THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM IN TRANSYLVANIA 1867-1940

The attitude of Albina prompted the advocates of the cooperative principle to strive to establish independent cooperatives. As a result of their organizational work, fifteen new loan associations had came about by 1900. All were involved in lending, at relatively high interest rates. They functioned independently of one another, without an administrative center. Some of them eventually became corporations or banks. Undoubtedly, "they played an important role in the economic develop-

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ment and enrichment of the peasant class," as the author already quoted has observed.⁴⁹

The organization of cooperatives on the Raiffeisen model started in 1893. The first of these was organized that year by an association of Nagyszeben, called the Reuniunea Romana de Argricultura at Veresmart [Rosia Saseasca]. By 1913 this association had promoted a further 24 cooperatives in the county of Szeben. By that time there were altogether 72 cooperatives on the Raiffeisen model operating in areas of the country inhabited by Romanians.

These cooperatives came into existence primarily for the purpose of promoting the purchases of land. The example of the community of Egerszeg [Cornatel] in the county of Maros-Torda was rather typical. Here, in 1901, 103 residents united to purchase an estate of 400 holds belonging to a count. They bought not only the estate for 80,000 crowns, but the residence and the annexes as well. In 1907 they managed a further purchase. For the sum of 58,000 crowns, 125 peasant members of the cooperative bought a nobleman's estate of 200 holds, along with his manor house on the outskirts of the village. Thereby "the Romanian inhabitants of the community became lords over the estate wherein their ancestors had worked as serfs." ⁵⁰

Because of such promising results the Greater Romanian Cultural Association, Astra decided to take over the management of cooperatives. Its expert traveled throughout the central portions of Transylvania as well as to villages in the north-western part where no cooperatives had yet been formed. He presented his proposal, according to which there was a dire need for organizing cooperatives in these places, to counter the practice of usury. But there was unexpected resistance to the proposal, not on the part of the Hungarian authorities, but rather from the Romanian banks. The latter were worried lest their own financial interests suffer in the face of this unexpected rise of competing cooperatives. Therefore, with the help of the intelligentsia which had a vested interest in the banks, they attempted to hamper the organizational efforts of Astra. Nevertheless, Astra did succeed in establishing 24 new cooperatives by 1915, overcoming many internal obstacles.

While the loan cooperatives rendered good service to the Romanian peasantry in many locations, the consumer cooperatives were unable to consolidate in the villages. The first such cooperative was formed at Balazsfalva [Blaj] in 1890. Until the First World War there were no more than eight such cooperatives, and eventually all had to close.

Unlike these independent Romanian consumer cooperatives, those branch cooperatives established in the Romanian villages which joined a central organization of the Hungarian cooperatives prospered and

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rendered good service to the Romanian villages under the protection of the head office. The people of Naszod were the ones to initiate the movement at the turn of the century. Their representative, one Daniello, got in touch with the managers of the Hangya in Budapest and at Enyed/Nagyenyed [Aiud], as well as with the main cooperative of the Saxons in Nagyszeben. At the main office of the Saxons he was told that they would not accept Romanian members because the Saxon cooperative central office could only serve the interests of the Saxon nation. But the central office of the Hangya at Budapest and Enyed were more than willing to accept the proposed Romanian cooperatives as members, first of all because according to the Romanian report this association was not strictly along nationality lines, and "those 900- odd consumer cooperatives which had been established throughout the country in the space of ten years were founded among the nationalities without any national discrimination whatever.'' ⁵¹ Both Budapest and Enyed accepted the Romanians on the basis of complete autonomy. "Thus," the author of the report wrote, "we could prepare our ground rules, organize, and manage our cooperative the way we liked. This should have a reassuring effect on those who showed some hesitation, whether because of our nationality or because they feared loss of autonomy."⁵² The Hangya main office was very helpful to the new Romanian cooperative, and the help provided by it was always to the advantage of the members whether at the moment of foundation, at the time of shipments, or when representation was needed before the authorities. The management of the cooperative resorted to the following sensible argument to undo those Romanians who objected to joining a "foreign" head office: The correspondent of the newspaper stated:

We must accept help from wherever it comes. Let us not reject it merely on the grounds of national sentiment, merely because this help happens to come from a foreign association.... We must keep turning in the direction from which we may expect help to improve our own and our nation's material situation because, as you well know, nowadays it is economics that plays the most important role in the life of nations.⁵³

Several Romanian villages did indeed understand the rationality of the argument and joined up with the Hangya center in Budapest. In addition to Naszod, the Romanian communities of Solymos [Soimus], Kisrebra [Rebrisoara] and Szalva [Salva] also founded consumer and profit cooperatives on the Hangya basis. Eventually 25 more Romanian

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villages established similar organizations. Oltszakadat, a village in the county of Szeben, where Judge Prie was able to obtain significant state support, thanks to the Hangya organization, had such a cooperative.

Where there were no autonomous Hangya branches, great poverty often prevailed. This was the situation in villages built near large estates. The Romanians of such villages lived under deplorable conditions particularly in the central counties of Transylvania and the northeastern areas. The Romanian researcher we have quoted several times ascribed the great poverty to the considerable power of the Hungarian landowners, but he added that "to a certain extent, it can also be attributed to the lack of concern, understanding and scruples on the part of the intelligentsia, many of whom exploit the peasants just as much as the foreigners.,' ⁵⁴

Of course, it would be unfair to generalize regarding the poverty of the villages, or regarding the attitude of the great landowners. According to the publication of the Iuliu Enescu brothers, almost every community had its own property. The wealthiest communities were the Saxon settlements in the counties of Brasso, Nagy-Kukullo, Szeben, Beszterce-Naszod, Temes, Torontal, Krasso-Szoreny, Bihar, and Arad. Of course, the excellent soil in the latter counties contributed to the prosperity of the villagers. The poorest villages were to be found in the counties of Szolnok-Doboka Also-Feher, Maramaros, and Torda- Aranyos. ⁵⁵ '

On the other hand, we know of individual Hungarian landowners who did help the population of the villages in the vicinity of their estates with charitable deeds; this was the case with Karoly Torma, the governor of Zarand [Zarand] county, landowner Karoly Huszar of Honoros [Honoriei] and Lugoskisfalu [Satu Mic], as well as Count Domokos Zichy, landowner at Major [Maieru] and several others. The good deeds of Huszar impressed even one of the representatives of the normally anti-Hungarian Romanian press. As soon as he settled in a Romanian village of Krasso-Szoreny he immediately gave away 48 holds of land to the village. Then he sold them 156 holds of pastures at half price, and the villagers also received wood from a forest area covering 334 holds. Later Huszar sold them 453 holds of land on installment at a very modest price. He had a house built for a poor widow and her five children, saving them from utter ruin. He also contributed considerable financial aid for the construction of the denominational Romanian school and of the new church. ⁵⁶

There were Hungarian landowners like Huszar in other regions as well who were also liked by the Romanian peasantry for their good deeds. Particularly good relations evolved between the Hungarian

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landowners and the Romanian peasants in Maramaros county. These good relations were expressed in one way or another more than once, to the great astonishment of the Romanian press. In early l909 the newspaper of Brasso noted with dismay that "the Romanian gentleman, the Romanian who wears trousers has a bad reputation" among the Romanian people of Maramaros. "There is no better lord than the Hungarian," they often claimed. ⁵⁷ This loss of prestige and the new sympathies signal the beginning of the end, noted the correspondent of the Brasso paper. The Romanian newspaper of Beszterce reprinted portions of the article because, as it stated, "it is a great pity, but in our region we have also heard some peasants declare that our lords are worse than the foreigners." Therefore, the Romanian paper called upon the intelligentsia to be more attentive to the people, "because the people are troubled by the attitude of the intelligentsia."⁵⁸

The nonchalance of the peasant, his abhorrence of books and learning, the lack of practical education and role models, the people's sinful distrust of the intelligentsia, the abuses committed by the intelligentsia against the people and their indifference to the people's woes, the boundless trust in foreigners, the refusal to listen to advice, alcoholism, laziness, rancor and quarrels,

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wasting time, reckless borrowing, interest on these loans, the taste for luxury.... These are some of the factors paving the road to America.⁶⁰

Some Romanian papers, particularly the weekly from Beszterce, carried out a praiseworthy campaign against these social afflictions. This weekly wrote with satisfaction of the activities of the Hungarian authorities aimed at controlling the consumption of alcoholic beverages. In several Romanian areas the Hungarian district administrator issued directives instructing the notary publics to fight against alcoholism alongside the clergy, forbidding gambling and visits to the pub before the mass or service on Sundays and holidays. This campaign was initiated by the Hungarian district administrator of Enyed, Jozsef Imre. ⁶¹ His example was followed by the district administrator of Algyogy [Geoagiu]. In the county of Beszterce-Naszod one of the objectives of the county authorities was likewise to fight against alcoholism by means of the already-mentioned didactic conferences in Romanian. Unfortunately, this praiseworthy campaign achieved but moderate success in most places. In some areas alcoholism remained the main vice of the Romanian peasantry to the end. A visiting American, member of the House of Representatives, noted why and when they drank:

People drink when they are hungry, so that they may eat more; and once they are sated they drink to improve their digestion. They drink when they are sleepy to stay awake. If they would like to fall asleep but can't, they drink again. If they feel cold they drink to get warmer. If they are warm they drink to cool down. They drink when they are healthy, so as not to fall sick; when they are sick, they drink to recover. They drink at baptisms, during social calls, at feasts, and at funerals. They drink when they are happy about something, but when they are unhappy they drink even more. They drink when they buy something, and when they sell they drink again....

This is the way the American speaks, noted the Romanian paper, adding in a rather depressed tone, "and he is telling the truth."⁶²

Summarizing the positive and negative data regarding the material condition of the peasantry, we may conclude that the former far outweighed the latter. The almost unlimited opportunities for the purchase of land, the cheap loans of the altruistic Romanian banks, the evolution of various cooperatives unchecked by government restrictions,

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the support provided by the Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture, and the didactic work of the Romanian press were all factors in promoting the welfare of the peasantry. The negative impact of alcoholism was somewhat mitigated by the continuous campaign the press and society conducted against it.

If we now try to express the situation of the Romanian peasantry in statistical terms and percentages, we get the following picture of land distribution, according to the census of 1910:

26 Romanian family heads owned estates in excess of 1,000 holds

1,435 Romanian family heads owned estates from 100 to 1,000 holds

6,204 Romanian family heads owned estates from 60 to 100 holds

62,858 Romanian family heads owned estates from 20 to 50 holds

161,163 Romanian family heads owned estates from 10 to 20 holds

' 232,480 Romanian family heads owned estates from 5 to 10 holds

274,244 Romanian family heads owned estates from 0 to 5 holds

237,405 Romanian family heads were shepherds or servants

(There were 1.441 dependents of the enumerated family heads).⁶³

There were 2,930,120 Romanians in Hungary in 1910, i.e. about three million Romanians lived under Hungarian rule and 85.6696 of them were engaged in agricultural work. With the exception of the dwarf holdings owned by 274,244 persons and the landless peasants, the independent livelihood of the others was assured; after all, shepherds and servants received a wage for their services. The breakdown of day laborers in Hungary by nationality indicates that the Romanian peasantry was relatively better off than the pure Hungarian ethnic group living in the Szekely land. As we know, in 1900 the day laborers formed the second largest group of wage earners in the country, while the largest class was that of producers. Countrywide, there were 252 day laborers for every thousand persons gainfully occupied. In the Romanian regions this ratio dropped to 197, whereas among the Hungarians of the Szekely area the ratio was 307 day laborers for every

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thousand wage-earners, which clearly indicates a higher rate of poverty than among the Romanians. ⁶⁴ A similar conclusion may be derived from statistics regarding emigration; there, too, Hungarians were proportionally more numerous than the Romanians.⁶⁵

The peasantry's desperation kept growing, and manifested itself in several uprisings towards the end of the 19th century: in 1B88 in the counties of Ilfov, Ialomita, and Prahova; in 1889 in the counties of Roman, Vaslui, Iasi, and Bacau of Moldavia; and in 1894 once again in Moldavia, in the counties of Tecuci, Tutova, Falciu, and Bacau. All these uprisings were put down by the army, which attempted to intimidate the disaffected peasantry with the bloody repression of their movement in 1894. Many a peasant fell victim to the firing squad.

Then their fate improved somewhat. Some of the state lands were parceled out, and new laws were passed regarding agricultural loans and labor contracts in the field. After 1900, however, conditions deteriorated again. Within a few years the cost of land rental increased from 25 lei per hectare to 40, then to 60 and even to 80 lei. Land lessors formed powerful cartels, the main purpose of which was to ensure maximum profit. In the northern counties of Moldavia, 88% of

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the peasants had no domestic animals whatever. Infant mortality rates reached 40 to 50%.

In 1907 the despair of the peasantry resulted in a Jacquerie, which started in the villages of Botosani county and spread to most of the country. The Romanian Liberal Party, then in opposition, intended to use the movement for its own ends, attempting to give it an anti-Semitic character, inasmuch as there were some Jews among those who rented land. Prefect Varescu and others egged on the peasants to act directly against the Jews. The uprising spread rapidly and soon became general throughout Moldavia. Now the rebels attacked the estates of every landowner and great lessor without discrimination. Then the Prime Minister of the Conservative Party summoned prefect Varescu and reproached him. "Why did you not take effective measures against the rebels?" he asked the prefect. "There is no danger whatever to the Romanian people," was the answer. "But," continued the Prime Minister, "it is not just a matter of the Romanian people, but all the other nationalities in the country as well." The answer of the prefect was typical: "I would not give a single Romanian for a million dews.,' The Romanian newspaper of Hungary which reported this conversation printed it under the following meaningful headline: "A Model Prefect." ⁶⁶

Part of the liberal press of Romania, along with the Romanian press of Hungary tried, for a few more days, to keep up the pretense that the entire uprising was caused by the inhuman exploitation practiced by the Jewish lessors. The ensuing events, however, clearly gave the lie to this presentation. In its lead article of March 9 the Tribuna had written that those familiar with conditions in Romania knew that only the "base Jewish lessors are guilty." Only two days later it printed the cable sent by the Romanian politician Take Ionescu to the Neue Freie Presse, in which the Minister declared: "This unfortunate movement is not exclusively anti-Semitic, but rather has an agrarian and anarchistic character. The homes of Christian landowners and lessors have also been destroyed." ⁶⁷ The opinion of professor Constantin Stere from the University of Iasi, published in the same issue of the newspaper, sounded even more convincing. The famous professor wrote:

Our peasants are in a state of starvation which derives from our agrarian conditions. In the northern areas of Moldavia, 88% of the peasantry does not own a single domestic animal and cannot provide even a spoonful of milk for their children; 40% to 50% of the children die of malnutrition before reaching the age of five.

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Having listed the statistics regarding the distribution of estates he noted that the misery of the peasants was the greatest in the purely Romanian areas where the large estates predominated, while Dobrudja, taken over in 1878, was "the most flourishing province of Romania." His final conclusion was as follows: "The agricultural population of the independent Romanian kingdom lives under far more miserable conditions than the subjugated brothers from Hungary, Bukovina, and even Bessarabia."⁶⁸

By this time the peasant war had spread to the highlands as well. Clearly it was not a matter of an isolated uprising, but a countrywide war. Some of the frightened landowners and lessors fled to Bucharest while others never stopped until they reached Hungarian territory. The government resigned. The King selected the new cabinet from among the leaders of the Liberal Party, under the premiership of Dimitrie Sturdza. The parliament, dominated by the Conservative Party, gave wholehearted support to the government of its political opponents when it introduced a state of emergency and mobilized the reserves. The army, under the leadership of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexandru Averescu, quenched the peasant war in blood in the space of two weeks. The repression was terrible indeed. The army's work of ''pacification,' was characterized everywhere by the most inhuman slaughters, mass executions, tortures, and mutilations. The artillery wiped out entire villages from the face of the earth. Altogether 11,000 peasants were slaughtered in response to orders such as: "Mow them down with machine guns. Do not report the number of prisoners, only the number of dead!"

The widespread repression aroused the indignation of the best of the Romanian intelligentsia. When the battles of the peasant war came to an end judicial proceedings were initiated throughout the country. Hundreds of innocent peasants were condemned to a lifetime of forced labor or to several years in jail. Sentences were handed down which "overstepped all the boundaries of law and humanity, and which brought shame on us," wrote Nicolae Iorga, the Romanian historian. The frightened and decimated Romanian peasants were now completely at the mercy of the landowners and lessors, open "to their vengeance as a class and as individuals," in the words of Iorga. In many places the peasants signed contracts by which they undertook to work on the estate of the landlord without any compensation or remuneration. Elsewhere they were forced to pay enormous sums for reparations.

The bloody outcome of the Jacquerie and the cruel reprisals filled the Romanian newspaper readers of Hungary with horror. Dailies, weeklies, and popular calendars dealt with the matter. The weekly of

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Szaszvaros published a few poignant observations culled from one of Iorga's lead articles.

Let God forgive them [i.e. the peasants] for carrying out such slave labor, for living such unfortunate and bestial lives, for putting up with such demeaning treatment. Let them be forgiven on account of their lives filled with suffering.... But let God not forgive that arrogant and stupid stratum of landowners who could not understand, and still cannot understand, love, defend, or at least spare those who belong to the same religion and stem from the same nation as he does.⁶⁹

It would seem that Iorga was condemning the landowners basically because they made a mockery of the oft-voiced fundamental notion of national solidarity. The irredentist nationalism he represented had always seen the foreigner, the Hungarian, the Austrian, and the Russian as the great danger to the Romanian people, and urged national solidarity for the liberation of Romanians living under their rule. Now he had to witness and experience the sins of the class of large landowners, the cruelties committed against the Romanian peasantry, and it was no longer possible to blame the foreigner, the Hungarian, Austrian, or Russian. Native Romanians, peers of old Romanian noble families, were the ones who damned the Romanian peasants to such inhuman fate. Iorga's disappointment and indignation were sincere, if only because he knew what unfavorable impact the peasant war could have on the "subjugated" Romanians of Hungary, living under far better conditions, or on world public opinion. The anonymous chronicler of a Romanian calendar printed in Hungary, wrote:

The good people, the prisoners who lived the lives of animals, and continue to do so even today, who have been cheated and robbed so many times, were inclined to peace, in the hope that their justified requests would be heard.... It was a shame for the country, since the whole world could now see how sad is the fate of the peasants.⁷⁰

The Jacquerie made the representatives of Romanian nationalism aware of two important facts. First, it provided evidence of the solidarity and class consciousness of the Romanian peasantry. The peasants of the highlands felt complete solidarity with the demands of

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the peasants from Moldavia. Upon hearing the news from Moldavia, the residents of the highlands did not use the pronoun "they," but rather "us.', As he explained in one of his articles, Iorga was amazed "to see the manifestations of such feeling of national solidarity." But soon he grew terrified, as he realized "that this solidarity was not 'national', but pertained to a social class." The peasants from the highlands felt solidarity with the peasants from Moldavia, "not because they were Romanian, but because they were all peasants.'' ⁷¹

The second fact was even more important than the first. The excitement that accompanied the Jacquerie soon drew the attention of the readers in Romania and Hungary to the difference between the situation of the peasantry of Romania, and the Romanian peasantry of Hungary. Given their favorable living conditions, the Romanian peasantry of Hungary felt no urge to rise up. In most places its economic situation was satisfactory, or even decidedly good. On the other hand, in free Romania the peasantry felt compelled to rise up because of its misery. Iorga felt compelled to note that the circumstances

...under which this uprising took place prove better than anything that we were facing a phenomenon of elemental power. This phenomenon was elicited by economic causes which alone are capable of stirring up the masses, for it is only hunger that places arms into the hands of the poor against the rich.⁷²

Even Romanian leaders living under Hungarian rule were compelled to admit this fact. The constantly-voiced accusations regarding oppression by the Hungarians and regarding the difficult fate of the Romanian people of Hungary, were now emptied of all content at the sight of the episodes of the peasant war taking place in the free Romanian kingdom. Their enthusiasm for Romania and for conditions in Romania began to wane. They no longer regarded the Kingdom of Romania as that "wonderful country of dreams," in the capital city of which, in Bucharest, "the sun rises for every Romanian." ⁷³ They viewed their own situation with all the greater self-confidence and feeling of superiority. Their attitudes and their statements regarding Romania revealed that they had been disappointed in their expectations, inasmuch as it seemed that "there was nothing to expect from that side." This was what prompted Iorga's criticism. He blamed them for looking down on Romania, for not caring about Romania, for relying excessively on their own powers.

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Slavici, who lived in Romania at that time, addressed an open letter to Iorga, pointing out the reasons why the Romanian leaders in Hungary behaved this way. He referred to his own experiences since he had moved to Romania. At one time he had been the editor-in-chief of the Tribuna of Nagyszeben. He knew the conditions of the Romanians of Hungary well, but he was also familiar with conditions in Romania. He could not reconcile himself to these. He too felt that "our brothers who remained in Hungary had nothing to expect from the Romania they love so much." They had been saddened by the Bucharest exhibition of 1906, "whereas the events of this spring (referring to the Jacquerie of 1907) alienated them from Romania." In many ways the Romanians living within the Habsburg Empire were ahead of their brothers in Romania.

The great masses of Romanians in Romania have degenerated on account of the misery to which they have been subjected whereas, as you well know, this is not the case in Transylvania, or in Hungary, or in the Banat, or in Bukovina except perhaps in certain provinces which have been overrun by the Jews. In Romania the peasants work in vain, the boyars live as leeches not only on the land, but on those who cultivate it. The Romanians who live on the other side of the border have nothing to learn from their brothers over here. God protect them from getting into the situation in which these are now.

One must fight against the bad attitudes prevailing in Romania. "Those among our brothers [in Transylvania] who are convinced that they can expect nothing from Romania are merely showing good judgment."

In his reply Iorga did concede that Slavici's letter contained no assertion, however painful, to which he himself could not subscribe. ⁷⁴ But the Romanians of Transylvania must understand that they cannot segregate themselves from the Romanians in Romania. Their future will become identical, for the basis of this future is the creation of national solidarity, which depends on Romania, for this is where the bulk of the army is. This last observation by Iorga was a veiled hint at the fact that, in the long run, it was the Romanian army that would decide the fate of the Romanians living under foreign rule.

For the time being the attention of the Romanians of Hungary did indeed focus inwards, towards further improvement of their own economic, cultural, and political lot. Instead of the social problems of Romania they were preoccupied with further purchases of land, the

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organization of mass demonstrations against the electoral law draft, with school problems. The newspapers of Romania, on the other hand, continued to focus on the situation of the Romanians of Hungary which they now began to describe as exemplary in several ways. These almost-flattering statements regarding the Romanians of Hungary, about the economic achievements of the peasantry and of other social classes, voiced in a tone of sincere admiration, were becoming increasingly frequent. The assessment of these achievements become even more widespread after 1910. In 1911 a Bucharest daily reported on the conversation of one of its correspondents with the head of the Romanian Orthodox parish of Nagyszeben. The church leader opened his statement by insisting that the Romanian peasantry of Hungary was much better off than that of Romania. The church leader declared:

The material conditions of the Romanian peasant of Hungary, are incomparably above that of the peasant in Romania. The state of our culture, which cannot even be compared with that of the peasant in Romania, contributes a great deal to this distinction. Almost every peasant among us is able to read and write, and lives under relatively hygienic conditions. ⁷⁵

The convictions of the historian Iorga were similar to that of the church leader from Nagyszeben. He expressed his feeling on this subject at the beginning of the following year in a well known essay:

We must note one thing, and that is that the Romanians of Hungary live under far better economic circumstances than we do, the Romanians of the Kingdom.... Our peasantry is far poorer, far more burdened and far less educated than the Romanian peasantry of Hungary.⁷⁶

At the end of the same year another Bucharest newspaper went even further; comparing the circumstances of the Romanians from Romania, from Bessarabia, and from Hungary, the latter were judged to be best off. In Austria and Hungary the Romanians were continually developing, economically and culturally:

National consciousness and pride have found roots even among the peasantry, while the Romanians of the Kingdom of Romania are very far from it. The social and economic life of the Romanian peasantry living in Austria-Hungary is incomparably superior to that of the peasantry of Romania.⁷⁷

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As these observations show, the statements regarding better economic conditions for Romanians in Hungary applied mainly to the peasantry. Far one thing, it was indeed the peasantry that had the greatest social significance as a class, for they constituted 85% of all Romanians. If the material conditions of this class were favorable this meant that the normal development of a clear majority of Romanians living under Hungarian rule was assured. The question remains, what were the material conditions of the approximately 15% of the population constituting the middle class in the period of the Dual Monarchy?

We may count among the Romanian middle class the artisans, merchants, and intelligentsia, including civil servants and employees of the churches as well as those who made a living partly as landowners and partly as professionals. These were able to take advantage of the economic opportunities in the Dual Monarchy period just as much as the peasantry. The evolution of these strata and their economic growth proceeded as freely and unhampered as did the well-to-do Romanian peasantry. They were not hampered in their evolution, in the discharging of their work, or in their attainment of material well-being by any generally-applied controls. All these strata began to thrive in the period of autocratic Austrian rule, but it was only in the period following the Compromise that they were able to fully develop and prosper.

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generously giving to the artisans from the beginning, the organizations of Romania also provided all kinds of encouragement to the slowly multiplying young artisans. The Bucharest Association for Assistance to the Romanian University Students in Hungary, sent a yearly subsidy of 400 forints for the keep of Romanian apprentices in Transylvania. In 1883 the 52 members of the trade association of Kolozsvar took care of the keep of 30 to 32 apprentices. ⁷⁹ Romanian trade associations were eventually formed at Balazsfalva, Arad, Beszterce, Fogaras, Hatszeg [Hateg], Lugos [Lugoj], Nagyszeben, Szaszsebes, Szelistye, Pojan [Poiana], Szerdahely [Miercurea], and Varadia [Varadia]. There were such associations in practically every town of any size, particularly near the Romanian borders. In 1907 a Romanian artisan association was formed in Budapest. As evidence of the freedom of assembly, we may note that the artisans of Budapest, began to meet immediately, after they submitted the statutes of the association to the authorities, without even waiting for the approval of the statutes, and "functioned in honest Romanian style," as we may read in the Romanian calendar for that year.⁸⁰

It is very difficult to follow the numerical growth of Romanian artisans, for no compilations of data pertaining to them have been published. According to the data that are available, the stratum of Romanian artisans grew most rapidly in Brasso and Szeben. According to a Saxon compilation, between 1870 and 1895 the number of Romanian artisans increased from 96 to 168 in Brasso, and from 15 to 75 in Szeben. ⁸¹ In the years preceding World War I their numbers increased proportionately in many other places. In 1910 the total number of Romanian artisans already reached 26,376.⁸² The Romanian intelligentsia, also increasing in numbers, employed primarily Romanian artisans as a matter of national solidarity; thus the livelihood of this stratum was ensured. The state or local authorities did not harass them on account of their nationality. We find no reference in the columns of the weeklies or dailies to any excessive taxing of Romanian artisans, or to the withdrawal of licenses issued to them. Nor was there any linguistic restriction imposed upon them which might have prevented them from using exclusively their Romanian mother tongue in the practice of their trade or in their dealings with the Romanian artisans' associations.

There were hardly any sizable Romanian industrial plants in Hungary. A few entrepreneurs lived in Brasso or Nagybanya [Baia Mare]. Some smaller Romanian enterprises could be found in the area of the Erchegyseg. Later, a few large Romanian enterprises were launched in Budapest and Szeben, as well as in Vienna. Large

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enterprises in the hands of the Romanians, however, remained relatively few and of modest proportions to the end, but not because their development was hampered by the state; nobody insisted on Hungarianizing them. Towards the end of World War I there were altogether 1,780 industrial enterprises in the areas to be attached to Romania later on; 26% to 29% of these were under Romanian ethnic control. ⁸³

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the president of the Chamber was a Romanian the well-known Manole Diamandy, the greatest economic power among the Romanians of Hungary, according to Slavici. ⁸⁵ But there were a good many other Romanian merchants in Brasso whose prestige almost equaled that of Manole. The first owner of an automobile, towards the end of the last century, was a Romanian merchant named A. Petru Popovici. The Brasso center of Romanian commerce gave considerable support to the Memorandum movement, which turned the issue of the Romanians of Hungary into a European issue.⁸⁶

In addition to the general economic conditions, the growth of modern commerce is a function of constitutionality, freedom of commercial competition, and the availability of capital. All these factors favored Romanian commerce in Hungary. Constitutionality and free enterprise were guaranteed by the laws and executive agencies of the state for everyone, without regard to nationality or religion. Riots, vandalism, and racial or anti-Semitic excesses were very rare and when they did occur for instance, during elections they were engineered mainly by Romanians against Jewish chandlers and innkeepers. Complaints or any data indicating demonstrations or vandalism perpetrated against Romanian stores or Romanian merchants are few and far between.

The fiscal policy of the state likewise did not discriminate against commerce controlled by ethnic groups other than Hungarian. There would be no point in looking for racial or ethnic considerations in Hungarian fiscal measures. The notion that some merchants should pay higher taxes because they were Romanian or Jewish, or because they did not conduct their bookkeeping in the official language of the state, never occurred to the Hungarian authorities. No law of any kind compelled the Romanian merchants to put signboards in Hungarian or to conduct their bookkeeping in that language. Nowhere have we found information or complaints to that effect. It was entirely up to the Romanian merchants whether they wished to advertise their wares exclusively in their language, or in both Romanian and Hungarian. In most cases they preferred to place their names only in Romanian in the advertisements or on signboards, without including a single word or letter in Hungarian; nor did it occur to anyone to prevent them from resorting to Romanian national slogans for the sake of promoting their business. For months, even years, one could read on the page of classified ads of the Romanian weekly of Szaszvaros: "Come, let us join hands, those of us in whom a Romanian heart beats, and let us buy only from Romanian merchants."⁸⁷ The Hungarian state, or its institutions, did not hamper in the least the economic freedom of the Romanian merchants, or their potential to develop materially along ethnic

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lines. This was one reason for the flourishing Romanian commerce, a clear testimony to the excellent financial situation of this stratum of Romanians, particularly in the decades preceding the outbreak of World War I. According to data compiled in 1918, even numerically the Romanian merchants controlled a considerable portion of the commerce of these areas. Of all the commercial ventures and companies the following percentages were in Romanian ethnic hands:

County	Percentage of Romanian Merchants
Brasso	14.56
Arad	44.27
Bihar	6.13
Fogaras	85.10
Krasso-Szoreny	58.33
Beszterce-Naszod	49.09
Hunyad	46.66
Szeben	40.84
Szilagy	40.73

Of all commercial employees 17.29% were Romanian, that is 3,803 out of a total of 21,990. ⁸⁸

Undoubtedly, in many places the Romanian merchants did not attain a fair share corresponding to their percentage of the total population. Nevertheless, they did achieve tremendous progress, considering that it was only after 1867 that they began to appear at all in most towns. According to a Saxon compilation there were 110 Romanian merchants in Brasso in 1870, and by 1895 there were 200. The number of Romanian merchants in Szeben increased 500% in the same period.⁸⁹

As we have already seen, the first such bank was founded in Nagyszeben by Roman Visarion in 1872. It was named Albina the bee. In its first year of operations it had barely a few thousand forints of deposits, but eventually this amount increased at a rapid pace. By 1874 deposits totaled 121,856 forints; in 1882 they reached 762,549

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forints, and in 1892 they attained 1,473,799 forints. The base capital increased correspondingly. At its foundation the institution had a base capital of 90,492 forints, and within a few decades this capital amounted to millions. In 1909 the base capital and the reserves totaled 4,803,093 crowns, and in 1912 around six million crowns. The following year it reached the seven million mark. ⁹⁰

Soon every sizable township had a Romanian bank on the model of the Albina:

	Number of banks
1892	28
1895	52
1899	73
1906	149
1914	221

By the end of that year they circulated almost 300 million in various financial transactions.

How do we explain the development of the Romanian banks of Hungary? These financial institutions were concerned basically with the transfer of money. They used the funds deposited with them for interest to disburse loans at a higher rate of interest. But no bank can rely exclusively on deposits. Its solvency, the amount of loans it can disburse, and the cost of sums loaned all depend on how much rediscounted credit it receives from a central bank or from other large banks. The central or money-issuing bank of the Dual Monarchy was the Austro-Hungarian Bank; the Romanian financial institutions received rediscounted credit from this bank and from certain big Budapest banking houses. It was clear, therefore, that if the Austro-Hungarian Bank or the large Budapest banking houses were to withdraw from satisfying the rediscount requests of Albina and similar institutions, as a matter of national prejudice or of deliberate anti-Romanian policy, then the evolution of Romanian banking would come to a standstill. The evidence, however, indicates that neither the Austro-Hungarian Bank nor the Hungarian banks of Budapest resorted to such a policy.

Indeed, if we page through the official periodical of the Romanian banking association there can be no hesitation regarding these facts. The data from the years preceding World War I are especially instructive in this regard. At the end of the fiscal year 1909-10 the Banca Poporala of Des [Dej], according to its published accounts, received

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307,785 crowns in rediscounts on a base and reserve capital of 100,000 crowns. Similarly:

	Bank Rediscount	Base or Reserve Capital(in crowns)
Draganul of Belenyes [Beius]	205,700	437,439
Orientul of Dobra	54,685	432,947
Progresul of Marosillye [Ilia]	130,379	255,381
Sebesana of Szaszsebes	235,003	478,216
Albina	4,803,093	14,009,394

⁹¹

We found amounts comparable to that of Albina in the accounts of Victoria, the Romanian Bank of Arad, which received 3,305,379 crowns, on a base of 2,200,000 crowns, also in 1909. The ratio between the base capital and the rediscount credit remained comparable in later years as well. At the end of 1912 Albina received 7,178,840.83 crowns on a base of 422,291, the Dragonul received 712,247 crowns on a base of 422,291, the Victoria of Arad 6,265,816.84 on a base of 3,500,000 crowns. In 1913 the credit dropped somewhat, whereas in 1914 it was generally on a level with the base capital. As the above data reveals, the Romanian banks often received twice as much rediscount credit as their base capital and reserve combined.

All these loans were easily granted to the Romanian banks not only by the Austro-Hungarian Bank but by some large Budapest banking houses as well. The largest credits were granted to Albina, and Albina in turn rediscounted the drafts of the smaller Romanian banks. A Romanian specialist on the subject wrote:

The Hungarian banks, appreciating the solid foundation of our own banks, easily granted them rediscount credits.... After all, in 1914, the rediscount was equal to the amount of the base and reserve capitals. The high rate of rediscount was justified by the fact that Romanian economic life in Transylvania, in full process of development, required more capital than what the deposits could provide. ⁹²

Enescu also noted that, in addition to the Austro-Hungarian Bank which provided 60% of the rediscount credit, the Credit Bank of Budapest, the Hungarian Commercial Bank of Budapest, the First

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Savings and Loan Association, as well as the Anglo-Austrian Bank were the ones to provide funds most often.⁹³

Unquestionably, from the point of view of their financial welfare, the large-scale development of the Romanian financial institutions so important for the well-being of the Romanians of Hungary could only come about because the Austro-Hungarian Bank and the banks of Budapest insured the operations of the Romanian banks. Hence the banks had indeed no reason to complain of the leadership of Hungarian economic policy. All the less so since Hungarian assistance to them more than once resulted in the bankruptcy of some Hungarian institution or in Hungarian lands falling into Romanian hands. For instance, at the end of 1911, the Victoria Bank of Arad swallowed up the Borosdeno [Ineu] branch of the Savings and Loan association of Gyulavidek; the latter not only ceased operations, but was even forced to relinquish its splendid premises to the Romanian bank. Hence a triumphant tone appeared in the Romanian dailies' accounts of this event. The premises of the Hungarian bank was the most beautiful building of the town.

In this building the expanded branch of the Victoria has already set up shop; its signboard, replacing that of the branch of the Savings and Loan Association of Gyulavidek announces this victory of our leading institution, with regard to financial matters, in Borosjeno and vicinity.⁹⁴

In the same year, the Transylvanian Bank of Kolozsvar, the Hungarian General Credit Bank of Budapest, the Hungarian Discount and Exchange Bank, and their discount loans enabled the Romanians to purchase a Hungarian estate of 500 holds at Apanagyfalu [Nuseni].⁹⁵ We may safely assert, therefore, that the Hungarian state did not indulge in economic chauvinism vis-à-vis the Romanian banks during the entire period of the Compromise. This fact also explains the rise of the Romanian intelligentsia and its relatively advantageous financial position. The history of modern nationalism teaches that everywhere the conscious carrier of the national spirit was primarily the so-called intelligentsia. If, in a given country, there was an attempt to relegate some nationality into the background, the oppressive power of the state would first of all strive to reduce the size of the intelligentsia of that group, to hinder its efforts at self-perpetuations and to bankrupt it financially.

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THE NATIONALITIES PROBLEM IN TRANSYLVANIA 1867-1940