DIPLOMACY IN A WHIRLPOOL

The Road from Non-belligerency to War.

After the outbreak of the second World War the Hungarian Government issued a proclamation which amounted to a declaration of neutrality. Prime Minister Teleki sought to maintain a non-belligerent status and, in the face of the growing Nazi influence, some measure of independence for Hungarydespite the territorial gains obtained with the help of the Axis powers. This policy was put on trial immediately after the German attack on Poland began.

The German Government asked the Hungarian Government to allow the use of the Kassa-Velejte railroad line for transporting German troops dispatched to attack the retreating forces in Southern Poland from the rear. Budapest informed the Italian Government of the German demand and Mussolini approved of the negative attitude of the Hungarian Government.¹

On September 9, Foreign Minister Csaky formally rejected Ribbentrop's telephone demand made in the name of the German Government. According to the documents of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Csaky firmly told Ribbentrop that the Hungarian Government was "compelled, to its great regret, to request Germany not to use the Hungarian railroad line for the transportation of German troops against Poland". Hungary did not think it "compatible with the honor of the Hungarian nation" to permit such action. The Hungarian attitude remained the same despite a German territorial offer in Galicia. When approached some days later with a similar demand by the Slovak Government which joined Hitler in the aggression against Poland, Count Cs_ky was even more outspoken, warning the Slovaks that such a move would be an act of aggression against Hungary. In the meantime, as a precautionary measure, the Hungarian authorities ordered the mining of all tunnels and bridges, leading to the Kassa-Velejte railway.²

This energetic manifestation of Hungary's decision to maintain a neutral status could not last for long. German-Russian collaboration gradually reduced the possibility of an independent Hungarian policy made difficult anyway by the unfortunate geographical situation of the country. The situation was aggravated by circumstances developing from the Trianon Treaty, and by the gradual disappearance of Western influence in Eastern Europe. The Western powers ceased to exist as power factors along the Danube, and Trianon Hungary was squeezed between overwhelming German and Russian forces.

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The Soviet Union renewed diplomatic relations with Hungary in September 1939, and the extreme right in Hungary did not cease to praise the wise cooperative policy of the two greatest powers in Europe, Germany and Soviet Russia.³ Telegraphic communications and railway connections were established between Hungary and the Soviet Union. Following a Soviet initiative, the Hungarian Government exchanged the now well-known Hungarian Communist leader, Matyas Rakosi (in an Hungarian jail), for banners taken by the Russian army in 1849, when it intervened on behalf of Austria in crushing the war of independence in Hungary. The anti-Soviet attitude of the Hungarian public, however, manifested itself especially in connection with the Russo-Finnish war. Public manifestations and collections were organized for Finland, and Hungarian volunteers left the country, with the help of the authorities to fight in Finland against the Red army.

During this period Rumania began to worry about the possibilities of a Soviet attack, and a special emissary of the Rumanian king asked the Italians to "work on the Hungarians", because any Hungarian threat on the Rumanian rear would "oblige the Rumanians to come to an agreement with the Russians".⁴ Csaky assured Ciano that "Hungary will not take the initiative in the Balkans and thus spread the fire",⁵ but he emphasized Hungary's demand for equality of treatment for Hungarian minorities in case Rumania should cede territory to Russia or Bulgaria without fighting.⁶ The Hungarian attitude was expressed even more clearly by Teleki on a visit to Rome in March 1940. Ciano noted that "he [Teleki] will not do anything against Rumania, because he does not want to make himself responsible, even indirectly, for having opened the doors of Europe to Russia . . . Teleki has avoided taking any open position one way or the other but has not hidden his sympathy for the Western Powers and fears an integral German victory like the plague".⁷ Later Teleki frankly told Ciano that he hoped "for the defeat of Germany, not a complete defeat that might provoke violent shocks but a kind of defeat that would blunt her teeth and claws for a long time".⁸

Shortly thereafter Hungarian hopes for possible Italian help against the Germans were ended. Assuming that Russia would soon move into Bessarabia, Germany intended to occupy the Rumanian oil fields. The German General Staff approached the Hungarian General Staff and requested free passage through Hungary. The price of this permission allegedly would have been Transylvania. The Hungarian Government sent a special messenger to Rome who explained that "For the Hungarians there arises the problem either of letting the Germans pass, or opposing them with force. In either case the Hungarian liberty would come to an end".⁹

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During these Hungaro-Italian negotiations the Germans began the occupation of Denmark and Norway, and the Italian Ambassador to Germany, Bernardo Attolico, denied the rumor of an attack on Rumania. The Duce advised the Hungarians to "keep calm and moderate, and . . . accede to German requests". Ciano commented: "This was not the answer the Hungarians expected and hoped for. They went so far as to ask whether, in case of military resistance, they could count on Italian help. Mussolini smiled, 'How could this ever be,' he said, 'since I am Hitler's ally and intended to remain so?' "¹⁰

The spectacular occupation of the smaller Western European states by Germany, and the unexpected collapse of France deeply impressed the Hungarian public. In fact, these events caused general consternation. The government press manifested a dignified reserve and, when Italy declared war on France and Great Britain, Foreign Minister Csaky stated that Hungary would continue her non-belligerent status.

Soviet Russia reacted to the German victories in the West by the incorporation of the Baltic states and Rumanian territories. Following a Russian ultimatum, Rumania evacuated Bessarabia and northern Bukovina and ceded these territories to the Soviet Union. After these events, Hungary and Bulgaria, in Bucharest, demanded the settlement of their territorial issues. In August, 1940, at Craiova, the Rumanian government agreed in principle with Bulgaria concerning the retrocession of South-Dobrudja, but declined to entertain seriously the Hungarian claims.

The Hungarian Government displayed great restraint and did not push the issue of Transylvania until August, 1940, but after the satisfaction of the Russian and Bulgarian demands, the negative Rumanian attitude towards Hungary was difficult to accept. At the 1919 peace settlement Rumania received from Hungary a larger amount of territory than that retained by the Hungarian state, and, according to the Rumanian census, one and a half million Magyars remained in Transylvania. The settlement of the Transylvanian problem was thus of great importance for Hungary. Although direct negotiations were conducted between the two countries in Turnu-Severin (August 16-24) the two delegations could not find a common basis for agreement.

Meanwhile the great powers expressed approval or understanding of the Hungarian thesis. Molotov declared to the Hungarian Envoy, Joseph Kristoffy, on July 7, 1940, that the Soviet government considered the Hungarian claims well-founded and would support them at the peace table. At the time of the negotiations in Turnu-Severin, Molotov again stated to Kristoffy that the Hungarian claims were justified.¹¹ The Western powers also indicated their understanding of Hungary's attitude.

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In July, 1940, Rumania renounced the Anglo-French guarantee of Rumania's political independence. Subsequently the permanent undersecretary of the British Foreign Office declared to Barcza, the Hungarian Minister, that the British government fully understood that Hungary was pressing her territorial demands but hoped that these would be realized by peaceful settlement. The Hungarian minister to the United States, John Pelenyi, reported that the head of the European division in the Department of State showed an understanding toward Hungary's attitude in the Transylvanian problem and disapproved of the delaying tactics of the Rumanians.

After the failure of the negotiations both Hungary and Rumania mobilized, and Teleki decided to settle the Rumanian issue by force if necessary. However, Hitler resolved to take a direct hand in the affair since a conflict in the southeastern European area would have resulted in serious complications for Germany and, especially, could have hindered the flow of Rumanian oil to Germany. In addition, the possibility of Russian intervention in a Hungarian-Rumanian conflict also existed. Later the German leaders repeatedly pointed out to the Hungarians that Germany had to decide the Hungaro-Rumanian conflict in order to save Rumania from collapse, and Russian intervention.¹² The German and Italian governments invited the representatives of the Hungarian and Rumanian governments to Vienna. The day before the meeting Hitler told Ciano that he was leaving the decision up to him and Ribbentrop. The only thing he had at heart was that "peace be preserved there, and that Rumanian oil continue to flow into his reservoirs."¹³

The Hungarians thought that the Axis Powers would mediate, but were not prepared to submit the issue for arbitration. Ribbentrop assailed the recalcitrant Teleki in Vienna. He accused Hungary of having adopted anti-German policies on more than one occasion.¹⁴ Finally the Hungarian delegation obtained, from Budapest, full power for submitting the issue to Italo-German arbitration. This document was deposited at the German Legation in Budapest only half an hour before the second Vienna Award was delivered on August 30, 1940. Based mainly on ethnographical considerations, the Award restored the northern part of Transylvania to Hungary. At the same time Germany and Italy guaranteed the territorial integrity of Rumania, which still retained the major and economically more important part of Transylvania with a minority of more than a half million Hungarians.¹⁵ There was a general outcry in Rumania against the Award, and at the same time disappointment in Hungary was great. The new frontier created great complications for Hungary from the point of view of communications,

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and it left under Rumanian control the most important assets and resources of Transylvania, such as the district of Meggyes-Kissarmas where mineral oil and natural gas could be obtained.

The Award caused serious friction between Moscow and Berlin. Germany informed the Soviet Union only after the Vienna decision had been delivered, and Molotov claimed that Germany violated the Nonaggression Pact which provided for consultation in questions of common interest to both countries. Molotov declared that the German Government "could not have been in doubt that the Soviet Government was interested in Rumania and Hungary".¹⁶

Hungary's position nonetheless was made more difficult by the pro-Axis reorientation of Rumania's foreign policy. This had been achieved with amazing speed. Rumania resigned from the League of Nations and from the Balkan Entente, and began to transform the internal structure of the country according to National-Socialist principles. The most dangerous step, however, was the invitation extended by Rumania in early October 1940, to the German "instructor corps". General Friedrich Paulus stated, in his deposition at Nuremberg, that an entire panzer division was transferred to Rumania, manifestly as a training unit but actually for the purpose of preparing the Rumanian Army for war. These troops had to cross Hungary, and some military personnel were also stationed in Hungarian railroad stations "to maintain the lines of communication between Rumania and Germany".¹⁷ Although Teleki restricted the Germans to a few important railroad stations, this was the beginning of the German military penetration into Hungarian territory. Shortly after these events Hungary adhered to the Tripartite Pact (November 20, 1940) concluded on September 27, 1940, in Berlin between Germany, Italy and Japan. This was considered as one of the means for maintaining the relative independence of Hungary in Axis Europe.¹⁸ But the Hungarian Government refused to accept a secret additional protocol which aimed at the implementation of the Pact in the field of newspapers and propaganda. Such a cooperation naturally would have led to the liquidation of all anti-Nazi opposition newspapers in Hungary.¹⁹

Simultaneously negotiations were conducted with Belgrade. It was hoped that the pact of eternal friendship soon concluded with Yugoslavia (December 12, 1940) would strengthen Hungary's position by leaving open possibilities for the future. But these hopes were shortly destroyed by the course of events. On March 25, 1941, the Yugoslav Government adhered to the Tripartite Pact, and two days later, the Cvetkovic Government was overthrown by a coup d'etat. Germany considered this a hostile act, and Hitler promptly demanded Hungarian approval for the

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passage of his troops as well as active military cooperation against Yugoslavia.²⁰

This demand was preceded by direct and confidential parleys between the German and Hungarian general staffs, without the knowledge of the Hungarian Government. General Paulus testified in Nuremberg that he arrived in Budapest on March 30 and had a conference with the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, General Henry Werth, and with Colonel Laszlo, chief of the operational group of the Hungarian General Staff. The conferees discussed deployment of German troops on Hungarian territory and participation of Hungarian troops in the forthcoming attack on Yugoslavia. Paulus noted that these conferences were brief and orderly and achieved the desired results.²¹

Quick understanding between German and Hungarian high army officers was not an accident. The Chief of the German General Staff General Franz Halder, informed General Werth as early as November 1940 - that is, before the conclusion of the pact of eternal friendship between Hungary and Yugoslavia that in the spring of 1941 "Yugoslavia would have to be compelled, if necessary by force of arms, to adopt a definite position in order to exclude, at a later date, the menace of a Russian attack from the rear. In this preventive war, possibly against Yugoslavia and definitely against Soviet Russia, Hungary would have to participate if only in her own interests".²²

Werth replied that he agreed with Halder and asked that Germany complete the Hungarian re-armament program. After that a Hungarian armament commission was invited to Berlin, and close contact was maintained between the two general staffs. In March, 1941, Halder urged Werth to mobilize certain army corps in order that Hungary be prepared for war against Yugoslavia and Soviet Russia.²³

The Hungarian General Staff wholeheartedly supported the German plans, made the necessary preparatory steps, and thus confronted the political authorities of the country with a fait accompli. When the decisive moment arrived the Hungarian Government had no choice. Unable to alter the course of events, Teleki committed suicide on April 3, 1941, the eve of the crossing of Hungary's boundary by German troops marching to attack Yugoslavia.²⁴ Winston Churchill noted in his memoirs that "His suicide was a sacrifice to absolve himself and his people from guilt in the German attack upon Yugoslavia. It clears his name before history. It could not stop the march of the German armies nor the consequences".²⁵

With the death of Teleki a new era began. Up to that time the Department of State and the British Foreign Office appreciated the merits of the Hungarian moderate and dilatory policy, particularly

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during the sad days of the invasion of Poland. This appreciation was repeatedly asserted to the Hungarian ministers in Washington and London. The Ambassador of France in London, M. Charles Corbin, characterized the Hungarian attitude as an "acrobatie diplomatique digne de toute eloge".

Teleki's successor was his Foreign Minister, Laszlo Bardossy, a professional diplomat, but a man of scant political experience. Death had prepared the way for his ill-fated career.²⁶ He had been Hungarian Minister to Rumania at the time of the second Vienna Award. Upon the sudden death of Count Csaky in January, 1941, Bardossy succeeded him as foreign minister. Although a patriot and originally an anti-Nazi, he followed a pro-German policy. Impressed by the successful pro-Nazi policy of the Rumanian dictator, General Jon Antonescu, he believed that limited cooperation with Germany was the only means for maintaining some independence for Hungary. In the course of this policy he committed grave mistakes and proved especially weak in his dealings with the Hitlerite element in the Hungarian Army.

Germany attacked Yugoslavia on April 6. A death blow was soon administered to the Yugoslav Army in the south by German troops previously massed in Rumania. On April 10, the independence of Croatia was proclaimed in Zagreb. Thereafter, Regent Horthy declared that, since Yugoslavia had ceased to exist, the Hungarian Army would protect the Magyar population living in territories taken from Hungary by Yugoslavia in 1918. Between April 11, and April 14, and without serious fighting, the Hungarian Army occupied part of the former Hungarian territory attached to Yugoslavia by the Trianon Treaty.²⁷

Under Bardossy, Hungary's international position rapidly grew worse. On April 8, 1941, Great Britain severed diplomatic relations with Hungary, since the latter country had become a base of military operations against the Allies. Following the outbreak of the German-Russian war, Bardossy was induced by the General Staff to declare war on Russia, on June 27, without consulting parliament. The town Kassa (Kosice) was bombed allegedly by Soviet planes on the preceding day, and Bardossy considered this action a casus belli.²⁸ The declaration of war caused violent protests from the opposition parties. At the time the chief of staff of the Hungarian Army, General Werth, suggested that the war against Russia would be just a matter of weeks and Hungary must not be late this time. He had announced the forthcoming attack on the Soviet Union at a secret meeting of Hungarian army corps commanders in May, 1941, and stated that Rumania and Hungary would take an active part on the side of Germany.²⁹

The British declaration of war against Hungary (December 6, 1941)³⁰

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and the severance of diplomatic relations with the United States (December 12, 1941) followed by an Axis-enforced declaration of war (not recognized by the United States), were the other important international events during Bardossy's premiership.

Hungary's entry into war with the English-speaking powers was not without dramatic incidents. When the American Minister to Hungary, Herbert Pell representing British interests in Hungary, handed over, on November 29, 1941, the above-cited British ultimatum, Bardossy, according to his own record of the conversation, replied as follows: "Your information comes as a surprise. I never believed it would go that far, nor that England could help the Soviets, only by declaring war on us. . . . There are no Hungarian forces fighting in Russia now. We have withdrawn our forces from the front. The Hungarian Government is not participating in any direct military action.... Most of the Hungarians placed their faith in English fairness to judge the present situation. They will feel hurt by such a decision of the British government".

In the course of the ensuing conversation Pell showed a most understanding attitude toward Hungary. Counselor Howard K. Travers stated that the American Legation tried every means to prevent a declaration of war by England on Hungary after the first rumors of such a decision. Minister Pell said that he considered the decision of the English Government as his own defeat.³¹

After Pearl Harbor, Hitler declared in the Reichstag that a state of war existed between Germany and the United States. As a subterfuge the Hungarian Government simply stated its solidarity with the Axis and severed diplomatic relations with the United States. According to the files of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, in answer to the question of Minister Pell "Does it mean war?", Bardossy replied with a categorical "No."

The Italian minister and the German charge d'affaires at Budapest called the next day on Bardossy, urging the Hungarian Government to declare war on the United States.³²

The Hungarian declaration of war was duly dispatched. This declaration, together with those of the other satellites, was rightly characterized later in a note of the American Government delivered in Budapest by the Legation of Switzerland on April 7, 1942. This note considered the satellite declarations of war as made "under duress, and . . . contrary to the will of the majority of the peoples of the countries in question". Similarly President Roosevelt stated in a message to Congress on June 2, 1942, that although the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania had declared war against the United States, "I realize that the three governments took this action not upon their own initiative or in

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response to the wishes of their own peoples but as the instruments of Hitler". However, on the recommendation of President Roosevelt, Congress declared on June 5, "that a state of war exists between the Government of Hungary and the Government and the people of the United States".³³ The reluctance of Hungary and the other satellites to declare war on the United States reflects the fact that the free will of small nations is very limited in a world conflagration. B_rdossy well described the tragic dilemma of Hungarian statesmen when he told Mussolini's representative in Budapest, Filippo Anfuso, that: "God confronted us with Hitler. If the Germans demand something, I always give a quarter of it. If I refused categorically, they would take everything, which would be worse".³⁴ B_rdossy expressed the same idea even more strongly before the people's court in 1945 when in his last speech he explained that half of his audience would not have been present for his trial but would have perished on the battlefield had he refused to declare war on Russia in 1941. In that case, said Bardossy, the German occupation of Hungary would have taken place three years earlier, and a government installed by Hitler would have carried out a total mobilization in Hungary. From the autumn of 1941 onward the German attitude toward Hungary stiffened. Up to that time Hungarian military help in Soviet Russia had been of token value. Time and again the Nazis pointed out to the Hungarians that the Rumanians, Slovaks, Czechs and Croats were more cooperative toward Germany and that Hungarian unfriendliness might have unpleasant consequences. In January, 1942, Ribbentrop himself came to Hungary to convey Hitler's insistance upon a 100 percent mobilization of all Hungarian resources needed for a speedy termination of the war. He dangled the idea of territorial concessions to Hungary in Transylvania with their magnitude depending on the amount of Hungarian support. This, combined with threats, was the usual German device. Ribbentrop extolled the merits of Antonescu, the Rumanian dictator. He pointed to Rumania's complete participation in the war as a shining example for Hungary to follow. Bardossy, still seeking to reduce to a minimum Hungarian participation in the war, refused to yield to German pressure for total mobilization. He argued with Ribbentrop that Hungary could not be expected to send all her military forces abroad, leaving her own frontiers undefended. This had been the main cause of Hungary's First World War catastrophe. Germany's interests, he said, could not be served by an unruly Hungary, in which all production would be seriously curtailed. Ribbentrop expressed regrets about this unexpected reply, intimating

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that it was likely to lessen Hitler's good will toward Hungary.

Hitler's next move was the dispatching of General Keitel to Budapest with a large military suite. Even so, for the spring offensive in Russia, he could bring about the mobilization of but one-third of Hungary's military forces.³⁵

In January, 1942, during the last weeks of Bardossy's Premiership, tragic events occurred in the territories reattached to Hungary from Yugoslavia. In some regions Tito's partisans were particularly active and repeatedly carried on raids against units of the Hungarian armed forces. The military commanders in the area received orders to take punitive measures against the partisans. Under the pretext of reprisals the Hungarian Army and gendarmerie carried out organized massacres of the Serbian and Jewish population, especially in the triangle of Zsablya and in Ujvidek (Novi Sad). The army instituted a regime of terror and isolated the area, while local civilian authorities were intimidated and blocked from all intervention. The indiscriminate murders were accompanied by extensive looting. The number of victims totaled over three thousand,³⁶ a large number of whom were thrown into the Danube through holes in the ice.

Shortly after these shameful events, Horthy accepted Bardossy's resignation (March 10, 1942) because of various disagreements between them. From this time onward Bardossy took a leading part in extreme rightist movements and became an ardent pro-Nazi.

Hungary's Efforts to Steer a New Course.

Bardossy's successor, Miklos Kallay, an intimate friend of the Regent, sought to extricate Hungary from the German grasp. This was no easy undertaking, for the country was completely encircled by German satellites and German-occupied territories. Thus outwardly Kallay had to adopt Bardossy's policies. Changes were made only gradually and with great discretion.

Kallay's cautious anti-Nazi policy also prevailed in regard to the massacres of Ujvidek. The opposition parties demanded that the perpetrators of the crimes be court-martialed. One of the leading Smallholder deputies, Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinsky was particularly insistent. He went to see the Regent personally and presented him and the Government with extensive memoranda on the matter. On December 2, 1942, Bajcsy-Zsilinsky vigorously protested in parliament that the criminals of Ujvidek had not yet been condemned and demanded that the surviving families of the victims receive annuities and compensation. The government allotted twelve million pengoes yearly for this purpose in the spring of 1943. Kallay ordered an investigation and initiated court

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martial proceedings against two generals and twenty-five army officers, many of them affiliated with the German Nazi Party. The principal criminals, however, escaped with German assistance into Germany before the completion of the proceedings. The ranking general among them was appointed Obergruppenfuehrer. For the indemnification procedure the council of ministers appointed a committee working on the spot, under the chairmanship of the undersecretary of state, Paul Balla. The committee settled 90 percent of the requests for annuities and 25 percent of the indemnification cases. The German occupation of Hungary, however, cut short the completion of this work.

It is not possible to clarify fully the real background and purpose of the massacres. According to a widely circulated rumor these crimes were deliberately planned by the Nazis in order to compromise Hungary's record, and thus to bind her fate more closely to that of Nazi Germany. Whatever may have been the direct connection between Berlin and the organizers of the massacres, it appeared on this and some other important occasions that a few leading officers in the Hungarian army owed greater allegiance to Germany and Hitlerite ideology than to their own fatherland. In view of Hungary's political position it was not possible to eliminate from the army these officers, some of whom were in key positions. Such conditions made Kallay's undertaking very difficult.

Kallay cautiously undertook the hard task of preparing the way for an armistice with the Allied powers, and of freeing Hungary from Nazi domination. This was the beginning of "underground diplomacy." The Foreign Ministry still formally maintained unchanged relations with the Axis, but in the meantime it established contacts with the Western powers. Exponents of Hungary's pro-Allied foreign policy had to be very watchful. The government itself was not without pro-Nazi members. In his efforts to reach an understanding with the Allies, Kallay could place absolute faith in only two members of his government; his minister of the interior, Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer, and his secretary general of the Foreign Ministry, Jeno Ghyczy. To Ghyczy he had turned over the portfolio of that Ministry in July, 1943.

The Ghyczy administration had been inaugurated by the reshuffling of the Foreign Ministry staff and the diplomatic representatives abroad, and by replacing pro-German officials with reliable ones.³⁷ Kallay's policy was made easier by the turn of international events. The demoralized retreat of the Germans in the second winter of the Russian venture clearly fore-shadowed Germany's defeat. In particular, the Voronezh disaster suffered by the Hungarian Army (January, 1943), caused widespread discontent. This calamitous defeat reduced Hungarian military help to Germany to a badly equipped token force. Anti-Nazi

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Hungarian politicians became more vocal. Kallay had no reluctance in stating at a meeting of the foreign affairs committee of Parliament, that Hungary's interest in the war did not go beyond the Russian campaign. Still, much caution was needed. In a statement before Parliament about the future peace negotiations, Kallay named his minister of public instruction, Balint Homan, a staunch pro-German, as the head of a prospective peace delegation. In the meantime, the real preparations for peace were made secretly under the leadership of the political division of the Foreign Ministry with the full conviction of the inevitability of a German defeat.³⁸ Government offices, research institutions, and selected experts were given assignments without being aware of the underlying purpose of the peace preparatory work. With the possible occupation of Hungary by the Germans always in sight, duplicate copies of all documents were sent to the Hungarian legation at Berne.

However, before continuing the examination of Hungary's foreign policy under the Kallay government, it is perhaps desirable to give a picture of the Nazi penetration of Hungarian life and of the main forces and methods of anti-Nazi resistance.

In the midst of the political and ideological chaos prevailing in Europe before the Second World War, unscrupulous Nazi methods were bound to score successes. The state of mind of the Hungarian middle class was, on the whole, somewhat unbalanced and confused, although the majority remained anti-Nazi. Some features of the political situation in Hungary were particularly favorable to the spread of Nazi doctrines, and some sections of the Hungarian middle class became infected by them. For people who disregarded basic human issues, all the abuses of dictatorial systems were completely justified by the conspicuous successes of a policy of accomplished facts, and by the hesitant behavior of democratic countries in the face of German violations of international obligations. The striking rise of German might impressed many people, but especially the army officers.

Under the impact of the unfortunate situation created in the Danubian Valley after the First World War, the Hungarian public welcomed any new trend which promised alleviation of the country's economic difficulties, and reparation of the injustices attributed to the Trianon Treaty. And the Nazis were rather generous with promises. They did not hesitate to practice the old imperial policy of pitting the national aspirations of one Danubian people against those of another. To Hungary they promised the correction of the "injustices of Trianon"; to the neighboring states, defense against "Hungary's exaggerated claims." A substantial part of the ethnic Germans in Hungary became adherents of Nazi principles and organizations. A minority of the Germans courage

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ously and under most difficult circumstances opposed Hitlerite ideology. They even organized a "loyalty movement".

Besides economic and nationalistic arguments, a most effective means of spreading Nazi ideology was anti-Jewish propaganda. This was made easy by the fact that Jews in Hungary occupied very advantageous positions in the country's financial and intellectual life. One could hear everywhere, as a result of well-planned Nazi propaganda, that Horthy and the statesmen who resisted Nazi penetration were bribed by the Jews. It was constantly repeated that Western democratic, capitalistic, and Jewish influence were responsible for all the privations and misery of the people and for the corruption in public life, as well. Under constant German pressure two anti-Jewish laws (Act 4, 1939 and Act 15, 1941) were enacted which went much farther than the first anti-Jewish law of 1938, contained strong political discrimination, and also penalized the Jews in economic and social respects. The government hoped by such measures to take some of the wind out of the Nazi sails. But these laws did not menace the physical existence of the Jews and did not apply the inhuman measures practiced in other satellite states, measures that the German Government consistently demanded from Hungary. However, some of the Jews who had been conscripted into the labor service and taken to the Russian front suffered brutal treatment. But the Minister of Interior, Keresztes-Fischer, and Kallay's short-lived Minister of National Defense, Vilmos Nagy, managed to re-establish justice toward the Jews.³⁹

It was characteristic of the situation that Jews from neighboring countries endeavored to seek refuge in Hungary. About 70,000 foreign Jews managed to reach Hungary, and with the help of the Hungarian authorities, many of them were able to go to Palestine. A Jewish writer dealing with the fate of Hungarian Jewry and with the annihilation of Jews in adjacent countries, concluded: "While the Germans had practically annihilated Central European Jewry, roughly one million Jews lived in Hungary. They all had to thank the 'protection' afforded them by Regent Horthy and the Kallay Government for their physical existence in what the Nazis called the 'Central European Jewish Island'."⁴⁰

It was reassuring to see that Nazi methods and principles could not deceive the bulk of the Hungarian people. Even in the worst days of pro-German influence, there were in Hungary forces who openly defied Hitler and worked against Nazi penetration, courageous people of sound political and moral judgment. They despised the momentary advantages offered by a wicked system, and fought for the underlying moral forces which guide amidst many ups and downs the course of mankind. To Hungarian common sense the ideas of the Nazis were alien. This fundamental

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humane trend vindicated itself by moderating the attitude of Hungarian governments even in desperate situations. Parliament was in session throughout the war, as in Finland. This gave an opportunity to the partly muzzled opposition parties mainly the Small-Landholders (hereafter Smallholders), Democrats, and Social Democrats to censure Hungarian foreign policy and to protest pro-German policy.⁴¹ The Journal of Parliament gives testimony of the courageous attitude of the opposition members of Parliament.

Until the German occupation, over a dozen leftist and anti-Nazi daily papers and periodicals were more or less vocal against pro-Nazi policy. Centers of resistance against Nazi penetration came into being. Churches of all denominations and left-wing parties fought desperately against the spread of Hitlerite ideology. So did prominent Hungarian writers as well as outstanding personalities in Hungarian intellectual life.⁴² Justinian Cardinal Seredi defied the Nazis openly in bold speeches. Other Catholic and Protestant clergy followed suit. Especially bold was the Catholic Bishop of Veszprem, William Apor, in defending persecuted Jews.⁴³ The masses of peasants and workers remained indifferent if not hostile to Nazi ideas. The great number of journalists were fundamentally anti-Nazi, although a small minority produced noisy pro-Nazi propaganda. This latter group of journalists, provided with much money, founded daily and weekly papers and even bought the favorite daily of the Hungarian middle class, the Magyarsag, formerly a pro-Habsburg, legitimist newspaper.

As the war continued, an ever increasing number of war prisoners and refugees of all sorts found asylum and warm hospitality in Hungary. The treatment of refugees went far beyond the prescriptions of international law. After the defeat of Poland, 140,000 Poles found shelter in Hungary. The majority of these people, with the help of Hungarian authorities and private persons, managed to cross the border of Yugoslavia and to join the Allied colors in the Near East.⁴⁴ While the Germans shut down all Polish high schools and cultural associations in Poland, these, in addition to grammar schools, were established in Hungary, and Polish papers were published until March, 1944. No fewer than 14,000 Polish Jews succeeded in procuring so-called "Christian papers" from the Hungarian Ministry of Interior. The Polish emigrants had every facility for communicating with underground organizations in Poland, and the Hungarian diplomatic pouch forwarded their correspondence to London via Lisbon. In charge of affairs concerning Russian war prisoners who escaped from German camps was a Soviet Russian partisan captain, who acted as an official of the Ministry of Interior.

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About 1400 French war prisoners managed to escape from German camps into Hungary and enjoyed the same hospitable treatment.⁴⁵ Hungarian hospitality provided all comforts. French ex-prisoners were lodged in hotels on the shores of Lake Balaton, the playground of Hungary. They had freedom of movement all over the country. Some of them were even helped to escape to unoccupied France. The Hungarian Government refused to surrender them to the Germans in spite of repeated Nazi protests. They were followed by a number of Dutch, Belgian, British, and American war prisoners who found hiding places with private persons. This happened, even after the German occupation of Hungary, with the connivance of the authorities.

Not only in the treatment of Jews and refugees did Hungary manifest her true feelings. Food in considerable quantities went to German occupied countries, especially to Greece and Belgium. By means of the International Red Cross gift parcels were forwarded regularly to Polish and French war prisoners in Germany, to the camps in Yugoslavia, and to those unfortunates interned in German-occupied Poland. International Red Cross reports indicate that the most substantial help to occupied territories came from Hungary. Nor did Hungary fail to send generous amounts of food to the Vatican.

The most important results of the Hungarian resistance were attained in economic matters. As statistical data demonstrate, exports to Germany did not approach anything like the volume stipulated.⁴⁶ Throughout the war, Hungarian sabotage curtailed deliveries to Germany. Economic resistance here became of the utmost importance. Between 1940 and 1943, Hungarian grain deliveries to Germany did not reach more than one-fourth of the quantities stipulated. This accounts for the fact that, while the value of food imports into Germany totalled $39.7 millions in 1939, this total fell to $21.1 millions in 1941. As a result, in spite of ravenous German demands, Hungarian live-stock increased by eleven percent during the war. At the time of the Russian invasion eighteen million metric quintals of cereals were housed in the public stores of the "Futura".⁴⁷ Nor did Hungary comply with the German demand that she mobilize her industries for war. As late as 1943, war industries consumed only twenty percent of the total electric energy of the country, the remaining eighty percent serving to supply other industrial and civilian needs.

This non-cooperative Hungarian attitude provoked angry reproaches from the Germans. Comparisons of Hungary's behavior with that of the more friendly satellites and occupied countries were loud and bitter. As early as 1943, Karl Clodius ⁴⁸ hinted to Kallay that Hungary's economic sabotage might lead to military occupation, since the Germans

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could get much more out of the occupied countries. As an example Clodius mentioned the output of Czech industry and agriculture.

The centers of Hungarian resistance to Nazi penetrations were certain high government agencies, notably the Foreign Ministry. There were not many pro-Nazi elements in the Hungarian diplomatic service. It was never a hotbed of Nazism, although there were some who were not averse to a policy of limited cooperation with the Nazis. They thereby hoped to prevent the total exploitation and occupation of the country. Fear of Soviet expansion was another argument for such limited cooperation.

Nevertheless, even during the years of a more cooperative policy, the anti-Nazi forces in Hungary always had a core in the Foreign Ministry. With the help of Hungarian diplomats the conservative forces succeeded in keeping Hungarian politics from complete "nazification". These diplomats, joining hands with elements of similar conviction, were able to show results which, under the circumstances, were gratifying. One result of the moderating influence of Hungarian diplomats was that even pro-German members of the Government had to comply with the policy of minimum concessions or compromise in a given situation. They were handicapped in playing the Nazi game. No wonder that the Germans gave voice to their dissatisfaction.

An example of official resistance was the Hungarian policy toward citizens who enlisted in the SS forces. One of the Nazi devices in the southeastern European countries was to enlist young members of the German minority in the SS forces. In other satellite countries, local authorities made such enlistments easy, but Hungary discouraged this practice by depriving such young men of their Hungarian citizenship. Until the German occupation of Hungary the prime minister and the Foreign Ministry made a strong effort to maintain this policy. This was probably one of the reasons why Goebbels wrote the following entry in his diary: "I have received a report about the fate of the German minorities in Hungary. The Hungarians still dare to commit acts of effrontery toward us that go far beyond what we can stand for. I suppose, however, we must keep quiet for the moment. We are dependent upon them. But everyone of us is yearning for the moment when we can really talk turkey to the Hungarians (wenn wir einmal Fraktur reden koennen)." ⁴⁹

These few examples of the methods of Nazi penetration in Hungary and the nature of the resistance to it should clarify the main course of political events to which I now return.

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DIPLOMACY IN A WHIRLPOOL