Stephen Borsody: The Hungarians: A Divided Nation

Since 1919 Hungarian foreign policymakers rarely showed decisiveness, and given the complexities of the country's situation between the two world wars, one ought not to be surprised by their hesitancy. The prime minister who was an exception to that rule was Laszlo Bardossy, Teleki's successor. He prided himself on making bold decisions and he paid for his boldness with his life after the war. Under his premiership, Hungary declared war on the Soviet Union without Germany asking her to do so.

Bardossy's decision to join the German war effort without being forced to do so by Hitler is one of those perplexing events in Hungary's recent history. Marxist historians claim that Hungary's attack on the Soviet Union was predetermined by the Horthy regime's "re-

visionist policy and its counterrevolutionary nature."31 However, Bardossy's personality and his faith in German victory had more to do with it than anything else. If at that juncture Hungary had had a different man with a different set of priorities at the helm, the outcome might have been different. Of course, sooner or later Hungary would have had to show her real colors, but the question is when that move should have been made and in what manner. Hungary's active participation in Hitler's war radically reduced her chances of keeping her territorial gains in case of German defeat. After all, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, represented by governments in exile, became cobelligerents of the Western powers and, after the German attack on the Soviet Union, of their eastern ally. The activities of the puppet governments in Slovakia, Croatia, and Serbia could, in case of Allied victory, simply be repudiated without the countries themselves losing their earlier gains or damaging their reputations. These neighbors of Hungary had a cushion that Hungary did not have. Hungary, like Romania, would have had to change sides when the fortunes of war turned - a much more difficult undertaking than that which faced the other two neighbors.

Hungary did make a half-hearted attempt at disentangling herself from the embrace of Germany. It started with the replacement of Bardossy by a pro-Allied prime minister, Miklos Kallay. From the autumn of 1942 a change in attitude became evident. By 1943, anticipating an Allied landing in the Balkans, Hungary began a series of secret negotiations with the Western powers. But Hungarian resolve was weakened by the very thought of a possible Russian occupation. Yet it was impossible to ignore the fact that the Soviet Union was an ally of the Western powers and a drastic reminder of that fact was the British and American refusal to negotiate unilaterally with the Hungarians. Ultimately, fear of the Soviet Union, fear of German occupation and atrocities, and insistence on some political guarantees concerning border revisions paralyzed the Hungarian government's efforts at doing anything at all.

Allied recognition of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia as cobelligerents greatly diminished the possibility of favorable Hungarian border adjustments in the north and in the south at any future peace treaty. Romania, on the other hand, was still in the German camp, and if Hungary wanted to retain any of her gains in Transylvania it

was imperative for her to change sides as soon as possible. Timing was all important. Such an about-face would have had to occur before a similar Romanian move. Kallay, however, was unable to respond to Allied urgings. Even after the fall of Mussolini, the government in Budapest lacked the will to act, afraid of German military occupation and retribution.

The German occupation came anyway in March 1944. The secret negotiations with the Western Allies (not at all secret as far as German intelligence was concerned) had resulted in nothing tangible; they only heightened German suspicion of the Kallay government.

Hungary's German occupation offered another opportunity for Regent Horthy to denounce the German alliance. Instead, the weakneed Horthy, compounding the ineptness of recent Hungarian moves, remained in office and cooperated with the Germans. Already very low, Hungary's stock plummeted in the eyes of the future victors. Hungary's hopelessness reached its greatest depths in August 1944 when Romania changed sides and joined the Soviet army in its advance against Hungary. In October, at long last, Horthy announced over the radio his intention to cease hostilities against the Soviet armies. Yet the proclamation was so cautiously worded with regard to the German alliance that it was almost meaningless. And in any case, the pro-German officers refused to obey Horthy's orders. But even if they had obeyed, it would not have mattered in the long run because a few days later Horthy withdrew the document. Moreover, he gave his blessing to the formation of a Hungarian Nazi government headed by Ferenc Szalasi, the leader of the fascist Arrow Cross party. This was Horthy's last act as regent of Hungary. Although some of the Hungarian officers and troops, on an individual basis, did go over to the Soviet side, officially Hungary was the only country to remain with the German cause to the bitter end.

Given the disgraceful performance of Hungary after March 1944, it is not surprising that the Allies made no effort to settle the Hungarian question in a more equitable manner than had been done in 1919. For the peacemakers of 1946 the settlement was not a question of the "justice" Hungary had so often talked about. It was simply a matter of not taking territories from friends and giving them to the only foe in Central Europe. Whether this expected response was wise or not is another matter.

Notes

1. Istvan Bethlen, "Eloszo," Bethlen Istvan grof beszedei es irasai, 2 vols. (Budapest, 1933), 1:12.

2. John F. Montgomery, Hungary the Unwilling Satellite (New York, 1947), 54.

3. Istvan Bethlen, "A bekerevizio gyakorlati politikaja: A Revizios Liga Nagygyulese, 1932. majus 22," Bethlen Istvdn grof beszedei es irasai, 2:375.

4. Gyorgy Ottlik, "Hungary's Foreign Relations," Hungarian Quarterly 4 (1938)): 31.

5. For example, C. A. Macartney, October Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary, 192F1945, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1957).

6. Marxist historians, on the whole, draw a sharp line separating the period before and after the fall of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. See, for example, Gyula Juhasz, Magyarorszag kulpolitikaja, 1919-1945 (Budapest, 1969), 7-33, where he merely summarizes the events of the pre-August 1919 period.

7. Cf. Mihaly Karolyi,"Az egesz vilag ellen, II," Az uj Magyarorszagert: Valogatott irasok es beszedek, 1908-1919 (Budapest, 1968), 367; and Zsuzsa L. Nagy, A parizsi bekekonferencia es Magyarorszag, 1918-1919 (Budapest, 1965), 60.

8. Karolyi, "Az egesz vilag ellen, II," 372-73.

9. Ibid., 372.

10. By December 1918, there were many volunteers who could not be used because of lack of funds. See Gyula Kadar, A Ludovikatol Sopronkohidaig (Budapest, 1978), 68-75. Kadar was a recruiting officer at that time.

11. I have dealt with this period extensively in two articles: "Istvan Friedrich and the Hungarian Coup d'Etat of 1919: A Reevaluation," Slavic Review 35 (1976): 269-86; and "Power Struggle in Hungary: Analysis in Post-War Domestic Politics, August-November 1919," Canadian-American Review of Hungarian Studies 4 (1977): 3-21.

12. The quotation is from Richard Crane to Robert Lansing, October 7, 1919, National Archives, Record Group 59, M367/540/0812. For a similar gloomy prediction, see Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents on British Foreign Policy 191W1939, 45 vols. (London, 1946-73), 1:6. For a detailed discussion, see Eva S. Balogh, "The Road to Isolation: Hungary, the Great Powers, and the Successor States, 1919-1920" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1974), 395-98.

13. For more details on the Hungarian government's endeavors in this direction, see Balogh, "The Road to Isolation," 416-48.

14. Stefan Osusky, "La genese de La Petite Entente," Revue d'histoire diplomatique 46 (1932): 134. Support for Osusky's statement can be found

in a letter from Sir Alban Young, British minister to Belgrade, to Lord Curzon, dated March 2, 1920, according to which "six months ago the Government of this country was approached by the Czechs with proposals for a defensive agreement against Hungary," Great Britain, Foreign Office, 371, 3520.

15. See Gusztav Gratz to Pal Somssich, January 26,1920, Hungary, Kulugyminiszterium, Papers and Documents Relating to the Foreign Relations of Hungary, eds. Francis Deak and Dezso Ujvary, 3 vols. (Budapest, 1939-48), 1:122, and Edvard Benes to Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, January 5, 1920, Czechoslovak Republic, Ministerstvo zahranicnich veci, lVocuments diplomatique relatifs aux conventions d'alliance conclue par la Republique Tchechoslovaque avec le Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovenes et le Royaume de Roumanie: dec. 1919-aoat 1921 (Prague, 1921), 15-16.

16. Gratz to Somssich, December 15, 1919, Papers and Documents, 1:86-90.

17. Marton Lovaszy to the Yugoslav Government, August 20, 1919, English translation of the German original, N.A., Record Group 59, M367/436/ 0104-0106.

18. On the long and intricate negotiations with the Romanians and the negative Entente attitude, the Hungarian National Archives, the Foreign Office, and the National Archives in Washington have a fair amount of material. Based on these unpublished sources, I have treated the negotiations in detail in my dissertation, "The Road to Isolation," 206-319.

19. These negotiations are amply documented at least on the Hungarian side in the volumes of English-language documents published by the Hungarian foreign ministry.

20. Quoted in Macartney, October Fifteenth, 1:83.

21. He was also certain that sooner or later Austria would join Germany. During his trip to Rome in April 1927, he learned that Mussolini shared his views concerning an Anschluss and, what is more important, saw "no instrument which could prevent such an outcome." See Bethlen's notes on his conversation with Mussolini, April 4,1927, Hungary, Orszagos Leveltar, Iratok az ellenforradalom tortenetehez, 1919-45, eds. Dezso Nemes and Elek Karsai, 5 vols. (Budapest, 1953-78), 4:51.

22. C. A. Macartney, Hungary: A Short History (Edinburgh, 1962),22627.

23. Barcza MS. quoted in Macartney, October Fifteenth. 1:303.

24. For the British and French atttitudes, see Hungary, Magyar Tudomanyos Akademia, Tortenettudomanyi Intezet, Diplomaciai iratok Magyarorszbg kulpolitikajahoz, 1936-1945, (henceforth cited as DIMK) ed. Laszlo Zsigmond, 4 vols. (Budapest, 1962- ), 4:491-92, 628, and 541.

25. Ibid., 3:614-16, 619, 684-86.

26. Richard V. Burks, "Two Teleki Letters," Journal of Central European Affairs 7 (1947): 69.

27. Memorandum by Istvan Bethlen received March 23, 1940, DIMK, 4:743-61.

28. Barcza MS. quoted in Macartney, October Fifteenth, 1:400; see also Gyula Juhasz, A Teleki-kormany kulpolitikaja 1939-1941 (Budapest, 1964), 108-10.

29. For details on German-Hungarian exchanges on this matter, see Germany, Auswartiges Amt, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series C and D, 18 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1949-66), D:10:38-39, 56-57, and 85-86.

30. See Juhasz, A Teleki-kormany, 139 and 128.

31. Even Gyula Juhasz, whose book on Hungary's foreign policy between the two world wars is justifiably considered a balanced treatment, claims this, in my opinion, erroneously. See his Magyarorszag kulpolitikaja, 237-38.

Stephen Borsody: The Hungarians: A Divided Nation