SUITORS AND SUPPLIANTS

April 20, 1919

Wilson had a sharp encounter with Sonnino today. The Italian seems to be fighting not only for more of Dalmatia but for other strong positions that would give his country supremacy in the Balkans.

"There is the gravest danger in that quarter," Sonnino said. "No one can foresee what will happen down there in the next five years or even in the next twelve months. Placing the control of all or any part of this region in the hands of a League of Nations that is nor made powerful with an adequate military force is an absurdity; more, it is a criminal action. These are a reckless, warlike people, very able in the use and in the manufacture of forged documents."

Here Wilson interrupted: "How can we promulgate an entirely different set of principles for our treaties with Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey from those we insist upon in our treaty with Germany? There must be a single, and I hope I shall not have to say it again, an honorable standard for all these treaties. We are pledged to establish a new basic principle, a new international morality, one that has been so often ignored in the last century. Never has a greater or a more vital question been presented than the one with which we are now confronted. I do not know whether France and Britain consider that the Treaty of London conforms to the principles upon which the Armistice was offered and accepted [that is, the Fourteen Points] and upon which in my view the Treaty of Peace is to be written. But I can and I do say that I do not think so. You are placing a great burden upon me; but I shall not shirk the responsibility you impose. If you insist, I shall have to state openly to the world the basic reasons of my objections. I cannot accept for myself or for the United States responsibility for principles which are in direct contradiction to those for the maintenance of which we entered the war."

It was after this passage in arms that the three prime ministers requested Orlando to withdraw his Foreign Minister (Sonnino) from the sessions. He was told that his presence was "incomodo" (inconvenient).

[1938. In the at times acrimonious verbal clashes in the course of the negotiations between Mr. Wilson and Signor Orlando, the Italian Prime Minister, as to the possession of Fiume, there was one which even today has an almost topical significance. "Mr. Wilson," shouted the usually urbane Sicilian, "there are at least thirty thousand Italians in that most Italian of cities. We cannot abandon them to the by no means tender mercies of the Yugoslavs - treaty or no treaty." (Orlando s figures were of course greatly exaggerated.) "Signor Orlando," countered the President, "there are at least a million Italians in New York, but I trust that you will not on this score claim our Empire City as Italian territory."]

April 26, 1919

The attitude of the President in the Fiume imbroglio is being hotly discussed and has given rise to many interpretations not all of which can be correct. Some assert that what they call his "mulish stubbornness is due to his regret (at times they call it his "remorse") at having conceded the Brenner and the three hundred thousand bed-rock Germans who live in the South Tyrol to the grasping Romans. As to why he made this disastrous concession, I at least am not informed. Some say he acted on a sudden impulse; others that he was beguiled to take this unfortunate step by one of his advisers on geographical matters who loves to dine at the Hotel Edouard VII, where undoubtedly the Italians set an excellent table. But whatever may be his sons, it is evident that the President, as far as Fiume is concerned, has returned to his original principles embodied in the Fourteen Points, and which, as he at least insists, were frankly accepted by Orlando during the armistice negotiations.

Tardieu puts in appearance daily, almost hourly in fact. He begs the Colonel to persuade the President to take a realistic view of the situation, which he asserts is endangering the none-too-friendly relations between Rome and Paris. His argument is this: "The good will of Italy is more important to the peace of the world than the ultimate disposition of a miserable Dalmatian fishing village." And he adds: "I fear that the Italians, unless they are `sweetened,' will turn pro-German."

Under instructions from the President, House has talked repeatedly with Lloyd George and with Clemenceau and also with those of their experts to whom the prime ministers are inclined to listen. All agree that their sympathies are with Wilson, hut unfortunately they are bound by a treaty which they cannot ignore. When told that Fiume is expressly excluded from the Italian domain and given to the Croats by the secret treaty, they say nevertheless that Italy must be kept happy or Orlando will not sign, and then our united front against the barbarians is broken.

In his report on the negotiations as of today, House told the President: "The situation is perfectly clear. Orlando will not give up Fiume because he is convinced that if he does his ministry will fall, and Page[16] wires from Rome that the Sicilian s conclusion is perfectly correct. He asserts that no ministry that signed the treaty without Fiume as part of the booty would survive." He (House) then went on to say to the President:

"In our insistence on giving Fiume to the Yugoslavs we stand alone and unsupported, except for a few expressions of platonic sympathy. What is the wisest course? We can keep Italy out by force of arms, perhaps even by merely sending a few warships to the Adriatic port; but then the united front would be broken and Germany and Russia would rejoice and not without reason."

The President listened with interest but said nothing. He had, it seemed to me, embarked upon his course without exploring the dangers that lurk ahead. In my judgment, the Colonel is against military measures to keep the Italians out of the disputed port. He thinks that would he an armed intervention in the affairs of Europe, which neither the Congress nor the people of the United States would approve unless they had been consulted in advance. I think, though he does not say so, that the Colonel is in favor of a policy of postponement, of procrastination; of bringing pressure to bear upon both Belgrade and Rome not to fight, and so, after a cooling-off period, to have the problem certified to the Council of the League as one threatening the peace of the world, which under the Covenant it is empowered to face and should solve.

May 4, 1919

After half a dozen interminable conferences, now with Trumbitch and Korosec for Yugoslavia and then with Chiesa and di Cellere for Italy, the Adriatic problem failed to yield to our diplomatic treatment. The Colonel grew weary of listening to complaints not all of which were well founded. And I? Certainly I was quite fagged out by my interpreting duties. And then an idea occurred to me. As the sequel proves not a very brilliant idea, perhaps it should be regarded merely as a lazy man's effort to escape continuing responsibility and increasing boredom. I cannot claim that my idea was even novel, because the same plan was being pursued in the Saar dispute.

The hope of a reasonable settlement under my plan was based on the conversations I had had with leading Italians and above all with prominent Croats before victory came and pretensions began to sprout. I knew that both parties to the dispute were claiming more territory than belonged to them either by historic rights or by the doctrine of self-determination. And both parties to the dispute knew that I knew this. I also knew there were areas for which probably each of the disputants would fight and that there were others which they claimed merely for trading purposes. I talked in confidence with most of the delegates, many of whom had sat with me at the Congress of Submerged Nationalities (Paris, September, 1918), and I also took counsel with Professor Salvemini, who was active for Italy's legitimate claims, among which he did not include Fiume. Seton-Watson, pupil of Supillo and an eloquent advocate of the Slav claims that would bear scrutiny, helped me to draw up a boundary line between the two nationalities which was much nearer the truth than the frontier that was drawn in the Treaty of London.

In this way we tossed about free cities and played ducks and drakes with not a few islands, and we certainly whittled down the territory which both countries claimed and insisted, it being a vital interest, much as they preferred peace, that for this they would have to fight. I made a "graph" and a map showing what we had accomplished. There was the city of Fiume and the port of Susak and a little of the adjacent territory. All the rest was assigned. "But this area, Colonel," I explained, "we shall call Disputanta, and we shall place it under the administration of the League of Nations for the period of fifteen years. Then we shall end up with a free and fair election, a plebiscite, Uncle Sam perhaps presiding over the ballot boxes." The Colonel was enchanted with what he called "a magical solution of all our troubles." He ordered a number of copies of my map made and he distributed it widely. In a few days it got into the papers, and to the anger of the Colonel it was ticketed, we shall say, as the Smith-Jones plan, names far better known than mine.

So far as I know the plan was mine, but it was so simple and indeed so obvious that it might well have occurred to other observers. Then, to tell the truth, on closer contact with the dramatis personae I was not infatuated with it nor was I confident of its success, as perhaps I had been in the first blush of authorship. I was even willing to concede it was not the most perfect instrument that ever sprang from the brain of man. I also had come to the conclusion that the only way to keep Italy out of Fiume, which by rank propaganda had been accepted by millions of her deluded people as a national symbol, was by military force, and I was convinced that none of the powers wanted to make the effort, least of all Uncle Sam.

I succeeded in letting the plan go into history as the Smith-Jones plan and very, very soon It was relegated to the dead files. Hunter Miller put the document in perfect legal shape and then both sides dropped it.

I find these memos in my daybook:

April 14th. The President told Orlando he would consent to giving Fiume the status of an international port with full measure of local autonomy. Orlando's answer was a sibilant Sicilian "No."

April 19th. The President made what he regarded as a further concession. lie was willing to place the disputed port and a rim of surrounding country under League administration somewhat like the Saar, with the promise of a plebiscite at some future and more tranquil day. This seems to be a revival of my plan, endorsed by House but long since lost in the general shuffle. It has at least one virtue. Neither of the contenders would suffer immediate defeat. They could both hope for victory at the polls at some not too distant day and then perhaps, as Tardieu remarks (he is enthusiastic for the plan), "No one would care whether he was saddled with the miserable fishing village or not." I do not agree because I know how important this sea front is to the Yugoslavs; but it was not necessary for me to express an opinion, for in half an hour Orlando had answered with a rotund "No" rather than his usual Papal "non possumus."

April 28, 1919

Even for those who were present and heard the uproar and witnessed the resulting disorganization in the ranks of the peacemakers, it is hard to understand and consequently most difficult to describe what has happened in Paris during what the Italians call the "Passion Week of 1919." It is certain, however, that President Wilson, in publishing to the world, although it was addressed to the Italian people, his views on the Adriatic problem that denied the right of Italy to claim Fiume, set off a time bomb the course and explosive qualities of which should not have been difficult to foresee. Even before the extremely unfavorable reception of the document in Rome was apparent, there were not a few who announced that Wilson had smashed the Peace Conference and that the Americans had better go home. The storm of fury that broke upon the President's head evidently surprised him, although Colonel House, who had sensed the high explosives which the document contained, had urged him to start his campaign by first reading the manifesto to Clemenceau and to Lloyd George. This he had apparently done at an official meeting, and, in the judgment of the President, they had both concurred in the statements made and fully approved of the views expressed.

Indeed, according to the President, Lloyd George went even farther. He (George) spoke of a memorandum which at his suggestion BaIfour had drawn up in which the Italian pretensions to Fiume were combatted, even more vigorously than in the Wilsonian text. The President had understood Lloyd George to say that he would publish this memorandum within a few hours with a statement demonstrating his complete approval of the President s position. His (the President's) impression was that M. Clemenceau had concurred in the views expressed but had made no announcement as to what action he would take.

In view of the fact that no formal records of the words exchanged, much less of the agreement reached, were kept, it is not surprising that the recollections of the distinguished participants in the conference are widely divergent. Mr. Wilson was impressed with M. Clemenceau's desire to keep in the background for reasons which he understood and respected. He had stated several times to the President that by the act of his predecessor France was a party to the Pact of London, providing for the division of spoils in anticipation of that victory which admittedly hung fire until America entered the war. The Tiger on several occasions had shown a reluctance to discuss the problem, but he had made it quite clear that Italy alone could release France from her given word. On the other hand, the President was quite certain that Lloyd George had pledged himself and his government to back up the American view and to hold the Adriatic bridge with him.

The President s argument was as follows: He insisted that the events of the last few months had completely transformed the Adriatic problem and that it should now be settled in the new spirit that was abroad in Europe, in fact in the world. He pointed out that the once powerful Austro-Hungarian monarchy had disappeared. He argued consequently that the Treaty of London, drawn up in the stress of a dark period in the war and designed as a protective bulwark for the submerged nationalities against a predatory power, then powerful and rampant but now destroyed, should be canceled. He suggested that the proposal of cancellation might best come from Italy, but as this was not the case, he made the suggestion himself.

Orlando, quite sincerely no doubt, chose to regard the manifesto as a direct appeal to the Italian people over his head. He told House that it was an invitation to the electorate in his country to repudiate their representatives in Paris and the government that had sent them there. All the Italian newspaper correspondents in Paris, with whom hitherto he had not been a favorite, rallied to his support when he stated that the manifesto was a challenge to his authority and that his position was: "The Italian people must choose between my leadership and that of Wilson."

It was not long before the first extremely sensational newspaper dispatches from Rome were confirmed by our official advices. Apparently, the Italian people had reached an immediate decision, and it was wholly unfavorable to our President; many of the avenues and streets in Italy which had so recently been given the name of Wilson, the Liberator, were "'de-baptized" in short order. And suddenly, overnight, Orlando and even his colleague, Sonnino, so generally disliked both at home and abroad, became immensely popular; civic crowns were voted them by many municipalities, and the cities awarded them the palms which are only given to those who have deserved well of their country. When Orlando, having walked out on the Conference [he returned May 6], arrived in Rome seeking a renewal of his mandate, he tasted for him the unusual sweets of unbounded popularity. While it is true he made the effort, he could not divest the ovations which he received of a distinctly and-Wilson character.

The President was distressed at the uproar. But he was not the man to bow his head to the storm nor to seek to explain away the charges of insolent interference in matters which did not directly concern him. In fact, he stood by his guns and told our newspapermen and all others who were entitled to hear his views (although he stated he deplored further newspaper controversy at such a delicate moment) that a vital factor in the peace settlement was in the balance; that the future peace of Europe, and hence of America, was at stake; that he would fight with the weapons of diplomacy for the only proper settlement of the Adriatic problem just as stoutly as he had fought for it with men and ships and money before the Armistice was declared.

Isolated as he now found himself, Mr. Wilson was naturally most anxious to learn what had happened to the British co-operation that was pledged and the unqualified support of the BaIfour memorandum that had been announced and, as he thought, promised. Many steps were taken to clear up this mystery, and some of them are doubtless unknown to me; I can, therefore, only relate with confidence those that were taken by me under instructions from Colonel House. Lloyd George was absent when I called at his residence, but all, or nearly all, of his secretaries were on hand. They seemed to have been mobilized in large numbers to meet the emergency. As they understood the agreement or understanding between Lloyd George and Wilson, the latter's manifesto was to have been released for publication in the morning papers of April 24 (as to the exact date, I am, as were they, not quite certain). Unhappily, they stated, the document had been sent out by the American press bureau so early on the afternoon of the day previous to the agreed date for release that it had been published in almost all the evening papers of Europe on that day. I had to admit that this was unfortunately true; that someone had been careless. "But," I said, "which is the press bureau that has not been guilty of similar acts of inconsiderate haste? And after all, what of it? Could not the Prime Minister of England endorse a manifesto which through the impetuosity of one of Wilson s subordinates had been published something like ten hours ahead of schedule?"

Now, as always, my colleagues of the British mission were frank and aboveboard, and they agreed that even after this trifling contretemps (mischance) the Prime Minister could co-operate; but, as a matter of fact, orders had been received from him which canceled all previous instructions on the matter. "Our slate is wiped clean and we can't do a thing until we hear from him again. He has gone to the country and we do not expect to hear from him very soon."

"Indeed," said one of these merry wights, "the last word we had was to the effect that we are not likely to hear from him for some time."

This concluded our business interview, but we then, as often before, resolved ourselves into a "common council" of the younger and, as we thought, more intelligent set and began to speculate as to the motives behind the enigmatic moves of the great men with whom we were associated. One of these charming fellows said:

"My guess is L. G. decided it would not be dignified to come steaming along in Wilson's wake a day or so late; perhaps he will barge in, however, when the atmosphere has cleared up a bit; when he learns that you fellows were not trying to steal a march on him."

Then another of the bright boys chuckled: "You see, we got the roar from Rome early in the evening, long before we had said `goodnight' to London, and perhaps L. G. thought it was no use for him to rush in among the brickbats, and so he told us to lay off, but later on, of course..."

May 3, 1919

If Aldovrandi, the secretary of Orlando, is to be believed, and I have always found him hitherto reliable, my previous entries with regard to this delicate subject are incomplete and certainly do less than justice to Lloyd George. He apparently did make an attempt to straighten things out, or at least smooth them over, to prevent the open "break" which is now apparent to all. In these words Aldovrandi describes the interview between Lloyd George and Orlando which he says took place on the afternoon of April 24.

"I ought to know what was said," he asserts, "as I acted as their interpreter."

Apparently Lloyd George insisted upon the meeting which Orlando wished to avoid, and when he appeared at the Hotel Edouard VII he (George) was nervous and quite pale. "I am taking this unusual step," he began, "because I wish to call your attention to the fact that the situation with which we are confronted is grave, very grave. It is not only critical for Italy, it is critical for all of us. All Europe needs America. Without America Europe cannot continue to live. I have come to tell you that Wilson, as always obstinate, is greatly irritated now. In this unfortunate state of mind he has drawn up a manifesto to the people of Italy which is really addressed to the people of the world, and he has requested M. Clemenceau and myself to sign it or in some way signify our approval. We have begged him to delay publication for at least forty-eight hours, and that is the reason why I am here. I hope to make its publication, which cannot fail to have unpleasant consequences for all of us, unnecessary. Cannot we smooth things over? I do not have to tell you the scandal that will follow upon its publication or how the Germans and our other enemies will rejoice. The unhappy division that exists in the council of the Allies will then be apparent to all the world. Let us see if we cannot stave off this catastrophe."

A few minutes after these words were spoken, Lloyd George left and while the Italian delegation was deliberating as to how the situation was to be met, one of the secretaries came in with a copy of the Temps of that evening. In it the manifesto of Wilson was published and Orlando said: "There is nothing left for us to do but to pack up and leave for Rome."

So, Aldovrandi.

April 29, 1919

This morning the President gave House a brief account of what happened at the last-minute meeting designed to pacify Orlando, or at least to keep him from "running out" on the conference. It was engineered by Lloyd George and took place in his private apartment in the rue Nitot. "I regret you were not present," explained the President, "for while completely unsuccessful it was illuminating."

Apparently before the President appeared Lloyd George had tried to calm down the now angry Sicilian. Above everything he begged him to be "careful." "Remember," he said (this from Aldovrandi), "Wilson is not only an obstinate man, he is also a vindictive one. We must humor him. If he left us in the lurch, Europe would be in a sad plight indeed."

Orlando s reply was, "Yes, everybody is generous including Wilson. Yes, even he promises me everything but what is necessary, absolutely necessary, to save my position as head of the government."

Wilson (still according to Aldovrandi) was very affectionate with the Tiger, who was not in his usual good humor. Wilson addressed him as "my dear friend," and the Tiger s riposte was, "I am all tremble when you address me with those endearing words." Thea Wilson bridled and said, "I will then call you `my illustrious colleague.' " With this out of the way, Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau vied with one another in assuring the Sicilian how fond they were of him, how they would miss him, how delightful in many respects their talks had been. Orlando replied, "You may be still fonder of me next week when you may well be confronted with d'Annunzio in my place."

Apparently coming to the conclusion that the Italian situation was hopeless, Lloyd George darted off to the Antipodes and took up the cudgels for little Hughes of Australia, who hates the ground that Wilson walks on, a feeling that is reciprocated in a generous measure. "Hughes is very bitter, Mr. President. He says that great America suffered fewer casualties in the war than little Australia, yet you oppose all her just claims and seek to shape the peace alone, excluding all others."

Again and not unnaturally Wilson lost his temper. "Do you mean to minimize our contribution or to deny that through our assistance the war was brought to a successful conclusion?"

"Of course not, of course not," repeated Lloyd George. "However, we are so far apart as to many problems, let us not pursue this prickly question further."

Then Clemenceau put in his oar. "I made war, but now I want to make peace. I hope you will help me. And mark what I say. I am not going to allow incompetent generals and bellicose civilians to spoil it not if I can help it."

House laughed quietly as he put away the notes that came to him from an undisclosed source. "What luck we had in not being at that party," was his only comment.

April 29, 1919

I was now told by House to take up the matter with Clemenceau and did so that evening. This was not difficult. For many weeks my visits to the Tiger were a matter of almost daily, or rather nightly, routine. For while the Prime Minister of France had resumed his attendance at the conference of the Big Four, Colonel House had held that this intimate channel of communication after the day's work was done, which had been initiated after Clemenceau was shot [February 19, 1919], was still valuable and that in certain emergencies it might prove even more so. Thus my visits were maintained.

The incident I am about to describe was certainly interesting, but as my mission was far from successful, I must sacrifice my reputation as a negotiator to the drama of the after-midnight scene. When I was shown in by Albert, I found the Tiger in his small study, installed in his large armchair where, half reclining, he could, because of the wound still troubling him, rest and even sleep more comfortably than in his bed. He was wearing the old wrapper and the famous slippers, and on his head was the cap which he called his "day and night cap." As I came in I found him grumbling about the inherent cussedness of books, for like most men with a large and disordered library he could never find the volume he wanted.

"C'est agaçant," he grunted. "In the morning, as usual, I 'shall have to send to the publisher for another copy and doubtless he'll say, `Out of print,' as most good books are. `You must apply at the Bibliothèque Nationale.' "

As I got down to the purpose of my visit, the Tiger listened very attentively. At my recital of the rôle, which in the light of the facts, as far as we knew them, Lloyd George had played, he grunted again. And then:

"I certainly concurred in every statement that Mr. Wilson made, but it was the spokesman of the great associated Power who was speaking. The spokesman of one of the Allied Powers could not speak in that independent way, and I never dreamt for a moment that Mr. Wilson thought that we could. If we did, the whole fabric of the alliance which had at last brought us through the furnace of the World War would have crashed. I won't say I wasn't tempted. I was. Wilson's attitude was straightforward, honest, and true. Yes, for a moment I was tempted to cut my cables, to cast off the old shackles and with him plunge into the unknown. But, no, the thing was impossible. We had fought to uphold the sanctity of treaties and we were trying to erect a barrier against future wars. I raw clearly what it would mean if I went back on my pledges and seconded Wilson. WelI, in the first place, it would mean that before I said a word I would have to send at least four divisions of troops to the Italian frontier. Things are very ticklish there today, to say the least, and I should think that the dangerous situation in Europe would be patent even to hopeful American eyes. The Spartacists in Germany, who are trying to overthrow the Weimar Republic, are openly working for an alliance with Soviet Russia against Western Europe. Many think they have already achieved it; the outbreak of war between the victors in the great conflict is by no means an impossibility, and that would indeed be a sad conclusion to our battle to end war.

"Let me illustrate the situation by reminding you of an incident that occurred some ten days ago, which for obvious reasons we have not stressed. One of our most irresponsible boulevard sheets published a canard to the effect that I was opposing Italian war aims. When the rumor reached Italy, even though it was immediately and officially denied and although Orlando announced that he had no cause of complaint against rue, anti-French riots broke out in many Italian towns. In Leghorn a mob attacked a small detachment of our soldiers, the very men who had been sent to Italy after the Caporetto disaster to save them. Some of our men were killed and a large number were wounded before order was restored. No, things are ticklish. It is touch and go; we must move very cautiously. From the beginning, I wished Wilson success, but I could not participate in his adventure. And now that the failure of his well-meant move is notorious, the only way I can help is to stand by, not jump overboard with Wilson, but talk quietly with Orlando, reason with him as best I can, and that I shall do."

Paris, July, 1925

The acute stage of the Adriatic problem soon passed, or rather, I should say, it was passed over. Although unsolved, it was displaced on the agenda by the more urgent, although not more important, questions of the future of the Saar, Belgian priority in reparations, and then Shantung. I never asked M. Clemenceau for his permission to publish any of the revealing statements in regard to Fiume that he made to me in the course of these confidential conversations, which were intended exclusively for the information of my chief, and of course I never published them or in any way indicated that such statements had been made. It was his pleasure and his wish that all these matters should be regarded as confidential. Frankly, I admit that, concerning this conversation, I pestered him many times for permission to print, but he would always dart off on some amusing tangent and permission was never forthcoming. Like most "old newspapermen," he had a horror of the modern hair-trigger reporter and a great distrust of amateur news gatherers.

Clemenceau gave me unstinted praise for respecting his confidence in this and several other matters that if published at the time would have proved world sensations. While amused at my persistence now he remained firm in his refusal to let me make public what I thought was the important lesson to be drawn from his decision to stand aside at the time of the Italian crisis. In 1925, when I stayed with him for some days in the Vendée, I returned to the attack and we had what he called a battle royal on the subject. I told him that my conscience troubled me, that I thought the deduction that could and undoubtedly should be drawn from his action at this time would strengthen the League of Nations and by the spread of understanding would help along the cause of peace. It would demonstrate, I argued, that the world needed the United States in the League, not because she was so rich and powerful or so "good," but because, owing to her happy geographical position, she was the only great power that could insist upon the truth as she saw it without being forced to move armies to her frontiers.

"Well, you can tell it when I m gone from this vale of tears - but nor now. You will not have to wait long. You are terribly insistent and hopeful, just like that heavy artilleryman who during the war was always clamoring for the manufacture, intensive, extensive, and oh, so expensive, of heavy guns, which never could be brought up to where they were needed by any power that was available. I fear it will be equally difficult now to get the League into anything like effective action, since your good people in America abandoned it on the doorstep of Europe.

Then he rehearsed what was said at our midnight conference, which, as I thought, if made public, would help in the pacification of a distracted world.

"Yes, you wanted me to second something that Wilson, a free-lance in European affairs, had said about the Adriatic problem. I agreed that what Wilson said was true and even wise, but I added that I was bound to a different course by a treaty as solemn as any France ever entered upon. It was in anticipation of the fulfillment of this treaty, you must remember, that brought the Italians into the war on our side, and you may remember at the time we assumed this would be helpful to our just cause. How different was the position of Wilson! He was merely associated with our general war purposes, but as far as this treaty was concerned, of which officially he was ignorant, he was as free as air. And I did tell you that I was tempted, only I saw very clearly that before I joined in on this adventure I would have to talk with Weygand about how many army divisions we could send to the Italian frontier. That, you must admit, would not have been a pleasing conclusion to our peace powwow.

"I admit that your memory of what I said further at this time is correct. Wilson was right; the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had put an entirely new face upon the European situation - certainly upon the Adriatic problem, and I hoped that Italy would release us from the obligation, which in a critical moment of great stress we had assumed. I talked to Orlando in that sense, not once, but several times. But I could not ignore the fact that this treaty carried with it the signature of France, duly authenticated, and that only Italy could release us from its provisions.

"When later we talked over the fiasco, and fiasco it certainly was, I comforted Wilson with the thought that the question could be taken up at an early meeting of the League, under Article 19 of the Covenant, which provides for a reconsideration of treaties which with the passage of time and the change in conditions have failed of their purpose, or, as is clearly the case in this instance, have developed into a menace to peace. And he told me that this was his purpose. Then you abandoned Wilson, and later on, as it seems to me, you abandoned Europe. I was disappointed, but, I confess, not surprised. Just as I was compelled to look at the Adriatic problem from the standpoint of our national responsibilities and pledges, so you were forced to look at the European scene, later on, from your traditional transatlantic standpoint of aloofness.

"Had Wilson said to me, as he seems to have said to Lloyd George and most certainly did not say to me, 'Clemenceau, will you make common cause with me? I would have been compelled to answer, 'Mr. President, most certainly not, but from the bottom of my heart I wish you luck. And I am afraid that is the attitude and the feeling of the great majority of Americans as they view the turmoil in Europe today."

SUITORS AND SUPPLIANTS