Stephen Borsody: The Hungarians: A Divided Nation

The Yugoslav textbook deals with the era of King Matthias in some detail, but the Romanian textbook does not mention it at all. However, the texts of all countries deal at great length with the subsequent peasant war in Hungary, led by Gyorgy Dozsa. The Czechoslovak summary is the most exact and detailed, stressing the struggle of the Hungarian peasantry against their oppressors. The Yugoslav presentation, consistent with its general conception, emphasizes the common destiny of the Danubian peasantry. It also mentions that the formerly faction-ridden aristocracy became united: "They were all united when

it came to dealing with the poor people; it did not make any difference if these were Hungarian, Serb, or Romanian."9 However, the title of the chapter divides the Hungarian state into nationalistic sounding parts: Peasant Uprisings in Hungary, Transylvania, and Vojvodina." Even greater falsehood is reflected by the chapter title of the corresponding Romanian text: "The Gyorgy Dozsa-Led Transylvanian Peasant War." The student is told that in terms of his ancestry, Dozsa was a Szekely - a Hungarian, that is. However, a picture of Dozsa based on a contemporary etching spells his name in Romanian as "GHE. DOJA," giving the impression that he was a Romanian. On the other hand, the text emphasizes the exclusively Hungarian character of the aristocracy arrayed against the peasants.

All texts properly connect the defeat of the peasant uprising with Hungary's defeat in the battle of Mohacs in 1526. The Romanian text, however, separates Transylvania from Hungary, as if it existed as a Romanian state. Following the Turkish conquest of Hungary, the text says, "The Transylvanian Voivode remained an independent state; it was obliged only-just as Moldavia and Wallachia-to pay taxes to the Turks. Its name became the Principality of Transylvania." It is well known that Transylvania had been part of the Hungarian kingdom since the eleventh century and that it remained under Hungarian rule even during the Turkish period, from 1526 to 1686.

After Mohacs, three hundred years of Hungarian history are passed over in silence in the Romanian textbook. Only in connection with the 1848 revolutions does the Transylvanian student find out, once again, something about Hungary. Until then, Transylvania is dealt with as one of the "three Romanian countries," without ever mentioning Hungary. On the other hand, the reign of less than one year of the Wallachian Michael the Brave in Transylvania (1600-1601) is described in glowing terms in a separate chapter. For the first time, says the text, the "three Romanian countries" were united under one ruler, in fulfillment of the Romanian people's "desires for liberty and union."10 Meanwhile, the names of Transylvania's Hungarian princes, those of Bethlen, the Rakoczis, and so on, are not even mentioned. After Michael the Brave, the next name mentioned is again a Romanian: Horia-Closca, the leader in 1848 of peasant uprisings in Transylvania. 11

The Slovak textbook discusses these three hundred years in some detail: The Turks ruled over a large part of the territory of Hungary for 150 years.... Transylvania was a vassal principality of the Turks; nonetheless, it had great political significance. In point of fact, Transylvania functioned as a counterweight to the politics of the Habsburgs; for one half of a century it served as the basis of the struggle for independence and was the center of Hungarian cultural development.

The text also describes in detail, and in proper historical perspective, the times of Istvan Bocskai. But the location of the wars of the Transylvanian Hungarian princes against the Habsburgs in northern Hungary is referred to in present-day terms as "Slovakia."

The Yugoslav textbook dramatizes the tragic consequences of the defeat at Mohacs: "The Hungarian-Croatian kingdom has ceased to exist. . . . While the peoples of Europe could develop freely, our peoples (the South Slavs as well as the Hungarians) were forced to conduct a constant bloody struggle just to sustain ourselves."13 But what about Transylvania? According to one of the Yugoslav maps, it was swallowed up in the shaded areas indicating the extent of the Turkish dominions, just as were the Balkans and North Africa. The cartographer, incorrectly, included in these Turkish dominions the greater part of northern Hungary as well.14

In the same textbook, the discussion of the Zrinyi family is no less curious. After the peace of Vasvar (1664), we read, the Danubian hope in the Habsburgs as liberators was disappointed and "one part of the dissatisfied Croatian and Hungarian aristocracy decided to depose the House of Habsburg. The most powerful Croatian aristocrats, including Miklos Zrinyi, the Croatian governor, his brother Peter, as well as Peter's brother-in-law, Frankopan, together with some Hungarian aristocrats, organized a conspiracy." It is true, the Zrinyi family was of Croatian origin and Miklos Zrinyi's ancestral home was in Croatia. However, he was also one of the greatest Hungarians of his age. A Hungarian poet and a military leader, an outstanding theoretician of war, the master of Hungarian Baroque literature, his models were his Hungarian-Croatian great-grandfather, the "hero of Szigetvar," and the great Hungarian Renaissance king, Matthias Corvinus. He stood for independence of the Danube peoples. It is most unfortunate to deny him his proper place in Danubian history.

Let us move on to 1848, the era of European bourgeois revolutions and struggles for national independence. We know that the Hungarian leadership of 1848, incapable of freeing itself from the nationalist bourgeois nation-state conception, was unwilling to make timely concessions to historic Hungary's non-Magyar nationalities. On the other hand, these nationalities-blinded by nationalist fervor and misled by Habsburg promises-became a major support of reaction against the revolutions of 1848.

How do the textbooks tackle these complex issues? The Romanian text deals with the revolution in Transylvania in a separate chapter: The Romanians, hearing of the Hungarian revolution, "hoped that the day of truth had come also for the Romanians. The Hungarian government, however, planned to make Transylvania part of Hungary." The Hungarians wanted to take Transylvania away? From whom? In 1711, following the defeat of the Rak6czi-led war for independence, the Habsburgs, in order to divide the strength of the rebellious country, had placed Transylvania under the direct control of Vienna, together with the southern military defense districts, as an autonomous province. Thus, in 1848, the Hungarian government simply wished to reunite Transylvania and make it a part of Hungary again.

The Hungarians of Transylvania enthusiastically supported, of course, the reunion with their mother country. Furthermore, as the Hungarian historian, Zoltan I. Toth, an ardent advocate of Hungarian-Romanian reconciliation, pointed out: "The demand for union in 1848 was a question of progress. Would Transylvania support the revolution or the counterrevolution? The issue of union at that time therefore also meant whether progress or reaction would be dominant in Transylvania."15 And a Hungarian Communist writer-politician, Jozsef Revai, hardly guilty of nationalist sentiments, expressed a similar view:

That revolutionary Hungary did not grant autonomy to the Serbs and did not give up its desire for union with Transylvania, cannot be faulted even from the perspective of ninety years. The connection of the national movement of the Slavic and Romanian peoples with Habsburg reaction and tsarism was at that time a living and painful fact. . . . Revolutionary Hungary could not permit that the counterrevolution should find a home under the cover of Slav and Romanian autonomy.16

A gallery of the great personalities of the "Transylvanian revolution" of 1848 is presented by the Romanian textbook. This includes a picture of Sandor Petofi, the Hungarian revolutionary poet, but in a shocking company: Simon Barnutiu and Stefan Ludwig Roth. Barnutiu and Roth both collaborated with Vienna, the former as leader of the Romanians, and the latter as leader of the Saxons of Transylvania. The caption with these pictures is worth quoting: "When they became aware of the intentions of the Hungarian government [namely, of its desire to make Transylvania part of Hungary], the Romanians decided to attain for themselves social equality and national liberty. Numerous educated individuals, enthusiastic and patriotic youth, such as Avram Jancu, Georghe Baritiu, Simon Barnutiu, and Eftimie Murgu stood at the head of the movement." It would be difficult to create more confusion about historical reality or to confound and obscure more thoroughly the conflicting forces of the 1848 revolution. So it comes as no surprise that among the leaders of the revolution who, following their defeat in 1849, sought refuge in foreign lands, the name of Lajos Kossuth is not even mentioned, while on the other hand it is pointed out that the Romanian exiles "continued the struggle for the freedom and unity of the Romanians."17

After all of this, it is refreshing to meet relative objectivity in the Czechoslovak textbooks. Discussing the eras of enlightenment and reform ushering in the revolution, the text lists the leading Hungarian figures of that age (Bessenyei, Csokonai, Kolcsey, Vorosmarty, Szechenyi, Kossuth, Deak, Eotvos, and so forth). It is, however, somewhat disappointing that the book deals in an offhand manner with the Hungarian revolution itself. A strangely brief summary oddly stresses the Croatian Jellasic's attack against the Hungarian revolution: "In point of fact the Hungarian war of independence started with this attack. Almost a year-long military and political struggle ensued, until Gorgey surrendered on August 13, 1849, on the plains of Vilagos to the reactionary Austrian and tsarist armies. With this the Hungarian war of independence came to an end." And that's the end of the Slovak account of the Hungarian revolution as well.

More detailed, on the other hand, is the Slovak account of the conflict between Hungarians and the Slovaks during the revolution of 1848-49. The text deals with the "Slovak volunteers who attacked the Hungarian revolution" and who were "joined by the Czechs." It frankly admits, however, that the leadership of these volunteers was

entrusted to Austrian army officers, and the Slovak troops became "the tools of the Austrian reaction."18

In the well-illustrated coverage of the Hungarian revolution by the Yugoslav textbook, Petofi's picture is prominently displayed.19 He is followed by Tancsics, Stur, Jancu, Kossuth, Jellasic, and the brave Hungarian general of Serbian descent, Damjanich. The explanatory note puts this mixed company of revolutionaries and reactionaries into some order by correctly identifying who was who. On the other hand, the book discusses the events of the revolution in territorial units corresponding to present-day national boundaries. Thus, events of the "upper northern regions" of Austria and Hungary appear under the heading: "Revolution in Bohemia and Slovakia." In the chapter entitled "The Revolutionary Movements of the Romanians in 1848," Transylvania is treated in conjunction with Moldavia and Wallachia, and only Romanian movements are chronicled. The events in the Vojvodina region are also separated from their Hungarian context and are presented in conjunction with the Slovenian and Croatian happenings. As a result, closely related events of that time, forming a historic unit, are shorn of their true meaning.

Territorial arbitrariness notwithstanding, every fact in the Yugoslav textbook is verifiable. The participants and the national groups are evaluated in a manner consistent with historical truth. And judgments concerning positions taken by the Hungarian revolutionary government in nationality matters are moderate, as the following samples indicate: "Kossuth struggled with an honest fervor for the liberty and independence of the Hungarian people against Austria; however, he did not acknowledge the same right for the Serbians, Romanians, and Slovaks living on the territory of Hungary at that time. Thus, he alienated these peoples from the Hungarian revolution and struggle for independence." When the House of Habsburg was dethroned in Hungary, the Yugoslav text continues, and the revolutionary democrats obtained a larger role, "they enacted the first nationality law in Europe; however, this no longer satisfied either the Serbians or the Romanians." The text does not stress the conflicts by making onesided reproaches. Rather, grief over lost opportunities of cooperation is the leading theme.

The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, and related problems

of the dualist monarchy, are dealt with from the same biased or moderate points of view as the other issues examined thus far.

The Romanian textbook does not even mention the Compromise itself, but begins to cover late nineteenth-century Danubian history with the struggles for independence of 1877-78 in the Balkans, describing them at length and in glowing terms, in particular the Romanian people's endeavors to "liberate Transylvania from Austrian oppression." No mention is made of the fact that with the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, the historic union of Hungary and Transylvania was restored. In conjunction with World War I, Transylvania is mentioned once again. "Neutral Romania," so the textbook says, "stipulated that it would enter the war only if it could achieve the unity of the state, including the liberation of Transylvania. This ancient desire of the Romanian people was identical with the desires of the Poles, Serbs, Czechs, and other peoples oppressed by Austria-Hungary, Turkey or Germany."20 The Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes, Bulgarians, Albanians, Ukrainians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, and Finns are not mentioned by name among the oppressed peoples, and tsarist Russia is strangely missing from the list of oppressors. The story of the dual monarchy's dissolution is also muddled: "In 1916 the Romanian army could not oust Austro-Hungarian rule from Transylvania. . . . In the fall of 1918 this empire began to disintegrate. All of the nationalities oppressed by Austria-Hungary-the Romanians, Czechs, Poles, Hungarians [sic], Serbs-revolted. The Hungarians, Czechs, and Poles established their own independent states. The Serbs and the Romanians joined the already independent parts of their countries."21 This strange listing suggests that the Hungarians have been "liberated" from the "oppression" of their own country. Also, among the liberated peoples, the Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes, and Ruthenians, are not mentioned by name.

The Slovak textbook is substantially more objective in dealing with the dualist era, although within the confines of a dogmatic Marxist point of view, as in this sentence: "With the dualist compromise, the Austrian aristocracy and bourgeoisie-disregarding the legal claims of other nations-unjustly shared power with the Hungarian aristocracy." The text, however, recognizes capitalist development, civil rights, freedom of enterprise, freedom of opinion, and so on, in the Czech lands of the dualist monarchy. Also, while stressing dualist Hungary's continued "half feudal status,"22 it calls the Compromise,

from a Hungarian point of view, a "realistic one" which contributed to vast capitalistic development.23

The Yugoslav textbooks, too, are quite objective on the topic of the age of Austro-Hungarian dualism. The negative aspects are summed up as follows: "With the Compromise the ruling class of the two most powerful nations (the German and Hungarian) assured their power over the other peoples of the multinational Austro-Hungarian Monarchy." Thus, more than half of the population "remained deprived of its national rights," and the unsolved nationality question embroiled the Monarchy in crisis situations until the time of its dissolution.24 But the positive aspects are not ignored. The 1867 Compromise "contributed to the ordering of the inner situation. The capitalist transformation made headway, . . . the bourgeoisie and the working class also developed. The system of parliamentary constitutionalism was solidified, which was based upon the achievements of bourgeois democracy." However, the economic circumstances developed unevenly and this "intensified the national, social, and political contradictions of the Monarchy."25

A moderate tone also characterizes the section on the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. As a consequence of the defeats suffered on the battlefields, the Yugoslav text reads, "the old Habsburg Monarchy was falling apart. Its dissolution provided impetus to the movements of separation and self-determination of the former subject nationalities. The Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Croatians, Serbians, Romanians, and other peoples established national councils which directed these movements resulting from the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy toward the goal of establishing national states."26

All textbooks, including those of the Carpatho-Ukraine,27 declare, on the one hand, that World War I resulted in a revolutionary new world order and, on the other, that it was a war of the imperialist great powers. Both aspects are most succinctly expressed by the Czechoslovak text: "The imperialist and unjust character of World War I is indisputable. . . . The opposing alliance systems were struggling for realignment of the world and [at the same time] they wished to suppress the momentum of revolutionary forces."28 The Yugoslav textbook calls the war "predatory and unjust," but also points out that for the smaller nations, especially for the small Slavic peoples, it was a "just" war of "self defense."29

This supposedly Marxist interpretation of "self defense" serves as an ideological prop for approving the territorial changes which followed the war. All textbooks suggest that the changes were proper fruits of victory, and well deserved results of valiant battles fought at a great human cost. Only the Yugoslav text speaks of a "dictated peace" and in vague terms even implies that within the newly drawn frontiers unresolved nationality problems continued to exist.30

With the two world wars and the subsequent peace settlement historic Hungary and the supremacy of Hungarians in the Danube region came to an end. It is crucial for a true Danubian reconciliation that the interpretations of the past should not hinder the peace of the present, that distorted views should not poison the historical consciousness of the Danubian people. Distorted views of the common past are especially hurtful to the Hungarians, dismembered nation as they are. For the Hungarians, it is of crucial importance that their common past with their neighbors, which lasted for a thousand years, should not be the victim of recent resentments of the nationalist age. The "millennium" of the Hungarian state is by no means a history of the Hungarian people alone. Historic Hungary was the home of many peoples and the birthplace of several nations of today.31 In the schools of the Danubian countries this common past should be taught in a common way. However, today, Danubian history is taught in five different ways to the five peoples who share a common past. Moreover, the Hungarian people are taught their own history in five different ways since they live in five different states today. Apart from discrediting Danubian historical scholarship, these contradictory interpretations are harmful to peaceful coexistence among the Danubian people.

With the coming to power of the working classes in the people's democracies after World War II, Marxism-Leninism has been made into a dominant ideology of the Danube region. All of us profess tenets of dialectical materialism in our interpretation of the past. Supposedly, the historians, the teachers, and the textbook writers are all Marxists. Their historical consciousness, despite their divergent national characteristics and viewpoints, should be built upon identical socialist foundations. As scholars, we may have disagreements, but children's textbooks are not the proper forum for debating them.

We have often heard that the Hungarian minorities in the four

countries of our neighbors could serve as "bridges,, among the peoples of the Danube region. This nice metaphor has, unfortunately, turned into an empty slogan. Let us not destroy the bridges built by our common past. Rather, let us strengthen them by an authentic and fair interpretation of our common historical experience.

Notes

1. Cf. I. I. Russo, Etnogeneza romanilor (Bucharest, 1981); Ion Joratiu Crissan, Burebista and His Time (Bucharest, 1978); Relations between the Autochthonous and Migratory Populations (Bucharest, 1978).

2. Cf. Peter Ratkos, Pramene k dejinamm velkej Moravy (Bratislava, 1964); Jan Dekan, Moravia Magna (Bratislava, 1980).

3. EDITOR'S NOTE. Linking Great Moravia to present-day Slovakia is the Slovak parallel to the Romanian Daco-Roman theory of continuity. Similar nationalist myths are being now nurtured by Soviet historiography, proclaiming today's Transcarpathia part of an ancient Ukrainian homeland. The mythmaking tendencies of Hungary's neighbors are being challenged by Hungarian historians who are anxious to replace myths concerning the early history of the Danube region with verifiable facts of modern research based on archeological excavations, historical source criticism, linguistic scholarship, and so forth. The Hungarian historian Peter Hanak has summed up the problem succinctly in the course of a roundtable discussion broadcast by Hungarian Radio and published, in 1979, in the first issue of a new Budapest periodical, Historia, whose aim is to promote enlightened historical education of the general public. Addressing himself to one of the currently most controversial questions, namely, "Who were the people who lived in the Carpathian Basin before the Hungarian conquest?," Hanak said: "No continuity between the peoples of the former Roman provinces of the Roman Empire and the peoples living there 500 years later, in the ninth century, can be demonstrated. The ideas of continuity - whether with reference to the Huns, the Great Moravian Empire, or the Dacians - have all been invented . . . by romantic historiographies of the early nineteenth century, to awaken the nation, foster beliefs in a heroic past.... But scholarship has advanced since, beyond myths and romantic idealizations."

4. Tortenelem az elemi iskolak Vl. osztalya szamara (Novi Sad, 1967), 185-86.

5. Hazank tortenete: Tankonyv a IV. osztaly szamara (Bucharest, 1968), 110-12.

6. Ibid. (1966), 60-62

7. Csehszlovakia tortenete: Tankonyv a kozepiskolak masodik es harmadik osztalya szamara (Bratislava, 1966), 80, 186-87

. 8. Ibid., 71-74.

9. Tortenelem az elemi iskolak Vll. osztalya szamara (Subotica, 1966), 123-26.

10. Hazank tortenete, 123-26.

11. Ibid., 145-46

. 12. Csehszlovakia tortenete, 104.

13. Tortenelem az elemi iskolak Vl. osztalya szamara, 191.

14. Ibid., 199.

15. Zoltan I. Toth, Magyarok es romanok, ed. Daniel Csatari (Budapest, 1966), 208.

16. Jozsef Revai, Marxizmus, nepiesseg, magyarsag, 3d ed. (Budapest, 1949), 208.

17. Hazank tortenete, 165-67.

18. Csehszlovakia tortenete, 146-47.

19. Tortenelem az elemi iskolak Vl. osztalya szamara, 191.

20. Hazank tortenete, 183, 203.

21. Ibid., 208.

22. Csehszlovakia tortenete, 154-55.

23. Ibid., 178.

24. Tortenelem az elemi iskolak Vl. osztalya szamara, 108-9.

25. Ibid., 112-36.

26. Ibid., 184-85.

27. Az ujkor tortenete; 11. resz. Kozepiskolai tankonyv (Kiev-Uzhgorod, 1966), 261

. 28. Csehszlovakia tortenete, 206.

29. Tortenelem az elemi iskolak VIII. osztalya szamara (Novi Sad, 1966), 15.

30. Ibid., 42.

31. For more on this subject, see above, Chapter 1, "State- and Nation-Building in Central Europe."

Stephen Borsody: The Hungarians: A Divided Nation