DIPLOMACY IN A WHIRLPOOL

III HUNGARY BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS.

The Peace Treaty

Hungary's status after the first World War was particularly difficult. After the defeat and disintegration of the Red Army of Bela Kun, Rumanian troops occupied Budapest and the major part of the country.¹ The occupation was accompanied by extensive looting, which caused damages of almost three billion gold crowns.² This was followed by a disastrous peace treaty. As Francesco Nitti put it: " By a stroke of irony the financial and economic clauses inflict the most serious burdens on a country which had lost almost everything: which has lost the greatest number of men proportionately in the war, which since the war has had two revolutions, which for four months suffered the sackings of Bolshevism led by Bela Kun and the worst elements of revolutionary political crime and, finally, has suffered a Rumanian occupation, which was worse almost than the revolutions of Bolshevism".³

Negotiations with Hungary did not precede the peace settlement; the provisions of the treaty were established by the victorious states. Subsequently the Hungarian peace delegation was merely heard on one occasion. The Treaty of Trianon made Hungary the most dissatisfied of all the Danubian states.⁴ The Peace Conference decided the claims of the neighboring states put forward against Hungary, but did not consider the cumulative effect of these claims on the new Hungary itself. As one outstanding chronicler of the Peace Conference, Harold Nicolson, points out, the Conference "approached its problems in terms, not of the enemy Powers, but of the respective 'claims' of the succession and smaller States".⁶ Dealing with the problem of the Territorial Committees, Nicolson noted the defects in their proceedings, pointing out that the main task of the Committees was not to recommend a general territorial settlement, but to pronounce on the particular claims of certain states.⁶ The adverse effects of such a procedure are obvious.

The American recommendations concerning Hungary's frontiers were more favorable than the final provisions of the Trianon Treaty.⁷ A member of the American Peace Commission, Professor Archibald C. Coolidge of Harvard, visited Hungary in January of 1919 and prepared a very objective report on the conditions in Hungary and the repercussions to be expected from the projected peace settlement.⁸ And as Lloyd George himself pointed out in a memorandum of March 25, 1919, "There will never be peace in Southeastern Europe if every little state now coming into being is to have a large Magyar irredenta within its

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borders". Therefore he recommended that the different races should be allocated to their motherlands, and that this criterion "should have precedence over considerations of strategy or economics or communications, which can usually he adjusted by other means".⁹

Such considerations were discarded. The frontiers of the new Hungary were fixed principally according to Rumanian, Czechoslovak, and Yugoslav demands, and after consideration of their geographical, strategic, economic and ethnographic arguments. Territories inhabited by Magyars figured as a sort of "no man's land".¹⁰ A remark attributed to Benes was characteristic of the general atmosphere of the conference. "I am alarmed" Benes said to a friend, "when I see that they give me everything that I ask for. It is too much".¹¹

The upshot of the matter was that the peace settlement was incomparably more severe for Hungary than for Germany or Bulgaria. True, Austria lost even more than Hungary, but Austria was a frequently changing federation of heterogeneous territories gradually acquired by the House of Habsburg and the Germans formed only a little over one-third of its population. Hungary had existed for centuries as a unitary state which demonstrated a remarkable degree of stability and stamina through the vicissitudes of history. The Treaty of Trianon reduced Hungary proper to less than one-third of her former territory and about two-fifths of her population.¹² Over three million Magyars were attached, against their wishes, to the neighboring states. The Hungarian peace delegation vainly proposed a plebiscite for the territories in dispute.¹³

As a result of the territorial changes effected under the peace treaty the population of Hungary decreased to a figure considerably less than the actual number of Magyars residing in Southeastern Europe, while the population of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia became, in every case, considerably greater than the actual number of any of their respective national groups. This situation is especially evident in the light of the 1910 and 1920 censuses, but it can also be clearly seen from the 1930 censuses which were least favorable to the Magyars.¹⁴

It is generally known that because of the complication of ethnographic conditions in the Danube Valley it was impossible to establish completely satisfactory frontiers. However, about one and a half million Magyars who lived in compact blocks along the new frontiers were detached from Hungary. This artificial separation could not be justified, even in the eyes of a disinterested observer, let alone to the Hungarian people themselves.

The dissolution of the Monarchy in itself had a very unfavorable effect on the economy of Hungary. The great internal market and

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balanced economy suddenly ceased to exist. Most of the factories and industrial areas remaining in Hungary were deprived of their markets and were cut off from their sources of raw materials within the neighboring states. In addition, the Trianon frontiers produced a whole series of special economic difficulties. For example, the new frontiers cut in half the areas of twenty-four flood control companies. As a result of the uncooperative attitudes of Czechoslovakia and Rumania, Hungary became exposed to grave risk of floods on the lower reaches of her rivers without being able to establish sufficient protection against them. A careless deforestation policy in both countries increased the flood danger to Hungary. The major part of Hungary is a lowland, and nearly one quarter of the productive area of the country consists of land which had been protected against inundations only at an enormous cost in money and labor. In many cases such troubles could have been avoided by minor frontier rectifications or other suitable arrangements, if Hungary's case had been seriously considered and Hungarian experts had been consulted at the peace settlement.

The general economic difficulties created by the peace settlement were increased by the refugee problem. More than 350,000 Magyars were forced to leave the neighboring states and move to the reduced territory of Hungary. These homeless masses, largely middle-class people, greatly increased Hungary's economic and social difficulties. They also became, as a matter of course, the moving spirits of revisionist movements.

The situation created by the peace treaty would have been unacceptable to any self-respecting people, but the Magyars were particularly proud of having organized and maintained a state on one of the most dangerous spots of Europe for a thousand years. Their bitterness was made even greater by their conviction that after Hungary had defended the whole of Europe against invasions in the past a claim asserted by a number of the countries of Eastern Europe the West had, so to speak, "stabbed them in the back".

The Magyars looked with great confidence to the United States and especially to the principles promulgated by President Wilson.¹⁵ However, the vindictive peace settlement imposed by the victors in the name of democracy gave that term a rather doubtful meaning to many Magyars. It seemed to them that, at the peace table, the lofty principles were applied only against them and never in their favor. Trianon had a harmful effect in domestic politics as well. It gave an evil connotation to the term "democracy", and indirectly retarded democratic forces in the country.

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Consolidation of the Status Quo.

After the upheavals of the revolutionary years of 1918-1919, the National Assembly, in March, 1920, elected Admiral Nicholas Horthy as Regent.¹⁶ Hungary remained a monarchy with the kingship in abeyance. The Treaty of Trianon was signed on June 4, 1920, and ratified by Hungary under pressure from the great powers on November 13, 1920.

The period preceding the ratification of the peace treaty was eventful in Hungarian foreign politics. Early in 1920 confidential parleys took place between France and Hungary.¹⁷ These were followed by formal negotiations. French foreign policy endeavored to bring about a Danubian integration. In connection with this plan France was inclined to support Hungarian claims aimed at correcting some of the territorial provisions of the Trianon Treaty.¹⁸ The French High Commissioner in Budapest, Maurice Fouchet, declared that France was determined to base her whole policy in Southeastern Europe upon Hungary as a pivot.¹⁹ In return Hungary was expected to give important concessions to France. These included leasing the Hungarian State Railways and Railway Locomotive Works, the exploitation of navigation on the Danube by a French concern, the building of a Danube port in Budapest by SchneiderCreusot, and the transfer of control over the Hungarian Credit Bank to a French financial syndicate. This bank owned a considerable part of Hungarian industry. The French negotiator, Maurice Paleologue, secretary general of the Quai d'Orsay, was supported by Prime Minister Millerand, but many influences worked at cross purposes. The FrancoHungarian negotiations provoked Italian and British protests, and Hungary's neighbors were greatly alarmed.

Since official French documents have not yet been published, the ultimate French objectives in these negotiations are not quite clear. Isolated Hungary obviously hoped that an understanding with France might improve her international situation. Paleologue gradually played down the prospects of a long-term Franco-Hungarian rapprochement and promised assistance to Hungary in negotiating with her neighbors for friendly settlements. Eventually the pro-Hungarian French policy in Danubian Europe was abandoned. Paleologue resigned in September, 1920. His successor, Philip de Berthelot, energetically supported a maintenance of the status quo. This remained thereafter the main line of French foreign policy.

One of the results of the Franco-Hungarian rapprochement may have been the vague promise inserted in the Covering Letter of Millerand which was transmitted to the Hungarian peace delegation with the draft peace treaty on May 6, 1920. ²⁰ But the Hungarian public greatly

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overestimated the extremely cautious passage of the letter which mentioned possible revision of the frontiers, and disappointment was great when the commissions of delimitation later recommended only a few minor frontier rectifications.

Another important development of the postwar years was the formation of the Little Entente, an alliance system almost completely encircling Hungary. The creator of the Little Entente was Eduard Benes, who foresaw the Hungarian reactions to the Trianon settlement and began negotiations with Yugoslav and Rumanian representatives as early as the end of 1918. Yugoslavia and Rumania shared Benes' feelings towards Hungary, but were reluctant at first to conclude a formal alliance with Czechoslovakia. A treaty of alliance concluded between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia on August 14, 1920, and directed against Hungary, was the first success of Benes' policy. Two attempts by King Charles to return to the Hungarian throne gave impetus to the movement among Hungary's neighbors for further integration.²¹

The concept of the Little Entente was not viewed with sympathy by re-established Poland a state which was to become an important factor in Eastern Europe. Marshal Joseph Pilsudski, President of Poland, and the Polish Foreign Minister, Prince Eustace Sapieha, would have preferred a Polish-Hungarian-Rumanian rapprochement with French blessing.²² Such developments had some chance of success during the RussoPolish war, which broke out in February, 1920. Even before the outbreak of the war, the Polish Government, anticipating a Bolshevik attack, inquired as to whether the munition factory at Csepel could supply Poland with ammunition.²³ The Hungarian Government reacted positively and later the Minister of National Defense put at Poland's disposal the army's whole reserve of ammunition and instructed the factory at Csepel that for fourteen days: all production should be for the benefit of Poland.²⁴ Beyond this material assistance, the negative Czechoslovak attitude excluded large-scale military cooperation between Hungary and Poland. Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia was attached to Czechoslovakia, and thus Hungary and Poland had no common frontier. The Poles especially asked for twenty to thirty thousand cavalry troops, which Hungary was not able to supply. But other troops of considerable strategic value were offered.²⁵ Negotiations continued, but there were great difficulties to overcome. Irrespective of the unfriendly Czech attitude, the disarmament clauses of the peace treaty made major Hungarian assistance an impossibility, and Hungary's neighbors were reluctant to modify the pertinent treaty provisions. Polish diplomacy cautiously supported Hungary and a special Hungarian diplomatic-military mission was dispatched to Paris to obtain French endorsement. The French were inclined to

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comply with the Hungarian request but they made their decision conditional upon the approval of the Rumanians and the Czechoslovaks who refused to give their consent. Sapieha informed the Hungarian Government that the chief reason why the Allied Powers declined Hungary's assistance against the Bolsheviks was the refusal of Czechoslovakia to permit the transportation of Hungarian troops. He explained that the Allied Powers were unable to force their will upon Czechoslovakia, thus they preferred to adopt a position of intransigence toward Hungary rather than to admit their impotency.²⁶ Eventually it was decided to send Hungarian legions of volunteers to Poland, but due to the favorable turn of the military operations against the Bolsheviks, this plan was not carried out.²⁷

The Polish victory over the Red Army in August, 1920, followed by an armistice in October, and the peace treaty of Riga the following March, made military cooperation between Hungary and Poland superfluous. Although relations between the two states remained cordial throughout the interwar period, their international positions and political interests were really widely divergent. While Hungary was the greatest loser of the peace settlement and consequently almost inevitably a revisionist state, Poland was quite naturally a pro-status-quo power and an ally of Rumania and France. The manifest political difficulties notwithstanding, however, Polish diplomacy endeavored several times to bring about a reconciliation between Hungary and Rumania. But these attempts met with little success.

The return of King Charles to Hungary in March, 1921, soon further troubled the already difficult waters of Hungary's foreign relations. Charles received French encouragement ²⁸ and appeared unexpectedly in Hungary on March 26, and remained until persuaded to leave the country by Regent Horthy on April 5 of the same year. Nevertheless, the damage was done. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia threatened armed intervention, and the great powers lodged protests. Italy also strongly supported the anti-Habsburg campaign.²⁹ The Hungarian Government considered the return of Charles a matter which concerned Hungary exclusively, but obviously Hungary was not in a position to resist the whole of Europe.

Under the impact of Charles' return, Rumania signed a treaty of alliance with Czechoslovakia on April 23, and with Yugoslavia on June 17, 1921.³⁰ Charles returned to Hungary for a second time on October 21, 1921, and marched with some Hungarian army units on Budapest. As the military threat of the neighboring states was even more serious than in March, the Hungarian Government resisted by force and interned the King. The Allied powers exiled him to the island of Madeira

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where he died shortly thereafter. Hungary was, however, obliged to enact a law declaring the dethronement of the House of Habsburg.

The two attempts of Charles to return to the Throne of St. Stephen complicated Hungary's foreign relations in many other respects, and especially increased suspicion among the neighboring countries. Following the signing of the peace treaty the government of Count Paul Teleki succeeded in stabilizing somewhat the internal conditions of the country, and sought to improve relations with the neighboring states. On March 14 and 15, 1921, Prime Minister Count Paul Teleki and Foreign Minister Gustave Gratz negotiated with Benes in Bruck.³¹ The two delegations discussed certain problems connected with the execution of the peace treaty and the larger aspects of political relations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The possibility of territorial revisions of the Trianon Treaty was also discussed, and Benes made interesting suggestions.³² But, after these negotiations, relations deteriorated between the two countries, although Masaryk himself visualized a close cooperation and even an alliance between Hungary and Czechoslovakia.³³ Negotiations took place again in Marienbad on June 23 and 24, between Benes and the new Hungarian foreign minister, Count Nicholas Banffy, but these were restricted to certain technicalities connected with the execution of the peace treaty.³⁴ Meanwhile, political events in Danubian Europe began to take a course which excluded a sincere reconciliation between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Masaryk maintained a friendly attitude toward Hungary throughout his presidency and was disposed to make important concessions, including territorial revisions, but Benes resolutely opposed such a policy.³⁵

After the Trianon Treaty became effective, Yugoslavia finally withdrew her troops from the occupied territories in southern Hungary in July, 1921. At the same time, the ratification of the treaty gave rise to an acute tension between Hungary and another neighbor, Austria. Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia occupied the Hungarian territories promised to them by the principal Allied powers at the close of hostilities, but western Hungary (Burgenland) remained under Hungarian administration. Hungary was obliged to transfer this territory to Austria within a month after the treaty entered into force. This placed the government in an extremely embarrassing position, since the Hungarian public bitterly resented this territorial claim, particularly since the war had been fought with Austria as an ally, and the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Stephen Tisza, was the only leading statesman in the Monarchy who energetically opposed in July, 1914 those diplomatic steps which lead to war.

It was true that the overwhelming majority of the population was

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German, but Burgenland had belonged to Hungary for a thousand years. Under pressure from the principal Allied powers Hungary evacuated the region in August, 1921, but immediately after the evacuation irregular detachments took over the territory and ejected Austrian gendarmerie.

Italian mediation helped to solve the ensuing deadlock. Under the presidency of the Italian foreign minister, Marchese della Torretta, Hungarian and Austrian representatives met in Venice and signed a protocol providing for a plebiscite in the city of Sopron and in eight small villages. The plebiscite took place and resulted in 15,334 votes for Hungary and 8,227 votes for Austria.³⁶ Thus occurred the first territorial revision of the Trianon Treaty. After the settlement of this question relations between Austria and Hungary gradually improved.

Meanwhile, following the first attempt of King Charles to recover the Hungarian throne, Count Paul Teleki resigned in April, 1921, and Count Stephen Bethlen took over the government, which he subsequently headed for more than ten years. Bethlen continued the work of internal and external consolidation began by Teleki. They suppressed the counter-revolutionary extremist movements.³⁷

Since relations with her neighbors improved to some extent in 1923, Hungary was able to begin financial reconstruction with the help of the League of Nations.³⁸ A reconstruction loan was floated abroad, the currency was stabilized and the budget balanced. An American citizen, Jeremiah Smith of Boston, became the League's Commissioner-General in Budapest. With his energetic cooperation Hungary made rapid progress on the road to economic recovery.

The government adopted a protective tariff and especially supported the development of textile and manufacturing industries. Increased industrialization was a necessity because Hungary, as an agricultural state, was overpopulated. But the Government failed to carry out an adequate agrarian reform. A large scale agrarian reform was a foremost social necessity; however, this alone could not have solved the economic problems of the country. Bethlen's idea was first to develop an industry and then to carry out an agrarian reform, when the necessary capital had been made available by the Hungarian industry.

Bethlen's conservative administration was supported by a strong parliamentary majority. The franchise was restricted and balloting was secret only in towns, being open in the countryside. Considerable progress was made in the fields of social legislation and public education. Intercultural relations were greatly developed, particularly with western countries, and hundreds of students were sent to foreign universities with the aid of government scholarships.³⁹

Hungary gradually concluded a network of commercial and other

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treaties, and in September, 1922, became a member of the League of Nations. Despite the assistance the League gave in connection with the financial reconstruction of the country, it never became popular in Hungary. The Hungarian political scene was dominated by the idea of revision, and the League was considered, with some justification, as the guardian of the status quo. Article XIX of the Covenant theoretically made possible the revision of treaties and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world, but actually this provision remained a dead letter.

Another cause of dissatisfaction was connected with the fate of the Magyars in the neighboring states. Immediately following the occupation of Hungarian territories, the successor states began to apply oppressive measures against them. These continued with varying intensity throughout the interwar years. The Magyar minority was almost completely cut off from Hungary and even cultural intercourse was barred.⁴⁰ The special 'Minority Treaties' provided for certain minimum rights for the minorities; the execution of these provisions was under the ultimate control of the League of Nations. The Hungarian public felt that the League had failed to do its duty in this field. Certain adverse criticism was undoubtedly justified, since the competent organs of the League did not show much interest in this delicate matter, and the procedure had many shortcomings. The Hungarian public did not realize that the very existence of such machinery acted, in many cases, as a restraint upon governments planning oppressive measures against minorities. They saw only the negative side of the League and a spirit of exasperated opposition developed in the country against the whole postwar international order.

During the interwar period the revision of the Trianon Treaty remained an almost inevitable policy of all Hungarian governments. The Hungarian people probably would not have tolerated any government which neglected this program, for all social classes were convinced of the injustices and absurdities of the new peace settlement. The peace treaty was considered the source of all evil. The government authorized the activities of some revisionist associations, since such authorization promised to be a means of controlling the general exasperation and preventing violent outbursts against the Treaty. The aim of these societies was to win world opinion for a peaceful revision of the Peace Treaty by application of Article XIX of the Covenant. Their enthusiastic but rather naive propaganda usually ignored the mentality of foreign countries. The false optimism and emotional exaggerations caused by the Rothermere campaign are the best examples of this mood, so favorable to self-deception.⁴¹

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The Hungarian public enthusiastically received the news in April, 1927, that Bethlen had signed in Rome a treaty of friendship and arbitration with Italy. Although the text followed the usual pattern of treaties of the same nature, it was considered as a break in Hungary's isolated diplomatic position. The Italian orientation of Hungary's foreign policy was further favored by the fact that in the next year Mussolini openly sponsored the Hungarian revisionist case.⁴²

From this time on friendship for Italy remained a characteristic feature of Hungarian foreign policy. Bethlen visited Italy again in 1930, and expressed his thanks to Mussolini for the support given to Hungary by the Italian Government during the conference on Eastern reparations.⁴³

When the world economic crisis reached Hungary in 1931 and shook the economic structure of the country, Bethlen resigned (August, 1931). His successor, Count Gyula Karolyi, continued Bethlen's Italian orientation,⁴⁴ and sought to resolve the crisis by introducing into the budget measures of economy. But world developments further aggravated the economic and financial situation of the country, and resulted in the overthrow of his government (September, 1932). With the resignation of Count Karolyi, the period of old-type conservative policy in Hungary came to an end. Germany was on the eve of revolutionary transformations which in turn affected political developments in Hungary and throughout Europe.

Fateful Years.

The new prime minister, General Gyula Gombos, was an outstanding representative of the strongly pro-Nazi elements in the Hungarian army. These officers despised the liberal traditions of the Hungarian upper class, cherished great admiration for Mussolini and had a profound sympathy towards the rising Nazi power in Germany. Contempt of democracy, worship of totalitarian methods, and propagandistic use of popular slogans characterized their way of thinking. Even though Gombos was more of a special fellow traveller than a simon pure Nazi, his confused rhetoric prepared the ground for the eventual spread of extremist slogans. His most fateful contribution was the introduction of politics into the army. He appointed army officers to important posts in the state administration and under his protection extremist secret societies were organized. Nazi ideas took the place of real patriotism in many quarters. Although there were many fine patriots among the Hungarian army officers, few of them were appointed to leading positions during these crucial years. Jingo-nationalist elements of the lower middle class were put into key positions and able persons of independent

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mind were gradually eliminated from the higher positions of public life. Another officer full of political ambitions was the mentally unbalanced Major Ferenc Szalasi, the later Arrow Cross ⁴⁵ leader. Gombos was much above the intellectual standard of Szalasi and most of the pro-Nazi officers and politicians. He could accommodate himself to political realities, and in spite of his German leanings wanted to be an independent master in Hungary. He soon visited Hitler and maintained intimate relations with him, but several times he protested strongly to Germany against organizing German minorities in Hungary along Nazi lines, and approved closer cooperation with Italy and Austria to check growing German influence. For the same reason Gombos visited Marshal Pilsudski and sought to strengthen the ties of Hungary's traditional friendship with Poland.

The result of the pro-Italian policy was the signing by Gombos, Mussolini and Chancellor Engelbert Dollfus of the three Rome Protocols (March 17, 1934) providing for cooperation among Austria, Hungary and Italy. The first protocol dealt with political matters and established the principle of common consultation. In the second protocol Austria and Italy promised to take measures to overcome the difficulties incurred by Hungary when the prices of grains fell. Moreover, the contracting parties agreed to facilitate transit traffic to the Adriatic ports and to set up a permanent committee to formulate concrete proposals for the development of their economic relations. A third protocol provided for some special aspects of Italo-Austrian economic relations.

The ultimate object of Hungarian diplomacy was to establish an economic union with Austria and Italy. It was thought that this would have solved to a large extent the problem of marketing Hungarian agricultural products. Because of German opposition this goal was never achieved. Although the Rome protocols were of momentary help, they did not solve Hungary's economic difficulties.

While Italo-Austrian-Hungarian cooperation was developing, the Little Entente established permanent political and economic organs among Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia. Besides, Greece, Rumania, Turkey and Yugoslavia concluded the Balkan Pact, mutually guaranteeing one another's frontiers on the Balkans and accepting the principle of consultation.

These two groups of states, together with those states involved in the Rome protocols, were composed of members with widely divergent political interests, and with mostly competitive rather than complementary economies. None of these groupings possessed inherent strength. The Danubian situation was characterized from 1919 on by the lack of real power in the area. Exaggerated nationalism and economic forces

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worked at cross purposes within the area, and outside powers France and Italy supported the various states and groups of states.

Since the European power situation underwent fundamental transformations in the 1930's, which revitalized the two really great outside forces, Germany and Russia, and which had strong repercussions in the Danubian Valley it is necessary to glance at some of these changes.

In these fateful years the impotence of the League of Nations in political matters became obvious. The Four-Power Pact initiated by Mussolini and signed by Great Britain, Germany, France and Italy (June 7, 1933) purported to recreate the old Concert of Europe, but this Pact was not ratified by France and Germany. Thus, the active cooperation of the major representatives of Western European civilization never became a reality. Although Hitler's arbitrary actions gradually isolated Germany, his treaty violations never evoked punitive measures.

The semblance of Western European unity was momentarily established by the common declaration of France, Great Britain and Italy in February, 1934, concerning the maintenance of Austrian independence. Four months later, when Chancellor Dollfuss was killed, Mussolini mobilized, and the Italian army moved to the Brenner Pass.

But Hitler's aggressive policy caused the most fateful changes in the relations between Soviet Russia and the Western world. After Hitler's siezure of power, the Kremlin initiated a rapprochement with the Western democracies and instructed the foreign Communist parties to cooperate with Social Democrats and other left-wing parties. In September, 1934, the Soviet Union was admitted into the League of Nations; and Litvinov, who skillfully used the jargon of Geneva, became the champion of collective security. Moreover, the Soviet Union renewed diplomatic relations with the United States of America and concluded treaties of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia. Thus, a Communist state, aiming at the destruction of the Western state system, was accepted as a full-fledged leading member of the family of nations.

Germany's repudiation of the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty (March 1935) caused general consternation in the Western democracies, and France demanded a special session of the League to censure Hitler's action. Before this session, the representatives of Great Britain, France and Italy met at Stresa in April, 1935, and under the chairmanship of Mussolini drafted a resolution for the Council which condemned Germany. They agreed on the necessity of an independent Austria, and reaffirmed their determination to resist aggression. At the same time, however, the British delegation made it clear that Britain "would not consider the possibility of sanctions in the event of Treaty violations".

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The French delegation professed similar feelings. Thus Mussolini left the conference with the impression that, in case of a showdown with Germany, Italy would not get effective military help from the Western powers. Moreover, he thought that Italy's actions in Africa would not be resisted beyond verbal protestations. This belief of Mussolini, first gained from earlier contacts with Laval, was strengthened by the attitude of the English and French delegations at Stresa.⁴⁶

But the first serious shock administered to Italy's Stresa policy was the British-German naval agreement, concluded in June, 1935. Such a step could have been part of a wise policy and might have had a beneficial effect in the midst of the growing international tension. Italy and France, however, were not informed of the preceding negotiations although the agreement was clearly a modification of the Versailles Treaty. Thus it could be considered as another treaty violation committed by Germany this time with British connivance. The resultant weakening of faith in British reliability, both in Italy and France, contributed to the further general deterioration of the political atmosphere in Europe.

The Ethiopian war (October, 1935), and the sanctions that followed, definitely alienated Italy from the Western powers.⁴⁷ The first direct political consequence of Italy's changed relations with France and Great Britain was the German occupation of the Rhineland, a move which immensely strengthened Germany's power position in Eastern Europe. Although Hitler, on this occasion, repudiated the freely negotiated Locarno Treaty, France and Great Britain again satisfied themselves with formal protestations. The Council of the League of Nations branded Germany as a treaty breaker but remained passive. French passivity was particularly strange in that France alone could easily have crushed the German army at this time. Her attitude had the worst possible psychological and strategical effect throughout Europe. It set the pattern for a large-scale appeasement in the West, it opened wide the door for German expansion in the East, and it strengthened pro-Nazi political trends, especially in the Danubian countries.

The occupation of the Rhineland was followed by an Austro-German agreement (July 11, 1936), and by a steady Italo-German rapprochement. In October, 1936, the Rome-Berlin Axis was created, and a year later Italy adhered to the Anti-Comintern Pact.⁴⁸

This new situation weakened day by day the political value of ItaloHungarian-Austrian collaboration, since, economically, Germany could offer much more than Italy. The Hungarian public followed these developments with anxiety as pro-Nazi political forces grew in strength.

In October, 1936, Gombos died. His successor, as head of the govern-

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ment, was Coloman Daranyi a correct civil servant with little political dynamism. He vaguely followed the policy initiated by his predecessor. Under his weak government Nazi seeds began to grow in Hungarian politics. The demagogic agitations of the various Nazi groups, supported by Germany, made good use of the defects of the social system and the economic difficulties of the country. Anti-semitic slogans became the order of the day.⁴⁹ In foreign affairs, Nazi propaganda emphasized the inability of the Western powers to bring about a viable political system in the Danube Valley, and promised that Germany would correct the injustices of Trianon. This political game was greatly strengthened by the eastward economic penetration started by the Third Reich.

The deceptive economic diplomacy of Hitlerite Germany was, as a matter of fact, of great momentary help to Hungary and to the other overwhelmingly agricultural Danubian states, which had been unable to sell their products since the crisis of 1931.⁵⁰ Germany solved their marketing problems, and this German help, resulted in a steady increase of the influence exerted by the Third Reich in these countries. It became apparent only later, that because of ingenious clearing agreements, the Danubian states themselves had to finance exports to Germany. This started an inflation and impoverishment which were camouflaged for a short time by a false prosperity. Mouth organs, aspirin, and other similar commodities soon flooded the Danubian markets, and later the Germans generously exported some scrapped armaments.

In economic matters there were only poor alternatives, but in home politics Daranyi finally sought to check the spread of Nazism by dissolving the Arrow Cross Party and imprisoning its leader, Major Szalasi. In the meantime, however, he brought the first anti-Jewish bill before Parliament in the spring of 1938.⁵¹ He was led astray by the vain hope that moderate anti-Semitic measures could dam the rising flood of antiSemitism, swollen by the Extreme Right.

Meanwhile, Hungarian diplomacy developed further cooperation with Italy,⁵² and tentatively explored possibilities of rapprochement with neighbors. Various Polish endeavors to bring about a reconciliation between Hungary and Rumania failed. Stakes were too great for both countries.

As early as 1926 Hungary made overtures toward Yugoslavia, and Hungaro-Yugoslav relations were, in general, slightly better than those with Rumania and Czechoslovakia. After the assassination of King Alexander in Marseilles on October 9, 1934, this relationship was greatly disturbed. Yugoslavia accused Hungary, before the Council of the League of Nations, of having supported the Croatian underground movement, and several thousand Magyars were expelled by the Yugoslavs.

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Constant Hungaro-Yugoslav negotiations in 1935-1937 did not produce any really positive results, but did improve the somewhat strained relations between the two countries.⁵³ Hungary considered Czechoslovakia the weakest Little Entente state and as least capable of resisting revisionist aspirations. Official relations were formally correct but reserved. Meanwhile, private feelers were put out concerning the possibilities of a larger settlement. For example, a Smallholder politician, Paul Auer,⁵⁴ repeatedly discussed with Benes, Foreign Minister Kamil Krofta, and Prime Minister Milan Hodza the problems of Hungaro-Czechoslovak reconciliation. Auer suggested to Krofta the formation of a Hungaro-Austrian-Czechoslovak collaboration or possible union. The leaders of Czechoslovakia's foreign policy stiffly rebuffed these overtures. Krofta explained to Auer that Czechoslovakia would not enter such a tripartite union in which the Austrians and Hungarians would vote together and Czechoslovakia be isolated and relegated to a minority position. In vain Auer tried to persuade him that within a tripartite union Hungary and Austria would not follow an anti-Czechoslovakian policy, but that the position of the member states would shift in the various issues according to their individual interests. Krofta retorted that Czechoslovakia was not afraid of the Germans, with whom they had learned to deal in the past centuries.

Hodza had a very friendly conversation with Auer on June 29, 1938, concerning the amelioration of the fate of the Hungarian minorities. He offered to intervene in Bucharest for a more liberal treatment of the Magyar minorities and added that in this spirit one could negotiate even on territorial adjustments in a few years. Auer, amazed, replied that because of the Germans, there were only a few months, at the utmost, in which to settle the differences between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and to create a close collaboration in the Danubian Valley. "We are not afraid of Germany" replied Hodza.⁵⁵

Benes was especially irritated by the pro-Habsburg propaganda of the Hungarian legitimists and declared to Auer who himself was not a legitimist that he would prefer Anschluss to restoration. Moreover, he put the blame on Hungarian revisionism and contended that Hungary could not be satisfied by minor concessions, which would only stimulate revisionist ambitions. Actually the extreme revisionist claims were harmful to Hungary's cause abroad and played into the hands of the Little Entente. They used them in persuading the West that Hungarian grievances could not be taken seriously. Meanwhile, Hungarian revisionism had become embittered, and blocked sound political developments in many ways.

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Under the influence of Nazi successes and propaganda, the revisionist policy cautiously advocated by Bethlen was openly pursued. This emotional state of mind, however, had an objective cause: the situation brought about by Trianon. Irrespective of the impact of Hitlerism, a real democratic evolution would have been very difficult in Hungary without the removal of some of the economic absurdities and political injustices created by the peace settlement. Reconciliation between Hungary and her neighbors thus was hindered by a sort of vicious circle.

Hungarian diplomacy tried to extricate the country from the German grasp by relying on Italy and Poland. In March, 1936, new protocols were signed with Italy and Austria which bound the three states more closely together than had been the case under the original act of 1934. Horthy visited Victor Emmanuel III (November, 1936) and the visit was returned in Budapest (May, 1937). Both occasions were manifestations of Italo-Hungarian friendship. In February, 1938, Horthy paid an official visit to Warsaw in order to emphasize friendship with Poland. The German orientation of Hungarian foreign policy, however, became almost inevitable, due to the general trend of European events. Representatives of the powers of the Rome protocols met for the last time in January, 1938, in Budapest.⁵⁶ After the Austrian Anschluss there was no further possibility of Italo-Hungaro-Austrian collaboration. Germany became Hungary's immediate neighbor and acquired an almost monopolistic position in the Hungarian economy.

The Crisis.

In May, 1938, Dar_nyi was succeeded as premier by Bela Imredy, a former President of the National Bank of Hungary, and noted up to that time for his liberal views and pro-English sympathies. Imredy was promptly attacked by the Germans and the extreme right as an Anglophile. This probably was true, but under the influence of European political events Imredy gradually changed his political views.⁵⁷ This excellent financial expert proved to be a poor statesman, and in the latter stage of his Prime Ministership, underwent an amazing transformation in the direction of Nazism. In spite of Imredy's drift toward a German orientation, Foreign Minister Coloman Kanya, an old career diplomat, succeeded in maintaining the relative independence of Hungarian foreign policy.

Imredy and Kanya visited Rome in the middle of July 1938, and discussed with Mussolini and Ciano the Czechoslovak crisis.⁵⁸ Kanya declared that Hungary would never take the initiative in the action against Czechoslovakia but would intervene after the conflict had been begun by Germany. The Duce assured them that a German attack

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against Czechoslovakia would not cause a European crisis. Italy would give complete support to Germany, and Hungary would not run the risk of attacks on the part of the Little Entente. He also promised to tell the Yugoslavs that Italy approved of an increase in Hungarian power. At Kanya's request the communique on the conversation stated that the Rome protocols retained their economic and political force as far as relations between Italy and Hungary were concerned.

Hungary's reluctance to take part in the German military action planned against Czechoslovakia soon became obvious, and this was one of the first serious incidents in German-Hungarian relations. Hitler invited Regent Horthy and leading Hungarian statesmen to the Reich, where they attended the launching of the cruiser, Prinz Eugen at Kiel. At first the Western press erroneously pictured this visit as a complete submission of Hungary to Germany. Far from being a submission, the visit coincided with the publication of the communique on the Bled Agreement, August 23, 1938. The agreement reached between the Little Entente and Hungary included "the recognition by the three States of the Little Entente of Hungary's equality of rights as regards armament, as well as the mutual renunciation of any recourse to force between Hungary and the States of the Little Entente". The Hungarian delegation on the S. S. Patria at Kiel became the target of German reproaches. Ribbentrop blamed Foreign Minister Kanya, who accompanied Horthy, for the agreement, and pointed out to him that the renunciation of the use of force would not protect Hungary from Yugoslavia, particularly in the event of a Hungarian-Czech crisis. On the contrary, said Ribbentrop, this Hungarian policy would make it more difficult morally for the Yugoslavs to leave their Czech allies in the lurch. All impartial observers would conclude that Hungary was, in effect, renouncing revision. Finally, Ribbentrop asked the Hungarians how they would act if the Fuehrer put into effect his decision to reply, by the use of force, to any new Czech provocation. The Hungarians hedged on two points. They argued that: "Yugoslavia must remain neutral if Hungary were to march northward and, eventually, to the east. Moreover, Hungarian rearmament . . . would require another year or two to complete." ⁵⁹

According to the German record, Horthy told Hitler that "Hungary intended to cooperate", but the Hungarian Ministers were skeptical, and remained so even later. Imredy was most relieved when the Fuehrer stated that, in this particular case, he required nothing of Hungary, and that he himself did not know the precise moment. But Hitler noted that "he who wanted to sit at the table must at least help in the kitchen".⁶⁰

Foreign Minister Kanya, visited Ribbentrop in Berlin two days later.

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Ribbentrop called his attention to the jubilation of the Czech, French and British press over the Bled communique, and repeated that this event was regarded as a rift in German-Hungarian friendship and as a renunciation of Hungary's revisionist aims. Kanya thereupon amended his statement, made two days before, and explained that Hungary's military strength had in fact improved and that therefore she could take part by October 1, 1938.⁶¹ The German record failed to explain why Kanya changed so radically his views about Hungary's military preparedness.

Such conciliatory Hungarian statements notwithstanding, the Germans clearly recognized Hungary's reluctance to take part in military action against Czechoslovakia. Otto von Erdmannsdorf, the German Minister to Hungary, reported on August 29 that Regent Horthy said to him that the extraordinary situation had arisen whereby he, who for years had desired nothing more ardently than a speedy realization of Hungarian revisionist aims, was now forced to sound a warning note owing to the international political situation. Kanya added that the Hungarians would fight even "if the chances of success were only 60 to 70 percent. But they could not be expected to commit suicide." ⁶²

The Hungarian public received with enthusiasm the news that the Government refused to commit the country in a common venture with Germany against Czechoslovakia. Imredy gave an interview, published in the Daily Telegraph on September 2, in which he stated that, "The key words of Hungary's foreign policy . . . were peace and justice, and if any conflict broke out in Europe Hungary's aim would be to remain neutral". This article was reproduced in a Hungarian newspaper Az Est under headlines pointing to disagreement between Hungary and Germany. This in turn evoked an energetic German protest. The Government suspended the newspaper, and from this time on, the intimidated Imredy began to show understanding toward Nazi demands and ideas.

In the critical days of September the dissatisfaction of the Nazi leaders with Hungarian passivity became more vocal. Field Marshal Goering invited Dome Sztojay, the Hungarian Minister to Germany, to Karinhall, and explained to him that Hungary was not doing enough in the crisis. He emphasized that the Hungarian press was keeping comparatively quiet. "There was complete calm prevailing in the Hungarian minority districts in Czechoslovakia in contrast to the Sudeten German ones, and the Hungarian Ministers in the various capitals were not making a practice of going to the Foreign Minister twice or three times a day, in contrast to their Czech colleagues. Finally neither the Hungarian Government nor even the leaders of the Hungarian minority had demanded in clear terms the detachment of the Hungarian region from

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Czechoslovakia."⁶³

After the German intervention Kanya promised a more active Hungarian attitude. The Hungarian memorandum of September 17 pointed out to the British Government that "a more peaceful atmosphere in Central Europe attaches itself to the principle that . . . no discrimination should be made in the treatment and ultimate rights between the various minorities in Czechoslovakia." ⁶⁴

The Hungarian Minister to Great Britain, George Barcza, handed Lord Halifax a new memorandum on September 20 and at the same time received the British reply to the insistent Hungarian interventions. The British note purported to be a sedative, and emphasized that the British Government had concentrated all its efforts on the problem of the Sudeten minority in Czechoslovakia "on the solution of which depends the issue of peace or war in Europe". The British government fully appreciated the interest felt by the Hungarian government in the future of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, but trusted that "they will be careful in the present delicate situation to do nothing to extend the scope of the present crisis, and will be content that their point of view has been placed on the record and will receive consideration in the appropriate moment". ⁶⁵

Two days later the British government protested to Warsaw and Budapest against alleged Polish and Hungarian military measures, and expressed the hope that these would not involve Hungary and Poland in actual aggression against Czechoslovakia. The note emphasized that there could be no justification whatsoever for attempting to compel an immediate settlement by direct action instead of through the process of normal negotiation.⁶⁶

When Sir Geoffrey Knox, the British Minister to Hungary, presented this note to K_nya, the latter turned to the claim of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia for equal treatment with the Sudeten Germans. K_nya told Knox that the answer Halifax gave to Barcza in London had been a bitter disappointment to him.

"The Sudeten territories" [said K_nya, as reported by Knox] had lain from time immemorial inside the frontiers of the Kingdom of Bohemia and the Sudeten Germans had in history known the Prussians more often as an enemy than a friend; moreover their case had been backed by threats and military measures. The Magyar minority on the other hand had been an integral part of the Hungarian Kingdom, and their case had been put forward for many years with calm and moderation. Hungary had made it abundantly clear that she sought a solution only by peaceful and lawful means.

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Now, if I would allow him to speak with all frankness, it was sadly evident that it was not the moral wish to see justice done that lay behind the concessions we [the British Government] had wrung from Prague to the Sudeten Germans but the threat of overwhelming force". ⁶⁷

Obviously the overwhelming force did not exist in the case of the Hungarians, and the evasive British attitude caused disappointment in Hungary. Knox himself admitted in his report addressed to Lord Halifax that the Anglo-French message addressed to President Benes on September 19 offered more grounds for Kanya's suspicion than he (Knox) had supposed to exist. Knox referred to paragraph two of the Anglo-French message, which envisaged the Sudeten German problem as a case by itself and therefore anticipated direct transfer instead of a plebiscite.⁶⁸

The German and Hungarian positions concerning Czechoslovakia came up once more in a conversation between the Fuehrer, Prime Minister Imredy, and Foreign Minister Kanya on September 21, 1938. Hitler, first of all, reproached his visitors "for the undecided attitude" in the crisis. He told them that Germany was determined to settle the Czech question even at the risk of a world war, and that neither France nor England would intervene. "It was Hungary's last opportunity to join in, for, if she did not, he would not be in a position to put in a word for Hungarian interests." Hitler demanded that Hungary should make an immediate demand for a plebiscite in the territories she claimed, and that she should not guarantee any proposed new frontiers for Czechoslovakia. He stated that the Czechoslovak problem would be settled by Germany within three weeks.

Imredy replied that it was thought in Hungary that a settlement would take a year or two. In the meantime, the Hungarian minorities had already demanded a plebiscite and "the Hungarian Government would now take this matter into their own hands. Further, Hungary would immediately put in hand preparations for military actions, but a time limit of 14 days was not long enough to complete them".⁶⁹

Hitler never forgot the "weak" Hungarian attitude demonstrated in the Czechoslovakian crisis. When Count Stephen Csaky, the successor of Kanya, visited him in January 1939, he pointed out that unfortunately the relations between Germany and Hungary were overshadowed by a dark cloud, a fact which could not be ignored by a great power like Germany. He then described the Hungarian attitude before the decisions of September, and pointed out that he had always considered Kanya as an enemy of Germany At the very moment when he (Hitler) discussed

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the possibilities of a German-Hungarian collaboration with Horthy, during the latter's visit, Kanya did not hesitate to support the Little Entente against Germany in Bled. This was why the Fuehrer had summoned Imredy and Sztojay and asked them, in their own interest, to publish Hungary's demands before the world. As events developed, Hungary was about to fall asleep and took only insignificant steps while Poland started to stir. Hitler further explained that Germany did not intend to sacrifice herself for friends who let her down in decisive moments. He stated that if at the right time Hungary had sided with Germany, he could have laughed in Chamberlain's face.⁷⁰

The hesitation of Hungarian Statesmen greatly increased Hitler's antipathy to Hungary.⁷¹ Whatever happened in August and September, ]938, the policy of the Western powers gave a free hand to Germany in the Danube Valley, and Hungary's agreement with the Little Entente thereby lost all political significance. And the Munich Conference greatly undermined the forces of resistance to Germany in the Danubian countries.⁷² The artificial character of the French alliance system on the Continent was shown by its rapid disintegration. In the crucial moment the Little Entente collapsed; Czechoslovakia was liquidated without a gunshot. The London Times noted: "Self-determination, the professed principle of the Treaty of Versailles, has been invoked by Herr Hitler against its written text, and his appeal has been allowed." ⁷³ The Danubian countries found themselves in the sphere of influence of the Third Reich. In spite of certain Hungaro-German parallel interests created by the treaties of Versailles and Trianon, even pro-German Hungarian politicians tried to stave off the Germans. But the aftermath of the Munich settlement automatically bound the Hungarian revisionist cause to that of the Axis.

A Declaration attached to the Munich Agreement of September 1938 provided that "The problems of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, if not settled within three months by agreement between the respective governments, shall form the subject of another meeting of the heads of the Governments of the four Powers here present." On October 1, the Prague government accepted all the demands made in a Polish ultimatum of September 28, and Polish troops subsequently occupied the Teschen district. Hungary, however, desired to solve the frontier problem by direct negotiations and plebiscite.

The Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, Kamil Krofta, took the initiative in solving the problem of the Hungarian minority. He handed a note, on October 1, to the Hungarian minister in Prague proposing that a Committee of Czechoslovak and Hungarian experts should be set up to deal with the question.⁷⁴ At the same time, the Hungarian

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minister delivered a note to him, pressing for direct negotiations between the two Governments. The Rumanian and Yugoslav Governments had been advised of the steps taken by the Czechoslovak Government. Both of them informed the German Government that they did not object to the cession to Hungary of areas of Slovakia inhabited by Magyars.⁷⁵

As is well-known, German foreign policy in the post-Munich period favored the liquidation of Czechoslovakia and opposed all attempts at integration in areas east of Germany. The objectives of this policy, as it appears in published documents, is clearly defined. The Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht explained, in a memorandum addressed to the German Foreign Ministry on October 5, 1938, that the creation of a compact bloc of states along Germany's eastern frontier, with lines of communication to southeast Europe, would not be in accordance with German interests. Hence, "for military reasons a common HungarianPolish frontier was undesirable." ⁷⁶ The German Foreign Ministry prepared a similar memorandum for Hitler on the Slovak and CarpathoUkrainian question.⁷⁷ The memorandum opposed an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine oriented toward Hungary, and advocated an independent Slovakia or a Czechoslovak solution for the Slovaks.⁷⁸

In accordance with these general ideas the German Government decided to support Hungarian demands for adjacent Magyar territory and Slovak demands for autonomy within the Czechoslovak state, but rejected plans for a common Hungarian-Polish frontier, supporting Ukrainian national aspirations. German missions abroad were instructed along this line. Nonetheless, the hostile attitude of the German press toward the creation of a common frontier between Poland and Hungary was resented in Budapest, and K_nya explained to the German envoy that with reincorporation of the territory, Hungary would strengthen the Rumanian front against Bolshevism and form a strong bulwark against it on the Carpathian passes.⁷⁹

Polish and Hungarian foreign policy aimed at the reestablishment of the centuries old common frontier on the Carpathian mountains. The British ambassador to Poland, Sir H. Kennard, reported on October 6 that the Polish government favored attainment of this goal by a grant of autonomy to Ruthenia under Hungarian sovereignty. He was informed in the Polish Foreign Ministry that there was a 20 percent Hungarian minority there, and that if the Hungarian districts were detached, including essential railways therein, the rest of Ruthenia could not exist. The Polish press pointed out that in any case Czechoslovakia never had any proper historical or economic claim to Ruthenia. It asserted that the problem of Ruthenia's restitution to Hungary was a Polish problem and involved Poland's military security.⁸⁰ In accordance

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with these ideas, Foreign Minister Joseph Beck attempted to persuade the British ambassador in Warsaw of the reasonableness of the Polish attitude regarding Ruthenia, which he considered to be a no-man's land and Hungarian rather than Czechoslovak. He explained to him that Poland had no territorial claims in Ruthenia, but he felt that no definite stabilization in Central Europe could be hoped for, unless Hungary's aspirations were satisfied.⁸¹ Meanwhile the United Hungarian Party in Ruthenia demanded the right of self-determination for all inhabitants of Ruthenia, including Hungarians, and asked that the maintenance of order in Hungarian districts be entrusted to the Party. This appeal was addressed to the British, German, Italian, French, Polish and Hungarian Governments as well as to the Czechoslovak Government.⁸² The British and French policies were rather cautious with regard to the importance of Ruthenia, and of a stronger Hungary. Knox reported from Budapest on October 8, 1938, that a Rome-Warsaw Axis could not form a barrier against German penetrations because of the weakness of the central link, Hungary. He expressed the opinion that no opposition to Germany could be made in Danubian Europe north of the Save river. Knox disagreed with the view of the British ambassador to Poland, who held that Slovakia in a Hungarian orbit could be an obstacle to German penetration. Knox thought that German domination of Hungary's indefensible western frontiers remained complete irrespective of strong defenses in the north. On the other hand, he considered Hungary to be a very solid link with all the power of Germany behind her if the Axis was to be a barrier built with the participation of Germany to cut of Russia from Western Europe.⁸³ Viscount Halifax, in his instructions sent to the British Embassy in Berlin on October 26, 1938, expressed the opinion that the solution of the Ruthenian question depended to a considerable extent on Germany's policy. According to his evaluation Germany intended to use Czechoslovakia to spread German influence along the frontiers of Poland and Hungary to the Rumanian border. He suggested, specifically, that Ruthenia, in German minds, was a spring-board to the Ukraine and a starting point for fomenting a Ukrainian movement. Halifax was not disposed to attach too much importance to the argument that Poland and Hungary would be able to form a bloc to resist further German expansion if Ruthenia fell to Hungary. But he thought it possible that "a common frontier between them might strengthen Poland and Hungary in their desire to retain sufficient independence to avoid becoming the vassals of Germany". The British Foreign Secretary seemed to appreciate the Rumanian objection both to the aggrandizement of Hun40

gary and to the separation of Rumania from Czechoslovakia. But he raised the question as to whether the maintenance of the connection between the three Little Entente States was, at that time, of such great importance and whether the separation of a German-controlled Czechoslovakia from Rumania might not compensate the latter for the success which would be won by Hungary.⁸⁴

While new policies were pondered and decided upon in various quarters of Europe, negotiations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia (October 9-13) had broken off, since Czechoslovakia was prepared to give up only a fraction of the territory inhabited by Magyars.⁸⁵ Since Czechoslovakia had not demobilized, Hungary partially mobilized, pending an appeal to the four great powers.⁸⁶ Dar_nyi visited the Fuehrer for support on October 14. On this occasion Hitler recalled that he had given the Hungarians many warnings, both on board ship [S. S. Patria at Kiel] and also during the visit of Imredy and Kanya to the Obersalzberg. He had told them plainly enough that he would solve the Czechoslovak problem one way or another in October. Poland had recognized the right moment, taken action, and achieved her goal. This problem could only be solved by means of negotiation if one were determined to act. Only in this way had he (the Fuehrer) obtained all he wanted. M. Kanya however, had expressed nothing but doubt, although the Fuehrer had told him that France and Britain would not fight. The position now was that, if it came to a conflict, Hungary would be completely alone and the outcome would be very doubtful. If it came to a conference of the Great Powers the outcome would also be doubtful, as no one was willing to fight, even if the Great Powers were in agreement,. . .

The decisive factor in any case would not be who was right but who had the power. He, the Fuehrer, had told M. Kanya all this in detail and he had proofs of the Hungarian Government's actions during the crisis which had not particularly impressed him, such as the statements made by the Hungarian Ambassador [sic] in London and the Bled Agreement during Horthy's visit. Whereas we and Poland had prepared ourselves to stake everything we had and had also suffered loss of life, Hungary constantly stated that she insisted on her rights but did not wish to achieve these by aggressive means. The moment had passed. He, the Fuehrer, was glad that for Germany the matter was settled. ⁸⁷

Daranyi's visit to Hitler did not bring concrete results, although he presented himself cap in hand, and offered various gestures such as Hungary's resignation from the League of Nations and adherence to the

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Anti-Comintern Pact.⁸⁸ But, simultaneously with Daranyi's visit, Ribbentrop received the Czechoslovak foreign minister, Frantisek K. Chvalkovsky and advised a speedy resumption of the negotiations with Hungary.⁸⁹

After renewed and protracted negotiations and exchanges of notes between Hungary and Czechoslovakia the Hungarian Government, in a note of October 24, suggested a plebiscite in the areas still under dispute. In the event of Czech disagreement on a plebiscite, the Hungarian note proposed arbitration by Germany and Italy, with the inclusion of Poland for the eastern sector. The government of Prague chose arbitration and proposed the inclusion of Rumania, if the Hungarian proposal to include Poland was accepted. Eventually Ciano and Ribbentrop arbitrated the dispute in Vienna on November 2, 1938.⁹⁰ The award was based mainly on ethnographic factors and restored to Hungary 12,103 square kilometers of territory with over one million population. In the course of the arbitral procedure Ribbentrop supported the Slovak, and Ciano the Hungarian case.⁹¹ The overwhelming majority of the people living in the territories reattached to Hungary were Magyars,⁹² but the fate of the Slovak and Czech settlements planted in Magyar districts caused further frictions and was settled only by protracted negotiations.⁹³

British foreign policy was rather favorable to the settling of the Hungaro-Czechoslovak conflict according to the principles adopted by the Vienna Award. The Earl of Perth, British ambassador to Italy, advised the Czechoslovak foreign minister, Chvalkovsky, on October 7, 1938, to meet immediately Hungarian claims to regions bordering on Hungary where Magyar populations predominated.⁹⁴ Sir Nevile Henderson, British ambassador to Germany, in his report of October 18, 1938, envisaged a settlement along the lines subsequently put forward in the Hungarian note addressed to Czechoslovakia on October 24. It seemed essential to him that full justice should be done to legitimate Hungarian claims in order to avoid the criticism of having treated Hungary less well than Germany, solely because the latter was more powerful and dangerous. He even added as a "less worthy consideration" that Prime Minister Imredy's position would be seriously compromised if Hungary failed to obtain all reasonable justice, and that he could conceivably be replaced by a pro-German who might get greater concessions as a result of German help.⁹⁵ The British Government informed the Czechoslovak Minister in London on October 20, 1938, that they saw no objection to the settlement of the Czech-Hungarian question by means of arbitration by Germany and Italy, if the Czechoslovak and Hungarian Governments agreed to settle their differences in this way. Simultaneously Lord Hali

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fax instructed the British ambassador to Italy to inform the Italian Government that "His Majesty's Government are, in principle, in favour of the return to Hungary of those districts in which the population is predominantly Hungarian, subject possibly to certain modifications that may be desirable for economic reasons, e.g., Bratislava." ⁹⁶

In the period between the Vienna Award and the total break-up of Czechoslovakia, Hungarian diplomacy continued its efforts for the reincorporation of Ruthenia. Meanwhile, the Prague Parliament hurriedly passed a law in November, 1938, which granted the Ruthenians their own legislative, executive and judicial organs. Defense, finance, foreign affairs and transportation still remained in the hands of the central Czechoslovak Government. Thus the autonomy of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, guaranteed by the Trianon Treaty and vainly demanded by the Ruthenian people for twenty years, was established. This new political status was received with enthusiasm in Ruthenia, and the province became the center of a Ukrainian independence movement aimed at the unification of all Ukrainians living in Soviet Russia and Poland. Germany supported and fostered this trend. The Nazis prepared for future events. Their goals included the detachment of the Ukraine from Soviet Russia and the possible use of Ukrainian ambitions against the Poles. Nazi influence increased in Slovakia and Ruthenia.⁹⁷ The German Foreign Ministry sent agents to the Carpatho-Ukraine and the German Security Service financed the study, in Germany, of German state and party institutions by Slovak ministers and other official Slovak personages. ⁹⁸

A Hungarian plan to seize the Carpatho-Ukraine with Italian help was opposed and vetoed by Germany in November, 1938.99 In the following month the provincial government of Monsignor Augustin Voloshin in the Carpatho-Ukraine gave, to a German company, complete prospecting rights for minerals in any part of the country and the right to exploit fully these minerals.¹⁰⁰ The German press showed an extremely friendly attitude toward Carpatho-Ukraine and Ukrainian national ambitions. Ukrainian propaganda was broadcast regularly from Vienna. Despite the fact that defense was under the control of the Central Government, the Voloshin Government organized with German help a semi-military body, called the Ukrainian National Guard (Sitsch) . Ukrainian refugees from Poland were incorporated into this organization which fought, with German blessings, against occasional intrusions by Hungarian irregulars. The Government of Voloshin was strongly Ukrainian nationalistic, a tendency which was bolstered by German help and encouragement.¹⁰¹

Strengthened by German support, the Voloshin Government eliminated

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from public life politicians and political parties opposing Ukrainian natonalist tendencies, and suppressed the Hungarian party. On February 12, 1939, elections were held on the basis of a single, unopposed slate of candidates. The "Magyarophile" list was declared invalid by the electoral commission and all elected deputies represented the nationalistic Ukrainian trend.¹⁰² The Hungarian Minister in Berlin informed the German Government in February, 1939, that the Hungarian Government expected serious disturbances to break out in the Carpatho-Ukraine, due to these events. He reminded Berlin that in a situation such as this Hungary might be forced to intervene "for the protection of her own nationals". Berlin advised the Hungarian Government to "keep to the Vienna Award".¹⁰³

Meanwhile British foreign policy began to show some understanding toward Hungarian aspirations. The British parliamentary undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, R. A. Butler, explained on February 17, to the Hungarian envoy, Barcza, that, in his opinion, Great Britain and France had committed a mistake in not supporting the establishment of a common Hungaro-Polish frontier. Czechoslovakia, he said, became a German colony after Munich. Thus, the attachment of Ruthenia to Hungary would have been in accordance with British interests. By the same act German expansion toward the Ukraine and the Rumanian oil fields would have been checked. Butler pointed out that it was difficult for him to understand the political blindness which had overlooked these facts. A few days later Sir Alexander Cadogan, permanent undersectary of state for foreign affairs, stated to Barcza that he had recently studied the Ruthenian problem and had become convinced that the vital interests of the Ruthenian people demanded their reattachment to Hungary; irrespective of such local interests, the interest of the great powers and European peace demanded that the German push to the East should be barred by a common Hungaro-Polish frontier. He recognized that it would have been to the Franco-British interest to attach Ruthenia to Hungary and that this interest still existed. The question, however, was not definitely closed, and at an opportune time Great Britain was willing to give political support to Hungary as well as the economic support necessary to strengthen Hungarian independence against Germany.

Butler and Cadogan apparently intended to stimulate Hungarian resistance against Germany with these goodwill remarks, but they were twenty years late in trying to form a bloc of states capable of resisting the eastward expansion of Germany.

Meanwhile Danubian Europe was heading toward new developments. On March 4, the German Government was still refusing the Hungarian

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proposal asking that Hungary's first claim to the territory of CarpathoUkraine be recognized.¹⁰⁴ The Poles still hoped to secure a common frontier with Hungary.¹⁰⁵ The Italian Government did not bolster Polish optimism in this respect. When Ciano was visiting Warsaw in early March, 1939, he told Beck that he considered the question settled by the Vienna arbitration, and that Italy would do nothing further in the matter.¹⁰⁶ A few days later the Polish Government informed Prague that Poland, while not pursuing any interests of her own in the Carpatho-Ukraine, would support Hungarian claims in view of Polish-Hungarian friendship.¹⁰⁷ At the same time Hungary declared, in Prague, that she had no interest in Slovakia and proposed only to purchase Carpatho-Ukraine.¹⁰⁸

A reversal in the German attitude toward the common HungarianPolish frontier then took place. On the eve of the complete break-up of Czechoslovakia and the creation of an independent Slovakia, Germany probably wanted to give some satisfaction to Hungary and Poland. On March 13, the Hungarian authorities in Budapest received the green light for the occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine.¹⁰⁹ Regent Horthy expressed his thanks in an enthusiastic letter to Hitler, in which he announced that a frontier incident would take place on March 16, to be followed by the "big thrust".¹¹⁰

But, in view of the declaration of independence by Slovakia on March 14, the Voloshin Government, on the same day declared the Carpatho-Ukraine to be an independent state "under the protection of the German Reich". ¹¹¹ The local Diet met the next day, and, in its only session, sanctioned the proclamation of independence and elected Voloshin as president of the republic. Voloshin asked the German Government to state whether or not the Carpatho-Ukraine had been promised to Hungary. Berlin advised Voloshin not to resist and regretted that Germany was not in a position to assume responsibility for the protectorate.¹¹² These political events were overshadowed by military events. The Sitsch first fought the Czech troops and then the invading Hungarian army.¹¹³ In these critical days the Poles reinforced their troops in the areas facing Ruthenia. The freshly recruited Hungarian troops completed the occupation of the much coveted region from March 15 to 18.¹¹⁴ Rumania sought to intervene at the last moment and attempted to seize the eastern part of Ruthenia where there were villages inhabited by Rumanians, but she was decidedly too late.¹¹⁵

Simultaneously with the memorable visit of the Czechoslovak President Emil Hacha to Hitler, German troops invaded Bohemia and Moravia.¹¹⁶ On March 16 Hitler proclaimed a German protectorate over these historic Czech lands.¹¹⁷ Amidst the general indignation over the

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German action, the Western countries observed with tacit satisfaction, and perhaps not without malice, the occupation of Carpatho-Ruthenia by Hungary. The economic and strategic position of Hungary thus improved. The common frontier with Poland, through which 140.000 Poles escaped into Hungary a few months later, was reestablished.¹¹⁸ At the same time the Rumanian Government asked London for financial support and informed the British Government "that within the next few months Germany would reduce Hungary to vassalage and then proceed to disintegrate Roumania".¹¹⁹

During this period a few important changes took place in the Hungarian Government and in domestic politics. Foreign Minister Kanya, repeatedly attacked because of his well-known anti-Nazi attitude, resigned shortly after the Vienna Award. Under his successor, Count Stephen Csaky, the threatening shadow of the Third Reich stretched over Hungary's foreign policy. The Western powers revealed some understanding of Hungary's difficulties, but Soviet Russia severed diplomatic relations when Hungary joined the Anti-Comintern Pact in February, 1939.¹²⁰

Regent Horthy, displeased with the increasingly pro-Nazi trends of the Imredy cabinet, replaced the prime minister in February, 1939, with Count Paul Teleki. Imredy's formal resignation occurred under spectacular circumstances. It was discovered, just when he was advocating a strong anti-Semitic policy and proposing the enactment of a second anti-Jewish bill, that he had had a Jewish great-great grandparent.

Teleki dissolved the National-Socialist Party and prohibited the socalled "Hungarist" movement. These measures notwithstanding, the rightist parties gained some ground. Nazi propaganda made good use of German successes and pointed out that some of the injustices of the Trianon Treaty had been corrected only with the consent and help of the Axis powers. In the general elections of May, 1939, held by secret ballot all over the country, a governmental majority was obtained, but the presence of a great number of Nazi-minded deputies and the decrease of deputies belonging to the left-wing opposition was significant. The balance in Parliament had shifted decidedly to the right.

Foreign Minister Csaky displayed great activity and had frequent contacts with the leaders of Italian and German foreign policy. He thought that Hungary could not maintain her independence, and, in case of war, her neutrality without some coordination of her policies with those of the Axis. Teleki and Csaky visited Mussolini and Hitler in April, 1939.¹²¹ In the following month Italo-German cooperation was solidified by the conclusion of the Steel Pact.¹²²

During 1938, and 1939, Hungarian statesmen had repeatedly told the

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German government that Hungary was not willing to take part in any hostile action against Poland. Teleki desired to make Hungary's position absolutely clear. On July 24, 1939, he addressed identical letters to Hitler and Mussolini in which he confirmed the adherence of Hungary to the Axis, and in a second letter to both Hitler and Mussolini, written on the same day, he stated that "Hungary, for moral reasons, can by no means take part in any military actions directed against Poland".¹²³ The Italian Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano, suspected that the "first letter was written in order to launch the second".¹²⁴ This letter caused such a furore in Germany that Csaky had to meet Ribbentrop in Fuschl on August 8, and upon Ribbentrop's insistance Csaky instructed the Hungarian envoys in Berlin and Rome to retract both letters. This, however, did not change Teleki's attitude. He overruled Csaky's retractions and ordered him to return to Budapest.¹²⁵

A few days after this incident, Csaky suddenly arrived in Rome, and submitted to Mussolini the idea of a Hungarian alliance with the Axis in order to save Hungary from a German invasion or a "friendly occupation". For the same reasons the Hungarian Government thought of putting a member of the House of Savoy, possibly the Duke of Aosta, on the throne of Hungary. Csaky sounded out the Italian Government on both these propositions. He described the temper of the times in Hungary by pointing out that "95 percent of the Hungarian people hate the Germans. The Regent himself, speaking of them [the Germans], called them 'buffoons and brigands', and Madame Horthy said that even she would take up arms if they had to fight the Germans".¹²⁶ Mussolini and Ciano, baffled at this unexpected outburst, remained diplomatically reserved toward Csaky.

Thus, on the eve of the Second World War, the Hungarian Government made some desperate moves to maintain independence and some freedom of action. The alternatives were poor. And after the conclusion of the Russo-German pact the prospects reached their lowest ebb. The unfortunate Danubian nations were nothing but "puppets of fate" ¹²⁷ in the hands of unscrupulous and overwhelming outside forces. The Teleki Government faced an international situation in which there were insoluble difficulties for Hungary. Geography, revisionism and the weakness of Western Europe limited the possibilities of Hungarian foreign policy.

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DIPLOMACY IN A WHIRLPOOL