DIPLOMACY IN A WHIRLPOOL

Elections and Aftermath.

The elections held in the autumn of 1945 were the turning point in postwar Hungarian politics. The Hungarian electorate had been rather restricted in the past, and until the 1939 elections the secret ballot had been limited to towns. According to the terms of the electoral law of September, 1945, the members of the National Assembly were elected on the basis of general, secret, direct, and equal suffrage. Proportional representation was introduced in the whole country and ten electoral constituencies were formed. The list of candidates in the constituencies were prepared by duly authorized political parties. Each 12,000 votes secured a seat in the assembly. After the seats had been distributed along these lines, the remaining votes were computed on a nation-wide special list.

It was an important and distinctly less democratic feature of the law that only those political parties whose right to participate was recognized by the Central National Committee, could take part in the elections. Thus the coalition parties had a sort of monopoly over the political life of the country.²

The new elctoral law lowered the voting age to twenty years and omitted most of the elaborate restrictions of former laws. Those who had taken part in the armed fight against the Germans and Fascists had the right to vote at the age of eighteen. On the other hand, a broadly defined category of pro-Nazis and supporters of similar ideologies were disfranchised. The new law almost doubled the electorate. In 1945 the population of Hungary was 8,943,533 and the electorate was 5,164,661, i.e., 59.7% of the total population. Legal requirements for suffrage and for election to the Assembly were the same. The National Assembly was authorized to elect twelve more members from among outstanding personalities.

It was a part of the Communist tactics to have the Budapest municipal elections on October 7, a month before the general elections. The Communists felt sure that the working-class districts of the capital and the city proletariat would assure a sweeping victory of the united Communist-Socialist ticket. The Communist mayor of the Capital, Zolt_n Vas, did his best to organize Communist propaganda through all modern means of communication like loudspeakers, radio, posters, newspapers,

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while the other parties were in a much less privileged position. But the outcome of the elections was the first major disappointment of the communist brain trust, for the Smallholders obtained an absolute majority. The results of the Budapest municipal elections were:

Votes Seats

Smallholder Party 295,197 121

United Socialist-Communist ticket 249,711 103

Civic Democratic Party 22,392 9

National Peasant Party 11,741 5

Hungarian Radical Party 5,013 2 584,054 240

Feverish Communist activities followed this defeat. They proposed a single electoral ticket for the forthcoming general elections. Voroshilov himself intervened and eventually offered 47.5% of the single electoral list to the Smallholders, who refused. The embittered Socialists also strongly insisted on separate electoral lists because they attributed their defeat in Budapest to the anti-Communist feeling of the population. The resistance of the non-Communist parties was strengthened by the stand of western representatives, who intimated that elections based on a "single" electoral list would not be in harmony with the Yalta agreement.³

In view of the general opposition to a single block ticket, Voroshilov peremptorily demanded instead the continuation of the coalition government whatever the results of the elections might be. The non-Communist parties accepted this condition as a better alternative than a single block ticket. The Communists still were optimistic. They enjoyed tremendous practical advantages. Besides the support of the occupying forces, they had newspapers, transportation, and other propaganda facilities in quantities not available to non-Communist parties. In addition, many potential anti-Communist voters had fled before the Red Army into Austria and Germany, and individuals taken as war prisoners had not yet returned at the time of the elections.⁴

It was a great surprise to the Communists and the Russians when, in these general elections held on November 4, 1945, the Communists polled only 17% of the total vote. The Smallholders obtained 57% of the votes cast, and with the help of the residual votes, almost 60% of the seats in the Assembly. The results of the general election were:

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votes seats

Smallholder Party 2,69l,384 57.0% 245

Social Democratic Party 822,666 l7.4% 69

Communist Party 801,341 17.0% 70

National Peasant Party 323,571 6.9% 23

Civic Democratic Party 76,331 1.6% 2

Radical Party 5,762 O.l % 0

Total 4,721,055 lOO.O% 409

The overwhelming Smallholder victory expressed the determination of the Hungarian people not to be bolshevised. Not only the peasants, but most of the anti-Communist elements of the population voted for the Smallholder Party because this seemed to offer the greatest resistance against the bolshevization of the country. The Smallholder Party at that time represented the national unity of the anti-Communist forces.⁵ Without proportional representation the Smallholder victory would have been even more sweeping and the number of Communist deputies almost insignificant. According to a Hungarian scholar, "A study of the local results revealed that the Smallholders Party had an absolute majority in 82% of the 3,300 towns and villages of Hungary, and a relative majority in 10 percent. The Communist Party had 74 absolute and 74 relative majorities, while the Social Democratic party had 19 absolute and 44 relative majorities. The National Peasant Party obtained 14 absolute and 30 relative majorities." ⁶

The electoral defeat proved that the Communists had not gained overwhelming support from the former agrarian proletariat, which had been their greatest hope. A considerable number of the new landowners, no matter how small their allotment was, had become class-conscious and staunch supporters of private ownership. The idea of Communism did not appeal to them. According to Rakosi the Communist Party gained 24-28 percent of the votes in the poorest agricultural regions in southeastern Hungary, but they won the smallest number of votes in the western agricultural areas.⁷

The Budapest municipal elections and the general elections had world-wide repercussions. Both were considered highly important because the evidence showed the elections to be free and unfettered, and they were officially recognized as such by East and West. The leading Western newspapers featured front-page articles and editorials. The following dispatch of the London correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor was most characteristic:

This concrete proof that free elections as they are understood

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in the United States and Great Britain have occurred in at least one Balkan country is heartily welcomed by Anglo-American officials. This election result would indicate that even in areas beyond Anglo-American control and about which many officials had been privately worrying the peoples of Europe can be given a chance to choose their own officials honestly and openly. ... In view of the fact that Hungary is wholly under control of the Red Army and that this quite naturally has been of no small benefit to the Communist Party, some observers had been concerned that it might be difficult to conduct completely free and unhindered elections. The result of the weekend balloting would seem to have disposed of that worry in convincing manner.⁸

After the elections Voroshilov was quick to point out to the Smallholder leaders that "the Soviet Union wished to base its friendship with Hungary on its relations with the Smallholders party".⁹ The Smallholders, impressed by their victory, were greatly pleased by this statement. They visualized a new era of constructive Hungarian-Soviet cooperation. The fact of the apparently passive Soviet attitude at the elections encouraged everyone.

The Communists were astonished but not greatly disturbed. They had to change their tactics and Rakosi had to give explanations to Moscow. The elections notwithstanding, the political situation remained favorable to them. The aristocracy and landowning classes had already been liquidated. Land reform had also deprived the Catholic Church of its main economic basis. An inflation on an unprecedented scale increased the general confusion and difficulties. People of the middle class lived in insecurity, and, in order to exist, were gradually selling their belongings. The Communists possessed the key positions, and exercised effective control throughout the country by means of the national committees and the police. Trade-unions and factory committees were in Communist hands. Fifth columns were carefully planted in all parties. The continuance of the coalition government was secured by the pre-election agreement. Thus the Communists hoped to be able to rule the country conveniently behind the screen of a coalition, as was the case in other satellite countries.

After the elections the coalition parties agreed that the minister of interior should be a member of the Smallholder Party. A few days later the Communists explained that the Ministry of Interior must be given to them, because Voroshilov was astonished to hear that in Hungary the situation in this respect would be different from the situation in other countries "friendly to the Soviet Union", and he had therefore vetoed

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the proposition. The Smallholders yielded. Otherwise they obtained 50 percent of the seats in the cabinet, but, not the real power positions, and they had no majority. The prime minister, one minister of state, seven other members of the cabinet, the speaker of the assembly, and later the President of the Republic were all Smallholders. The Communist and the Socialist Parties each obtained three portfolios, and the Peasant Party one. In addition, the Communist and Socialist Parties each had a deputy premiership.

Simultaneously with the political penetration, the Communists were anxious to seize one by one key positions in the economic life of the country as soon as they had trained experts in sufficient number. This process was greatly facilitated in November, 1945, by the establishment of the Supreme Economic Council, of which a leading Muscovite, Zoltan Vas, became the secretary general. The functions of this council were more important than the activities of the ministries dealing with economic and financial problems. In the most significant questions it had supervisory powers. Zoltan Vas actually became the economic dictator of the country and the ministers concerned had little power, although nominally the prime minister was the chairman of the Supreme Economic Council. Rakosi noted that the Communists "created the Supreme Economic Council, thus gradually acquiring all the economic key positions".¹⁰

The Republican Constitution.

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On January 31, 1946, the new National Assembly by its first legislative act declared Hungary a republic. The new constitution guaranteed to the citizens the natural and inalienable rights of man and to the Hungarian people the right to an organized community life and peaceful cooperation with other peoples; personal freedom; the right to a human life free of oppression, fear and want; freedom of thought and opinion; free exercise of religion; the right of assembly and the right to form associations; the right to property, to personal security, to work, and to dignified human living; the right to free education; and the right to participate in the affairs of the state and municipalities. These rights were regarded especially as the natural and inalienable rights of man. The constitution declared that no citizen could be deprived of these rights without due process of law. The Hungarian state guaranteed these rights, in an equal and uniform way, to all its citizens without discrimination within the order of a democratic state.

The President of the Republic was elected for a four year term by the National Assembly. Every Hungarian citizen who had attained the age of thirty-five and who was eligible for membership in the National

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Assembly, was eligible for the office of the President. No one could be elected President of the Republic twice in succession. The President of the Republic represented Hungary in international relations, sent and received envoys, appointed consuls and granted the exequatur to foreign consuls. He was authorized, through the ministry, to conclude treaties with foreign powers but the approval of the Assembly was needed if the subject matter of the treaty was within the competence of the legislature. He was entitled to declare war, to announce the existence of a state of war, to conclude peace and to use the armed forces with the previous authorization of the Assembly.

In internal affairs the President had important prerogatives. He exercised the executive power by means of a ministry responsible to the Assembly. He appointed and dismissed the prime minister in accordance with the principle of parliamentary majority and he appointed the cabinet ministers upon the proposal of the prime minister. The prime minister or a competent cabinet minister countersigned all acts of the President.

The President appointed all the judges and the government officials above a certain rank. He could not resign without the consent of the Assembly. In case of the death of the President, or if he was continuously hindered in the exercise of his functions, these were fulfilled by the speaker of the National Assembly until the election of the new President.

The President signed and promulgated within fifteen days the laws enacted by the Assembly. Before promulgation however, he had the right, within fifteen days, to return any law to the Assembly with his recommendations for reconsideration. But he was obliged to promulgate the law within fifteen days if it was sent to him by the Assembly for the second time. The President had the right to adjourn the Assembly, but for no longer than thirty days in any one session. He also had the power to dissolve the Assembly on the recommendation of the government or if two fifths of the members of the Assembly demanded the dissolution. ¹¹

It appears from these and other provisions that the laws establishing the Hungarian Republic corresponded to the accepted westem standards and were in many respects exemplary. However, in March, 1946, another law was promulgated to protect the democratic order of the Republic. This law declared all agitations against the democratic order of the state, and against persons or groups because of their republican convictions, to be criminal activity. In apparent defense of the Republic, the law had very far-reaching provisions. For example, it considered as criminal activity any statements which could be interpreted as contemptuous to the democratic-state order or as hammful to the international prestige of the Republic, whether they be true or false. As the

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democratic-state order gradually became identified with Communist dictatorship, the extremely broad provisions of the law could be used, and actually were used, against anyone who refused to accept this identification or criticized the activities of the Government. The political police and the people's court, interpreted this law according to the directives received from the Communist Party. Moreover, the National Assembly periodically authorized the government to govern by decrees to assure the economic order, the balance of the budget, and the regular course of the administration.¹²

By such actions, the National Assembly strengthened the executive and relinquished its own prerogatives. This attitude was largely the consequence of the conditions prevailing in the country but, oddly enough, it helped to consolidate Communist positions and influence in the executive and judiciary in the period when the National Assembly was dominated by a Smallholder majority.

Party Politics.

Clever Communist policy asserted itself in the fie1d of party politics even more than in Parliament. The most skillful tactical step in undermining the Smallholder position was the formation, in March, 1946, of a left-wing bloc by the Communists, Socialist, Peasant Party,¹³ and the Trade-Union Council. Thus the Communists isolated the Smallholders within the framework of the coalition, assumed the offensive and began to address ultimatums to them in the name of the progressive Hungarian people. Politicians opposing the demands of the leftist bloc were denounced as "fascists" and "enemies of the people". A revolutionary atmosphere of increasing tenseness was created, making a normal functioning of parliament impossible.

Mass meetings and other Communist-organized demonstrations of the workers, synchronized with Russian political and economic demands, pressed the government towards a leftist policy. These demonstrations were not spontaneous actions. Most of the participants, especially the workers, were compelled to take part in them. Some of them received money or were promised positions. Those who were unwilling to picket under Communist leadership were declared "reactionary", and a variety of threats was used against them and their families. Lynching and mob trials were instigated throughout the country by the Communist Party.

Gradually the Smallholder Party was maneuvered into a self-liquidating process which began in March, 1946, with the expulsion of twentyone deputies, attacked by the Communists as "reactionaries". This was a compromise measure, since the Communists had originally demanded the expulsion of eighty deputies. Simultaneously with Communist actions

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strong Soviet pressure was exerted on the Hungarian Government. In the coming months this action was followed by the adoption of various Russian and Communist-dictated political and economic measures.¹⁴ But the Smallholders still hoped to keep a parliamentary majority. The ousted Smallholder deputies remained members of Parliament and certainly did not strengthen Communist voting power there. But the fate of Hungary was not decided in the Hungarian Parliament. Almost simultaneously with these concessions and perhaps as a reaction to them, the Smallholders initiated a more energetic policy against Communist abuses. Under the leadership of Bela Kovacs, the Secretary General of the Smallholder Party, they began a political offensive, and in June, 1946, they handed the Communist Party a list enumerating their political demands. The most important among them were: proportional representation in the administration in general and in the political police in particular; municipal elections in the fall of 1946; abolition of the people's courts and reestablishment of the jury system; abolition of the internments; and passage of an act by the Assembly concerning the Trade Unions and another act concerning the representation of peasant interests.

In the course of numerous inter-party negotiations the Communists accepted, in principle, some of the Smallholders demands, such as their demand for municipal elections and a more adequate proportional representation in the administration and in the political police, upon condition that the Smallholders first liquidate all "reactionary" elements in their own party. The Communists wanted to determine who was "reactionary" according to their own changing doctrine and then compel the Smallholders to exclude them from political life.

The only practical result of the negotiations was the gradual release of a substantial number of persons from the internment camps and the reinstatement of a few dismissed civil servants.

In speeches and articles, Bela Kovacs and some other Smallholder leaders openly challenged the Communist Party and advocated the fulfillment of the Smallholder demands.¹⁵ The Communists reacted violently. In reference to the Smallholder demands and accusations, the Szabad Nep, official newspaper of the Communist Party, declared:

It is a great exaggeration to state that the Communist party "took over" the police. ... It is true that the share of the Smallholder Party in the leading positions of the Police is nowhere proportional to the results of the elections. There are mainly historical reasons for this. After the liberation, nobody was willing to undertake the reorganization of the police, except the Communists: that

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is why there is a Communist "preponderance" in the police. . . . But let us speak of the "proportional representation". Indeed, the Smallholder Party is inadequately represented in the top police positions. Is it possible and is it desirable to change this? It is. . . . But while the Smallholder Party lives in concubinage with reactionaries, the matter of proportional representation will not be carried one step further. . . . Everything for the real democratic Smallholders, nothing for the reactionaries hidden under the skin of Smallholders. All pleasantry must stop in connection with the police force of a democracy. ... According to Bela Kovacs and his group, the Communists are preparing to seize power. We have always said and we still say that this is nonsense. The very fact that the democratic elements in the Smallholder Party take this absurdity seriously, shows how much they are under the influence of reactionary gossip. Bela Kovacs talks about Communist danger in the state apparatus perhaps to distract attention from the real danger, namely that of the spreading gentry under the wings of the Smallholder Party.¹⁶

Despite all the serious difficulties with the Russians and Communists, a strange optimism prevailed in all the coalition parties, especially after the elections of November, 1945. The Communist defeat in the free elections created, for Hungary, an exceptional position in Russian-occupied Danubian Europe.¹⁷ Under the circumstances this was almost a miracle, and some people thought that general developments along democratic lines would follow. It is an important fact, which one cannot overlook, that the non-Communist parties in the coalition were progressive on social, economic, and cultural questions and the Communists, at the outset, adapted their tactics to the general mood of the country.¹⁸ The coalition parties, during the Horthy regime, were all in opposition, and they cooperated to some extent with the Communists during the German occupation. As throughout Nazi-oppressed Europe, so in Hungary, the common fight against the Nazi foe developed into a marriage of convenience if not into a sort of camaraderie between the Communist and non-Communist politicians. The mere fact that Hungary survived and avoided complete annihilation at the end of a disastrous war seemed a promise of a better future, and the leading politicians of the new regime seemed determined to make the most of a desperate situation. This task called for courage and an optimistic outlook, especially in regard to the possibilities of cooperation with the Russians and Communists. The Western powers, as early as 1943-44, gave encouraging advice to Hungarians as to the possibility of such cooperation.¹⁹ In the postwar

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period in view of the passive western attitude - there were no alternatives.

Above all there was a great common task before the parties: the rebuilding and rehabilitation of the devastated country. In that respect the Communists displayed zeal and energy. According to Rakosi's words, the Communist Party "not only advocated the amalgamation of national democratic forces, and appeared not only as the staunchest persecutor of fascists, Hitlerite elements, but at the same time was foremost in healing war wounds, in cleaning up the debris, in starting reconstruction". Non-Communist leaders hence "thought it natural that the Communist Party should be more radical than other parties, but expected it would work shoulder to shoulder with the others in reviving the country".²⁰

The fact that Communists in Hungary behaved differently in 1944-45 than in 1919, was a part of their most deceiving tactics. Largely because of apparent Communist moderation during the prelude of the postwar Hungarian drama, the opinion of some of the foreign observers was equally optimistic. For instance, Oscar Jaszi rejected the suggestion that "what is taking place in Hungary is simply a repetition of what has occurred in the Baltic states, in Bulgaria, Rumania and Jugoslavia".²¹ He characterized the Hungarian situation in the following manner:

The old demagogy of the first Bolshevik revolution was completely absent; Communism had become respectable and gentlemanly. Even the criticism of certain Governmental measures by the Roman Catholic hierarchy was listened to with respect, and when Archbishop Mindszenty attacked the expropriation of the estates as a "product of hatred", the rejoinder was moderate and tactful. Though the large ecclesiastical estates were dismembered like the others, liberal grants-in-aid were provided for the maintenance of the lower clergy, the Churches and parochial buildings. Generally speaking, there is not much talk about Communism in Hungary today; the leitmotiv is democracy with intensely patriotic overtones.²²

It took some time to realize that this was not the case. The Communists hated left-wing politicians or Socialists of independent views even more than they did the former Nazis.²³ A number of former Nazis were welcomed into the Communist Party and became its obedient tools.

Gradually it became clear that in decisive questions the Communists did nothing but carry out the orders of Moscow and that the Communist Party was, in reality, a disguised third branch of the Soviet administration represented in Hungary outwardly by the Soviet Army and

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Soviet officials. Not having popular support, the Hungarian Communist Party could rely only upon the Russians. Under these conditions genuine cooperation between the Communist and non-Communist parties never really took place. Political expediency at all times guided the Communist attitude. They sought control. This was the aim and driving force of all Cornmunist actions. Economic and social reforms played a secondary and merely tactical role in relation to this chief goal. In pursuing this objective the Communists sometimes changed their policies quite suddenly and without any apparent motive or reason. Always, however, they invoked the "will of the people". This "will", they cleverly manipulated through the Communist-dominated press and through Communistorganized mass demonstrations.

In addition to Russian support, the Moscow-educated Communists had two other advantages. One was a concrete program the blueprint of a revolutionary conquest laid down in Lenin's and Stalin's works and applied to the Hungarian situation. The other was their freedom, in moral and political ethics, from any restraints in carrying out their wellpremeditated plans. The Communists did not feel any obligation to keep promises given to non-Communists, but were outraged if others did not strictly abide by agreements or act according to expectations.

Their task became somewhat easier in Hungary due to the fact that the non-Communist politicians of the coalition had previously always been in opposition and had no experience in the "business of the state". The Communists were cautious enough to eliminate gradually all skilled non-Communist politicians from public life, and were rather proud of their "know how" in political matters.²⁴ This political "know-how", however, could not have asserted itself for any length of time without Soviet political support and the presence of the Red Army.²⁵ In all phases of Hungarian politics, energetic Soviet intervention helped the Hungarian Communist Party. If the Hungarian Government was not responsive enough to suggestions, there quickly followed threats, ultimatums, and the use of sheer force. The methods by which the transformation of Hungary's political structure has been manipulated were repeatedly admitted and even described by leading Communists. Joseph Revai pointed out retrospectively:

We were a minority in Parliament and in the government, but at the same time we represented the leading force. We had decisive control over the police forces. Our force, the force of our Party and the working class, was multiplied by the fact that the Soviet Union and the Soviet army were always there to support us with their assistance.²⁶

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Rakosi later said more explicitly that it was "the imperishable merits and the support of the Soviet Union that tipped the scales" and helped to estab]ish the Hungarian People's Democracy. He mentioned that the presence of the Soviet Army in Hungary precluded any attempt at armed rebellion, and protected the country "from imperialistic intervention". Moreover, the Soviet Union shielded Hungary "from diplomatic interference of the great Western Powers", and assisted "in the building up and consolidation" of Hungary's foreign relations. The preamble of the new Constitution of the Hungarian People's Republic openly admitted the fact that the assistance of Soviet Russia has been the deciding factor in the postwar transformation of Hungary's political structure.²⁷

Notwithstanding many difficulties and odds, political life in postwar Hungary was rich in potential democratic leadership. A correspondent of the London Times noted that a visitor in Hungary "will be surprised by the vigorous intellectual activity displayed both in print and in conversation. In comparison with the mental sterility and haunting fear prevalent in the Balkans, Hungary seems an oasis of culture and liberty." ²⁸

The great issues, however, were settled by external and not by internal forces. Hungarian democracy would have developed on sound lines and would have restricted Communist influence to due proportions if a free political evolution could have taken place. The decisive factors in Hungary were not the shrewd Communist leaders but the occupying Soviet Army, Soviet leadership in the Allied Control Commission, the proximity of the Soviet Union, and the lack of western assertiveness.

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DIPLOMACY IN A WHIRLPOOL