequently the Communists were confronted with a fait accompli and could cause trouble only after the notes had been delivered. This procedure was in contradiction to the rule laid down by Voroshilov, according to which the Hungarian Government was supposed to channel all foreign contacts through the ACC. Until autumn 1945, no foreign representative was accredited to the Hungarian Government. The representatives of neutral powers were expelled by the Soviet occupation authorities, and delegations of the victorious nations were attached to the ACC. Notwithstanding this situation, the peace preparatory notes ignored the ACC and were addressed directly to the British, Soviet, and United States representatives in Budapest even before renewal of diplomatic relations with Hungary.¹⁰ Though the new procedure made possible direct delivery of notes to the British and Americans. the Western nations did not show much interest in our proposals. Moreover, the Communist domination of the coalition

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government, the Soviet occupation, and the general insecurity of our international position contributed greatly to the difficulty of drafting the notes. The Foreign Minister refused to accept responsibility for texts which differed greatly in their content from the general political ideas of the coalition parties. The parties themselves, however, did not have the same conception of foreign affairs. The Communist Party, as the major and in many respects determining factor in the coalition government, declared emphatically that winning the confidence of the Soviet Union by liquidating all reactionary elements and features of Hungarian politics and by thorough execution of the armistice agreement were the only steps necessary for a favorable peace treaty. They claimed other preparations were unimportant.

The Hungarian peace aims were presented for the first time to the representatives of the three major powers in a note of August 14, 1945. ¹¹ This note advocated the establishment of a close economic cooperation among the Danubian nations, and an increased industrialization of Hungary to be carried out in the course of the economic reconstruction of the Danubian region. Moreover, it proposed the establishment of an inter-Danubian cultural commission for the promotion of friendly cooperation among the Danubian peoples. As for the territorial settlement to be undertaken by the peace conference, the Hungarian Government suggested that if boundaries lost their significance, the ideal state of affairs would be in the process of appearing. Failing this, the process of international cooperation would best be served if the boundaries were determined in conformity with the freely expressed wishes of the population concerned. This would bring about the political stability necessary for economic cooperation. Finally, the note emphasized the necessity of providing for the protection of the national minorities by means of some international machinery of the United Nations.¹²

Although ideas concerning political integration of the Danubian nations were more or less hidden between the lines, the Communist Party subsequently objected to the general principles expressed in the note. Rakosi pointed out that projects for a full-fledged cooperation of the Danubian nations were premature. These countries, he argued, must first become truly democratic, and afterwards thev would cooperate automatically. Simultaneously with Communist objections, Pushkin presented strong Soviet criticisms. The Western powers did not react at all.

In this situation the Hungarian peace aims could not be developed in further detail. Instead I prepared notes dealing with seemingly technical problems to which the Communists could not easily object. These were, for instance, regulation of problems connected with citizenship, Hungarian water routes giving access to the sea, problems dealing

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with insuring the overland route to the sea, and improvements of water power in the Carpathian basin.

A note of October 31, 1945,¹³ dealing with the citizenship question explained that as a consequence of the provisions of the Trianon Treaty, thousands of inhabitants of prewar Hungary, who had never left the country, had been deprived of their citizenship without any opportunity of acquiring citizenship in any of the successor states. The origin of this situation was the complicated and frequently contradictoriy provisions of the Treaty of Trianon, which enabled certain states to deny citizenship to the members of an undesirable minority. Consequently, these peoples were left in the neighboring countries without the enjoyment of the rights connected with citizenship, and were greatly handicapped in their economic and other activities. In reference to this situation, the note proposed the measures which were to be incorporated into the peace treaty in order to prevent such an anomaly.

The note dated November 12, 1945,¹⁴ dealt primarily with an extensive elaboration of landlocked Hungary's problem of insuring free access to the sea. In this connection, the note suggested numerous improvements in the Danubian Convention. The second part of the note was devoted to the Carpathian Basin water-ways and suggested solutions which would have resulted in a development similar to the T.V.A. This note particularly insisted on the maintenance of the international character of the Danube. It urged the revival and strengthening of international control over the river, with continued participation of nonriparian states in an effectively functioning commission, and advocated freedom of navigation in the Danubian valley. This aspect of the note was referred to by Cavendish W. Cannon, head of the American delegation at the Danubian Conference in Belgrade, in the following statement:

It is interesting to note that the postwar government of Hungary, on November 12, 1945, addressed a note to the United States, British, and Soviet Governments, giving its views on the Danube question. It called attention to the great importance to Hungary of a regime which guarantees full freedom of navigation. It suggested that the pre-war system of international navigation be reconstituted with provisions for changes required by new conditions. The Hungarian Government did not envisage elimination of nonriparian representation, for it suggested consolidation into one Commission of the Danube. Both Commissions, as the Conference is aware, had non-riparian representation. There have been changes since 1946 but we believe the long-term economic interest of Hungary remain the same.¹⁵

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Such then, were some of the subjects and some of the difficulties involved in bringing a final peace to the stricken Hungarian nation. Surely the task was difficult, and to some of us at that time it was beginning to seem almost impossible.

Deadlock and last efforts in the peace preparations.

In the second half of 1945, Soviet pressure for the expulsion of all Germans from Hungary and the persecution of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia were the most acute issues of Hungary's foreign policy. Both were somewhat outside of the preparations for the peace conference and belonged within the competence of the political division of the Foreign Ministry. I was not informed of all the steps taken. Nevertheless, I intervened whenever I could relate these issues to the peace preparations.¹⁶

The defeat of the Communists and the victory of the Smallholder Party in the Budapest municipal elections in October and at the general elections in November, 1945, caused a spell of short-lived optimism even in foreign affairs. Nevertheless, the over-all picture did not change substantially, and the new coalition government created under the premiership of Zoltan Tildy (November 15, 1945) proved to be no stronger than the Dalnoki Miklos government.

The Soviet consolidation of the Communist-dominated puppet governments in Rumania and Bulgaria, in violation of the Yalta agreement, as well as various manifestations of Soviet policy in Hungary, forecast a gloomy future for the new Hungarian regime. This was especially conspicuous in connection with such actions as the Soviet endorsement of the persecution of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet abuses violating the armistice agreement, and in general the extreme exploitation which characterized the Soviet Union's treatment of Hungary.

It was clear to every sensible individual that Russian influence would increase after the war and that under the impact of the new political balance in Europe, Hungary's political, social and economic structure would undergo important changes. Nevertheless, Russian abuses, methods, and general intolerance caused great bewilderment and consternation.

Despite all the difficulties, the preparations for the peace conference and a stand for the interest of the Hungarian people appeared to be both a political necessity and a matter of national honor. Continuation of the peace preparatory work, however, became almost impossible because the new government despite some consolidation of Hungary's internal and international affairs could not decide on peace aims. The government did not take a stand on any fundamental question of foreign

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affairs. Despite my repeated proposals, it did not designate delegates and experts for the peace conference. It was an anomalous situation that while the Hungarian peace aims were expressed to the major victorious powers in our note of August 14 1945, the very same principles were not endorsed explicitly and could not be discussed by the coalition parties. In answer to my pressing proposals, the Foreign Minister informed me that the disagreement on peace aims might easily blow up the coalition, and that such a situation might open the door for developments similar to those in Rumania and Bulgaria.

Another difficulty was that the Foreign Ministry remained at the mercy of party politics. When I criticized this situation, the Foreign Minister in turn complained to me that he was not able to resist Communist wishes in connection with the appointment of their party men in the foreign scrvice, because of the precedents created bv the Smallholder and Social-Democratic Parties.

Reflecting on these circumstanecs, I first orally informed Prime Minister Tildy in December, 1945, that the peace preparatory work had reached a deadlock. Then, on December 28, I presented to him an exhaustive memorandum. The memorandum described the history, progress and actual state of peace preparations, analyzed the main problems, and very frankly discussed some of the outstanding political difficulties. As was already mentioned I explained my views concerning Hungary's war responsibility and dealt at some length with a decree concerning the expulsion of the Germans from Hungary, issued on December 22, 1945. I thought it necessary to emphasize the danger of accepting the doctrine of collective responsibility in regard to a group of Hungarian citizens. The memorandum pointed out, moreover, that it was not sufficient to make decisions concerning our peace aims and the arguments to be used, but that it would be necessary to concentrate our efforts upon carrying out the accepted policies. In this connection I referred to the lack of governmental experience on the part of the coalition parties. a lack of experience especially conspicuous in the handling of foreign affairs. In this framework I developed my objections to the disintegration of Hungarian foreign policy under the coalition regime, and especially to the scandalous abuses in the field of party political appointments in the foreign service. The conclusion summed up the most urgent agenda.¹⁷

For a short time this memorandum caused consternation in high governmental circles. As a result, I received promises from the Prime Minister and from the Foreign Minister that they would take steps to eliminate the difficulties. They also authorized me to prepare new peace preparatory notes which, however, had to be in line with the general

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views of the Government in foreign affairs. Nevertheless, the difficulties did not cease. Friendly pledges could not change the fact that the coalition parties could not agree on principles to follow in foreign affairs particularly as to our aims at the peace conference.

Concerning our peace aims, Prime Minister Tildy eventually called an inter-party conference in mid-January, 1946, which I attended as an expert from the Foreign Ministry. This conference was dominated and frustrated by the dynamism and dialectics of the Communist leader Rakosi. His obvious goal was to prevent the conference from arriving at any concrete decisions. Szakasits, the representative of the Social Democratic Party, supported him with enthusiasm.

The issue which occasioned the longest debate involved the decree of December 22, 1945, concerning the deportation of the Germans from Hungary. I pointed out again that this decree was a fundamental mistake from the point of view of our peace preparations and national interests, and asked for its revision.¹⁸ In my opposition to the indiscriminate expulsion of the Germans, I was supported only by the Smallholder under-secretary of state, Istvan Balogh. The other Smallholder representatives and the Social Democrats sided with Rakosi. In regard to other issues connected with our preparations for the peace conference, the representatives of the Smallholder Party (Tildy, Gyongyosi, and Balogh) remained passive. The representative of the Peasant Party, Imre Kovacs, firmly stated that we must take a stand for the claims vitally effecting the nation. Otherwise, he explained, the Peasant Party would be obliged to reconsider its participation in the coalition Government. This was a strong statement, but all participants suspected that the Peasant Party was infiltrated by Communists and in case of a showdown would not follow Kovacs. Eventually the inter-party conference terminated without having made any substantial decisions.

In addition to the territorial and nationality questions, it was necessary to decide upon the economic problems to be presented to the peace conference, as well as the manner of their presentation. In this respect Soviet and Communist interventions again frustrated all progress. Pushkin considered Hungarian territorial and political grievances and claims as remainders of the Horthy regime, and did not take them seriously. He urged the "democratization" of Hungary and the acceptance of the Czechoslovak demands as to the fate of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. He suggested, confidentially, as it was already mentioned, that Hungary should rather stress territorial claims against Rumania which, as a former satellite, was in the same category as Hungary. Marshal Voroshilov also intimated to Prime Minister Tildy that Hungary might obtain some territorial compensation from Rumania if she behaved well.

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and accepted the Czechoslovakian proposals concerning the settlement of the Hungarian question in Czechoslovakia.¹⁹

Pushkin was somewhat more concerned that the Hungarian Government might reveal to the Western public its economic plight, and especially the Soviet methods for exploiting devastated Hungary. The following incident was characteristic of this situation: When Pushkin discovered that the Hungarian Government was compiling statistica1 data on war damages by means of detailed questionnaires, to be answered by all inhabitants of Hungary, immediate cessation of this work and the destruction of the data compiled were energetically demanded. Pushkin asserted that the ACC had not authorized this action by the Hungarian Government. He charged that the questionnaires clearly indicated that the goal of this work was to establish statistics concerning damage caused by the Red Army. In due course, the Foreign Ministry transmitted this Soviet protest to the Ministry of Finance. Later, an elaborate reply to Pushkin explained that the war was caused by German aggression and that therefore we intended to attribute all war damages to the Germans. Nevertheless, since the questionnaires covered different periods of time during which the damages occurred, those caused by the Germans and the Red Army were easily distinguished. The balance was decidedly unfavorable to the Soviet Army.

In harmony with Soviet policy, the Communist party made efforts to sabotage preparations of economic questions for the peace conference. A typical example of this was the attitude of Communist ministers, who for weeks in the council of ministers hindered nomination of the chief economic delegate to the peace conference. I initiated the appointment of Arthur Karasz, director and former president of the National Bank of Hungary. Time and again Gyongyosi brought up the matter in the council of ministers but the Communist ministers always asked for more time to consider the problem. Finally, some weeks later, when Karasz was about to leave the country on an official mission, the council of ministers agreed to his appointment. Upon his return, six weeks later, he prepared a memorandum, revealing the economic situation of the country and proposing that we should ask for a reduction of our reparation payments. When this memorandum was read in the peace preparatory subcommittee of the Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Communists reacted violently. Chief Communist delegate, Joseph Revai, launched a sharp attack against it and concluded: "Because of this memorandum a head must fall", adding obligingly, "of course, only politically". The political decapitation of Karasz took place promptly. Upon an ultimatum of General Sviridov, he was dismissed as chief economic delegate and as Director of the National Bank.²⁰

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In view of our impotence, I found it expedient to request the three major powers, in a note dated January 25, 1946, to appoint a committee of experts to investigate problems connected with the Hungarian peace settlement.²¹ The memorandum attached to this note pointed out some of the mistakes and errors which were made at the peace conference after the First World War, and suggested that the organizational weakness of the conference partly explained why the Treaty of Trianon accepted exaggerated claims against Hungary.²²

In a note dated February 1, 1946,²³ it was possible to insert some passages describing the anti-nazi conduct of the Hungarian people during the war and also to make statements on Hungary's war responsibilities in the sense I indicated in my memorandum addressed to Tildy.²⁴

Furthermore, this note pointed out that the Hungarian problem after a Second World War must not find an isolated solution. A proper solution would rather consider the common interests of all Danubian peoples in the course of an institutional reorganization of the Danubian Basin. The note emphasized that the settlement of Southeast European problems did not present "insurmountable difficulties", and remarked that

similar conditions of life brought about by geographic factors, the influence which for centuries one nation had been exercising over the other, the effects of intermarriage and more especially the cooperation of the long period preceding the epoch of exaggerated nationalism had long ago produced forms of life which bore a certain resemblance to each other. The small states are in fact separated from each other only by differences of language and an exaggerated and improper interpretation of their historical traditions, and the chauvinist propaganda to which the former gave rise. Large sections of the population, above all the working classes and the peasants who struggle against the same social evils, have no difficulty in understanding each other. The first step towards the furthering of mutual prosperity through peaceful cooperation would be an honest and institutional attempt to uproot the nationalism which, for the last century, has been fostering the growth of differences.

After such general explanations, the note concluded that the settlement of Southeast European problems must be based on the three following principles:

1. The harmonization of questions of territory and nationality.

2. The establishment of economic and cultural cooperation.

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3. The elimination of the factors which give rise to political and social discord between countries.

Not until May, 1946, were we able to present a note to the three major powers which put forth more detailed propositions. Between February and May several incidents characteristic of our situation took place.

In early February, 1946, the Social Democratic Party delegate to the peace preparations work, Sandor Szalai, called on me in my office. He informed me in the name of his party that the peace preparatory work under my direction had become partly useless and partly harmful. He accused me of nationalism, and suggested that the Foreign Ministry try to find a practical solution by removing the Hungarian minority from Czechoslovakia, thus assuring amicable relations with our northern neighbor. I rejected his ideas and replied that the peace preparatory work was not my personal enterprise, and that if there were such essential political objections, these should be reported to the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister. Simultaneously with the move of the Social Democratic Party, the Hungarian Communist Party and the Soviet Minister, Pushkin, also expressed dissatisfaction with the peace preparatory notes. Pushkin pointed out to Gyongyosi that our notes had the character of policies followed under the Horthy regime and actually could have been sent by the Horthy regime. A few days later the Social Democratic press launched a campaign against the Foreign Minister.²⁵

Under the impact of these attacks, Gyongyosi refused to sign a note which he had previously approved, and which dealt with territorial and ethnographic questions and particularly with the problems of Transylvania. He called an inter-party conference in the Foreign Ministry and submitted the text of the note to the representatives of the coalition parties.

At this inter-party meeting, the delegates of the Communist party, supported by Vilmos Bohm, delegate of the Social Democratic Party, refused to accept the general ideas and terms of the proposed note. The Communists themselves did not offer any specific suggestions. They stated only that the note contained veiled revisionist tendencies against Rumania, that Hungary should by no means weaken "Groza's democracy", and that before a definite stand could be taken Soviet support must be sought. Our actions, they said, must be governed by Soviet advice. The inter-party meeting eventually accepted this suggestion, and advised the Foreign Minister to find out more about Soviet intentions as to the peace settlement. I could not make it known there that it was Voroshilov and Pushkin who had privately suggested that Hungary

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should raise territorial claims against Rumania.

The draft note rejected by the inter-party meeting developed the idea that the Hungarian nation should be given a territory corresponding to the proportion of the Hungarian population in Danubian Europe. It was re-emphasized that the conditions brought about by the Trianon Treaty had contributed greatly to the dissatisfaction of the Hungarian nation and had naturally developed the revisionist and irredentist movements. As to the future, the note again proposed the setting up by the victorious powers of an expert committee whose duty it would be to examine the nationality and territorial problems. The Hungarian Government declared at the same time that it was willing to accept a plebiscite regarding the fate of any territories affected by a new settlement. The Communists and Socialists especially objected to the following passage of the note dealing with Transylvania:

For the present, the Hungarian Governrnent only wishes to point out that the territorial resettlement affects Hungary most closely where the question of Transylvania is concerned. With the satisfactory solution of the problem of Transylvania by settling equitably the political and economic claims of Hungary and Rumania this territory could form a connecting link, rather than a dividing line between the two states. In any case, the solution must be such that any division of the mountainous region of Transylvania Iying between the areas of the original settlement of these two neighboring nations both of which have populations of about the same size, 11-12 million Hungarians, 13-14 million Rumanians, of whom the greater part inhabit the Great Plain should be affected in such a manner that it shou]d complete most advantageously the economic systems of both countries, and that, from a national point of view, it should also create a state of equilibrium.

After the inter-party meeting the peace preparatory work came to a complete stand-still. The Smallholder Party did eventually prepare a memorandum concerning peace aims, but the party leaders did not want to force a showdown with the Communists since this would have caused the breakdown of the Coalition Government. The Smallholders wanted to avoid this. They played for time. Their leaders hoped that after the peace treaty the Red Army would leave the country, and a truly democratic government could then be established.

Meanwhile the technical part of the peace preparatory work was nearing completion. All important problems which could have been dealt with at the peace conference were first worked out in detail by

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competent experts and then synthesized. There were hundreds of memorandums and other material classified into a comprehensive system. Due to the lack of peace aims on the part of the Government and the constant breakdown of cooperative efforts between the parties, we could not use the material for any specific purpose.

In this situation, I felt that my duties had been fulfilled and that I could do nothing more. On March 13, 1946. I asked the Foreign Minister for my release as the head of the division for peace preparation, and suggested that the division be dissolved. I explained that the division had accomplished its mission and that the necessary political decisions must be made by the Government. Since my request went unheeded, I sent an official letter to Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy, informing him of the deadlock of the peace preparations and expressing my disagreement with the Government's dilatory policy. I stated that under the circumstances I could do no more useful work, and requested that the Government release me from my assignment.

Shortly after dispatching this letter to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister informed me, very confidentially. that perhaps the situation was not entirely hopeless. He told me that leading members of the Hungarian Government, following an invitation of the Soviet Government, would shortly visit Moscow. He asked me to prepare material for the delegation and asked me to accompany them as their political advisor. Next day the embarrassed Foreign Minister regretfully informed me that Pushkin had removed my name as well as the name of the economic advisor ²⁶ from the list, stating that this conference would negotiate issues of great political importance and that therefore only leading politicians were needed, and experts were unwanted. Under the circumstances, this was scarcely bad news for me.

I found it amusing that the delegate of the Social Democratic Party to the peace preparations, called on me again and excitedly asked for maps and materials concerning our territorial claims against Rumania. This was the same man, Szalai, who a few weeks before had characterized the entire peace preparatory work as partly useless and partly dangerous. He now explained enthusiastically that this material would be needed by the Social Democratic Party leader, Szakasits, in Moscow. He also indicated that the chances of regaining territories from Rumania were good, and that this would strengthen Hungarian democracy.

Faced with dissatisfied public opinion and strong Smallholder pressure, the Government decided to ask for Soviet support concerning the settlement of the problem of Transylvania. The Communist Party, apparently receiving the green light from Moscow, reversed its attitude towards national aspirations and suddenly became the champion of

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Hungarian territorial claims against Rumania - an attitude which previously was branded by them as Fascist and reactionary.

As the armistice agreement declared the Vienna award of August 30, 1940,²⁷ to be null and void, the Government was looking for a solution of the Transylvanian problem along new lines. The revival of the ethnographic arguments which were the basis of the Vienna award was considered unwise, and was rejected at the outset. Although there were prepared a variety of projects for solution, I rvould have preferred a rather general than specific demand until we ascertained what support we could get from the great powers. I was overruled, and the Foreign Minister decided to accept a plan worked out by a member of the Paul Teleki Institute for Political Science. This plan envisaged the return of 22,000 sq. kilometers to Hungary with roughly 1,600,000 inhabitants. According to the 1930 Rumanian census, this territory was inhabited by 865,620 Rumanians and 495,106 Hungarians. In the 1941 census the proportion of the Hungarians was somewhat higher, but this difference did not change the basic disproportion. Meanwhile, over one million Hungarians would have remained under Rumanian domination. The idea was to counter-balance the number of the Hungarian and Rumanian minorities in Hungary and in Rumania. It was assumed that these conditions would have resulted in better treatment for minorities in both countries.

A meeting held under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic on the eve of the departure for Moscow endorsed this plan, but decided that the delegation should also present an alternate solution aiming at only the border districts with a clear Hungarian majority. Following the meeting, I was ordered to prepare the alternate plan that night. In a few hours, experts in the Teleki Institute worked out another plan which proposed the return to Hungary of 11,800 sq. kilometers and 967,000 peoples. According to the Rumanian figures of 1930 the Hungarians had a slight majority (442,000 as compared to 421,000 Rumanians) in this territory. Ethnographically, the second plan looked better, but it would have caused economic difficulties to the local inhabitants both in Rumania and in Hungary. In any case, I thought it unwise to put forward two proposals in Moscow. This course was obviously a wrong approach, psychologically, and apt to weaken our position. I vainly opposed this method of procedure.

The delegation returned from Moscow full of optimism. They had been extremely well received. Soviet hospitality knew no bounds. They were lavishly entertained. On April 11, 1946, Molotov and Stalin devoted many hours to discussions with the members of the Hungarian delegation. The atmosphere seemed most friendly. In addition there

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were some positive results. The period for the fulfillment of the reparation liabilities was extended from six to eight years. The Soviet demand for $15.000.000 for the restoration of Hungarian railroads was cancelled,²⁸ and the delegation believed that they had received a Soviet pledge for the support of Hungarian territorial claims against Rumania.

Gyongyosi explained to the leading officials of the Foreign Ministry how the discussion concerning Transylvania developed. According to him, Stalin, after listening to the Hungarian explanations, turned to Molotov and asked him if there was a basis for such aspirations. Molotov correctly replied that Article 19 of the Rumanian armistice agreement left the way open for Hungary's territorial claims regarding Transylvania.²⁹ Stalin nodded and said that the Hungarians thus seemed to be really entitled to raise claims. The next day, Dekanozov, head of the Southeastern European division in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, strongly advised the Hungarian Foreign Minister that, before raising territorial claims, direct negotiations should be attempted with the Rumanian Government. Later Molotov repeated this advice. No one from the delegation asked Stalin or Molotov if the Hungarian claims would be supported by them. Nevertheless, the atmosphere of the conversations was so friendly and the attitude of Stalin so benevolent that the delegation took Soviet support for granted. In reality, both before and after the Moscow visit of the Hungarian delegation Molotov opposed most resolutely in the Council of Foreign Ministers an American proposal favoring a slight modification in the Transylvanian boundary line in favor of Hungary.³⁰

Following the Moscow visit the members of the delegation delivered optimistic speeches. One of the leading Hungarian Communist authorities in foreign affairs, Jozsef Revai, delivered such an irridentist speech that it would have been envied even by the oldtime League for Revision of the Horthy regime. Revai demanded, among other things, that the important cities of Arad, Szatmar, and Nagybanya should be returned to Hungary. Moreover, he asserted that the Communists in the emigration between the two World Wars were the true representatives of Hungary's national aspirations but that their efforts were annihilated by the suicidal pro-Nazi and anti-Soviet policy of the Horthy regime. A few months before that speech he had wanted every "reactionary" who asked for territory from Groza's Rumania to be brought before the people's court. "We cannot weaken Groza's democracy", he said at that time.

This reversal of Communist policy concerning Hungary's territorial claims gave a basis for optimistic speculation. Later it became evident that the motive behind the change in Communist tactics was the hope of winning the support of Hungarian public opinion. The change of

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tactics did not alter their final goal. The Communists apparently did not want to burden the Party by opposing national aspirations, but preferred to ride a popular bandwagon.

In accordance with Moscow's advice, a high official of the Foreign Ministry, Pal Sebestyen, was sent to Bucharest to initiate negotiations. The Rumanian Prime Minister, Petru Groza, and the Foreign Minister, Gheorghe Tatarescu, gave him a courteous reception, but refused to discuss Hungarian territorial claims. For this reason Sebestyen returned home immediately, and a note was presented to the representatives of the major victorious powers on April 27.³¹ This note was based on the above mentioned project prepared in the Paul Teleki Institute and handed over in Moscow as the "major" solution of the Transylvanian question. The Hungarian Government requested the return of 22,000 sq. kilometers to Hungary, that is, 20 percent of the total area of 104,000 sq. kilometers transferred to Rumania by the Treaty of Trianon.

But the optimism which followed the visit to Moscow rapidly vanished, and uneasiness developed. One of the reasons for this change was the conduct of Rumanian statesmen with regard to Hungarian overtures. The shrewd Tatarescu would not have refused negotiations with Sebestyen, had the Rumanian Government lacked assurance of full Soviet support. Groza and Tatarescu hinted as much to Sebestyen.

The coalition parties became more and more disappointed when it appeared that the members of the Government delegation to Moscow could not support with facts, the optimism they expressed in public speeches. The warm reception and the small concessions gained at Moscow had not warranted such optimism. Even the economic concessions gained were of relatively small value.

Because of dissatisfaction and reproaches from many quarters and because of the general depression of public opinion caused by the inactivity of the Government in foreign affairs, the Foreign Minister decided to send me to Paris, where at that time the Council of Foreign Ministers was in session preparing the drafts for the peace treaties. Pushkin once more refused to grant me permission to travel abroad, saying that I would not be needed in Paris. Gyongyosi under attack at that time even in the Smallholder Party remained adamant. He told Pushkin that if he was not allowed to send a high official of the Foreign Ministry to Paris to make contacts and preparations for the peace conference, he would no longer consider himself as foreign minister and would act accordingly. Pushkin, not wanting to make a political issue of this trifle, suggested that I be appointed as counselor to the Hungarian Legation in Paris. He explained that such an appointment would enable him to grant me the necessary permit to leave the country. The

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Foreign Minister accepted this proposal, and on May 9, 1946, I left for Paris by plane. Shortly before my departure, news arrived that the Council of Foreign Ministers, at a meeting held on May 7, had decided to accept the Trianon boundaries between Hungary and Rumania as final.

A few days before I left for Paris the President of the Republic, Zoltan Tildy, asked me through a confidential go-between whether I would be willing to lead the Hungarian peace delegation as foreign minister. He informed me that a group of Transylvanian politicians discussed with Tildy problems connected with the future peace settlement. In the course of these conversations they had criticized the manifest weaknesses of Hungarian foreign policy, and Tildy himself expressed his concern because of the general discontent with Gyongyosi. He was considered as pro-Soviet even in his own party. Inasmuch as national unity was of the utmost importance before the peace conference, they agreed with Tildy that I, as a non-party man, should take over the portfolio for the period of the peace conference. I replied that I was a government official and as such I would do my best as administrative leader of the Hungarian peace delegation, but I would not consider accepting the portfolio of the foreign office under Soviet occupation. I added that probably a few things could have been done differently in the past, but that it was questionable whether the Russians would have tolerated a more assertive Hungarian foreign policy. The Western powers did not mean business in Danubian Europe. No Hungarian foreign minister could have changed the existing political situation. It is difficult to play cards if you do not have a partner and your opponents hold all the aces. Moreover, the Smallholder Party played for time and wanted to avoid a showdown. Thus no one could have followed a foreign policy substantially different from that of Gyongyosi. The only question was whether someone was willing or not to play a political role under such circumstances. I did not feel suited for this and, moreover, thought that I could do more useful work in my administrative capacity.

Before my departure I agreed with Gyongyosi that I should act in Paris as the secretary general of the Hungarian peace delegation. In Paris I received, to my great surprise, a communication from him announcing my appointment as chief political delegate of Hungary. I refused to accept this latter position, and remained in Paris for six months as secretary-general of the Hungarian peace delegation, and at the same time, as minister-counsellor to the Hungarian Legation, as desired by Pushkin.

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Burial of Hopes.

During my activities in Paris I witnessed the burial of many of our hopes. We were not optimistic after the experiences of the postwar period, but still had some hope in the final peace settlement. All these hopes and any optimism that remained evaporated in the course of the Paris Conference. The peace negotiations did not deal with basic problems of the Danubian nations. The issues were not treated on their merits. A few delegations, chiefly the Australian, raised issues of fundamental importance, but such endeavors were out of context in the helpless atmosphere of the Conference. The non-cooperative Soviet attitude stirred up crises and deadlocks in the Council of Foreign Ministers which prepared the first and final draft of the peace treaties, ³² and at the Conference of Paris itself which only had advisory powers. As Philip E. Mosely pointed out, "in a negotiation of this kind, the most reluctant government determines the maximum rate of progress".³³ In the bewildering atmosphere even minor Soviet concessions brought general relief. Under these conditions, the fundamental problems were avoided, and the participants limited the issues and the range of discussions as much as possible. Hungarian and other proposals for the reorganization of the Danubian states on a cooperative basis were not even considered. Some Western delegations thought that all integrations in the Soviet sphere of influence were undesirable, because these eventually would serve Moscow's interests.

It should be noted at this juncture that before the Conference of Paris, in May, 1946, a Hungarian Government delegation under the leadership of Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy visited Washington and London and asked for American and British support. This appeal to the West, a unique action among the states occupied by the Red Arrny, made perfectly clear that the coalition Government of Hungary was not under an exclusively Soviet orientation but did want to maintain close relations with the Western powers as well. Sympathy and understanding for Hungary were increasing in the West, but under the existing political realities it was difficult to give a helping hand to Hungary at the peace negotiation.

The United States delegation showed much understanding toward Hungary, but their goodwill was limited by the actual power situation in Danubian Europe and by Hungary's position at the peace conference.³⁴ Eventually Hungarian endeavors for a territorial revision in Transylvania were obliterated by the Conference of Paris. Czechoslovakia asked for five and obtained three Hungarian villages opposite Bratislava. Otherwise the Trianon frontiers were reestablished.

Soviet Russia's grasp on the Hungarian economy strengthened. The

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United States Delegation did submit to the Conference a proposal to reduce the total amount of reparations to be paid by Hungary from $300 million to $200 million, but the Conference rejected this proposal.³⁵

The greatest direct threat to Hungary at the Peace Conference was a Czechoslovak proposal, openly sponsored by the Soviet Union, to insert in the peace treaty a provision authorizing expulsion of 200,000 Hungarians from Czechoslovakia. The peace delegation of defeated Hungary a state in the Soviet orbit asked for Western political support, and with energetic American, and some British help, defeated the Czechoslovak proposal. Avoidance of this catastrophe for the Hungarians, however, did not in essence change the general situation along the banks of the Danube.

In the course of Western postwar planning, probably one of the greatest political mistakes was committed at Potsdam and at the Moscow Conference in December, 1945, when Austria, the westernmost Danubian country, was left out of the projected peace settlement, and the conclusion of the Italian peace treaty was connected with those of Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland. This procedure was all the more anomalous and illogical since as far back as October, 1943, the foreign ministers of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union had, in Moscow, issued a declaration on Austria in which they recognized that Austria was the first free country to fall a victim of Hitlerite aggression, and in which they stated their desire to see a free and independent Austria reestablished. Stalin himself had proposed the restoration of Austria as an independent state in December, 1941, in the course of his first conversation with Eden.³⁶

Austria, however, was not included in the peace settlement and remained an occupied country. In the situation thus created, the Western powers, in order to consolidate Italy's international position, concluded and ratified the peace treaties with the Danubian states. The regained sovereignty, however, was of little value in these Communist-dominated countries. The independence of Hungary and Rumania remained all the more fictitious because the peace treaties authorized the Soviet Union to keep in both these countries armed forces for the maintenance of the lines of communication of the Soviet Army in Austria. At the same time, with the dissolution of the Allied Control Commissions in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, even the nominal Western influence came to an end in the Danubian region. Thus, the policy of the Western powers almost automatically had the effect of a boomerang as far as Western expectations and interests were concerned in central Eastern Europe.

True, the peace treaties obliged the defeated states to take all measures necessary to secure to all persons under their jurisdictions,

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"without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship, of political opinion and of public meeting".³⁷ But an international control for the enforcement of these rights, or an adequate machinery for the settlement of disputes concerning the execution and interpretation of the Peace Treaties, was not established. An Australian proposal aiming at the creation of a European Court of Human Rights was rejected.³⁸ The British, United States, and French delegations proposed that any dispute concerning the execution or interpretation of the peace treaties which could not be settled by direct negotiations, might be referred at the request of any party to the dispute, to the International Court of Justice.³⁹ This proposition, strongly opposed by the Soviet delegation, was accepted at the Conference by a vote of 15 to 6. The Council of Foreign Ministers, however, under Soviet pressure, eliminated all reference to the International Court of Justice from the final draft.

The system for the solution of disputes inserted into the peace treaties did not prove to be satisfactory in the face of the obstructive tactics of the Soviet Union in the Communist dominated countries.⁴⁰ When Great Britain and the United States charged Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania with having violated their obligations under the respective Peace Treaty provisions requiring them to secure to all persons under their jurisdiction the enjoyment of human rights and the fundamental freedoms, they simply refused to recognize the existence of a dispute. Moreover, the Danubian countries denounced the English and American notes as illegitimate interferences in their domestic affairs, and stated that they had fully complied with the human rights provisions of the peace treaties. Subsequent proceedings before the General Assembly of the United Nations and the International Court of Justice were fruitless.⁴l

As a result of these developments the Danubian countries became the captive states of the Soviet Union.⁴² The Peace Treaties facilitated the consolidation of the Soviet power position established de facto at the close of hostilities in Eastern Europe. Incorporation of Czechoslovakia in the Soviet sphere, and the exclusion of the Western powers from the Danube by the Soviet-dictated Danubian convention, were only further consequences of the peace settlement. Simultaneously with the process of isolating the Danubian countries from the West, a ruthless Communist minority seized all power positions and has been following a policy of political, economic and cultural integration with the Soviet Union. A new chapter of history along the Danube began.

In central Eastern Europe we have been witnessing in these last few years the emergence of a new world in which normal rules established

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for free internal developments and for orderly international intercourse do not operate. Nations have been subjected to Soviet domination which, through forceful methods of social engineering, and especially through the indoctrination of the youth, aims at the total transformation of peoples who belonged, until now, to the Western world.

Hungary has become part of a process in the course of which the most cherished values of Western civilization are gradually being exterminated. Despite this ruthless procedure, results of bolshevization and Russification have so far been limited and superficial. One cannot change the spirit of a people and wipe out traditions of centuries overnight. The passive resistance of the Hungarian people has remained general. The time factor, however, is all important because the spirit of the resistance can not be maintained for an indefinite period.

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DIPLOMACY IN A WHIRLPOOL